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Abstract 
Preventable patient harm and medical error occur frequently in health care.  Despite the 
apparent widespread commitment to the “First do no harm” aphorism in medicine, it has 
proved difficult to get prompt, effective and sustained action to detect and prevent these.  
The existence of preventable patient harm and medical error has been well established over 
the past 50 years and its high frequency has been confirmed in many international studies 
over the past two decades.  
The thesis used a secondary source research methodology across a wide range of 
disciplines that have looked at medical error, preventable harm and doctor behaviour to 
explore possible explanations for these phenomena.  The thesis concludes that there is an 
alternative plausible explanation for why action on identification and action on these issues 
by doctors, as leaders in health care, have been so slow and inconsistent.  The thesis 
provides evidence in support of three hypotheses that form part of this explanation: 
• the occurrence of patient harm and medical error can be perceived psychologically by a
doctor as a fundamental threat to his or her identity;
• a serious threat to identity causes a range of psychological defences, often rooted in the
biological responses of the brain to threats to existence, and these defences can make it
hard for a doctor to recognise, identify or accept the risk of patient harm;
• elements of the Doctor Identity deny ordinary human psychological responses and
physical limitations, and thus promote unrealistic self or group perceptions. This creates
risks to both doctors and patients.  Many of these risks may be avoidable through
modifying these perceptions and developing more realistic self-and professional
schemas.
The thesis concludes that these hypotheses provide potential new ways to address the 
issues, and reduce harm caused to both patients and doctors. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
A. The genesis of this thesis 
1. The Professional Indemnity Review 1991-1995
The genesis for this thesis was my work as Chair of the Commonwealth Government’s 
Review of Professional Indemnity Arrangements for Health Care Professionals (called 
variously the Professional Indemnity Review and the Tito Review) between 1991-1995.  
My research question arose over the following 8 years as I worked to implement various 
elements of that work, in particular by the introduction of measures into healthcare to 
reduce patient harm.   
A key part of the Professional Indemnity Review’s work was the development and 
management of the first and only national Australian study into adverse events in the 
Australian hospital system.  Eventually known as the Quality in Australian Health Care 
Study1, this study was based on the methodology of the US Harvard Medical Practice 
Study2 with some important differences.  The Harvard Study was focused on negligent 
healthcare and its relationship to litigation, whereas the Australian Study was focused on 
preventability of the harm to patients that arose from healthcare provision.  Both studies 
looked at “adverse events”, which were broadly defined as an unintended injury or 
complication resulting in disability, death or prolongation of a hospital stay and caused by 
healthcare management (not the patient’s underlying condition)3.   
1 Originally the study was called the Australian Hospital Care Study (as noted in the Professional 
Indemnity Review’s Final Report), but this was changed to avoid confusion with another study to the 
“Quality in Australian Health Care Study”: Review of Professional Indemnity Arrangements for 
Health Care Professional. Compensation and Professional Indemnity in Health Care – Final Report.  
November 1995 Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (PIR Final Report), paragraph 
1.10. 
2 Harvard Medical Practice Study. (Harvard Study) Patients, doctors, and lawyers: medical injury, 
malpractice litigation, and patient compensation in New York: the report of the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study to the State of New York. 1990 Harvard Medical Practice Study Boston. [Harvard 
Study Report] A full copy of the scanned Report is available electronically through the New York 
State Library, via WebCat Call no: HEA 302-4 PATDL – 90 33997, as a 4-part download.  Accessed 
27 September 2006.  
3 This concept is explored in more detail in Chapter 1 following, Section B, Language and Patient 
Harm, page 25 and following. 
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The original purpose of the Australian study was to provide some base line numbers on the 
incidence of preventable harm in healthcare, to explore the feasibility of a no-fault 
compensation scheme for healthcare injuries, where preventability might be the basis for 
eligibility.  Funding for this study and other work of the Professional Indemnity Review 
was obtained by the then Health Minister, the Hon Brian Howe MP, who had a deep 
personal commitment to the work.  The perceived need for a no-fault scheme arose from a 
report by Ian Bidmeade, which had been commissioned by the Australian Health Ministers 
Council, in response to the first Australian Medical Defence industry4 crisis in the late 
1980’s.  The main reasons for this crisis were the long-term underfunding of liabilities 
across all medical defence organisations (MDOs) in the Australian market and the 
nationalisation of United Kingdom (UK) medical defence liabilities by the National Health 
Service.5  This latter event stopped the large income stream from UK doctors to the UK-
based MDOs, exposing more clearly the liabilities of their Australian operations.  The 
industry-wide, long term under-funding resulted in one UK based MDO and one Australian 
based MDO making financial calls on their members (equivalent to an additional annual 
“premium” contribution) to meet estimated shortfalls in reserves for the claims incurred by 
their member doctors in1989.  This problem was compounded by several incursions by 
commercial insurers offering low cost “claims made”6 premiums with limited cover to low 
                                                
4  The Medical Defence industry was a collection of discretionary mutual doctor-based bodies, which 
provided insurance-like, claims incurred indemnity cover for doctor against the costs and payments 
associated with negligence claims and disciplinary actions.  While offering a service similar to 
insurance, these organisations were not prudentially regulated by Government at that time.  Insurers 
offering similar products were regulated at that time by the Commonwealth Government, under the 
Insurance Act 1973.  
5  In the United Kingdom, this was called a move to Crown Liability, which was a form of vicarious 
liability that had applied to all other employees of the National Health Service, except doctors. For a 
useful summary of these changes, see Heasell SL. Economic aspects of medical negligence in the 
context of the National Health Service in Britain. 1994 Annals of Health Law, volume 3, page 205-
223. 
6  At that time, and up to the MDO financial crisis of the 2000’s, the Australian MDO industry 
operated through mutual funds outside of the scrutiny of the insurance regulation regime.  They 
offered a “claims incurred” product, where they agreed to meet the liabilities of their members for all 
claims which arose from a year of coverage, whenever they were made.  Because of the long tail 
nature of MDO business, this often meant that most claims were not lodged in the year the event 
occurred, but at some time in the future, even decades after an event occurred.  Insurers offered a 
much cheaper product, which only covered claims incurred and made in the year of policy cover, 
which doctors later discovered, often left them with uninsurable risks when they moved between 
medical indemnity providers.  A detailed discussion on the operation of the industry and its different 
players at that time is provided in Chapter 9 of the PIR Final Report – see note 1: see especially 
paragraphs 9.3-9.39. 
3 
Introduction 
risk general practitioners.  In combination, these led to a significant rise in premiums 
overall and a move away from mutuality to risk-rated premiums, which saw an additional 
premium increase for some specialist doctors. 
 
Unlike insurers, at that time, MDOs were not subject to Government prudential regulation7.  
Claims data was shrouded in secrecy and the quality of the available information on both 
incidence and cost of claims was poor, which made understanding what was driving 
medical defence contribution increases quite difficult.  The medical profession expressed 
the view that it was driven by greedy lawyers and disgruntled patients, often with spurious 
claims.  However, there was no publicly available data on claims incidence, the frequency 
of harm or the payments being made. 
 
The Quality in Australian Health Care Study was designed to fill in one part of the picture – 
how many people were being harmed by healthcare, where that harm was preventable with 
what was known when the care was provided8.  The relationship between the incidence of 
harm and the costs of premiums was teased out through surveys of the medical defence 
industry9, actuarial estimations of medical indemnity liability (and conclusions about the 
need for prudential regulation)10 and an examination of data from State and Territory 
Governments, undertaken as part of the work of the Professional Indemnity Review11.  
What was revealed was that there were much higher levels of harm than was subject to 
                                                
7  This changed in 2003, with the introduction of the Medical Indemnity (Prudential Supervision and 
Products Standards) Act 2003, which the Commonwealth Government introduced in response to the 
provisional liquidation of United Medical Protection in 2002. 
8  The main study was preceded by a Feasibility Study conducted by the Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare to see if Australian medical records were adequate to support the medical records 
review of the Harvard Study. See - Review of Professional Indemnity Arrangements for Health Care 
Professionals.  Report on the feasibility study of an Australian hospitals' adverse health care 
incidents study. Prepared by Roy Harvey and John Goss, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. 
December 1992 Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing and Community Services, Canberra 
(The Feasibility study). 
9  Review of Professional Indemnity Arrangements for Health Care Professionals.  Survey of medical 
defence organisations. Prepared by Statistical Consultancy, Australian Bureau of Statistics. April 
1993 Unpublished material. 
10  Review of Professional Indemnity Arrangements for Health Care Professionals.  Report on medical 
professional indemnity arrangements. Prepared by John Walsh and Jann Skinner, Coopers & 
Lybrand Actuarial and Superannuation Services Pty Ltd. March 1994 Commonwealth Department of 
Human Services and Health, Canberra. 
11  PIR Final Report – see note 1, paragraphs 2.94-2.103. 
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consideration by the MDOs.  The small number of claims they received and the even 
smaller number where a payment was made were the so-called “tip of the iceberg” of 
patient harm, both in terms of costs and human suffering.  Most of the costs were not borne 
by doctors through their MDOs or by public hospitals.  Costs were mainly falling on 
harmed patients and their families through their personal resources, and on the community, 
through tax-funded income support, disability, health and accommodation services.12 
2. The Quality in Australian Health Care Study and beyond
The Professional Indemnity Review conducted a feasibility study with the Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare to ensure that the quality of Australian health records was 
adequate to support the study and to test whether the Harvard study methodology would 
work in Australia13. The Feasibility study showed that only the most recent records were of 
sufficient quality to support the needs of the main study.  States and hospitals saw this 
initially as a barrier to participation in the main study, because the period between the study 
and the records would have been within the statute of limitations (which was between 3-6 
years in different Australian jurisdictions).   
The risk of litigation arising from data on patient harm gathered within the statute of 
limitations period was also emerging as an issue from the pilot work on incident 
monitoring.  Any delay in data collection beyond 3-6 years would have been useless to 
prevent timely action on known risks of harm.  The Professional Indemnity Review 
oversaw the preparation of legislation to protect information gained from it and other 
quality improvement work being reviewed in any identifying manner and prevented it being 
subpoenaed by a court, through a declaration of specific quality assurance activities by the 
Commonwealth Minister for Health, under what is now Part VC of the Health Insurance 
Act 1973 (Cth).14  The public interest in openness and transparency in health was to be 
protected by the production of de-identified reporting of how the activity had improved 
12 The full explanation and account of this complex net can be found in the PIR’s Final Report – see 
note 1, Chapter 6, especially, which deals with meeting needs arising from compensable harm. 
13 The Feasibility Study – see note 8. 
14 The legislation was passed in 1992 as the Health Insurance (Quality Assurance Confidentiality) 
Amendment Act 1992. 
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patient safety.  While this legislation remains in place and continues to be used, the 
Commonwealth Government has not been diligent in requiring public reporting of declared 
quality assurance activities.  After the publication of the results of the declared activities 
undertaken by the Professional Indemnity Review, most of the declared activities have 
remained completely hidden from public view. 
 
A consortium from the University of Newcastle and Adelaide University tendered for the 
main study.  Quite early, it became apparent that the Australian Study was detecting a 
higher level of “trigger events”, which meant that almost twice as many records required 
doctor review.  Additional funding was sought and approved by the Government to allow 
the study to be completed.  The results were released by the then Commonwealth Minister 
for Health, the Hon Dr Carmen Lawrence in a Ministerial Statement to the House of 
Representatives on 1 June 199515.  This announcement, unfortunately, preceded the 
availability of the full study data and the publication of the study in a peer review format, 
which led to strong criticism from many, in both the academic literature and the medical 
profession16. 
 
The announcement by Dr Lawrence on 1 June 1995 saw the establishment of a Taskforce 
on Quality in Australian Health Care by the Australian Health Minister Conference 
(AHMC) at their next meeting in Alice Springs on 15 June 199517.  This sixteen-member 
Taskforce, chaired by Professor Bruce Armstrong (then head of the Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare) included members from the Commonwealth and State Governments, 
medical, nursing and healthcare administrator Colleges and healthcare consumers.  An 
interim report was presented to Dr Lawrence in September 1995, and the Final Report of 
                                                
15  Commonwealth of Australia. Parliamentary Debates - House of Representatives Official Hansard, 
No. 201 1995, Thursday 1 June 1995, pages 911-913. 
16  See eg, Weeramanthri T. The Quality in Australian Health Care Study (QAHCS) – A Review. 1996 
Health Information Management Journal, June, volume 26(2), pages 94-96; Van Der Weyden MB. 
Politics and publishing: the Quality in Australian Health Care Study. 1995 Medical Journal of 
Australia, 6 November, volume 163(9), pages 453-454.  
17  This was reported in the ACT by the then Health Minister and Chief Minister, Kate Carnell, to the 
ACT Legislative Assembly on 22 August 1995: Legislative Assembly for the ACT.  1995 Week 5 
Hansard (22 August), page 1245.  Accessed at; 
http://www.hansard.act.gov.au/Hansard/1995/week05/1245.htm on 28 October 2016. 
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the Taskforce was completed in June 1996.18  The report included 56 recommendations, 
many of which replicated or built on recommendations from the Professional Indemnity 
Review Report.   
 
AHMC considered the Taskforce Report in October 1996, and agreed to its release without 
endorsing action on any of its recommendations19.  The Ministers also decided to create a 
national expert group to report to them by March 1997, to prepare proposals for the 1997-
98 Budget, and to accept the Harvard University offer to compare data, with the expert 
group overseeing this further study.  After some delays, the Government established the 
four and later five-member National Expert Advisory Group on Safety and Quality in 
Australian Health Care (NEAG), which met first on 26 May 1997.  Its Interim Report20 was 
finalised in May 1998 for presentation to AHMC in July 1998, where the recommendations 
of the Interim Report were endorsed in principle, and each jurisdiction agreed to ensure 
action on specifying “performance standards outlining expected safety and quality 
enhancement achievements’ in that jurisdiction.  As well as recognising the need for “a 
national commitment to improving the safety and quality of the Australian healthcare 
system”, the five key action areas identified by the Interim Report were: 
• Providing appropriate and accessible consumer health information; 
• Providing better frameworks for healthcare organisations to manage quality of care 
through their organisation; 
• Improving systems for self-assessment and peer review by all clinical service 
providers; 
• Encouraging learned colleges, professional associations, and medical and nursing 
administration to actively ensure quality performance through ongoing certification 
programs; 
• Strengthening the quality focus of organisational accreditation processes through 
requiring organisations to demonstrate mechanisms for quality enhancement21. 
                                                
18  Taskforce on Quality in Australian Health Care. The Final Report of the Taskforce on quality in 
Australia health care. June 1996 Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council, Canberra 
(Taskforce Report 1996).  The Report also includes the Interim Report in Appendix 4, page A4. 
19  Taskforce Report 1996 – see note 18, page iii (Foreword). 
20  National Expert Advisory Group on Safety and Quality in Australian Health Care (NEAG). 
Commitment to Quality Enhancement – the Interim Report of the National Expert Advisory Group on 
Safety and Quality in Australian Health Care. April 1998 NEAG, Canberra (NEAG Interim Report 
1998) 
21  NEAG Interim Report 1998 – see note 20, paragraph 25, page 6. 
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Health Ministers also agreed that: 
There is a need for national commitment, in partnership with clinicians, to health 
care safety and quality improvement and … there are some safety and quality issues 
which are best dealt with at a national level.22 
 
They therefore asked the NEAG to “consider and make recommendations on ways which 
national coordination of efforts to improve health care safety and quality can best be 
achieved within current organisational and financial frameworks” and to report back to the 
Australian Health Ministers Advisory Council (AHMAC) in March 1999 for consideration 
by Ministers in July 199923.  The NEAG conducted 29 consultations and received 115 
submissions between September and December 199824.  The second of four 
recommendations in the NEAG Final Report dealt with national efforts and stated:  
That Health Ministers support the need for national actions for safety and quality 
enhancement in the following areas:  
• strengthening the consumer voice;  
• fostering best clinical practice;  
• learning from incidents, adverse events and complaints;  
• developing frameworks for quality improvement and management;  
• developing information systems to support quality; and  
• education and training for safety and quality improvement.25 
 
Another part of the NEAG’s work related directly to the results of the Quality in Australian 
Health Care Study and scepticism by the then Minister for Health Dr Wooldridge about the 
validity of the results.  The Australian study appeared to show a significantly higher level 
of patient harm (16.6% of admissions involved an adverse event) compared to the earlier 
Harvard Study (3.7%) and the contemporaneous Utah Colorado Study (2.9%).  The 
                                                
22  National Expert Advisory Group on Safety and Quality in Australian Health Care (NEAG). 
Implementing Safety and Quality Enhancements in Health Care – National Actions to support 
quality and safety improvements in Australian health care. Final Report to Health Ministers from the 
National Expert Advisory Group on Safety and Quality in Australian Health Care. July 1999 NEAG, 
Canberra (NEAG Final Report 1999): Appendix 1, page 27: Extract from the Minutes of the 
Australian Health Ministers’ Conference, 30 July 1998. 
23  NEAG Final Report – see note 22. 
24  NEAG Final Report – see note 22: Appendix 2, pages 29-42. 
25  NEAG Final Report – see note 22: page ii, Recommendation 2. 
8 
Introduction 
approach by Harvard University to more closely examine these differences was overseen by 
the NEAG.  In the end, the comparison was undertaken using the Australian Study and the 
Utah Colorado study because they were contemporaneous, thus reducing the confounding 
factors.   
Two published studies arose from this work: one comparing the context, methods, casemix, 
population, patient and hospital characteristics of the Australian study and the Utah 
Colorado study (UTCOS)26, the other comparing reviewer behaviour and quality of care27.  
Methodological and scope differences reduced the rate variation significantly, but there was 
still a two to threefold difference in the rate of adverse events.  The second study showed 
that while the Australian study and UTCOS had similar rates of death and significant 
disability, there were 6-7 times more minor injuries reported in the Australian study.  The 
researchers hypothesised that UTCOS had asked doctors to identify incidents of negligence, 
and this excluded many types of preventable harm from their mind sets.  An example of 
this was the incidence of pressure injuries acquired in hospital (sometimes called “bed-
sores” in lay terms).  The reviewers found the data on the incidence of hospital acquired 
pressure injuries was similar in the US and Australia at the time, but in the Quality in 
Australian Health Care study, there were 41 identified cases, compared to just one in 
UTCOS.  The hypothesis was that doctors did not attribute pressure injuries to negligent 
healthcare, but they did consider them to be preventable with appropriate quality normal 
care.   
3. The Australian Council, then Commission, for Safety and Quality
in Health Care
Another NEAG recommendation was the creation of the Australian Council for Safety and 
Quality in Health Care to move forward with nationally co-ordinated reform in the areas 
26 Thomas EJ. Studdert DM. Runciman WB. Webb RK. Sexton EJ. Wilson RM. Gibberd RW.  
Harrison BT. Brennan TA. A comparison of iatrogenic injury studies in Australia and the USA I: 
context, methods, casemix, population, patient and hospital characteristics. 2000 International 
Journal for Quality in Health Care, October, volume 12(5), Health module, pages 371-378. 
27 Runciman WB. Webb RK. Helps SC. Thomas EJ. Sexton EJ. Studdert DM. Brennan TA. A 
comparison of iatrogenic injury studies in Australia and the USA II: reviewer behaviour and quality 
of care. 2000 International Journal for Quality in Health Care, October, volume 12(5), Health 
module, pages 379-388. 
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requiring national action, as identified above by the NEAG.  This was approved by 
Ministers in August 1999 and was established on 21 January 200028.   
 
At this stage, the Australian Government had had extensive data on the areas of risk and 
harm to patients available to it for 5 years from the Quality in Australian Health Care 
Study.  Despite this knowledge and repeated confirmation of the need for action from its 
own advisers, nothing had been done to address the issues identified except to create a 
series of government committees to decide if there was a problem that needed action.  Each 
of these bodies spent 18 months to two years looking at the data from the Australian study, 
consulting with stakeholders and looking at the work of the body or bodies previously 
tasked by Government to look at the same issue.  Each determined that urgent and 
significant action was needed.  International attention to the issue came with the release of 
the Institute of Medicine’s Report To Err is Human on 29 November 1999 and increased 
the call for urgent action across the world. 
 
Despite being extremely well-placed to be an international leader in tackling iatrogenic 
patient harm, the Commonwealth Government essentially marked time, with action only 
commencing after the formation of the Council in January 2000.  The Council, headed by 
surgeon Professor Bruce Barraclough, operated from 2000-2005.  It was a somewhat 
unwieldy creation, with 27 Council members, an Executive of 8, a significant number of 
working and advisory groups (13 in August 2004) and a staff of up to 20.  Its original term 
was 5 years, but this was extended to 6 years, and its budget over that time was $55 million.  
The Council’s work was designed to complement the work of States and Territories 
through their Quality Improvement and Enhancement Practices and plans, required to 
access $660 million funding under the Australian Health Care Agreements 1998-2003.   
 
In 2004, AHMC sought a review of the Council and its work.  It also asked the reviewers to 
develop proposals for future governance arrangements, including how to achieve national 
leadership and to identify priority areas for national action for transforming healthcare 
                                                
28  Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care. Safety First – Report to the Australian 
Health Ministers’ Conference. 27 July 2000 Safety & Quality Council, Canberra: Attachment B, 
page 15. 
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safety and quality in Australia.  This Review was undertaken by Ron Patterson, the then 
New Zealand Health and Disability Commissioner and a team of 5 Australian senior health 
administrators from the Commonwealth and 4 states, with a reporting date of the AHMC 
meeting of July 2005.  While the Review found that progress had been made on national 
leadership and high level policies, many issues were raised, and the Review reported that: 
It was asserted by many that there is little evidence that Australia has made any 
measurable progress in improving safety and quality since the Quality in Australian 
Health Care Study. The need for measurement was an important issue in its own 
right, with stakeholders pointing to the lack of coordinated collection and analysis 
of relevant data to measure the progress of safety and quality improvement on a 
national basis29. 
 
The Council’s size and mechanisms were found to be cumbersome and its large work 
program not well integrated with work being done by other stakeholders.  It had no powers 
of compulsion, so any standards set by it were only voluntary.  The Review noted that 
stakeholders considered that “there remains an unacceptable level of risk in the health 
system”, but widespread support for a “broader focus on quality across the health care 
system”30.  This commentary was provided 10 years after the Quality in Australian Health 
Care Study, just after I had started work on the thesis.   
 
Over the first period of that decade, I continued my personal, professional and advocacy 
interest in patient safety.  Initially, as a carer of my father, through his final illness in the 
period 1996-1997 immediately after completing the Professional Indemnity Review(PIR), I 
saw many of the kind of adverse events I had discussed in the PIR’s Final Report 
happening to my father and other people around me in various health services.  This made 
achieving patient safety action a strong personal driver for me, as I saw very directly the 
anguish that could occur and the harm tolerant nature of the hospital system.  Subsequently, 
my engagement in the developing patient safety work in Australia occurred through various 
projects, involving doctors, midwives, consumers, consumer organisations, medical 
colleges and medical organisations.   
                                                
29  Review of Future Governance Arrangements for Safety and Quality in Health Care. National 
Arrangements for safety and quality of health care in Australia – the Report of the Review – Final 
Report. June 2005 (Paterson Report 2005). Presented to the AHMC Meeting 28 July 2005 – Agenda 
Item 1.11 – Attachment 1 (Issued 25 July 2005): paragraph 2.2.2, page 9. 
30  Paterson Report, see note 29: at page 9. 
11 
Introduction 
 
My engagement included the development of a Patient Safety Action Plan for my home 
jurisdiction, the ACT31.  This work, which had commenced in May 1998, was used to 
provide ACT compliance with the Australian Health Care Agreement 1998-200332.  Later, I 
also became engaged as a member of the Australian Quality and Safety Council’s 
Consumer Reference Group and then its replacement Advisory Group.  At the grass roots 
level, I became a consumer member on local Quality of Care Committees and a Consumer 
Reviewer using the Root Cause Analysis methodology.  I also worked as a volunteer Health 
Policy Adviser for the ACT Council of Social Services and the Australian Council of 
Social Services, both of which included lobbying for action on the patient safety agenda. As 
a Board member of the Consumers Health Forum of Australia, I was also heavily engaged 
in the patient safety and quality agenda.   
 
The next decade, during which I was working on this thesis, saw the creation of the 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care on 1 January 2006, initially 
as an unincorporated body managed by all Australian governments.  Following 
recommendations from the National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission33, the 
Commission was established by statute in 2011 through Chapter 2 of the National Health 
Reform Act 2011(Cth).  Among other things, it was provided with powers to compel 
compliance. 
 
4. The 2001-2002 Medical Indemnity Crisis 
However, it was in 2001 (before I enrolled in my PhD) that my involvement in the medical 
indemnity and patient safety policy area again increased.  The Australian government had 
not acted on most of the recommendations of the Professional Indemnity Review, 
particularly in regulation of the medical defence industry.  By late 1999-2000, there was 
                                                
31  Tito F. A Patient Safety Action Plan for the ACT – Final Report. Prepared by Enduring Solutions for 
ACT Health and Community Care. February 1999, Canberra.  
32  In the ACT Australian Health Care Agreement, the details of the required Strategic Plan “to advance 
quality improvement and enhancement of public hospital services” were set out in Clauses 29-30, 
with the financial arrangements in Clause 36. 
33  National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission. A Healthier Future for All Australians – Final 
Report of the national Health and Hospitals Reform Commission. Report No. P3-5499. June 2009. 
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growing concern among both governments and doctors about the financial position of 
United Medical Protection (UMP), which was the main MDO in New South Wales and the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT).  The then ACT Minister for Health, the Hon Michael 
Moore, who was chairing AHMC at that time, sought support from Health Ministers around 
Australia to a new examination of the issues in mid 2000.  In January 2001, the Australian 
Health Ministers’ Advisory Council, chaired by Dr Penny Gregory, then Chief Executive of 
ACT Health, created the AHMAC Medical Indemnity Working Group, to which I was 
appointed Principal Consultant.  The Council’s work was to be focused on five issues: 
• options to provide sustainable solutions to address long-term care costs for those 
involved in healthcare litigation; 
• draft medical indemnity industry standards; 
• reducing the administrative and legal costs associated with healthcare litigation; 
• a model for the collection of national data on health-care negligence cases; and 
• assessment of the need for a national regulatory regime for medical indemnity 
insurance 
The year of 2001 brought a succession of unforeseeable but devastating blows for the 
Australian medical defence industry, some parts of which were greatly exposed because of 
their own high-risk financial actions.  This included the failure of the HIH Insurance Group 
on 15 March 2001 (which held almost $100 million of three of the Australian MDOs “re-
insurance” liability) and the contraction of the international reinsurance market following 
the tragedy of 11 September 200134.  These impacts were compounded by NSW legislation 
to reduce litigation costs, which brought many unreported claims to fruition to protect the 
potential claims from exclusion.  Changing accounting standards brought matters to a head 
when the directors of the largest MDO in Australia at the time (United Medical Protection) 
sought to place the organisation in voluntary liquidation on 27 April 200235.   
 
                                                
34  The first national AHMAC Workshop on National Standards and Regulation of the Medical Defence 
Industry was held in Sydney on 12 September 2001, and those in attendance watched with the rest of 
the world as the events of 9/11 unfolded, not understanding at the time, the likely implications of 
these horrific events on the work being undertaken to make the Australian MDO industry more 
secure. 
35  For a detailed explanation of these event, see Tito Wheatland F. Medical Indemnity Reform in 
Australia: “First Do No Harm” 2005 Journal of Law Medicine and Ethics, volume 33(3), Health 
Module: page 429-443. 
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This was a period of high drama, and rapid action, with the Commonwealth Government 
shifting many of the costs of medical negligence onto tax-payers through a range of 
measures36, in a frantic attempt to prop up United Medical Defence and other MDOs37.  
The original estimated cost of this package was $560 million over 4 years, with the then 
Prime Minister John Howard claiming that taxpayers would only fund about $45-$50 
million per year38. Despite these assurances, the nature of the package meant that additional 
costs will continue to be met by taxpayers far into the future.  For example, in 2015-16 the 
actual amount paid out under the Medical Indemnity Act 2002 was $88.7 million39, with a 
4-year estimate from 2016-2020 of $404.3 million40.  In the eleven years between 2004-
2015, the cost of payments made under the Medical Indemnity Act 2002 has totalled more 
than $1.16 billion dollars41.  The annual average cost to the Commonwealth Budget has 
been $96.8 million per year over the 12 years between 2004-2016.42 In 2014, the National 
Commission of Audit suggested cessation of these schemes due to market recovery, high 
industry profits, relatively small number of beneficiaries under the schemes and the high 
costs of administration, but to date this has not occurred43.  However, at the time, doctors 
(and politicians) saw the support package as crucial to the future of medical practice, but 
                                                
36  The package was modified multiple times between 2002-2004, almost always to the benefit of the 
medical profession and the medical defence industry.  For details of the package of reforms at 
various times, there are several reports of reviews which outline them.  See, eg, Medical Indemnity 
Review Panel Affordable, secure and fair – Report to the Prime Minister. 10 December 2003; 
Medical Indemnity Review Panel. Achieving stability and premium affordability in the Australian 
medical indemnity marketplace. 2007. 
37  See Tito Wheatland 2005 – at note 35: page 437-438. The legislative support package remains in 
place today. 
38  Medical indemnity rescue package announced. The Age, 23 October 2002: accessed at 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/10/23/1034561538517.html on 29 October 2016. 
39  The 2016-17 Health Budget Papers disclosed a total cost for the administration of the Medical and 
Midwifery Professional Indemnity Scheme. Including its own administrative costs as $94.6 million 
in 2015-16, with a four year forward estimate of $430.3 million. 
40  Department of Health (Cth). Budget 2016-17 Portfolio Budget Statements 2016-17, Budget Related 
Paper No.1.10. Health Portfolio Program 4.5, page 88. 
41  This figure is derived by adding the actual amounts disclosed on the various Commonwealth 
Government’s Health Portfolio Budget Statements for the years since 2004. 
42  This figure is derived by averaging the actual amounts disclosed in the Commonwealth 
Government’s Health Portfolio Budget Statements – if the administrative costs attributed in the 
various costs to the program are added, the annual average cost is $98.5 million. 
43  National Commission of Audit. Towards Responsible Government. Appendix to the Report of the 
National Commission of Audit – Volume 2. February 2014 Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.  
Accessed at http://www.ncoa.gov.au/report/docs/appendix_volume%202.pdf on 29 October 2016: 
Section 10.16 Medical Indemnity. 
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few considered the relationship between medical indemnity and the need for concerted 
action on patient safety.  As discussed later, only the Legal Process Working Group from 
AHMAC drew the connections in its work. 
 
The Government also took strong regulatory action in relation to the financial management 
of MDOs, as recommended 7 years before in the Professional Indemnity Review’s Final 
Report.  Despite action on most of the AHMAC Medical Indemnity Working Group terms 
of reference in the manner recommended by the end of 2003-2004, the more integrated 
package proposed by the AHMAC Legal Process Reform Group44 did not have the same 
success. Its “package” made conscious links between the safety and quality agenda of the 
Quality and Safety Council and the actions of state and territory governments, with the four 
purposes set out as: 
• To improve patient safety and minimise the likelihood of patient injury; 
• To reduce the need to litigate and encourage early finalisation of disputes; 
• To provide fair compensation to those injured by medical negligence; and 
• To ensure affordable and sustainable premiums. 
Legislative changes that were to support the quality and safety initiatives were detailed in 
Chapter 4 of the Options Paper, and can be summarised as follows: 
• creating incentives and encouraging practices that minimise the incidence of harm 
to patients arising from healthcare, like greater openness and truth-telling to 
patients; 
• creating an environment where the health system learns from its mistakes and takes 
systemic responsibility; and 
• ensuring that there are adequate systems for dealing with deliberately or recklessly 
unsafe care or systematically poor performance in the health system.45 
 
The AHMAC Legal Process Reforms Group work occurred at the same time as the Ipp 
Review of the Law of Negligence which was created by the then Commonwealth Attorney 
General Helen Coonan.  This Review had limited but extremely detailed terms of reference.  
                                                
44  See eg Australian Health Ministers Advisory Group (AHMAC) Legal Process Reform Group 
Responding to the Medical Indemnity Crisis: An integrated reform package. Chaired by Professor 
Marcia Neave. August 2002. (AHMAC Legal Process Reform Group Report 2002) was the writer 
and researcher for this Paper. 
45  AHMAC Legal Process Reform Group Report 2002 - see note 44, page 12. 
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Its preamble commenced with a statement that “the award of damages for personal injury 
has become unaffordable and unsustainable as the principal source of compensation for 
those injured through the fault of another”. The review was given a very short time frame 
from July 2002 to September 2002, but in the words of one of its members, it had an impact 
because it was “politically salient”46.  Despite the lack of empirical evidence to support 
their task47, the Panel had been asked to examine “a method for the reform of the common 
law with the objective of limiting liability and quantum of damages arising from personal 
injury and death”.48  
 
This period of intense review activity saw a wide range of legislative changes that had been 
recommended in the Professional Indemnity Review, in the AHMAC Medical Indemnity 
Working Group and the Ipp Review.  It also saw the extension of some of the tort 
limitations originally introduced in NSW in 2001 under the Health Care Liability Act 2001 
(NSW) and significant legislative changes in all jurisdictions (albeit with varied outcomes), 
because of Ministerial agreements to act to address the “public liability crisis” and the 
recommendations of the Ipp Review.49 
 
The public attention given to this process paid little or no attention to the related need to 
address the high levels of harm still occurring as part of healthcare as an integral part of 
cost containment.  Generally, in reform of compensation law, the public policy priority is 
first, safety and prevention of the incidence of harm, then rehabilitation to reduce disability 
                                                
46  Cane P. Reforming Tort Law in Australia: A personal perspective. 2003 Melbourne University Law 
Review, volume 27(3), pages 649-676. 
47  Review of the Law of Negligence. Review of the Law of Negligence Final Report.  September 2002 
(Chair: DA Ipp, Members: P Cane, D Sheldon, I Macintosh). 2002 Canprint, Canberra. (Ipp Review 
Final Report 2002) The Review was driven by concerns about the cost and availability of public 
liability insurance, in the shadow of the collapse of HIH Insurance Pty Ltd.  The Review team 
acknowledged that the data to support these concerns and various solutions was limited and that 
instead, they based their recommendations on what they perceived as fair and what appeared to be 
“widely acceptable in the community at large”: see paragraphs 1.38-1.40, page 32.  
48  Ipp review Final Report 2002 – see note 47, Terms of Reference, pages ix-xi. Many of the terms of 
reference specified solutions to be developed, rather than identifying if there was a real issue. In 
combination with the extremely short time frame of less than 3 months, this made any full 
exploration extremely difficult. 
49  A detailed summary of all the legislation is included in the report released by the then 
Commonwealth Assistant Treasurer, Senator Helen Coonan in February 2004. Commonwealth 
Department of the Treasury. Reform of liability insurance law in Australia. February 2004 Treasury, 
Canberra. 
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when harm occurs and finally compensation as the residual cost, when both safety and 
rehabilitation have failed or have been achieved as much as practicable.  The Professional 
Indemnity Review Final Report and the AHMAC Legal Process Reform Group saw these 
three areas as important parts of an integrated solution to the human and financial costs of 
preventable patient harm in healthcare50.  However, the scope of most of the other 
initiatives were limited to the compensation end of the policy continuum.  At a practical 
level, nothing was done by this set of reforms to address patient safety or the costs 
associated with preventable patient harm.   
 
B. The position of this thesis 
The research question underpinning my thesis was conceived in this context in 2003.  There 
had been a strong push by doctors and the various Australian governments to reduce the 
cost of medical indemnity, in the context of broader tort reform in the period 2000-2002.  
Eight years had passed since the release of the Professional Indemnity Review and the 
Quality in Australian Health Care Study.  The major response of the various federal 
Governments had been to create a series of committees, where only limited actions had 
occurred as discussed above.  While doctors had been very vocal about the need for 
Government to contain their indemnity costs, there had been silence about the 
corresponding need to reduce preventable patient harm, the occurrence of which 
underpinned tort liability. While I had continued to work at both my local level and the 
national and College level to address the harm which had been revealed in the results of the 
Quality in Australian Health Care Study, many of the projects appeared to be dependent 
upon the presence of champions and their effects did not seem very durable.  It was 
extremely frustrating to see the limited impact of the Study’s ground-breaking information.  
The increased awareness appeared to have had so little clear and measurable impact. 
 
This thesis emerged from the decade I had spent looking at patient safety, participating in 
major efforts, producing data, and seeing, in the end, little sustained change.  The level of 
measurement of harm appeared almost frozen in the work of the Study.  Having just 
                                                
50  PIR Final Report – see note 1: paragraphs 5.1-5.4. 
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emerged from the “tort reform” insanity of the early 2000s I came to my thesis with a 
picture of the damage that the tort system probably caused to patient safety efforts, both as 
a powerful distraction but also as an over-powering influencer.  The professional and public 
discourses of the time stated that underreporting of instances of preventable patient harm 
and inaction on patient safety issues were principally caused by concerns of doctors about 
medical negligence and the tort system.  Alongside this worldview were the apparently 
enthusiastic efforts of many compassionate doctors and other health workers all attempting 
to grapple with patient safety issues in their systems.  Overall, there appeared to be a degree 
of complacency about the high level of patient harm, both at the clinical and policy level.  
This, in turn, produced a health system which was extremely harm tolerant, despite the 
affirmations that the basic ethical tenet of healthcare was to “first, do no harm”. 
 
C. Thesis methodology 
My thesis research started from the consequent question “If the principal driving ethic of 
medicine is to ‘First do no harm’, why was it so hard to identify and get action on 
preventable patient harm?”  The first tranche of my research involved the analysis of the 
methodology and results of all the “adverse event” studies that had used retrospective case-
note review methodology. and the earlier and later studies of harm using different 
methodologies, which are summarised in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 1 following.  The 
studies were conducted across jurisdictions where the tort system operated alone, where the 
tort system operated in a limited manner and where there was no-fault compensation.  
Across all the studies, results differed, but they did not appear to differ consistently with the 
nature of compensation available.  Rather, once it came down to matters of detail, the 
differences were explainable by reviewer behaviour and what was decided to be “in” or 
“out” in specific studies. 51 This and subsequent more specific studies discussed later 
showed that the reasons for inaction were much more complicated. 
 
                                                
51 This work was summarised in a separate unpublished Background Document by the thesis author. 
Tito Wheatland F. Patient no longer – what we already know about preventable patient harm – 
Background Paper. May 2008 Unpublished paper. 
18 
Introduction 
At that time, I began looking for alternative explanations – across the broad range of 
disciplines that had looked at medical mistakes and doctor behaviour: medicine, sociology 
of the professions, psychology and medical anthropology, medical education and the 
history of the professions, organisational theory and theories of change.  I explored books, 
journal articles, policy reports, and theses.  I also scrutinised studies that looked at how 
doctors recognised adverse events.  These showed that it was quite difficult for doctors to 
consistently discern whether harm was preventable, what its causes were, and even whether 
an adverse had occurred.  This research is considered in parts of Chapters 3 and 4.  Looking 
at these bodies of literature and observing the progress of patient safety more broadly as a 
consumer advocate, I tentatively formed some thoughts that a plausible explanation was 
linked to how doctors saw themselves.  There were many instances which indicated that 
recognition of error and consequent patient harm was anathema to a doctor’s self-
perception.  This led to my first hypothesis: that patient harm and medical error constituted 
identity threats to a doctor’s professional and often personal identity.  This further led to me 
looking at the psychology and neuroscience involved with identity and threats to identity, 
the growing understanding in neuroscience of brain plasticity, as well as agency theory, 
moral reasoning and various other areas to do with doctors as patients and doctors self-care 
and mental health.   
 
My research methodology also involved reading broadly across secondary sources 
(including various data sources, ranging from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, to specific collections on medical students).  
Using the focus of my original research question, I considered the relevant theories and 
evidence about the nature of what it is to be a doctor, the medical profession as a collective 
form of identity, human and social psychology, neuroscience, behaviour and a diverse 
portfolio of other areas described in the thesis.   I also explored some subsidiary questions:  
• why it might be that doctors often do not recognise when patient harm has occurred;  
• why such harm is often not recorded in reporting system or identified in day to day 
care; and  
• why action to reduce the unacceptably high level of harm to patients in healthcare is 
generally taking so long to achieve. 
 
19 
Introduction 
This thesis is arranged around the provision of evidence for three hypotheses derived from 
the broad range of literatures that shed light onto some aspect of the thesis question.  These 
hypotheses in summary are: 
Hypothesis 1: The occurrence of patient harm and medical error can be perceived 
psychologically by a doctor as a fundamental threat to his or her identity; 
Hypothesis 2: A serious threat to identity causes a range of psychological defences, 
often rooted in the biological responses of the brain to threats to existence, and these 
defences can make it hard for a doctor to recognise, identify or accept the risk of 
patient harm; 
Hypothesis 3: Elements of the Doctor Identity deny ordinary human psychological 
responses and physical limitations, and thus promote unrealistic self or group 
perceptions. This creates risks to both doctors and patients.  Many of these risks 
may be avoidable through modifying these perceptions and developing more 
realistic self-and professional schemas. 
My original motivation for the thesis was initially derived almost solely from the 
perspective of the protection of consumers, patients and families from unexpected negative 
outcomes in healthcare.  However, in the end, it became clear that the doctor-patient 
relationship involved a much more complex dance of interlinked interests. The Doctor 
Identity appeared to be derived partly from medical professionalisation and partly from 
cultural stories the community tells about doctors.  Equally the evidence showed that harm 
is also done to doctors.  This includes harm caused through their education, training and 
professional identity formation.  It also includes harm which comes from the unrealistic 
hope that patients have of perfect healthcare performance to protect them when they are 
most vulnerable.  It also includes harm which comes from the systems put in place to deal 
with inevitable harm in healthcare and because of harm that occurs “on their watch”.   
 
The thesis concludes that the community and individual requirement of a compassionate 
and healing health system which delivers good outcomes for patients can be the same 
system requirement that maintains and enhances the wellbeing of doctors and other health 
professionals.  Solutions which create this synergy are likely to come through an 
acknowledgement that many of the “good intentions” in patient safety actions have not 
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delivered what was expected, because the impact of harm on the Doctor Identity was not 
perceived or understood. 
 
D. An outline of this thesis 
Chapter 1 shows that there has been significant knowledge available for a long time about 
the level of patient harm caused in healthcare. After almost 2 decades of effort directed 
mainly at a systems approach to preventing harm to patients in healthcare, there remain 
unacceptably high levels of patient harm.  Such an approach has allowed more 
sophisticated analyses of care processes, that enable safer care delivery systems to be put in 
place.  However, this thesis argues that the dichotomy in the medical and social discourse 
on patient safety between systems and individuals has been unhelpful.  Systems are 
composed of people – their actions and inaction shape systems for good or ill.  The current 
focus on “system only” responses sometimes appear to treat the system, as if it were an 
entity outside of the people who compose the system.  This has meant that often methods 
that can influence the conduct and values of individual doctors and the medical profession 
have been downplayed.  Given the high human and financial costs associated with 
preventable patient harm, funders – both public and private – have a high interest in looking 
at and evaluating other options, which may have a broader effect, to supplement efforts 
already underway at the system level. 
 
Chapter 2 looks at why doctors are a useful focus for this thesis, rather than a broader focus 
on “healthcare culture”.  Doctors’ behaviours and roles as individual clinicians working 
with patients, as leaders in healthcare teams, as teachers and trainers of the next generation 
of doctors and in the management and oversight of hospitals and health systems are all 
important for improving patient safety.  When the Professional Indemnity Review looked 
for solutions to the high incidence of preventable patient harm in the 1990’s, there was a 
great belief that taking a systems approach would lead to prompt and effective action to 
reduce the now evidenced incidence of harm.  However, there is significant evidence that 
while this approach has been useful in some circumstances, it was insufficient on its own.  
This thesis puts forward an argument that the shared self-identity of individual doctors also 
had a large role to play in the lack of progress towards reducing the burden of preventable 
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patient harm.  This is what I refer to as the Doctor Identity.  This term also includes the 
collective expression of that Identity in the medical profession as an identifiable social and 
occupational group.  This thesis does not argue that this was a deliberate strategy of 
inaction or an intentional moral failure on the part of doctors – far from it.  Rather, it argues 
that preventable patient harm deeply threatens the identity of doctors both individually and 
as a profession and thus brings other powerful personal and social psychological forces into 
play, which are often not recognised in the moment. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a brief outline of the emerging understanding of human psychology and 
neuroscience as it relates to identity and specifically threats to identity.  The field of neuro-
psychology and our understanding of the links between our minds and bodies has grown 
exponentially over the two decades since the Quality in Australian Health Care Study was 
published in 1995.  At an individual psychological level, evidence has accumulated about 
the autonomic and sub-conscious impact of a threat to someone’s identity, about the human 
physiological responses to fear and its relationship to threats to identity, about the 
interwoven nature of reason and emotion, and about the long-lasting effect of shame and 
humiliation.  
 
Chapter 4 then looks at the evidence of the relationship between preventable patient harm 
and the Doctor Identity – including why there is such poor reporting and why action may 
have been hampered once the problem was identified.  It looks at how many of the human 
psychological processes and characteristics discussed in Chapter 3 provide a different 
explanation for some doctor behaviours. It also includes a case study of doctors and fatigue, 
as an example of the potential negative impact of unrealistic self-perception on patient 
safety.  
 
The formation of the specific Doctor Identity through medical education and training is the 
subject of Chapter 5 and its consolidation and maintenance throughout the life of the doctor 
are outlined in Chapter 6.  These last two chapters will explore how many typical 
experiences of doctors in their education, professional training and formation, and in living 
as a doctor in our society and in their “tribe”, shape human neural pathways and result in 
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conflicting drives relating to the identification of and actions to reduce preventable patient 
harm. 
 
The last chapter of the thesis looks at the three hypotheses noted above and what research 
could be conducted to test these hypotheses.  In some areas, it is argued that the 
precautionary principle dictates that, even though evidence of the highest level is not yet 
available, there is sufficient plausible evidence of a causal connection to human harm to 
require action.  It also considers how this conceptualisation and understanding of the 
Doctor Identity might lead to different solutions to prevent patient harm.  Some of these 
ideas could allow doctors to better fulfil their ethical commitment to the welfare of 
consumers, patients, carers and society, and thereby strengthen the relational context of 
healthcare.  Some options may improve the well-being of doctors, medical students and 
trainees, through improved resilience and awareness.  Options could also sustain and 
increase trust between doctors and patients through a more open, humble dialogue about the 
risks and benefits of healthcare.   
 
This different understanding could provide the scaffolding to build a more accountable and 
transparent healthcare system: one which enacts many of the noble stated goals of doctors, 
the medical profession and hospitals, and one which knows, in a demonstrable way, if these 
are, in fact, being achieved. 
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Chapter 1: Preventable patient harm 
A. Introduction 
Preventable patient harm is recognised as a very significant health problem throughout the 
world, giving rise to high human and financial costs1.  There has been evidence of such 
harm for a long time and large studies showing the size of the problem have proliferated 
over the past quarter of a century2.   
 
Despite this ever-growing body of evidence and calls for action, more than a decade of 
effort appears to have failed to significantly reduce preventable patient harm across the 
board.  For example, a 2016 estimate of deaths from preventable patient harm places 
medical error as the third highest cause of death in the USA, behind cardiovascular disease 
and cancer3.  Examples of excellence exist, where there has been a consistent and sustained 
reduction in preventable patient harm4.  However, these tend to be limited in scope and 
reliant on individual champions.  Efforts to expand these have often been less successful.  
The continued absence of comprehensive concurrent data on preventable patient harm 
                                                
1  Many of the studies documented later in this chapter in tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide support for this 
statement.  The costs flowing from adverse events have been studies less, but some illustrative 
examples are Ehsani JP. Jackson T. Duckett SJ. The incidence and costs of adverse events in Victorian 
hospital 2003-2004. 2006 Medical Journal of Australia, 5 June, volume 184(11), page 551-555, which 
showed at that time, an adverse event added $6,826 to each admitted episode and total costs to the 
hospital of $460.311 million.  For an examination of estimates of the full costs associated with adverse 
events see Runciman WB. Moller J Iatrogenic Injury in Australia – a report prepared by the 
Australian Patient Safety Foundation for the National Health Priorities and Quality Branch of the 
Department of Health and Aged Care of the Commonwealth Government of Australia. August 2001. 
This study estimated acute hospital costs were less than half the life-time costs of adverse events: see 
Table 4, page 23.  Potential savings from addressing adverse events was estimated as exceeding $2 
billion with 5 years.  A more recent US study estimated adverse event medical costs as at least $19.5 
billion and life time costs possibly $1 trillion annually: Andel C. Davidow SL. Hollander M. Moreno 
DA. The economics of health care quality and medical errors. 2012 Journal of Health Care Finances, 
Fall, volume 39(1), pages 39-50. 
2  See Section C, in this chapter and Tables 1.1 and 1.2 for summaries of a selection of these studies. 
3  Makary MA. Daniel M. Medical error – the third leading cause of death in the US. 2016 British 
Medical Journal, 3 May, volume 353, i2139 at doi: 
http://dx.doi.org.virtual.anu.edu.au/10.1136/bmj.i2139 . 
4  See eg, Pronovost P. Wachter RM. Progress in patient safety: a glass fuller than it seems.  2014 
American Journal of Medical Quality, volume 29(2), pages 165-169.  An excellent example is 
Pronovost’s Michigan Keystone ICU Project, which has seen 10 year sustained reductions in Central-
line Associated Bloodstream infections in the ICU’s in Michigan: Provonost PJ. Watson SR. Goeschel 
CA. Hyzy RC. Berenholtz SM. Sustaining reductions in central-line associated bloodstream infections 
in Michigan Intensive Care Units: A 10-year analysis. 2016 American Journal of Medical Quality, 
volume 31(3), pages 197-202.  
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remains a significant barrier to determining progress on known issues, to prioritising areas 
for action on current data and to promptly ascertaining the nature of emerging problems. 
 
Much of the patient safety effort thus far has focussed on the system in which preventable 
patient harm occurs.  This thesis accepts the importance of system factors in the causation 
and the prevention of harm.  However, such a focus appears to have had a limited effect on 
the widespread prevention of patient harm.  A focus on system factors may arguably result 
in diminished attention being paid to the role of individual people as actors in the 
occurrence of preventable patient harm and as agents in the prevention of such harm.  In 
reality, all systems are made up of individuals.  Doctors, nurses, administrators, patients are 
all individuals coming together in healthcare for a specific purpose.  Actions of each of 
these individuals related to preventable patient harm occur in a system and in many cases, 
the actions constitute the system.  In almost all situations involving preventable patient 
harm, “the system” and the actions of individuals within in it exist in a complex 
interrelationship.   
 
Current approaches to patient safety have usually focussed on “the system”.  This thesis 
instead is concerned principally with the conduct of individuals, more specifically doctors, 
and their actions or inactions that result in preventable patient harm or its prevention.  The 
thesis will look at how doctors understand their own conduct and how their conduct 
influences and shapes the systems in which they operate.  The purpose of looking at the 
conduct of individuals is not to look for someone to blame in a moral sense.  It is rather to 
explore the reasons why doctors act the way they do in relation to preventable patient harm 
and to consider how this is deeply linked to their identities as doctors.  The thesis also looks 
at the collective expression of the Doctor Identity in the medical profession, and at the 
institutional impact this has within hospitals and healthcare.   
 
One of the key hypotheses of this thesis is that the occurrence or risk of patient harm and 
medical error acts as a fundamental threat to the identity of a doctor and to group identity of 
the medical profession.  Normal human responses to identity threats make it difficult for 
doctors to recognise and be proactive in relation to these issues.  Further, the thesis suggests 
that alternative public policy options may result from exploring how to reduce the 
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psychological impact of threats to individual and group identity, compared to a purely 
system-focussed paradigm.  
 
B. Language and patient harm 
In much of the medical literature, preventable patient harm is called by the technical term 
“adverse event”, which was used in the various retrospective medical record review studies 
discussed below.  In general, this term is defined as: 
 
an unintended injury or complication which results in disability, death or prolonged 
hospital stay and is caused by healthcare management.5 
 
The term has come to be used more broadly in medicine and the patient safety policy 
discourse as synonymous with unexpected patient harm.  In this thesis, the term “adverse 
event” is used in the description of the various study results to ensure that the technical role 
of the phrase in these studies is honoured.  However, its use is limited to this context 
because, as a term, I believe it creates ambiguity for most readers and its apparent 
“conceptual emptiness” serves to disguise what is being discussed in the public discourse 
about patient harm.   
 
This thesis argues that the culture of medicine is derived from the beliefs and cultural 
understandings of individual doctors about their role and their identity.  In turn, it is argued 
that this can act as an impediment to patient safety, through powerful cultural stories that 
are harm-denying, harm-excusing and in the end, harm-tolerant.  In such a context, it is 
understandable that the phrase “adverse event” was not limited to these studies, but found 
broad acceptance in medicine.  It is a phrase which, at first glance, is not connected to a 
person at all, as either a causal vector or as someone harmed.  The apparently benign and 
impersonal phrase hides its formal definition and what is being discussed.  Many patients 
and some doctors are not aware of the formal meaning of the phrase used in the various 
studies: that is, preventable harm to a patient caused by people and processes designed to 
                                                
5  Wilson RMcL. Runciman WB. Gibberd RW. Harrison BT. Newby L. Hamilton JD. The Quality in 
Australian Health Care Study. 1995 Medical Journal of Australia, volume 163, pages 458-471: at 
page 459 (Grey Box). 
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provide healthcare, and which results in the patient’s death, disability or a prolonged 
hospital stay. 
 
Language can connect or disconnect actions and consequences.  While sometimes 
euphemistic language can be used to be less emotive or to appear more objective, it may 
also result in a disconnection from ethical or moral meanings.  This in turn can impact on 
how someone engages with issues that may require an exercise of their moral agency (that 
is, their internal incentive to do the “right” thing).6.   
 
In the development of a moral or ethical self, human beings adopt standards of right and 
wrong that serve as guides and deterrents for conduct.  In this self-regulatory process, 
people monitor their conduct and the conditions under which it occurs, judge it relation to 
their personal, moral or social values and perceived circumstances, and regulate their 
actions by the consequences they apply to themselves.  They do things that give them 
satisfaction and a sense of self-worth, and they refrain from behaving in ways that violate 
their personal and social standards because such conduct will bring self-condemnation7 or 
condemnation from peers or their community8.  A strong positive professional and ethical 
norm in medicine is to do no harm to patients.  The language of “adverse events” 
camouflages the occurrence of patient harm, by hiding the object of the harm and the 
agent(s) of it.  Instead of the term overtly triggering a doctor’s self-regulatory system to 
want to stop this harm occurring, the language of “adverse events” can fail to trigger the 
self-regulatory system at all.  The agentless passive voice also creates the appearance that 
negative acts, omissions or outcomes are the work of nameless forces rather than people.9 
 
In medicine when an “adverse event” is said to have occurred in medicine, the term 
“adverse event” can obscure the meaning of what has occurred not only to the patient but 
                                                
6  Bandura A. Barbaranelli C. Caprara GV. Pastorelli C. Mechanisms of moral disengagement in the 
exercise of moral agency. 1996 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, volume 71(2), pages 
364-374: see page 364. 
7 Bandura A. Selective exercise of moral agency. Chapter in Thorkildsen TA. Walberg HJ. (editors) 
Nurturing morality. 2004 Kluwer Academic, Boston, pages 37-57: at page 37. 
8  Harris N. Reassessing the dimensionality of the moral emotions. 2003 British Journal of Psychology, 
volume 94(4), pages 457-473. 
9  Bandura A. 2004 – see note 7: pages 40-41. 
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also to the doctor.  For example, the likely impact on a doctor’s moral agency of the 
thought that “An adverse event occurred in the operating theatre”, will be different from 
that of thinking “The patient I was operating on today died when I accidentally cut his 
aorta”.  While it is also arguable that euphemistic language is used to protect grieving 
families, the phrase “adverse event” provides little useful information for them and they 
may see it as the doctor or hospital “hiding” something10.  The doctor may feel that the 
adverse event explanation has discharged any ethical obligation to explain why the death or 
unexpected patient outcome occurred or the circumstances surrounding it11.  A 2006 study 
by Iedema and others of the language of critical incident reporting provides examples of 
various degrees of minimisation and distancing.12 
 
An “adverse event” explanation may also leave the patient’s family bewildered because 
they don’t know what it means.  Sometimes they may fear that things are being hidden 
from them13.  Alternatively, language which reduces their understanding of what actually 
occurred can mean they remain unaware of the contribution healthcare made to the harm 
done to their loved one.  If they do not understand that the death or harm was preventable 
and caused by healthcare, they may also be unable to take any action to address their needs 
eg to complain or seek compensation, where appropriate14. 
                                                
10  Gallagher TH. Waterman AD. Ebers AG. Fraser VJ. Levinson W. Patients’ and Physicians’ attitudes 
regarding the disclosure of medical errors. 2003 Journal of the American Medical Association, 26 
February, volume 289(8), pages 1001-1007: at page 1003. 
11  Gallagher TH. et al 2003 - see note 10: the results of this study showed that doctors “disclosed the 
adverse event” but “avoided stating that an error occurred, why the error happened, and how 
recurrences could be prevented” all of which were matters that patients saw as vital to proper 
disclosure. See results section and Tables 2, page 1003, comparing the views of doctors and patients. 
12  Iedema R. Flabouris A. Grant S. Jorm C. Narrativizing errors of care: critical incident reporting in 
clinical practice. 2006 Social Science and Medicine, volume 62, pages 134-144: see especially, 
‘Analyzing critical incident reports’, incident #27 at page 138. 
13  Iedema R. Sorensen R. Manias E. Tuckett A. Piper D. Mallock N. Williams A. Jorm C. Patients’ and 
family members’ experiences of open disclosure following adverse events. 2008 International 
Journal of Quality in Healthcare, volume 20(6), pages 421-432. 
14  The 1984 Harvard Medical Practice Study showed, among other things, that there was a significant 
mismatch between cases of adverse events involving medical negligence and litigation.  The ratio of 
incidence of negligent adverse events to litigation was 7.6 to 1.  However, when those cases where 
litigation was initiated were compared to cases where negligence had been found on medical record 
review, the difference was even greater, with the majority of cases where litigation commenced not 
being found to show negligence. Only 1.53% of cases of negligent care resulted in a claim.  Localio 
RA. Lawthers AG. Brennan TA. Laird NM. Hebert LE. Petersen LM. Newhouse JP. Weiler PC. 
Hiatt HH. Relation between malpractice claims and adverse events due to negligence – results of the 
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Therefore, in this thesis, I will generally use the phrases “preventable patient harm” and 
“patient harm”.  This terminology brings together the concepts in the “adverse event” 
definition in a phrase which is likely to be understood more readily in the public discourse 
around patient safety.  The phrases seek to label the issues of concern in this thesis more 
openly.  The thesis is concerned with the impact of actions and inaction in healthcare by 
doctors on patients, who are users and consumers of its services.  It is concerned with harm 
to these people – whether it be death, disability or prolongation of incapacity.  Its special 
concern is where this negative impact on a patient is already known to be preventable.   
However, as will be noted at different points, all unexpected patient outcomes need to be 
detected and reflected upon, whether the consequences are known to be preventable or not, 
and sometimes this term will be used. 
C. The problem of preventable patient harm 
1. A brief history 
Preventable patient harm has existed within healthcare throughout history. For example, 
Pliny the Elder in his Natural History written in the first century AD, complained that: 
 
…there is no law in existence whereby to punish the ignorance of physicians, no 
instance before us of capital punishment inflicted.  It is at the expense of our perils 
that they learn, and they experimentalize by putting us to death, a physician being 
the only person that can kill another with sovereign impunity.  Nay, even more than 
this, all the blame is thrown upon the sick man only; he is accused of disobedience 
forthwith, and it is the person who is dead and gone that is put upon his trial.15 
 
This is not surprising perhaps, given the lack of understanding of the functioning of the 
human body and pharmacology, and false theories about the cause of disease, such as 
humoralism, which guided Western medicine from the 5th Century BC to the 19th 
Century.16   
                                                
Harvard Medical Practice Study III. 1991 New England Journal of Medicine, volume 325 (4), pages 
245-251. 
15  Pliny the Elder. The Natural History (Bostock J. Riley HT. editors and translators) Book XXIX, 
Chapter 8.  Pliny the Elder is said to have lived from 23-79AD. 
16  Rosenberg CE. The Therapeutic Revolution. Chapter in Vogel MJ. Rosenberg CE. The Therapeutic 
Revolution: Essays in the Social History of Medicine. 1979 University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
Chapter 1 – Preventable Patient Harm 
 29 
 
Despite the instructions of Hippocrates in his Epidemics that “the physician must … have 
two special objects in view regarding disease, namely, to do good or to do no harm”17 the 
lack of accurate knowledge about both the workings of the body and the causes of diseases 
often resulted in poor outcomes for patients, especially where treatments were extreme.18 
 
Similarly, healthcare institutions often caused a significant burden of mortality and 
morbidity in those who were treated there.  For example, hospitals in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries were generally places of such poor sanitation and environment that 
staying out of hospital often meant the difference between surviving and dying.   This was 
especially so for those who were more vulnerable, such as children.  For example, Turner 
states that “the London Foundling Hospital in its first few years of existence provided 
accommodation for approximately 15,000 children of whom only 4,500 survived 
hospitalisation”.19  Unfortunately, even where data like this were collected, they did not 
motivate action to change these outcomes as the causes of disease and death were not 
understood and doctors who suggested that there may have been healthcare causation were 
often ostracised, as discussed in Chapter 6 below.   
 
2. Studies in the mid-20th Century 
From the mid 1950’s, considerable mainstream discussion about the hazards associated 
with modern medical care can be observed.20  For example in 1957, Dr White Franklin, a 
paediatrician from St Bartholomew’s Hospital London said, in an address to the Annual 
Meeting of the British Medical Association: 
So we see that all the powers mobilized for healing – the drug, the prophylactic, the 
apparatus of diagnosis, the hospital, the out-patient clinic, the ancillary personnel – 
all carry also the power to damage.  And in the end of it all the doctor and the 
                                                
17  Hippocrates Of the Epidemics, Book 1, Section II, Second Constitution, Paragraph 5. Written around 
400 BC. 
18  Sharpe VA. Faden AI. Medical Harm – Historical, conceptual and ethical dimensions of iatrogenic 
illness 1998 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: page 39. 
19  Turner BS. Samson WC. Medical power and social knowledge. 2nd edition. 1995 Sage Publications, 
London: page 160. 
20  See eg, Barr DP. Hazards of modern diagnosis and therapy – the price we pay – Frank Billings 
Memorial Lecture. 1955 Journal of the American Medical Association. 10 December, volume 
159(15), pages 1452-1456; Moser RH. Diseases of medical progress. 1956 New England Journal of 
Medicine, 27 September, volume 255(13), pages 606-614. 
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patient face each other, two human beings prone to error, both with mankind’s 
portion of fantasy and fear, one trying to be scientific, the other to be brave, each 
trying to fathom the other by questions and answer, but with the help of instinct and 
feeling as well as words.  Small wonder that at times the patient is left the worse for 
the encounter with a “harmful disorder unwittingly induced in him by the 
inappropriate use of drugs or faulty management or treatment or because of the 
physician’s examination, manner and discussion”, or with, in two words, iatrogenic 
disease.21 
 
There is a long literature from that same period onwards, which describes the nature and 
frequency of “iatrogenic” or medically caused harm22, including a large number of “case 
studies” in medical journals cataloguing deaths and injuries arising from various medical 
treatments.23  There were also a small number of more systematic studies of harm to 
patients arising from healthcare in various settings in the 1950s and 1960s, some of which 
are set out in Table 1.1.  Many of these were prospective, observational studies, conducted 
in single institutions, and their results showed disturbingly high numbers of people harmed, 
as can be seen from the sample summarised in Table 1.1.  While they show higher rates of 
adverse events than the later retrospective case note studies, their figures are closer to the 
modern prospective studies. 
                                                
21  Franklin AW. Iatrogenic disease in childhood – an essay in definition. 1958 British Medical Journal, 
30 August, volume 2, issue 5095, pages 559-561.  
22  See eg, Moser RH. Diseases of medical progress: a survey of diseases and syndromes 
unintentionally induced as the result of properly indicated, widely-accepted therapeutic procedures.  
1959 Thomas Springfield (Illinois); D'Arcy PF. Griffin JP. Iatrogenic diseases. 1972 Oxford 
University Press, London. 
23  A search of PubMed for the period before 1970 gives a good sample of the adverse events recorded 
in the literature.   
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Table 1.1: Early modern studies on preventable patient harm 1960-1986 
Date of 
Study 
(duration) 
Investigator Method Place Inclusions Exclusions Coverage 
p=patients, 
a=admissions 
Results 
1960-1961        
(8 months) 
Dr E 
Schimmel (1) 
Observations by 
participating 
house officer 
doctors 
80 bed Yale 
University Medical 
Service of the 
Grace-New Haven 
Community 
Hospital 
Untoward events, complications 
and mishaps resulting from 
acceptable diagnostic or 
therapeutic measures deliberately 
instituted in the hospital 
Inadvertent errors of nurses 
or doctors, post-operative 
complications, non-
specific psychiatric 
disturbances, adverse 
effects of previous 
treatments 
1,014 p   
1,252 a 
240 "episodes" occurred to 198 
patients; 110 minor effects, 82 
moderate, 48 major with 16 ending 
in death 
1964-1965   
(8 months)  
Dr W Reichel 
Chief Medical 
Resident (2) 
Prospective 
observational 
study of 500 
consecutive 
admitted elderly 
indigent patients 
by author, 
including chart 
and test review or 
autopsy results 
and county death 
certificates 
Stanford Teaching 
Service of the San 
Mateo County 
General Hospital 
Untoward responses caused by 
hospitalisation, including 
reactions to medications and 
procedures, physical injury, 
accident or unusual occurrence, 
hospital-induced major 
psychiatric de-compensation, 
hospital acquired infections, 
medical and nursing errors 
(including errors of omission) and 
inter-current disease conditions 
which developed in hospital eg 
pulmonary embolus, infarction, 
aspiration pneumonia, faecal 
impaction, decubitus ulcer, 
urinary retention and parotitis 
must be a clear cause and 
effect between the care and 
the problem, where 
potentially harmful 
conditions did not cause 
harm 
500 a: 214 
male and 286 
female Mean 
age 77.9 years 
193 untoward responses and 44 
inter-current disease incidents 
occurred in 146 patients - rate of 
patients adversely affected was 
29.2%, and frequency of 
complications was 47.4% 
1965-1966  
(12 
months) 
Dr R Ogilvie 
(3) 
Reports by 
medical staff, 
reports by nurses, 
plus any change in 
medication, 
diagnostic or 
therapeutic 
procedure was 
reviewed by RO 
Public medical 
ward in Montreal 
General Hospital 
(McGill University 
teaching hospital) 
"Adverse reaction to 
hospitalization" defined as any 
undesired or unintended 
consequence of investigation or 
care of the patient while in 
hospital 
Failure to achieve expected 
therapeutic result, 
psychiatric disturbance or 
reactions present at 
admission 
731 p: Mean 
age 57.0 years. 
177 patients had one or more adverse 
reaction - there were 261 reactions 
recorded. Rate of patients adversely 
affected was 24.2%, and frequency 
of complications was 35.7% 
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Date of 
Study 
(duration) 
Investigator Method Place Inclusions Exclusions Coverage 
p=patients, 
a=admissions 
Results 
1979             
(5 months) 
Project Team 
headed by Dr 
K Steel (4) 
Prospective study 
using patient 
charts during 
hospitalisation and 
immediately post 
discharge by 
project staff - data 
was abstracted 
using a 27-item 
instrument - 
classified 
complications into 
549 categories and 
cases into 68 pre-
defined causes 
Two floors of a 
medical service at 
Boston University 
Medical Center 
teaching hospital - 
including 83 beds, 
coronary care unit, 
medical intensive 
care unit, metabolic 
unit and 2 general 
medical wards 
Iatrogenic illness - defined as any 
illness resulting from a diagnostic 
procedure or any form of therapy 
and any harmful occurrence that 
was not a natural consequence of 
the patient's diseases. Multiple 
impacts relating to the one 
incident were only recorded as a 
single incident. 
If there was even a slight 
reason to believe the 
condition related to the 
patients' underlying 
disease, it was excluded. 
Minor problems that 
resolved without specific 
therapy were excluded. 
Anything not documented, 
even if suspected. Cancer 
patients. 
815 p: 290 patients had one or more 
iatrogenic illness - 497 occurrences 
were recorded.  Rate of patients 
adversely affected was 35.6% and 
frequency of iatrogenic illness was 
61.0% In 15 patients (1.8%), the 
iatrogenic illness contributed to their 
death. In 9% of admissions the 
incident was considered serious - 
either threatening life or producing 
considerable disability. 
1986          
(12 
months) 
Project team, 
headed by Dr 
A De La 
Sierra(5) 
Prospective study 
of consecutive 
admissions, 
suspected episodes 
reported by 
residents, verified 
and collected by 
two study authors 
Hospital Clinic in 
the Department of 
General Internal 
Medicine in 
Provincial, 
Barcelona, Spain 
Based on Steel's definition - an 
adverse situation due to any 
diagnostic or therapeutic 
procedure, as well as those 
harmful events occurring during 
hospitalization that are not a 
direct consequence of the disease 
of the patient, but do have a 
specific aetiology 
 1,176 a: 599 
males and 577 
females 
295 patients had one or more 
iatrogenic events - 367 events 
occurred.  Rate of patients adversely 
affected was 25.1% and frequency 
was 31.2%. Two deaths and 19 
incidents of life-threatening 
iatrogenic illness were recorded. 
 
Notes to Table 1.1: 
 
(1) Schimmel EM. The hazards of hospitalization. 1964 Annals of Internal Medicine, January, volume 60(1), pages 100-110. 
(2) Reichel W. Complications in the care of five hundred elderly hospitalized patients. 1965 Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, volume 13(11), pages 973-981. 
(3) Ogilvie RI. Ruedy J. Adverse reactions during hospitalization. 1976 Canadian Medical Association Journal, 9 December, volume 97(24), pages 1445-1450. 
(4) Steel K. Gertman PM. Crescenzi C. Anderson J. Iatrogenic Illness on a general medical service at a university hospital. 1981 New England Journal of Medicine, 12 March, volume 
304(11), pages 638-642. 
(5) De La Sierra A. Cardellach F. Cobo E. Bové A. Roigé M. Santos MJ. Ingelmo M. Urbano-Márquez A. Iatrogenic illness in a department of general internal medicine. 1989 Mount Sinai 
Journal of Medicine, September, volume 56(4), pages 267-271. 
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In addition to these more general studies, there were studies looking at iatrogenic harm 
in particular medical settings, such as surgery24 and admissions to the intensive care 
unit25 and where an adverse event was the reason for a patient’s admission to hospital26. 
 
3. Modern “adverse event” studies 
In the context of growing concerns about medical litigation in the 1970’s, a different 
methodology for measuring the incidence of preventable patient harm across the 
hospital population was developed.  Because Governments were seeking to explore 
potential alternatives to negligence-based litigation for patients harmed in healthcare, 
rather than examining healthcare quality from the clinical care perspective in a specific 
institution, the overall incidence of harm became more important.  The most common 
methodology used in these studies was retrospective medical record review, but a small 
number used prospective observation methodologies27, and in one pilot study, used both 
                                                
24  See eg, Couch NP. Tiney NL. Rayner AA. Moore FD. The high cost of low frequency events – 
the anatomy and economics of surgical mishaps. 1981 New England Journal of Medicine, March 
12, volume 304(11), pages 634-63.  While this prospective study of general surgery only located 
36 patients with adverse outcomes due to error in general surgery in a pool of 5,612 patients in a 
12 month period, 20 of these died in hospital – 11 directly as a result of the adverse event. There 
were 56 important errors in these 36 patients, resulting in 61 complications.  Two-thirds of the 
errors involved an error of commission, defined as an unnecessary, defective or inappropriate 
operative procedure. 5 of the 16 survivors left hospital with serious physical impairments. The 
average hospital stay was 42 days (1-325 days range) and the total costs for the 36 patients was 
$US1,732,432.  The most frequent complications were intra-abdominal sepsis eg abscess, 
peritonitis, (15/61), followed by ischaemic non-cardiac injury eg stroke, gangrene (9/61), renal 
injury (9/61), mechanical lesion of the bowel (8/61), and cardiac injury eg acute myocardial 
infarction, arrhythmia, congestive heart failure (7/61). 
25  See eg, Trunet P. Le Gall JR. Lhoste F. Regnier B. Saillard Y. Carlet J. Rapin M.  The role of 
iatrogenic disease in admissions to intensive care. 1980 Journal of American Medical 
Association, 12 December, volume 244(23), pages 2617-2620.  This French study looked at 325 
patients admitted to the ICU between 3 August 1978 and 3 August 1979.  41 (12.6%) were 
admitted from iatrogenic disease.  While many had other serious conditions, the admission of 19 
patients (46.3% of those with iatrogenic disease) arose from iatrogenic disease caused by 
avoidable therapeutic or technical errors.  The disease caused death in 8 case and was life-
threatening in 13. 
26  See eg, Lakshmanan MC. Hershey CO. Breslau D. Hospital admissions caused by iatrogenic 
disease. 1986 Archives of internal medicine, October, volume 146, pages 1931-1934.  This US 
study studies 834 admissions, which showed 47 distinct iatrogenic events resulting in 45 
admissions (5.4% of all admissions).  35 cases were caused by medications, 9 by procedures, 1 
each by radiotherapy, transfusional therapy and hospital acquired infection.  Around 50% of 
these admissions were considered avoidable. 
27  See Table 1.2 later in this Chapter, National French Adverse Events Study (ENEIS) (Study table 
note 9), French Pilot Comparative Methods Study (Study table note 10) and Iberoamerican 
Study of Adverse Events (IBEAS) (Study note table 14) – these studies used medical records as 
part of their data source but as part of the observation process.  They used similar screening tools 
as the Medical Record Review studies. 
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methodologies on the same patient population.28  The commonalities across both kinds 
of studies were the use of a similar definition for an “adverse event” and the choice of a 
sample, the results from which could be generalised across the country or state’s 
hospital population. 
 
The first three retrospective medical record review studies29 took place in such a policy 
environment.  There was a perceived litigation “crisis” and doctors (in particular) were 
calling for action to reduce their medical indemnity premiums.  Because of their broader 
brief, these studies each involved doctors, lawyers, indemnity funders, governments 
and, in the case of the Professional Indemnity Review, healthcare consumers, in the 
policy development processes surrounding these studies.  
 
While these three studies were established as responses to a perceived “litigation” crisis, 
the evidence in each case showed a different picture.  In both the US and Australia, the 
premium rises, which were seen as prima facie evidence of a “litigation crisis”, were 
not caused by a steep rise in the incidence of litigation.  Rather, they were caused by the 
need for a financial “catch-up” following consistent, long term underfunding of this 
form of cover through inappropriate price setting by indemnity insurers and other 
funders, as well as poor investment outlooks domestically or internationally. 30 
 
What became clear from the negligence-based studies was that regardless of the level of 
litigation, the frequency of harm to patients was much greater than the frequency of 
litigation against doctors.  For example, the Harvard Study showed in its Litigation 
Claims Study that there were 7.6 adverse events to every incident of litigation in New 
York in the study year31.  Similarly, in the Californian study, about 17.0% of the 
                                                
28  See Table 1.2 later in this Chapter, French Pilot Comparative Methods Study (Study table note 
10). 
29  These were the Californian Medical Insurance Feasibility Study, the Harvard Medical Practice 
Study and the Quality in Australian Health Care Study conducted as part of the Review of 
Professional Indemnity Arrangements for Healthcare Professionals (the Professional Indemnity 
Review), discussed below in Table 1.2. 
30  See, for the United States: Danzon PM. Medical Malpractice: theory, evidence and public policy 
1985 Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts): Part II, page 85 and following; and 
for Australia: Review of Professional Indemnity Arrangements for Healthcare Professionals.  
Compensation and Professional Indemnity in Healthcare – Final Report.  November 1995 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (PIR Final Report): paragraphs 9.142 and 
following; and Baker T. The medical malpractice myth. 2005 University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, especially chapters 1-4. 
31  Localio RA. Lawthers AG. Brennan TA. Laird NM. Hebert LE. Petersen LM. Newhouse JP. 
Weiler PC. Hiatt HH. Relation between malpractice claims and adverse events due to negligence 
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potentially compensable events (PCEs) identified were assessed to show evidence of 
negligence32.  Further, in the Harvard Medical Practice Study, the study authors argued 
there was not a good correlation between litigated cases and harm where negligent care 
had occurred.  For example, of the adverse events where negligence was determined to 
exist in the study, only 2% of these cases had given rise to a claim.33  Some 
commentators have argued that the Harvard Study’s decisions on negligence were very 
conservative and based only on the medical record content, rather than the evidence that 
might be available in a negligence action.  Therefore, they argue that this figure grossly 
underestimates the correlation between negligence and litigation34.  However, like the 
Harvard Study, the Professional Indemnity Review found only a small number of 
negligence claims were being made,35 especially compared to the incidence of patient 
harm through adverse events, as disclosed in the Quality in Australian Health Care 
Study. 
 
While there have been slight variations in the definition of an adverse event in the 
various modern adverse event studies, they all share common features36: the occurrence 
of an unintended injury, caused by healthcare management rather than the underlying 
disease process, the consequences of which were sufficiently serious to result in 
                                                
– results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III. 1991 New England Journal of Medicine, 
volume 325(4), pages 245-251 (HMPS article III): at page 248.  This differs slightly from the 
estimate in the HMPS Report, due to additional cases identified in the follow-up (an additional 
580 records, of which 12 had filed claims against 18 providers).  For comparison, see Harvard 
Medical Practice Study. (HMPS) Patients, doctors, and lawyers: medical injury, malpractice 
litigation, and patient compensation in New York: the report of the Harvard Medical Practice 
Study to the State of New York. 1990 Harvard Medical Practice Study Boston. [HMPS Report] A 
full copy of the scanned Report is available electronically through the New York State Library, 
via WebCat Call no: HEA 302-4 PATDL – 90 33997, as a 4 part download.  Accessed 27 
September 2006.page 7-28, where a ratio of 9:1 (or around 11%) was found.  
32  Mills DH. Report on the Medical Insurance Feasibility Study. Sponsored jointly by the 
California Medical Association and California Hospital Association. 1977 Sutter Publications, 
San Francisco [referred to as “the Californian Study”]: Table 66, page 98. 
33  Chapter 7 of the HMPS Report at note 31- sets out the results of this work, but more distilled 
data can be found in the peer reviewed report of this work in the HMPS article III, also at note 
31. 
34  Baker T. Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice Study conclusions about the validity of 
medical malpractice claims. 2005 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethic,. Fall, volume 33(3), 
pages 501-514. 
35  See PIR Final Report at note 30: paragraphs 2.54-2.103 and 7.8-7.12. 
36  The definition and two stage medical record review methodology came first from the Californian 
Study’s definition of a potentially compensable event (PCE).  Mills DH. Report on the Medical 
Insurance Feasibility Study. Sponsored jointly by California Medical Association and California 
Hospital Association. 1977 Sutter Publications, San Francisco [referred to as “the Californian 
study”]: page 8 (PCE) and pages 23-33 for the methodology. 
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prolongation of the patient’s otherwise expected hospital stay, temporary or permanent 
disability or death.  All studies required doctors to determine: 
• causation across a scale: only those events were counted where causation was more 
likely than not or greater to have been caused by medical or healthcare management; 
• preventability across a scale – those were considered to be preventable where it was 
more likely than not to have been preventable with current clinical knowledge at the 
time of the occurrence; and 
• disability outcomes for affected patients across a scale – if a preventable adverse 
event required treatment but did not prolong the person’s hospital stay, then it was 
not counted as an adverse event in most studies.   
The earlier US studies, driven by the litigation concerns discussed above, also asked 
doctors to make judgments on whether the occurrence involved negligence.   
 
The methodology of all the retrospective medical record review studies is similar.  A 
sample of records is selected, generally representative of the system’s patient 
population.  In some studies, a specific population is oversampled to obtain more data 
on areas of specific concern, for example, older patients, younger patients, patients in a 
specific specialty.  Where there is oversampling, this is then corrected in the results.  
The first stage review of the sampled medical records is usually conducted by a nurse or 
medical records administrator using a screening tool.  The screening tool lists events 
likely to be evident on a medical record, which may indicate an adverse event has 
occurred37.  Examples of these are unplanned readmission to theatre or unplanned 
transfer to intensive care, unexpected death, adverse drug reactions, and injury in 
hospital38.  The second stage review is done by either one or two doctors, using a very 
detailed reporting pro-forma (written or computerised in the more recent studies).   The 
pro-forma information has been similar, with some studies requiring a narrative 
summary and some not. The grading scales for degree of causation, preventability and 
disability have been similar across the different retrospective case note studies.   
 
                                                
37  The number of criteria have varied between studies – for example, the California Study had 20 
criteria, the Australian Study, the Canadian Study and the UK pilot study had 18 criteria, the 
Harvard Study had 15 and the recent Latin American IBEAS study had 19 triggers. 
38  The exact criteria have varied a little between studies, but almost all of the criteria have been 
shared.  For the list used in the Quality in Australian Health Care Study, see Wilson RMcL. 
Runciman WB. Gibberd RW. Harrison BT. Newby L. Hamilton JD. The Quality in Australian 
Health Care Study. 1995 Medical Journal of Australia, 6 November, volume 163, pages 458-471 
(QAHCS article): Table 1, page 460. 
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Studies using a similar methodology have been conducted across many countries now, 
and are generally used as a “flag” indicator of the frequency of preventable patient harm 
across a healthcare system.  Table 1.2 summarises the main results of these studies:
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Table 1.2: Modern Hospital Population-wide Adverse Event (AE) Studies  
Study name Place, 
Country 
Hospital and patient 
coverage 
No in sample  Key injury results Disability results Other interesting findings 
California Medical 
Insurance Feasibility 
Study *1 
California, 
USA 
all patients discharged from 
non-federal, short-term, 
general hospitals in 
California in 1974 
20,864 
hospitalizatio
ns 
1,155 PCEs altogether, 970 
attributable to 1974 or 
4.65% admissions 
80.0% temporary 
disability, 6.5% minor 
permanent. 3.8% major 
permanent, 9.7% death 
75% of deaths occurred in patients who were 
not expected to die within one year of the 
admission 
Harvard Medical 
Practice Study *2 
New York, 
USA 
Acute care, non-psychiatric 
hospitals, Sample weighted 
to reduce % of older people 
and increase % of specialties 
thought to be at high risk of 
AEs then corrected in results 
30,121 
admissions 
1,278 AEs and 306 
negligent AEs identified, 
1,133 AEs were within 
defined time limits, giving 
an AE rate of 3.7%, with 
27.6% of AEs involved 
negligence 
56.8% recovered in 1 
month, 16.5% 1-12 
months, 6.5% permanent 
disability, 13.6% death, 
6.6% unknown degree of 
disability 
People over 64 (27% of hospital population) 
had higher incidence of AEs (43% of AES in 
this group) and higher proportion of negligent 
AEs (52%). 48% of all AEs associated with 
operations, 52% non-operative. 
Quality in Australian 
Health Care Study *3 
Australia 28 hospitals - Stratified 
sample of general non-
psychiatric hospitals & 
hospital population 
14,179 
admissions 
16.6% admissions 
associated with an AE, 
8.3% highly preventable, 
Annual AE rate 13% 
46% recovered within 30 
days, 30.5% between 1-12 
month, 13.6% permanent 
disability, 4.9% resulted in 
death. 
Agreement between 2 doctors at Stage 2 
occurred in 67.9% of records, 32.1% required 
a third review - 69% of these were disputes 
about whether there was an AE disclosed. 
Utah-Colorado 
Medical Practice 
Study *4 
Utah & 
Colorado, 
USA 
15 hospitals in Colorado, 13 
in Utah, excluded veterans, 
psychiatric, rehabilitation 
and drug and alcohol 
hospitals 
14,700 
records 
169 AEs in Utah, 418 in 
Colorado, Overall AE rate 
2.9%, negligence rate in 
Utah 27.5% AEs, 32.6% in 
Colorado 
53.3% minor temporary, 
major temporary 31.6%, 
permanent disability 
7.5%, grave disability or 
death 7.5% 
Used only one reviewer at Stage 2 - use 
additional quality checking to address 
reliability issues. . Elder Care study 
component showed AEs twice as likely 65 
and over, and death rate for preventable AEs 
over 65 was over 10%. 
British Pilot Study *5 London, 
England 
2 hospitals - index admission 
in 2 months of 1998 
1,014 random 
files 
110 patients suffered 119 
AEs, 11.7% AE rate, 48% 
preventable  
66% minimal impairment, 
19% moderate 
impairment, 6% 
permanent impairment, 
6% death.  
Patients with AEs on average 68.5 v 47.5 
years without. 119 AEs resulted in 999 extra 
bed days. Quality of medical records was 
inadequate in about half. 
New Zealand 
Adverse Event Study 
*6 
New 
Zealand 
13 acute care public hospitals 
with over 100 beds - no 
psychiatric or rehabilitation 
admissions 
6,579 
admissions 
13% prevalence rate, 11.3% 
AE rate with 10.4% 
occurring in public 
hospitals, 37.1% 
preventable 
7.9% recovered in 30 
days, 19.0% in 1-12 
months, 10.2% permanent 
impairment, 4.5% death, 
4.7% unable to be 
determined from record. 
AEs more common over 65.  When the AE 
occurred outside hospital, there was a greater 
degree of disability and death. 
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Study name Place, 
Country 
Hospital and patient 
coverage 
No in sample  Key injury results Disability results Other interesting findings 
Danish Pilot Study 
*7 
Denmark Random sample from Danish 
National Patient Register 
from 17 different acute 
hospitals 
1,097 
admissions 
176 AEs found in 114 
admissions, prevalence rate 
9.0% of admissions, 40.4% 
preventable 
Most effects were 
transient, but in 26.3% of 
AE admissions, death or 
permanent disability 
resulted. 
 
Canadian Adverse 
Event Study *8 
British 
Columbia, 
Alberta, 
Ontario, 
Quebec, 
Nova Scotia 
Inpatients in acute facilities 
within 250 kms of provincial 
research centre, with >1,500 
inpatients in 2002, 24 hr 
emergency department - one 
teaching hospital, one large 
community hospital .100 
beds, 2 small community 
hospitals < 100 beds 
3,745 
admissions 
255 charts contained 289 
AEs. 7.5% AE rate, 36.9% 
preventable 
55.7% recovered in less 
than 1 month, 12.5% in 1-
12 months, 5.2% suffered 
permanent impairment, 
15.9% death, and in 
10.4% disability couldn't 
be determined. 1.6% of 
admissions died from an 
AE 
255 AE patients required additional 1,521 
days in hospital directly related to the AE, 
Errors of omission in medicine caused 57.1% 
of medical AEs, but 50-50% in surgical cases 
French Pilot 
Comparative 
Methods Study *10 
Aquitaine, 
France  
Patients in 37 wards in 3 
public and 4 private hospitals 
778 patients 241 AEs in 174 patients - 
70% had 1, 22% had 2 and 
8% had 3 AEs. Overall AE 
rate was 31.0% 
Not obtained- purpose of 
study was to test methods 
for ENEIS below 
This study compared cross sectional (data 
gathered on one day), prospective (data 
gathered during hospital stay), retrospective 
record review method over same patient 
sample. Only 25% of all AEs were detected 
by all methods, and less than 4% of 
preventable AEs. Retrospective and 
prospective performed best. 
National French 
Adverse Events 
Study (ENEIS) *9 
Aquitaine, 
France 
117 hospitals 8,754 patients 450 AEs - 181 preventable - 
6.6% AEs per 1,000 bed 
days during hospitalisation, 
37.2% preventable, in 
addition 4% of admissions 
were caused by AEs - 45% 
were preventable 
Temporary disability/ 
prolongation of stay 
66.2% of AEs; 29.3% 
Serious disability 
(permanent or life 
threatening); 1.7% death 
This study showed higher AE rates with 
older, more fragile patients. Prospective study 
method used. 
Spanish Adverse 
Events Study 
(ENEAS) *11 
Spain Patient had to have been an 
inpatient in one of 24 
hospitals in the sample 
representing all Spanish 
hospitals by size for at least 
24 hours and been 
discharged between 4-10 
June 2005. 
5,624 records 9.3% incidence of AEs. 
(525)- 473 occurred in 
hospital. In 105 AE caused 
the admission 
45% were considered of 
low seriousness (43.5% 
preventable), 39% of 
moderate seriousness 
(42% preventable), 16% 
serious AEs (41.9% 
preventable) 
Patients over 65 with other risk factors were 
2.5 times more likely to suffer an adverse 
event than a younger person without risk 
factors.17.7% of patients with an AE had 
more than one AE. 
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Study name Place, 
Country 
Hospital and patient 
coverage 
No in sample  Key injury results Disability results Other interesting findings 
Dutch Adverse 
Events Study *12 
Holland 21 of 101 Dutch hospitals- 4 
university, 6 tertiary 
teaching, 11 general -3,983 
deceased patients and 3,943 
discharged patients in 2004 
7,926 
admissions  
5.7% of admissions had one 
or more AE, 40% 
preventable 
12.8% resulted in death or 
permanent disability; 
10.7% of deceased 
hospital patients had an 
AE, and in 4.1% of 
hospital deaths, a 
preventable AE 
contributed to the death. 
Proportion and impact of AEs increased with 
age.  More than 50% were related to surgery. 
OIG Medicare 
Adverse events study 
*13 
USA Statistically valid sample of 
Medicare patients discharged 
in October 2008 
780 
beneficiaries 
13.5% suffered AE and 
another 13.5% had 
temporary disability 
requiring treatment but not 
defined as an AE; 44% of 
both were considered 
preventable. Estimated 
direct annual care costs of 
preventable harm in 2009 
was $4.4B - 3.5% of 
inpatient expenditure. 
0.6% had a National 
Quality Forum Serious 
Reportable Event, 1.0 had 
a Medicare Hospital 
Acquired Condition 
(HAC) event, and 13.1% 
experienced one of the 
four most serious 
categories of patient harm 
- 1.5% AE contributed to 
death. 
86% of harm not reported in ordinary incident 
monitoring systems - 62% because staff did 
not consider it reportable, 25% because while 
they normally reported these kind of things, 
this time they didn't. 28% of beneficiaries 
who had an AE also experienced temporary 
harm. Projection of death rate to Medicare 
beneficiary hospital population is 15,000 
patients per month. 
Iberoamerican study 
of adverse events 
(IBEAS) *14 
Argentina, 
Colombia, 
Costa Rica, 
Mexico and 
Peru 
58 hospitals across 5 
countries - 2000 patients per 
country during the study 
week AE had to be present 
on day of observation 
11,379 
inpatients 
1,191 patients had at least 
one AE, point prevalence 
rate 10.5%, 60% of which 
were considered preventable 
28% of AEs caused 
disability, 6% associated 
with death of the patient, 
64.7% of AEs prolonged 
hospital stay on average of 
16 days 
Used medical record review tools but 
observations only related to one day in 
hospital so data not comparable with other 
studies - sought point prevalence instead. 
40% of AEs related to hospital acquired 
infections, and 1.5% of admissions were 
caused by AEs 
Eastern 
Mediterranean and 
African Adverse 
Event Study *15 
Egypt, 
Jordan, 
Kenya, 
Morocco, 
South 
Africa, 
Sudan, 
Tunisia, 
Yemen 
(265M 
people - 1/3 
living below 
poverty line) 
26 hospitals, 23 general 
hospitals (including 13 
teaching hospitals), 1 
paediatric hospital, 1 
maternity hospital, 1 private 
hospital 
15,548 
admissions 
Rate overall 8.2% of 
admissions (varied between 
countries from 2.5-18.4%), 
83% considered highly 
preventable 
32% recovered within 30 
days, 16% between 6-12 
months, 14% permanent 
disability, 30% died. 
Low rate of selection at first screening may 
have resulted in lower AE rate.  AE mostly 
occurred when there was good consensus on 
diagnosis and treatment and in non-complex 
settings - therapeutic error was most frequent 
cause 34.2%, diagnostic error 19.1% and 
operative error in 18.4% of AEs. 
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Retrospective medical record review analysis studies of the kind described above are 
generally not built into regular organisation-wide reporting39, which is designed to identify 
when patient harm occurred, because it has been argued to be too costly and inaccurate in 
its current form40.  However, where this methodology has been compared with regular 
reporting such as incident monitoring, the evidence is that more adverse events are 
identified by medical record review.  For example, in the 2012 report of the Department of 
Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General in the USA, 86% of the 
instances of harm identified in the retrospective medical record review analysis study were 
not reported through the normal incident monitoring systems.  When asked why they did 
not report, 62% of staff said they didn’t think it was reportable and 25% said they would 
normally have reported but didn’t on that occasion.41   
 
There are other studies which show the most popular forms of adverse event reporting 
vastly underestimate the incidence of serious harm.  For example, a 2011 US study42 
compared the most common US hospital reporting methods of voluntary reporting of 
sentinel events, other voluntary reporting of adverse events, and the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality’s Patient Safety Indicators with the Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement’s Global Trigger Tools medical record review43.  The results showed that the 
most common methods missed 90% of adverse events.  The study was conducted in three 
                                                
39  An example of where this has been done on a regular basis is in the Wimmera in Victoria.  Their 
clinical risk management program includes medical record review screening of all admissions 
against a simplified set of criteria, combined with incident monitoring, and a range of other 
measurement and monitoring tools.  There is good evidence showing that this has reduced incidence 
of preventable patient harm. See Wolff AM. Bourke J. Campbell IA. Leembruggen DW. 2001 
Medical Journal of Australia, volume 174(12), pages 621-625. The methodology has been fully set 
out in Wolff A. Taylor S. Enhancing Patient Care: A practical guide to improving safety and quality 
in hospitals. 2009 MJA Books Strawberry Hills (Australia). 
40  Neale G. Woloshynowych M. Retrospective case record review: a blunt instrument that needs 
sharpening. 2003 Quality and safety in health care. February, volume 12(1), pages 2-3. 
41  Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General (USA).  Hospital 
incident-reporting systems do not capture most patient harm. Daniel R. Levinson Inspector General, 
January 2012, OEI-06-09-00091: page ii. 
42  Classon D. Resar R. Griffin F. Federica F. Frankel T. Kimmel N. Whittington J. Frankel A. Seger A 
and James B. ‘Global Trigger Tool’ shows that adverse events in hospitals may be ten times greater 
than previously measured. 2011 Health Affairs. April, volume 30(4), pages 581-589 
43  The IHI Global Trigger Tool is a refined and expanded medical record review methodology for 
identifying adverse events on an on-going basis.  See Griffin FA. Resar RK. IHI Global Trigger Tool 
for Measuring Adverse Events. IHI Innovation Series white paper. 2nd Edition 2009 Institute for 
Heathcare Improvement, Cambridge (Massachusetts). 
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large tertiary hospitals with well-established operational patient safety programs.  The 
programs were judged to be so on the basis that they received external funding for patient 
safety research, they had internal operating programs to improve the detection of adverse 
events and special tools built around advanced electronic health records systems, and they 
had received external recognition for their internal patient safety initiatives through awards, 
publications or involvement in national initiatives.  The rate of adverse events in this study 
was 33.2% of admissions.  Given that a number of patients suffered multiple adverse 
events, the overall incidence was 49% of admissions.  This result is not included in the 
above table because it used a wider definition of adverse events, though all required the 
occurrence of preventable patient harm to be counted.  After reporting these results, the 
authors concluded that, while these rates were high, it was likely that that “true rates are 
likely to be higher still, given the consistent finding that direct observational studies reveal 
higher rates of adverse events than retrospective studies because not all adverse events are 
documented in the patient record.”44 
 
The retrospective medical record review analysis methodology has been adapted in 
Australia by the Wimmera Healthcare Group in Victoria, Australia and Dr Alan Wolff, to 
provide a more cost effective option for on-going use in the patient safety and quality 
programs of individual hospitals45.  The methodology has also been built into elements of 
other review methodologies, such as was used in the systematic review component of the 
2010 study of preventable patient harm in the Paediatric Intensive Care ward at the Royal 
Melbourne Children’s hospital.46.  This methodology included both concurrent checking 
processes by an observer and retrospective record checks.  In total, the incidence of harm 
was 26.1% of patients.  The systematic method revealed 80% of the incidents, whereas 
incident reporting detected only 32%.  Incident monitoring was least reliable in cases of 
major, severe or catastrophic harm related to medical or surgical diagnosis or management.  
As this method is regularly used in hospitals to monitor quality of care, this means that it is 
                                                
44  Classon D. Resar R. Griffin F. Federica F. Frankel T. Kimmel N. Whittington J. Frankel A. Seger A 
and James B. ‘Global Trigger Tool’ shows that adverse events in hospitals may be ten times greater 
than previously measured. 2011 Health Affairs. April, volume 30(4); pages 581-589: at page 586. 
45  Wolff A. Taylor S. Enhancing patient care: a practical guide to improving quality and safety in 
hospitals. 2009 MJA Books Sydney: section 4.2.3, pages 51-63. 
46  Silas R. Tibballs J. Adverse events and comparison of systematic and voluntary reporting from a 
paediatric intensive care unit. 2010 Quality and Safety in Health Care, volume 19(6), pages 568-571. 
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likely that most preventable patient harm is not detected, reported or able to be addressed.  
To act on a problem, it needs to be known about. 
 
D. So far, not so good … 
Despite these efforts to identify the extent of patient harm over more than 20 years, and 
many attempts to reduce patient harm, the healthcare system remain surprisingly tolerant to 
continuing high levels of preventable patient harm.  While there appears to be widespread 
acceptance in medicine of the maxim that a doctor should “First, do no harm”, in 2008 the 
World Health Organisation stated that “Unsafe medical care is a major source of morbidity 
and mortality throughout the world”47.   
 
In those countries, which have had data on the frequency of harm for the longest, the story 
is little changed.  Using the results from the New York based Harvard Medical Practice 
Study and the Utah-Colorado study set out in Table 1.2 above, the 1999 US Institute of 
Medicine Report To Err is human stated: 
When extrapolated to the over 33.6 million admissions to U.S. hospitals in 1997, the 
results of the study in Colorado and Utah imply that at least 44,000 Americans die 
each year as a result of medical errors.  The results of the New York Study suggest 
the number may be as high as 98,000.  Even when using the lower estimate, deaths 
due to medical errors exceed the number attributable to the 8th-leading cause of 
death.   More people die in a given year as a result of medical errors than from 
motor vehicle accidents (43,458), breast cancer (42,297), or AIDS (16,516). … In 
terms of lives lost, patient safety is as important an issue as worker safety.  Every 
year, over 6,000 Americans die from workplace injuries.  Medication errors alone, 
occurring either in or out of the hospital, are estimated to account for over 7,000 
deaths annually.48 
 
The goal of the report was to “break the cycle of inaction” and to produce a health system 
for patients that did not cause harm49.  The four-tiered approach recommended looked at 
systemic responses in the main and proposed, among other things, a nationwide mandatory 
                                                
47  World Health Organisation (WHO) World Alliance for Patient Safety. Summary of the evidence on 
patient safety: implications for research. Prepared by the Research Priority Setting Working Group 
of the World Alliance for Patient Safety. 2008 WHO, Geneva: page XIII. 
48  Kohn LT. Corrigan JM. Donaldson M. (editors). To err is human: building a safer health system. 
Committee on Quality of Healthcare in America. Institute of Medicine. 1999 National Academy 
Press, Washington DC: pages 1-2. 
49  Kohn LT et al. - see note 48: page 3. 
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reporting system for all “adverse events that result in death and serious harm”50.  More than 
a decade later in 2011, the US Commonwealth Fund noted that: 
 
[Despite] national, statewide and professional campaigns to persuade hospitals to 
adopt practices that have been shown to reduce patient mortality … nevertheless, 
the nation appears to be far from realizing the goal of eliminating unintentional 
harm to some patients resulting from healthcare.  For example, a recent study found 
no significant change from 2002 to 2007 in the overall rate of patient harm or of 
preventable harm recorded in patient records drawn from a random sample of 10 
hospitals in North Carolina.51 
 
There have been only a few studies looking at the longitudinal recording of patient harm 
data, and these confirm that there has been little progress.  A study of patient harm levels in 
10 hospitals in North Carolina, noted above, was published in 2010.  This used the IHI 
Trigger Tool methodology (which gave a rate of preventable patient harm around 25% of 
admissions), and showed that there was no significant change in the rate of harm identified 
by internal reviewers over the six-year period, and that there was no reduction in rates of 
harm judged to be preventable52.  A 2013 Dutch study showed an increase in adverse events 
over the period 2004-2008, from 4.1% to 6.2%.  While the study considers that some of the 
increase arose from changed patient case-mix, the authors conclude that the patterns of 
adverse events over the period remain consistent, and that “patient harm related to 
healthcare is a persistent problem that is hard to influence” and that continuing to measure 
over time “stresses the continuing urgency” for action on patient safety.53 
 
Action has also been slow both in the US and Australia on one of the acknowledged 
prerequisites for accurately measuring progress on preventable patient harm: the regular 
                                                
50  Institute of Medicine. To Err is human: building a safer health system summary. November 1999: 
page 3. 
51  McCarthy D. Klein S. Keeping the Commitment: a progress report on four early leaders in patient 
safety improvement – synthesis report. Publication 1478, volume 10. March 2011 The 
Commonwealth Fund, Washington DC. 
52  Landrigan CP. Parry GJ. Bones CA. Hackbarth AD. Goldman DA. Sharek PJ. Temporal trends in 
rates of patient harm resulting from medical care. 2010 New England Journal of Medicine, 25 
November, volume 363(22), pages 2124-2134: at page 2127. 
53  Baines RJ. Langelaan M. de Bruijne MC. Asscheman H. Spreeuwenberg P. van de Steeg L. 
Siemerink KM. van Rosse F. Broekens M. Wagner C. Changes in adverse event rates in hospitals 
over time: a longitudinal retrospective patient record review study. 2013 BMJ Quality and Safety, 
April, volume 22(4), pages 290-298. 
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recording of individual patient harm and patient outcomes of care as a normal incident of 
healthcare.  In the US, for example, one commentator noted that a decade on from the 
Institute of Medicine’s report that “hard evidence of improved outcomes remains elusive 
because of our rudimentary measurement capacity in safety”54.  The lack of effective, and 
appropriately sensitive measurement of the incidence and types of preventable patient harm 
was recently identified as one of the probable explanations for the lack of progress in 
patient safety, combined with the lack of proven effective, “dispersible” interventions, low 
levels of financial investment and the “newness” of the patient safety “discipline”55. The 
authors of the 2016 estimate that medical error was now the third highest cause of death in 
the US noted that: 
currently deaths caused by errors are unmeasured and discussions about prevention 
occur in limited and confidential forums, such as a hospital’s internal root cause 
analysis committee or a department’s morbidity and mortality conference.  These 
forums review only a fraction of detected adverse events and the lessons learnt are 
not disseminated beyond the institution or department.56 
 
In Australia, two decades after the publication of the Quality in Australian Health Care 
Study, there have been repeated calls for the regular collection of reliable data on adverse 
events but little action.  The Final Report of the Professional Indemnity Review that 
commissioned the Australian study57first recommended this in 1995.   In 2010, the 
Australian Commission for Quality and Safety in Healthcare, echoing the earlier reports of 
the previous 15 years, stated that:  
Measuring the safety of healthcare is a key step ....  However, currently, there is a 
lack of reliable and consistently reported national data on patient safety in 
Australian hospitals which quantifies the levels of harm or the rate of adverse 
events. One of the essential tools in improving patient safety in Australian hospitals 
is the provision of routine, accurate data on the severity and types of patient harm to 
clinicians, hospitals and policy makers. Sentinel events are reported annually by 
                                                
54  Wachter RM. Patient safety at ten: unmistakable progress, troubling gaps. 2010 Health Affairs. 
January, volume 29(1), pages 165-173: at page 172. 
55  Shojania KG. Thomas EJ. Trends in adverse events over time: why are we not improving? 2013 BMJ 
Quality and Safety, April, volume 22(4), pages 273-277. 
56  Makary et al 2016 – see note 3: at page 2. 
57  The need for effective data on preventable patient harm was called for in the Final Report of the 
Professional Indemnity Review (the overseeing and funding body of the Quality in Australian Health 
Care Study) in 1995, the Taskforce in Quality and Safety in Australian Healthcare in 1996 (See eg 
Recommendations 7 and 17 and others), the National Expert Action Group on Quality and Safety in 
Australian Healthcare in 1999 (Action 5), the Australian Council on Quality and Safety in Healthcare 
and the Paterson Review of the Council in 2006. 
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jurisdictions, by the Productivity Commission, and in this publication. Such 
reporting, however, does not constitute the timely, routine feedback of key 
information required to support change at all levels of the system.  The need to go 
beyond sentinel events and understand the magnitude of those events which occur 
far more often but result in relatively lower patient harm (sometimes referred to 
somewhat dismissively as ’mundane’ events) has been argued for some time.  These 
events cause significant harm to patients.58 
 
In 2012, the Australian Commission for Quality and Safety in Healthcare, stated in its new 
Accreditation standards that: 
Although most healthcare in Australia is associated with good clinical outcomes, 
patients still do not always receive all the care that is recommended to them, and 
preventable adverse events continue to occur across the Australian healthcare 
system. 
 
Presently, the data that measures the extent to which problems are occurring are 
unavailable or unreliable. This prevents the establishment of a baseline value from 
which improvements in safety and quality of care can be measured.59 
 
While there have been many activities directed at safer healthcare, these do not appear to 
have been effective in the reduction of preventable harm to patients, despite the extensive 
focus on “system improvement”.  Even where these efforts may have had success, 
understanding of this and dissemination of lessons remain hampered by inadequate patient 
outcome recording. 
                                                
58  Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC). Chapter 10 - Reporting 
for Safety: Use of Hospital Data to monitor and improve patient safety in ACSQHC. Windows into 
Safety and Quality in Health Care. 2010 ACSQHC, Sydney: page 86. 
59  Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare (ACSQHC). National Safety and 
Quality Health Service Standards -September 2012. 2012 ACSQHC Sydney: page 15.  
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Chapter 2: Doctors and the Doctor Identity 
A. Introduction 
Chapter 1 set out some of the extensive data on the incidence of preventable patient 
harm as well as noting the evidence that effective action on this issue has been limited.  
While much effort has been directed at an examination of the healthcare system and 
how error and harm occurs there, this thesis specifically explores the role of doctors.  
This Chapter discusses, among other things, some of the effects of the adoption of a 
systems focus in health in the 1990s, in particular on the role of doctors in the health 
system, and the impact of “the system” on doctors.  The thesis argues that doctors are 
important actors in and on the system, powerfully influenced by and powerfully 
influencing healthcare.  They have a key role in the nature of “the system” and how it 
functions. 
 
Just as healthcare is a complex system, so too, at the psychological level, is the 
individual Doctor Identity.  Complex influences that form the identity and interact with 
it include a doctor’s own developmental background, their training and education and 
their individual, social and relational experiences as doctors.  However, doctors are also 
human beings, who respond physiologically and psychologically to the world they are 
in, as do all others.  Their experiences in the world shape them just as they shape the 
world in which they live and work.  The growing understanding of brain plasticity and 
the positive and negative impacts of this throughout the brain shows that “everything we 
think, feel and remember is somewhere in the structure of the brain itself.  Our brains 
embody our experiences.”1 
 
Before discussing relevant psychological and neurobiological functions in the next 
chapter, this chapter also looks at the “mixed messages” given to doctors about their 
place in the healthcare system and their responsibility as actors.  The inherent threat to a 
doctor’s identity from preventable patient harm is compounded by uncertainty and lack 
of trust in the system in which they work, which in turn, generate greater levels of fear.  
Fear – particularly where it is generated by threat to identity, can be an overwhelming 
psychological driver to actions not fully mediated by the cognitive brain. 
                                                
1  O’Connor R. Undoing depression – what therapy doesn’t teach you and medication can’t give 
you. 2nd edition 2011 Souvenir Press, London: accessed as a Kindle Book, location 1307 of 
7260.  
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B. Why doctors? 
Most adverse event studies have looked at healthcare management, when determining 
causation of adverse events, consistent with a system-based analysis of harm.  This 
thesis, focuses more on the role of doctors, because of the central role they play in the 
delivery of healthcare to patients and in the achievement of safer care for patients.  This 
thesis hypothesises that such a focus is justified for three reasons: 
1. doctors continue to have the dominant role in the clinical delivery of healthcare, 
in particular, in hospital-based care; 
2. data shows that doctors play the most significant role in the causation of 
preventable patient harm in most clinical relationships; and 
3. doctors play a central role in the implementation of patient safety strategies and 
in clinical leadership, and if they are not “on board” they can thwart such 
processes. 
While this thesis focuses specifically on the role of doctors, the analysis of professional 
identity developed here can also apply to other professionals in the healthcare system.  
For example, just as there is a Doctor Identity, so there is a “nurse identity”, a 
“psychologist identity”, a “social worker identity” and a “pharmacist identity”.   
 
The enculturation of professional expectations and practice mores occurs in all these 
areas, as well as in areas outside of healthcare, such as the law, academia and other 
careers.  In the end looking at these other groups may provide a richer, more interactive 
understanding of the pressures and interrelationships with a “system”, particularly in 
response to error and similar threats to professional identity.  However, this thesis 
begins with the identity of a Doctor, for the reasons summarised above and expanded 
below. 
Medical dominance 
Medicine has long been recognised as the quintessential “profession”.  The American 
sociologist Eliot Freidson described what this meant in the Anglo-American context: 
[Professions] gain their distinction and position in the market-place … from 
their training and identity as particular, corporately organised occupations to 
which specialized knowledge, ethicality and importance to society are imputed, 
and for which privilege is claimed.”2 
 
                                                
2  Freidson E. Professionalism Reborn – Theory, prophecy and policy. 1994 University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago.: page 19. 
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External characteristics traditionally attributed to professions include Government 
endorsed monopoly powers, autonomy over services provided by the group, political 
“sovereignty” in relation to government policy in the profession’s areas of interest and 
dominance in the division of labour. For a long period, doctors have been the 
overwhelmingly dominant professional force in healthcare at the structural, political and 
clinical levels3.   
 
There is evidence that the medical profession’s dominance in a number of these areas 
has reduced since its peak last century4.  The last decade has seen significant changes in 
Australia in medical autonomy as governments have become more involved in the 
regulation of doctors5 and hospitals6.  In addition, the medical monopoly power to 
receive income under tax-payer funded Medicare benefits7 and to prescribe drugs under 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme8 have altered with other health professionals 
                                                
3  Freidson E. Professional Dominance – the social structure of medical care 1970 (reissued in 
2007) Aldine Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick; and Willis E. Medical dominance – the 
division of labour in Australian healthcare. Studies in Society19 - Series editor: Wild R. 1983 
George Allen and Unwin, Sydney. 
4  See eg, Willis E. Introduction: taking stock of medical dominance. 2006 Health Sociology 
Review, volume 15, pages 421-431; and Coburn D. Medical Dominance then and now: critical 
reflections. 2006 Health Sociology Review, volume 15, pages 432-443. 
5  The most recent development in this area has been the introduction of national registration for 
medical practitioners and other health professionals with the passage by all jurisdictions of 
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law eg Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 
(ACT) 2010. 
6  See eg, the establishment of various bodies under the National Health Reform Act 2011, 
including the National Health Performance Authority in 2012 to provide, among other things, 
public data on hospital performance. While the NHPA has been closed from 1 July 2016, the 
regulatory framework and capability was transferred to the Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare. http://www.nhpa.gov.au/internet/nhpa/publishing.nsf/Content/Closure-of-NHPA .  
There is now some public reporting on performance through two different web-sites: 
http://www.myhospitals.gov.au/ and http://www.myhealthycommunities.gov.au/.  See also the 
establishment of legislated obligatory accreditation under the National Safety and Quality Health 
Service Standards since 2013 https://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/NSQHS-Standards-Sept-2012.pdf . 
7  Certain optometry services have been covered by Medicare since its commencement.  The 
extension of Medicare Benefits to other health professionals first occurred in 2004 in relation to 
allied health services provided to patients under a GP supervised chronic disease management 
plan.  Over the next decade, various allied health services have been extended to different 
population groups or to services related to specific health and disability conditions.  For current 
coverage, see Department of Health and Ageing. Medicare Benefits Schedule – Allied Health 
Services. 1 July 2012, accessed 19 July 2013 at 
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/mbsonline/publishing.nsf/Content/700EAEBE8BC5D5FECA
257A0F0017617F/$File/201207-Allied.pdf.  
8  See eg the Commonwealth Government’s 2010 legislative arrangements in relation to Nurse 
practitioners, which provide not only for Medicare payment and prescribing rights, but also 
powers to order certain tests and to refer patients to specialists. For details, see Australian 
Government Department of Health and Ageing. Eligible Nurse Practitioners – Questions and 
Answers. 1 November 2012, published by Medicare Financing and Analysis Branch.  
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having access to these funds, albeit, under varying degrees of medical oversight or 
statutorily obliged “collaboration”9.   
 
Despite these changes, doctors have retained their dominant position in relation to the 
clinical management and treatment of patients, and through their clinical leadership role 
in healthcare.  In addition, in many parts of Australia and elsewhere, where there is a 
shortage of doctors or where doctors bring in income for a hospital (such as in private 
hospitals), doctors retain political and social power virtually unchanged from earlier 
periods.  In these cases, the alleged growing power of hospital administrators to control 
and influence doctor behaviour are often thwarted by the power of doctors to threaten 
withdrawal of their services if any aspect of their “professional autonomy” is 
questioned10.  In rural and remote communities where retention of a doctor as a 
necessary local service is paramount, the social and practical pressure on administrators 
to simply ignore poor practices can be great, when the administrator’s job may be 
threatened if doctors withdraw their labour, and communities are left with limited or no 
health services.   
 
The patient interface with a hospital is mediated almost exclusively by doctors, who 
control admission to hospital, discharge from hospital and the management of a patient 
in hospital11.  Despite the rhetoric of “team based” care and some preliminary efforts at 
“team training”, recent studies have shown that power continues to reside in the hands 
of doctors.12  
 
                                                
9  See eg, Ministerial Determination National Health (Collaborative arrangements for nurse 
practitioners) Determination 2010 
10  Personal commentary from a rural hospital administrator in NSW, August 2013.  The issue of 
doctor power when there is a shortage of doctors also occurs in other countries: see Allsop J. 
Medical dominance in a changing world: the UK case.  2006 Health Sociology Review, volume 
15(5), December, pages 444-457: see especially pages 449 and 453-454. 
11  See eg, Negus P. Greenfield D. Travaglia J. Westbrook J. Braithwaite J. How and where 
clinicians exercise power: Interprofessional relations in healthcare. 2010 Social Science and 
Medicine, volume 71, pages 898-909. 
12  See eg, Reeves S. Rice K. Gotlib Conn L. Miller K. Kenaszchuk C. Zwarenstein M. 
Interprofessional interaction, negotiation and non-negotiation on general internal medicine 
wards. 2009 Journal of Intraprofessional Care, November, volume 23(6), pages 633-645; 
Salhani D. Coulter I. The politics of interprofessional working and the struggle for professional 
autonomy in nursing. 2009 Social Science and Medicine, volume 68, pages 1221-1228. 
Braithwaite J. Westbrook M. Nugus P. Greenfield D. Travaglia J. Runciman W. Foxwell A. 
Boyce R. Devinney T. Westbrook J. Continuing differences between health professions’ 
attitudes” the sage of accomplishing systems-wide interprofessionalism. 2013 International 
Journal for Quality in Healthcare, volume 25(1), pages 8-15. 
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Within the clinical relationship between doctors and patients, the power dynamic has 
shifted somewhat towards the patient or consumer, for example, in relation to the 
doctor’s legal obligations in relation to disclosure of risk to a patient or potential 
patient13.  A doctor can no longer keep expert knowledge to himself or herself and make 
paternalistic decisions on behalf of a patient.  Australian law requires that a patient be 
told anything that a reasonable patient would want to know so far as risks and benefits 
are concerned14.  There has also been a greater policy focus on patient’s rights15, though 
the existing Australian statements of rights are aspirational rather than enforceable.  
 
While these changes to some extent modify and arguably reduce the power that doctors 
have traditionally been accorded in the clinical encounter, doctors continue to be the 
principal authority at the clinical interface.   This is not only because of their specialised 
knowledge, but because of their various powers, in the hospital and in relation to 
treatment in the community.  For example, in a business process re-engineering project 
at the Leicester Royal Infirmary, it was concluded that “local variation across the 
clinical settings was down to the high degree of control that doctors held over work 
practices and which the reengineers found difficult to reshape over short time scales”16.  
The authors of the study noted that: 
The powerbase of professional workers – here doctors – remains a crucial factor 
in the organisational context of change within the health sector.17 
 
The clinical encounter, where most preventable harm occurs and where actions to 
prevent harm can have most effect, clearly remains under the power and control of the 
doctor in most healthcare situations and almost always in hospitals.   
 
                                                
13  While “informed consent” had been the focus of the law in the US and in the UK the focus had 
been on the practice of a reasonable doctor, the Australian High Court shaped the Australian law 
in terms of disclosure of risk of what a reasonable patient would want to know in the 1992 
judgement of Rogers v Whitaker (1992) Commonwealth Law Reports, volume 175, page 479. 
14  Rogers v Whitaker 1992 HCA 58. 
15  See eg, the Australian Charter of Healthcare Rights, developed between 2007-2008 by the 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, was endorsed by the Australian 
Health Ministers Council in July 2008 and applies to all public and private health settings in 
Australia. 
16  Dickinson H. Ham C. Engaging doctors in Leadership: Review of the Literature.  2008 National 
Health Service Institute for Innovation and Improvement and Academy of Medical Royal 
Colleges, London: page 20. 
17  McNulty T. Ferlie E. Re-engineering Healthcare: the complexities of organizational 
transformation. 2002 Oxford University Press, Oxford: page 2. 
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While hospital services are provided within a bureaucracy, where non-clinical staff can 
have hierarchical power, the exercise of power in hospitals occurs in what is categorised 
in the literature as a “professional bureaucracy.” One key feature of this is: 
that front line staff have a large measure of control over the content of work by 
virtue of their training and specialist knowledge.  Consequently, hierarchical 
directives issued by those nominally in control often have limited impact, and 
indeed may be resisted by front line staff. 18 
 
Because of the primacy of the role of doctors in the hospital’s front line, understanding 
the motivation and conduct of doctors is necessary because of the impact these have on 
individual patient safety behaviour and collective professional responses.   
 
Medical causation and contribution 
Despite the repeated assertion that the vast majority of adverse events are caused by 
system failures, most studies, in fact, show that the actions (or inactions) of doctors are 
significant causes of preventable patient harm.  For example, in the Quality in 
Australian Health Care Study, the clinical situation codes for the “specialty responsible 
for an adverse event” showed that over 65% of adverse events were found to be the 
responsibility of hospital-based specialty doctors and another 6.3% were judged to be 
the responsibility of general practitioners.  Nursing was reported as responsible for 
3.6% of adverse events and almost 25% were attributed to “others”.19 
 
Looking from a different angle, the Australian Incident Monitoring System Study into 
the first 2000 voluntary incident reports in anaesthetics showed that while 90% of these 
incidents involved system failure, 83% also involved human failure.20  The incidents in 
this study were those voluntarily reported by anaesthetists and may or may not have 
involved harm to a patient.  As stated “the AIMS data represent the spectrum of 
incidents which individual anaesthetists felt motivated to report.  It is highly likely that 
                                                
18  Ham C. Dickinson H. Engaging doctors in leadership: what we can learn from international 
experience and research evidence. 2008 National Health Service Institute for Innovation and 
Improvement and Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, London: page 8. 
19  Quality in Australian Healthcare Study Consortium. (Gibberd R. Hamilton J. Wilson R. Harrison 
B, Newby L. Howley P. Dolja-Gore X.) Quality in Australian Healthcare Study. Final Report – 
Second Part. Presented to the Commonwealth Department of Health in 1996. Unpublished: 
Table 4.2.10; page 61. 
20  Webb R. Currie M. Morgan C. Williamson J. McKay P. Russell W. Runciman W. The 
Australian Incident Monitoring Study: an analysis of 2000 incident reports. 1993 Anaesthesia 
and Intensive Care, October, volume 21(5), pages 520-528: see Table 6, page 526. 
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unusual, interesting or particularly dangerous incidents are more likely to have been 
reported than mundane events”21.  It is also likely that doctors may have not reported 
incidents where they were the causative agent – either because of fear of disclosure or, 
as will be discussed in the next chapter, because of a lack of awareness that the event 
occurred.  Even with the limitations of these data, the importance of individual acts of 
omission or commission by doctors can be seen in the proportion of incidents at least 
partly attributed to human failure. 
 
In some studies, the extent of involvement of doctors in preventable patient harm has 
been assessed differently, but it remains a strong feature.  For example, the 2008 US 
study of adverse events in Medicare patients showed that 7.4% of Medicaid admissions 
involved a preventable adverse event22.  Doctors were asked for their main reasons for 
determining that the harm was preventable, and in 58% of the cases, they stated that 
“Error was related to medical judgment, skill or patient management”, in 46% 
“Appropriate treatment was provided in a sub-standard manner.”, in 17% “Necessary 
treatments were not provided” and in 14%, such “Events rarely happen when proper 
precautions and procedures are followed”.23  
 
Doctors as barriers to patient safety 
Clinical leadership, where doctors are engaged deliberately in management, leadership 
and systems change, is being touted increasingly as a means of improving quality of 
care24.  Research has shown that evidence supporting this positive proposition is scant, 
                                                
21  Webb et al 1993- see note 20: page 522. 
22  In this study, 13.5% of Medicare patients experienced an adverse event and another 13.5% 
experienced an event that caused temporary harm – study doctors found 44% of the adverse 
events to have been preventable.  See Department of Health and Human Services (USA), Office 
of the Inspector General. Adverse events in hospitals: National Incidence among Medicare 
Beneficiaries. Inspector General:  Daniel Levinson. OEI-06-09-00090, November 2010: pages i-
ii., and Table F-2 in Appendix F, page 48. 
23  Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General (USA). Adverse 
events in hospitals: National Incidence among Medicare Beneficiaries. Inspector General:  
Daniel Levinson. OEI-06-09-00090, November 2010: pages 24-25, and Table 8, page 25. 
24  See eg, Health Workforce Australia. Leadership for the sustainability of the health system: Part 
1- A Literature Review. 2012 Health Workforce Australia, Adelaide: see especially pages 20-22.  
Hamilton P. Spurgeon P. Clark J. Dent J. Armit K. Engaging Doctors: can doctors influence 
organizational performance? Enhancing engagement in medical leadership.  2008 National 
Health Service Institute for Innovation and Improvement and Academy of Medical Royal 
Colleges, London; The King’s Fund. Leadership and engagement for improvement in the NHS – 
Together we can.  Report from the King’s Fund Leadership Review. 2012 The King’s Fund, 
London. 
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but that the negative impact of lack of medical engagement is clear. 25  Whether or not 
doctor engagement does improve quality of care, doctor conduct can be a powerful 
barrier to the adoption of patient safety changes, and the adoption of other quality 
practices.  The research shows that “by virtue of their power and position, doctors are 
able to block or confound the efforts of managers or politicians to impose change via 
top-down mechanisms”26  
 
For example, despite the championing by the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, 
in the evaluation of the Australian adoption of the Correct Patient, Correct Site, Correct 
Procedure Protocol, Healy noted: 
The protocol opened up another arena for hospital power battles: between 
managers and clinicians over medical governance, between doctors and nurses 
over medical dominance, and between specialty groups over professional 
cultures since each of the surgical specialties had different checking 
procedures.27 
 
A quote from a Director of Surgery in the evaluation showed the negative “trickle 
down” impact of doctor opposition to the protocol: 
We ran it past the surgeons at our meeting and nobody was particularly negative.  
But nothing happened for a while except for some stalling.  Then the objections 
started.  The surgeons said it was another example of bureaucracy gone mad.  
The nursing staff said if the surgeons aren’t taking it seriously, why should we.  
It’s not a nursing problem.  The anaesthetists said, yes it should happen, but it’s 
not our problem, the surgeons need to take responsibility.28 
 
Where doctors are reluctant to engage fully with efforts to reduce preventable patient 
harm, this is likely to negatively affect the willingness and capacity of the entire health 
system to achieve such a reduction.  At the very least, medical reluctance will create a 
significant impediment to adoption of change. 
 
A quintessential characteristic of a dominant profession is its “ultimate control over its 
own work”29, and through the hierarchical nature of hospitals and other settings in 
                                                
25  See Hamilton et al - note 24: page 5.  See also Dickinson et al 2008 – see note 26: page 2.  
26  Dickinson et al 2008 – see note 16: page 2. 
27  Healy J. Safe surgery in Australian hospitals: implementation of the correct patient, correct site, 
correct procedure protocol. Occasional Paper 12.  September 2008, Regulatory Institutions 
Network ANU, Canberra: page 21. 
28  Healy 2008 - see note 27: pages 21-22. 
29  Freidson E. Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge. 1970 (2nd 
edition -1988 Impress) University of Chicago Press, Chicago: see especially chapters 2 and 9. 
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which medicine is practised, this control impacts on all other participants – nurses, other 
health professionals, and patients, carers and families alike.  The power traditionally 
exercised by doctors in healthcare also impacts on the regulatory tools which may be 
needed to bring about safer care.30 As Healy said: 
The health professions are being pressed to strengthen their internal governance, 
embed patient-centred standards, and engage in partnerships with external 
regulators.  Reliance upon self-regulation by the health professions is no longer 
acceptable, and is giving way to co-regulation, meta-regulation to ensure 
professional bodies regulate their members satisfactorily, and command and 
control intervention by the state in strengthening the legislation governing health 
professionals.31 
 
Research on clinical leadership concludes that the engagement of doctors in patient 
safety appears to be a necessary but not sufficient requirement for success.  Addressing 
the opposition or inertia of doctors in relation to patient safety is therefore necessary.  
This requires a better understanding of the individual and collective psychology of 
doctors. 
 
C. The pivotal role of the conduct of individual doctors 
Conduct by doctors contributes to preventable patient harm in many ways, because of 
their multiple roles in healthcare.  The first is the direct role doctors have in individual 
patient care – what is sometime called the “pointy end” of medicine in the patient safety 
literature.  Patient harm caused by or contributed to by doctor conduct of this kind can 
arise from: 
• Human errors of commission made by doctors, for example: where a wrong 
diagnosis is made; where wrong tests are conducted; where there are poorly or 
incorrectly performed procedures; where slip-lapse performance errors occur; where 
wrong procedures are followed and the many human errors identified in the studies 
discussed above; 
• Human errors of omission, where doctors do not act, such as: omitting to check test 
results or to conduct appropriate tests; failing to diagnose a condition despite a 
                                                
30  For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Healy J. Improving healthcare safety and quality – 
reluctant regulators. 2011 Ashgate Publishing, Surrey (UK).  
31  Healy 2008. – see note 30 at pages 127-128.  For examples of the types of regulatory tools fitting 
under each of these categories, see Figure 1.1, page 5. 
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patient having clear symptoms; not investigating symptoms reported by a patient or 
their carer; not washing hands or following sterile procedures; 
• Violations or deliberately unsafe acts, such as: choosing not to follow a protocol, 
procedure or other measure; choosing not to follow evidence-based guidelines; 
choosing not to inform a patient about some treatment options or about their risks 
and benefits; 
• Practices driven by various conflicts of interest, which are not disclosed to a patient, 
but which may expose a patient to greater risk of harm, for example: referring a 
patient to a hospital in which a doctor has a financial interest when this may not be 
the safest option for the patient; prescribing drugs promoted to the doctor by a drug 
company when safer drugs are available; referring patients for tests or carrying out 
procedures motivated by fear of litigation (so-called “defensive medicine”); 
recommending treatment influenced by the doctor’s specialty or “normal” process, 
when either another medical specialty may be more appropriate or safer or when 
“watchful waiting” is the best practice choice; 
• Not knowing about and not developing safeguards or patient protective strategies 
against the specific errors that are more likely in their kind of practice or with their 
specific skills, for example: the cognitive “grouping” skills required for accurate 
diagnosis can result in inappropriate categorisation based on prejudices or 
stereotypes; the “quick thinking” required in emergency treatment may not always 
be the safest or best approach for a patient when there is less urgency; and 
• Not recording or reflecting on the outcomes of patients who have a clinical 
interaction with the doctor, to determine whether there has been any preventable 
harm done to the patient, and thus not addressing what should be done either to help 
this patient or prevent harm happening again. 
 
Doctors also have crucial patient harm prevention roles in systems of care – for 
example, as members of care teams, as identifiers of risk, as notifiers of patient harm, as 
clinical leaders, and as models for and educators of less experienced or trainee doctors.  
Again, patient harm can be caused or contributed to by doctor conduct, both actions and 
inactions, in these areas, for example: 
• Through actions which increase the risk of team members not “speaking up” if they 
have a patient safety concern, for example: by encouraging and maintaining power 
differentials; by abusing or criticising staff who ask questions; by not recognising or 
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using the skills of other team members where appropriate, where this failure can 
result in risk of harm to the patient; 
• Through not acknowledging or speaking up about known human limitations in the 
design of systems of care, for example: relating to fatigue, stress and attentional 
capacity; 
• Through not raising concerns about unsafe or out-dated practices, when they are 
aware of new information or that the patterns of care create risks to patients;  
• Through not reporting or recognising patient harm when it occurs, and not engaging 
in the development of systems to look at the outcome for every patient, where 
treatment is provided or a diagnosis is made, to check for unnoticed harm; 
• Through not learning about, understanding and reporting identified risks in their 
own practice or in care provided by others, for example:  the impact of external 
stresses on their capacity; the conduct of fellow doctors who put patients at risk 
through ill-health or sub-standard performance; equipment that malfunctions; and 
• Reluctance or refusal to participate in the review of individual patient outcomes 
from their care team and to reflect on whether their own teams’ practices are 
delivering safe and quality care for their patients. 
 
At a patient safety organisation level, doctors also have important and unique roles, for 
example, in Medical Colleges, on hospital committees, protocol and guideline 
development, implementation and maintenance, peer review, determining credentialing 
rights on performance data, and engagement in accreditation processes.  The positive 
role of doctors in these processes is fundamental to achieve effective systems and hence 
to reduce or eradicate preventable patient harm.  Individual actions or failures to act can 
contribute to patient harm at this level as well.   
 
Patient safety theory has tended to identify problems arising here as “system failures”, 
but these systems are all the product of the actions and inaction of individual people and 
groups of people.  The “system” is not an external, amorphous entity, separate from the 
people involved in its existence.  Those who knowingly fail to act to prevent patient 
harm at the “system” level and those who do not look to see if there is preventable harm 
occurring, can also be considered responsible for the continuation of preventable patient 
harm, particularly where they are in leadership positions.  Such inaction also provides 
an environment where mediocre care can come to be seen as normal, acceptable practice 
by those not in leadership roles. 
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Responsibility of this kind is not like individual blame for making an error or causing 
patient harm.  Rather, this sense of responsibility is akin to the concept of “reactive 
fault” developed by Brent Fisse in relation to criminal responsibility in corporations32.  
Under this model of responsibility, doctors and health administrators, as the responsible 
actors at the top of the hospital hierarchy, would have a legal responsibility to prevent 
harm and to restore the consequences of any failures to act.  Liability would not arise 
from making the mistake or causing the harm, but from the failure to act to prevent 
repetition. 
 
Because of the power of doctors within the clinical relationship, the clinical team, 
within healthcare generally, and in hospitals in particular, the influence of doctors in 
relation to patient safety issues extends beyond individual action and inaction, to shape 
the culture of healthcare.  This power can either contribute to or reduce the tolerance of 
healthcare to preventable patient harm.  The importance of an appropriate culture in 
reducing preventable patient harm has been the subject of much discussion in patient 
safety literature33 and in boards of inquiry into specific problems34.  While culture has 
often also been attributed to “the system”, the culture of an organisation, a team and a 
practice is made up, again, of many individual’s actions and inactions, within a 
framework of values.  Doctor conduct currently dominates and shapes the norms and 
values at each level.  If doctor conduct is consistent with the primacy of patient safety, 
this can create a rich and responsive environment, with an embedded focus on 
preventing harm to patients.  The obverse is also possible. 
 
                                                
32  Fisse B. Reconstructing corporate criminal law: deterrence, retribution, fault, and sanctions. 
1983 Southern California Law Review, volume 56, pages 1141-1246: see especially pages 1195 
and following.  There is a comprehensive discussion of the concept of “reactive responsibility” 
in Cane P. Responsibility in Law and Morality. 2002 Hart Publishing, Oxford: at pages 36-39.  
33 See eg, Mannion R. Davies H. Marshall M. Cultures for performance in healthcare. 2005 Open 
University Press, Berkshire (UK); Runciman B. Merry A. Walton M. Safety and ethics in 
healthcare: a guide to getting it right. 2007 Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot (UK): see especially 
pages 271-273. 
34 See eg, Healthcare Complaints Commission (NSW) (chair: Amanda Adrian). Investigation 
Report: Campbelltown and Camden Hospitals Macarthur Health Service. December 2003; 
Inquiry into obstetric and gynaecological services at King Edward Memorial Hospital (chair: 
Neil Douglas). Final report. November 2001; Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public 
Inquiry (chair: Robert Francis QC). Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
Public Inquiry – Executive Summary. February 2013. 
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D. The potential risks of focussing primarily on “the system” 
1. Diversion of attention from other factors 
One of the key tenets of the system approach is that most patient harm doesn’t come 
from bad people intending to do harm, but from good people35 making errors in flawed 
systems, where they are trying to do their best.  The key element of the “Good people, 
flawed systems” meme is the assertion that most medical errors are caused by “the 
system”.  For example: 
As modern medicine has evolved, emphasis has been placed on the character 
and skill of the physician as the decision maker and guarantor of correct and 
appropriate care.  All too often, healthcare leaders assume that quality care can 
be ensured and mistakes avoided if they have good people working hard for 
them.  However, an ever-increasing body of evidence indicates that at least 80 
percent of medical error is system derived – meaning that system flaws set up 
good people to fail.36 
 
Such assessments have militated against individual or collective action on preventable 
patient harm.   People have seen as futile any individual attempts to change harmful 
outcomes of “the system”. 
 
Available data does not provide evidence that system errors cause most adverse events.  
For example, data from the Quality in Australian Health Care Study showed that almost 
57% of all causes of adverse events were associated with some form of “cognitive 
failure”, such as failure to synthesise, decide or act on available information (15.8% of 
the adverse events) and failure to request or arrange an investigation, procedure or 
consultation (11.8% of the adverse events).  These cognitive failures were associated 
with most of the highly preventable adverse events and most were found to have caused 
significant disability.  In addition, 19.6% of adverse events involved treatment errors, 
more than half of which involved no or inadequate treatment, and another quarter 
involved wrong or inappropriate treatment. 37  While there are certainly system 
contributors or a lack of system defences in these cases, the focus on “system” causes 
alone fails to recognise and acknowledge the central role of individual human conduct 
                                                
35  The implications of the coalescence of moral virtue and good work performance in this tenet is 
something which will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
36  Frankel L. Frankel A. Simmonds T. Vega K. Achieving safe and reliable healthcare: strategies 
and solutions. 2004 Health Administration Press, Chicago: page 5. 
37  Wilson RMcL. Harrison BT. Gibberd RW. Hamilton JD. An analysis of the causes of adverse 
events from the Quality in Australian Healthcare Study. 1999 Medical Journal of Australia, 
volume 170, pages 411-415. 
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and to look at ways of influencing this, thus thwarting or delaying effective and 
appropriate action. 
 
Patient safety experts argue that a system focus is necessary for putting defences in 
place, given that human error is ubiquitous in healthcare as in life generally.  For 
example, citing the above 80% statement as its source, the Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement’s Leadership Guide to Patient Safety said: 
Approximately 80 per cent of medical errors are system-derived.  Good people 
simply working harder will be insufficient to overcome the complexities 
inherent in today’s systems of care to prevent errors and harm to patients.  Errors 
will occur; the key is to design the care delivery system so that harm does not 
reach the patient.38 
 
What is often overlooked in these analyses is that individuals and groups of people are 
needed to design safer care systems and to enact “safer systems”.  The model of 
understanding patient harm in terms, principally, of system failure led to calls for a “no 
blame” approach to medical error and preventable patient harm.  This approach initially 
was very popular among doctors and was seen as a gateway into doctor engagement 
with patient safety: 
[A No-blame approach] was politically expedient … [i]n the USA particularly, 
where mentioning ‘medical errors’ to a doctor immediately evokes near-
Pavlovian thoughts of being named in a malpractice suit, the ‘no-blame’ 
approach represented the only hope to engage physicians in safety efforts.39 
 
While Reason’s analysis is often given as a justification for such an approach, he was 
clear in his criticism of such an interpretation of his work.  In his 1997 book Managing 
the risks of organisational accidents, where he discusses the need for a safety culture, 
he specifically denies the appropriateness of a “no-blame” approach, instead putting 
forward the concept of a “just culture”. 
A ‘no-blame’ culture is neither feasible or desirable.  A small proportion of 
human unsafe acts are egregious (for example, substance abuse, reckless non-
compliance, sabotage and so on) and warrant sanctions, severe ones in some 
cases.  A blanket amnesty on all unsafe acts would lack credibility in the eyes of 
the workforce. More importantly, it would be seen to oppose natural justice.  
What is needed is a just culture, an atmosphere of trust in which people are 
encouraged, even rewarded, for providing essential safety-related information – 
                                                
38  Botwinick L. Bisognano M. Haraden C. Leadership Guide to Patient Safety. IHI Innovation 
Series White Paper. 2006 Institute for Healthcare Improvement, Cambridge (Massachusetts): 
page 2- see also footnote 3. 
39  Wachter RM. Personal accountability in healthcare: searching for the right balance. 2013 Quality 
and Safety in Heath Care; volume 22, pages 176-182: at page 176. 
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but in which they are also clear about where the line must be drawn between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.40 
 
The concept of a “just culture” has begun to be explored in the literature41, but the 
dominant theme of public medical discourse has remained “no-blame” and “systems-
focus”.  While acknowledging that, in most cases, the occurrence of human error does 
not imply wrongdoing in a moral sense, this thesis argues that the almost exclusive 
focus on the “system” has meant that other causes and contributing factors to on-going 
high levels of preventable patient harm have not been explored42. 
 
At the most basic level, it has meant a reluctance to look at individual behaviour and 
how that is shaped, despite strong evidence that human error remains at the core of 
preventable patient harm.  The Quality in Australian Healthcare Study showed that 
81.8% of adverse events were associated with one or more human error categories, and 
in those adverse events with high preventability, only 0.7% were not associated with a 
human error.43  This data does not mean that some of the human errors were not 
contributed to by “system factors” but it shows that understanding more about 
individual human errors is an important prerequisite to understand harm causation.  
While it is important to look at the systems in which healthcare is provided to improve 
patient safety, the establishment of this false dichotomy between system factors and 
factors that are based in individual conduct has meant attention has been diverted 
outward away from a fuller understanding of the complex symbiotic relationships 
between the “system” and the individual people and groups of people who make it up. 
 
                                                
40  Reason J. Managing the risks of organizational accidents. 1997 Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 
(UK): page 195 
41  See eg, Dekker S. Just culture – balancing safety and accountability. 2012 Ashgate Aldershot 
(UK). 
42  It is also true that in any complex organisation like health care there are often multiple systems 
and a safe system would need to tease out these and their interactions.  A doctor can often be in 
several of these intersecting systems as well, sometimes in different roles: eg, a doctor may be a 
trainer of junior doctors and medical students, a trainee in a specialist College and Registrar 
employed in a hospital. 
43  Wilson RMcL. Harrison BT. Gibberd RW. Hamilton JD. An analysis of the causes of adverse 
events from the Quality in Australian Healthcare Study. 1999 Medical Journal of Australia, 
volume 170, pages 411-415; at pages 412-413. 
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2. A system focus displaces and diffuses individual 
responsibility 
Individual doctors (and nurses and administrators) often do not see that they have any 
individual responsibility to take action to address preventable patient harm when it is 
attributed to “the system”.  The “system” is seen as existing outside them and their 
sphere of influence.  Any sense of personal responsibility to change what they are doing 
to prevent patient harm is thus reduced.  As noted earlier, doing no harm to patients is a 
key element of most doctors’ perception of their moral selves and so the reduction of 
preventable patient harm would have been expected to be a top priority.  However, it 
can be argued that the focus on “systems” has facilitated selective disengagement of 
medical moral agency.  This reduction in moral agency occurs through both the 
displacement and the diffusion of responsibility for action to prevent patient harm, 
inherent in a system focus.  As Bandura said “Moral control operates most strongly 
when people acknowledge that they are contributors to harmful outcomes”44. 
 
Displaced responsibility arises when “the system” is seen as responsible.  The logic of 
such reasoning states that if the system is responsible and the system is separate from 
the people in it, individuals do not see themselves as the potential agents of their own 
preventive actions.  Displacement of responsibility can also occur when someone is kept 
intentionally uninformed or where someone chooses “not to know”.   
 
Diffusion of responsibility also weakens personal agency.  For example, where “the 
system” is seen as the problem, the notion of who is responsible to address the problem 
becomes unclear.  If it is seen as a group responsibility, this also leads to a diffusion of 
responsibility -“When everyone is responsible, no one really feels responsible”.45 
Everett C Hughes in his 1951 essay on “Mistakes at Work” goes so far as to say that in 
types of work where errors are frequent such as medicine, the collegial and structural 
systems involve the development of a “collective rationale … and defences” that tend to 
“spread the risk psychologically, morally and financially.”46  Some of these risk and 
guilt sharing practices include: supervision, consultation, cross-coverage and case 
                                                
44  Bandura A. Selective exercise of moral agency. Chapter in Thorkildsen TA. Walberg HJ. 
(editors) Nurturing morality. 2004 Kluwer Academic, Boston, pages 37-57: at page 42. 
45  Bandura A. 2004 – see note 44: at page 44. 
46  Hughes EC. Mistakes at Work. 1951 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 
August, volume 17(3), pages 320-327:at page 321. 
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conferences47.  These all constitute processes of displacement and diffusion of 
responsibility, which can undermine an individual’s sense of moral agency to identify or 
reduce the incidence of preventable patient harm. 
 
An illustration of this occurred in relation to the highly critical series of reviews of the 
Mid Staffordshire Foundation Trust in England48.  Following the release of the final 
report of the last Public Inquiry, the Chief Executive of the English National Health 
Service was asked to give evidence before the United Kingdom House of Commons 
Health Committee, which was considering the findings of the inquiry and the role 
played by Sir David Nicholson.  Nicholson was, at the relevant time, Chief Executive of 
the Strategic Health Authority in which the Mid Staffordshire events occurred.  Having 
admitted that he didn’t know of the unusually high death rate at the facility because that 
was not what was reported to him, he was extensively questioned about accountability 
and responsibility for the “system” failures49.  His evidence was summarised by a 
reporter in the following manner: 
In any case, he wasn’t going to resign.  Indeed, listening to him, you might have 
formed the impression that no one should resign.  This was because the blame 
lay not with actual people but with a mysterious and sinister-sounding entity 
known as “the system”. “The system did not take seriously enough the input of 
patients” lamented Sir David. “Patients were not the centre of the way the 
system operated. … No culture of sharing information across the system … A 
basic system problem … A big failing in the whole system…”  The system.  The 
system.  He might have been a character in a sci-fi film analysing a computer 
failure on a space ship.  Rather than, say, the head of the NHS explaining why 
patients were given no water to drink, or left to lie in sheets soaked in urine.50 
 
                                                
47  Bosk CL. Continuity and change in the study of medical error – the culture of safety on the shop 
floor.  Occasional Papers of the School of Social Sciences, Paper Number 20. February 2005 
Unpublished: accessed 17 March 2014 at http://www.sss.ias.edu/files/papers/paper20.pdf : page 
3. 
48  There have been three major inquiries into the problems identified in Mid-Staffordshire – a 
Healthcare Commission Report in 2009, an Independent Inquiry conducted by Robert Francis 
QC which published a two-volume report released in 2010 and a Public Inquiry also conducted 
by Francis, which produced a 3 volume report, which was released in 2013. All documents are 
available on the Inquiry Website at http://www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com/  
49  Full evidence given at the UK House of Commons Health Committee on 5 March 2013 on this 
issue by Sir David Nicholson can be viewed on 
http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=12729 : for discussion on system 
failure and accountability, see especially the interchange between Andrew George MP and Sir 
David Nicholson at 10:16:49 am and following. 
50  Deacon M. Sketch: Need an excuse? You can’t beat ‘the system’. 2013 UK Telegraph, 5 March 
2013: sighted 17 June 2013 at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9910554/Sketch-Need-
an-excuse -You-cant-beat-the-system.html. 
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Where health administrators, doctors and others in positions of organisational power in 
health blame “the system”, they often do not recognise that it as their job to prevent 
patient harm continuing to occur.  The system focus allows them to avoid personal 
responsibility for their role in preventable patient harm and their moral obligation to 
ensure harm is prevented from occurring again.  As has been recognised in the literature 
on selective moral agency, where “the system” is seen to be at fault or to have failed, 
the result is often that no-one sees it as their responsibility to address the problem.  
 
3. The system is composed of individuals 
There has also been a general failure to recognise that health professionals are, in fact, 
major actors in “the system” with the capacity to change and re-design “the system” to 
be safer.  Those in positions of power and leadership, like doctors and other clinical and 
non-clinical healthcare leaders, are responsible for a significant part of the design, 
operation, maintenance and change of the complex, inter-related systems that compose 
healthcare.  They may also be responsible for failing to report failures or criticisms 
which they observe or become aware of in these “systems”.   
 
Again, the Mid Staffordshire experience shows the dilution of responsibility that can 
occur when only “the system” is seen as accountable.  The National Health Service 
Medical Director, Sir Bruce Keogh was asked by Andrew George MP in the United 
Kingdom House of Commons Health Committee about who would, in future, be 
accountable for systemic failures, such as a failure to improve patient safety and care 
following the findings of the second Francis Report.  Keogh outlined the three levels of 
accountability proposed – at the clinical level, the Trust Board level and the regulator 
level: 
 
Andrew George MP: So, we’ve got accountability at the clinical level, the Trust 
Board level and then the regulators, but the people who design the system – they 
are not accountable. 
 
Sir Bruce Keogh: Well, of course, the people who design the system are 
accountable. 
 
Andrew George MP: In what way? … with the Mid-Staff’s we had “systematic 
failure”, that was “system’s failure”. Who designed the system? Who created the 
system? Who analysed the system? 
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Sir Bruce Keogh: I have no idea who designed the system.51 
 
A singular focus on “the system”, which ignores individual actions and inactions that 
compose the system, can thus sometimes be used as a diversionary tool for those who 
would otherwise have to take responsibility and act.  It also provides a convenient and 
reassuring base for denial of responsibility.  It resolves any cognitive dissonance that 
arises when a doctor’s individual psychological identity is affronted by the occurrence 
of preventable patient harm.  Similarly, calls for the need to change the “culture” of 
medicine and hospitals often fail to recognise or acknowledge that the cultures of a 
profession and an institution are created through the values and actions of individuals 
within the profession and the institutions.  To change a culture, the actions and values of 
the people in it need to change. 
 
4. A system focus has shaped data collection 
A “system” approach has even shaped the data collection surrounding preventable 
patient harm in a way that has limited the usefulness of what is collected and 
discouraged attention to information collected about, and perhaps contributed to, by 
patients.  Instead of a focus on the clinical encounter which can provide data that is 
more meaningful to both doctors and patients (such as patient outcomes data), what has 
been collected has often related to process failures.  These may be more readily 
“countable” but may not be seen by doctors as effective meaningful measures “at the 
bedside”.  This can reduce the quality of the data, because it becomes seen as data 
collection for data collection’s sake, rather than being a bi-product of what the doctor 
sees as his or her priority –the clinical care of the patient.   
 
Similarly, the lived experience of patients or the observations of their carers that are 
relevant to determining quality and safety in healthcare are often marginalised and not 
included in data collected.  This is often argued to be because patient or carers do not 
know what to expect, and so their reports are likely to be unreliable and not useful.  
However, the general absence of consumer-focussed outcome data and the significant 
under-reporting of preventable patient harm by doctors leads to an incomplete picture of 
                                                
51  Full evidence given at the UK House of Commons Health Committee on 5 March 2013 can be 
viewed on http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=12729 The exchange here 
was transcribed by the thesis author from this broadcast.  The full evidence from which it is 
extracted can be found from12:12:01pm to 12:15:40pm. 
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the performance of both systems of care and individuals within the system.  Consumer 
experience of the system is not effectively used to examine the safety performance of 
healthcare in most hospitals and community settings52, because the “system” defines its 
own measures of success.  The ubiquitous joke about the surgeon who tells the family 
that surgery was a success, but unfortunately the patient died, is a black humour 
example of the way the system focus has tended to shape data collection.   
 
E. Doctors as the legally responsible actor – the mixed 
“system” message 
Despite the significant focus on the “system” as the cause of preventable patient harm in 
the last 15 years, when a patient is harmed in healthcare and legal action is taken by the 
patient, the doctor is generally sued personally rather than as part of the responsible 
“system”.  For example, he or she is usually personally named in the litigation and his 
or her personal medical indemnity is invoked (often by the hospital) to provide at least 
partial recompense to the patient for the harm, depending upon the contractual 
arrangements between the doctor and the hospital in which the services were provided.  
For many doctors, the perception is that the “system” approach is shallow and does not 
protect a doctor when most needed.  This can lead to doctors distancing themselves 
from “the system” and, not unreasonably, they may feel abandoned by it.  Under these 
arrangements, hospitals, governments and other liability funders benefit financially 
from the doctors’ medical indemnity insurance.  There has always been another 
“system” based alternative called “enterprise liability”, which is a legal arrangement 
similar to vicarious liability for an employee’s actions, but which focuses on all who 
participate in “the enterprise”, not just employees53.  However, this is not widely used. 
 
While the threat of litigation is much lower than many doctors believe, the risk-averse 
approach of many health-system risk managers is antithetical to the “no blame” culture 
                                                
52  There are some exceptions to this – the development of Patient Reported Outcome Measures over 
the past 30 years has been one example, but few of these are routinely collected.  See Nelson E. 
Eftimovska E. Lind C. Hager A. Wasson JH. Lindblad S. Patient reported outcome measures in 
practice. 2015 British Medical Journal, 10 February, volume 350, article g7818 at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g7818   
53  Review of Professional Indemnity Arrangements for Healthcare Professionals. Compensation 
and Professional Indemnity in Healthcare – Final Report.  November 1995. Australian 
Government Publishing Service Canberra (PIR Final Report): “Enterprise liability – a different 
model” at paragraphs 9.137 -9.141. This model applies a more truly “systems” approach to 
liability, by a collective acceptance of liability and financial consequences. 
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discussed in the system paradigm.  It can also be antithetical to the “just culture” 
paradigm as well.  The legal concept of negligence awards damages on the degree of 
loss suffered rather than the degree of wrongdoing of the defendant.  This mismatch 
between the degree of moral wrong-doing associated with doctor’s action and the 
damages which may be payable often results in medical outrage or distress, partly 
because of a lack of understanding of the basis for damages.  A damages award for the 
consequences of a momentary lapse, which fulfils the legal definition of negligence but 
for which most doctors will feel sympathy, is seen by many doctors as unreasonable 
punishment, even where they are covered by insurance.  While a key reason for the 
existence of the tort system is the allocation of financial losses associated with an 
injury, the tort system is founded on a “failure of a duty of care”.  Such language 
generally invokes feelings of both personal and professional shame in a doctor.  Where 
the doctor sees the injury as an “innocent mistake”, they see the damages paid as unjust 
punishment.  The sociologist Charles Bosk describes this phenomenon as the “contested 
concept” of error in medicine.54  
 
One consequence is that doctors generally feel unsafe and under threat, just in case a 
patient suffers harm in their care.  The whole practice of so-called “defensive medicine” 
is argued to be a consequence of the need to allay this fear55. In some situations, a 
doctor performing the defensive medicine gains a financial advantage from so doing, so 
not all “defensive medicine” is driven by fear alone.  Equally not all fear-driven practice 
change has been negative.  Fear of complaint or litigation has led to improved practices, 
such as better record-keeping and better explanations of risks to patients, which can lead 
to better patient care and outcomes56.  However, because defensive practices are not 
focussed on likely benefit to the patient but rather protection of the doctor, it is of 
concern57.  Where a defensive treatment is invasive, it may give rise to additional risks 
to the patient.  At the very least, it adds costs to the healthcare system, through 
unnecessary or poorly directed testing. 
 
                                                
54  Bosk 2005 – see note 47: accessed 21 August 2013.  
55  See eg, Hancock L. Defensive Medicine and Informed Consent. – A Research paper. Prepared 
for the Review of Professional Indemnity Arrangements for Healthcare Professional. May 1993 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 
56  Mulcahy L. Disputing doctors – to socio-legal dynamics of complaints about healthcare. 2003 
Open University Press, Maidenhead (England): pages 108-109. 
57  PIR Final Report 1996 – see note 53, paragraphs 5.215 to 5.217. 
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The work for this thesis started with a widely-held assumption that in fact, fear of 
litigation in a fault-based system resulted in the under-reporting of adverse events, the 
high incidence of preventable patient harm and the lack of action on prevention.  
Analysis of the various studies in Chapter 1 show that preventable patient harm and 
poor reporting of patient harm occur across all jurisdiction, representing many different 
litigation and compensation cultures.  High levels of harm and low levels of reporting 
appear to be universal problems, regardless of the nature of and basis for compensation 
for those who suffer preventable harm in healthcare.  This has been noted in passing by 
others, with a range of reasons being postulated for the consistency of these issues 
across diverse countries58.  Some of these relate to the so-called “culture of medicine”.  
With the formal setting of international standards for medical training59, and the 
replication of similar hospital-based intern training processes across the world, a 
common professional culture transcends national boundaries.  Other discussion has 
focussed on doctor self-perception and group identification between doctors.  The 
common education and training processes of doctors and the self-beliefs created in this 
formative environment have shaped a recognisable self-identity for those who go 
through this professionalisation process, referred to in this thesis as the Doctor Identity.   
 
F. People as complex systems 
The earlier part of this chapter described some of the complex roles of doctors within 
the broader healthcare system, that may give rise to preventable patient harm.  The 
health system is complex, and the development of durable and consistently effective 
ways of addressing patient safety has proved to be a “wicked problem60”, not readily 
                                                
58  See eg, Robbennolt JK. Apologies and Medical Error. 2008 Clinical Orthopaedics and Related 
Research, 30 October, volume 467, pages 376-382. 
59  The World Federation for Medical Education, which was established in 1972 under the auspices 
of the World Health Organisation, set about establishing agreed international standards on 
medical education in 1997. For further information go to: http://wfme.org/standards, viewed 18 
January 2016.  Prior to this international effort, there were national variations, but in countries 
which have an English or European medical history, the common heritages within the profession 
across nations created a similar “culture”. 
60  The theory of “wicked problems” was first expounded by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber in 
1969 and published in 1973. Rittel HWJ. Webber MM. Dilemmas in a general theory of 
planning. 1973 Policy Sciences, volume 4, pages 155-169.  A more recent exposition by Jon 
Kolko describes a wicked problem as “a social or cultural problem that is difficult or impossible 
to solve for as many as four reasons: incomplete or contradictory knowledge, the number of 
people and opinions involved, the large economic burden, and the interconnected nature of these 
problems with other problems”.  Kolko J. Wicked Problems: Problems worth saving – A 
Handbook and A Call to Action, 2012 Austin Center for Design, Austin (Texas): page 10. 
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solved despite it being widely acknowledged in public discourse.   The external 
complexity is compounded with the internal complexity of all human beings and their 
emotional and psychological responses, shaped at the biological level.   
 
When the high risk of preventable patient harm came to significant public attention in 
the decade between 1995-2005, the knowledge base to address “systems failures” in 
organisations had achieved some maturity in an academic sense, following the ground-
breaking work of Rassmussen61 in the 1980s and Reason in the 1980s-90s.62  These 
authors identified the types of human behaviours and situations likely to result in error 
and harm.  Their contribution helped popularise the understanding of the complex web 
of causation which could set up a situation where harm was an "embedded pathogen” 
waiting to express itself in any complex system.  In turn, this moved the medical 
discourse about “adverse events” and “medical error” away from a more simplistic, 
individualistic tort law based approach, which was designed to find someone to blame 
who could pay damages.   
 
It is argued in this thesis that a system perspective was a necessary, but not sufficient. 
step towards safe and effective patient safety-centred healthcare.  There was another 
body of knowledge which was emerging about human performance vulnerability, based 
in human biology.  Neuroscience and the biological bases of psychology, human 
emotions and “reason” has, over the last decade, moved into centre stage, to explain 
why human beings sometimes act or fail to act, when there is a known problem to be 
addressed. This thesis argues that a broad understanding of these developments is core 
to progress in relation to patient safety, and to assist doctors to have greater well-being.  
It is not just the complexity of external systems that are relevant to understanding 
human error and preventable patient harm.  The complexity of the internal systems in 
each and every doctor, and their collective professional identity, has created 
corresponding internal system strengths and vulnerabilities. 
                                                
61  Rasmussen J. Human errors – a taxonomy for describing malfunction in industrial installations. 
1982 Journal of Occupational Accidents, volume 4, pages 311-333; Rasmussen J. Skills, rules 
and knowledge; signals, signs and symbols and other distinctions in human performance models. 
1983 IEEE Transactions on systems, man and cybernetics, volume SMC-a3(3), May/June, pages 
257-266. 
62  Reason J. Human Error. 1990 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  Reason J. Managing 
the risks of organizational accidents. 1997 Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot (UK). 
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G. The Doctor Identity 
Most analyses of human psychology and neuroscience have, at their core, consideration 
of how a person sees themselves and how they believe they are seen by others.  Not a 
theme limited to psychology, it was also described in the important sociological works 
of Canadian-American Erving Goffman between 1959-198163.  The growing 
understanding of neuroplasticity and the ability to scan brain activity in real time have 
shown interrelationships between the physical brain, thoughts, actions and emotions.  A 
person’s sense of identity and their responses to threats to that identity can create 
biological wiring in neural circuitry, which fundamentally affects future behaviours and 
perceptions.  The possible impact on doctors of these neurobiological processes and the 
consequent impact on their approach to identifying and acting on preventable patient 
harm are the subjects of Chapter 3 below. 
 
The scientific understanding of neuroplasticity - the ability of the brain to adapt and 
change throughout life - has undergone exponential growth since the middle of last 
century.  For a long time, the relationship between the physiology of the brain as an 
organ and “the mind” were poorly understood.   The brain was seen as a physiological 
“machine” of fixed capacity, with little power to change and the creator of automatic 
behaviours and reflexes that were “hard-wired” 64.  For many years, there was a view 
that there was a single period of development of the brain in childhood, and after that, it 
became, to a large extent, fixed65.  Once damaged, it was generally seen as 
unrepairable66.  The mind was seen as non-physical and linked somehow to the concept 
                                                
63  Erving Goffman’s books related to this topic include: The presentation of self in everyday life 
(1959), Asylums – Essays on the Social Situation of Mental patients and other inmates (1961), 
Stigma – Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963); Frame Analysis – An Essay on 
the organization of experience (1974); and Forms of Talk (1981) – for full details, see 
Bibliography. 
64  Doidge N. The Brain that changes itself. Revised Edition 2010 Scribe Publications, Melbourne: 
see page xiii-xiv. 
65  One of the earlier modern pioneer researchers into the plasticity of neurons, Santiago Ramon y 
Cajal, stated in 1913-14 that “nerve paths are something fixed, ended, immutable.  Everything 
may die, nothing may be regenerated.”  Cajal SR. Degeneration and regeneration of the nervous 
system. Translated by RM May. 1928 Oxford University Press, London. For further discussion 
of Cajal’s work and understanding, see Azmitia EC. Cajal and brain plasticity: insights relevant 
to emerging concepts of mind. 2007 Brain Research Reviews, volume 55, pages 395-405, who 
notes that “these descriptions of a static mature nervous system influenced neuroscience thinking 
for over 50 years.”: at page 396. 
66  The contrary to this, as it is has become known over the past decades, is described in Doidge N. 
The Brain’s Way of Healing – remarkable discoveries and recoveries from the frontiers of 
neuroplasticity. 2015 Scribe Publications, Melbourne: especially Chapter 3 – the Stages of 
Neuroplastic healing – how and why it works. 
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of soul, which made it capable of change and learning.  Over the four centuries since 
Descartes outlined these revolutionary ideas, a vast number of scientists, physicians, 
physicists and other have gradually learned how nerve tissue functions and passes 
information electro-chemically, how the brain and nervous system are not in fact hard-
wired and unchanging, and that the operation of the mind and physiology of the brain 
and body are closely linked67.   
 
In 1890, the psychologist William James first used the term “plasticity’ in relation the 
effect of behaviour modification on the habits of adults68.  He saw these established 
patterns of behaviour as difficult to change, and at the core of social functioning69.  The 
human cortex, which is responsible for sensory input, limb movements and most of the 
mental functions associated with being human70, is now known to be highly changeable.  
A new understanding of brain plasticity has emerged which sees the brain and the whole 
nervous system in a much more dynamic way: 
[T]he nervous system [is] a continuously changing structure of which plasticity 
is an integral property and the obligatory consequence of each sensory input, 
motor act, association, reward signal, action plan or awareness.  In this 
framework, notions such as psychological processes as distinct from organic-
based functions or dysfunctions cease to be informative.  Behavior will lead to 
changes in the brain circuitry, just as changes in the brain circuitry will lead to 
behaviour modifications.71 
 
While the exact processes at work are still the subject of theoretical and practical 
study72, this description of neuroplasticity shows both the promise and the threat of this 
vital characteristic of the human brain.   
 
                                                
67  For an excellent outline of this growth in understanding from Descartes to the period before the 
last 50 years, see Wickens AP. A History of the Brain – from Stone Age Surgery to modern 
neuroscience. 2015 Psychology Press, East Sussex: from chapter 4-13.  
68  Pascual-Leone A. Amedi A. Fregni F. Merabet LB.  The Plastic Human Brain Cortex. 2005 
Annual Review of Neuroscience, volume 28, pages 377-401: see page 378 
69  James W. The Principles of Psychology. Volume 1. 1890 Dover Publications, New York: page 
121, where James states that “Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious 
conservative agent.” 
70  These more complex cortical functions include memory, language, abstraction, creativity, 
judgment, emotion and attention. See Swenson RS. Review of Clinical and Functional 
Neuroscience. 2006 Dartmouth Medical School, Dartmouth.  Online version available at: 
https://www.dartmouth.edu/~rswenson/NeuroSci/index.html : see especially Chapter 11. 
71  Pascual-Leone 2007 – see note 68: at page 379. 
72  See for example, Shaw CA. McEachern JC. Towards a theory of neuroplasticity.  2001 
Psychology Press, Philadelphia. 
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Firstly, the human brain and its processes arose evolutionarily to allow humans to adapt 
rapidly to changing circumstances to survive in an uncertain world.  The plasticity of 
the brain provides an evolutionary survival advantage, in situations where to survive 
required the ability to move through different landscapes, physical and social situations 
and threat environments.  When the environments change, a plastic brain can adapt to 
new conditions and experiences, and can develop appropriate responses much faster.  
These responses and any subsequent changes in the brain and neural systems can be 
positive or negative in terms of behavioural change, both immediately and in the future.  
For example, fear can provide immediate high energy in an emergency to allow action 
to avoid harm.  It can also lead to long term avoidance or attack responses, which may 
or may not be useful and appropriate over time.  It may lead to anxiety and on-going 
stresses that last well beyond the emergency. Plasticity allows all these adaptations – 
whether they are useful or not. 
 
Secondly, changes happen in different ways in different parts of the brain.  Where the 
brain is exposed to something perceived as a threat, the first adaptation is likely to occur 
in the lower parts of the brain – in the limbic system (particularly in the amygdala, 
which is activated by fear and triggers the brain’s “first alarm system”73) and the brain 
stem, which manages the main autonomic and instinctual physiological responses eg 
blood pressure, circulation, breathing, digestion.  The perception, awareness and 
memory of threat is a primal survival advantage and these parts of the brain 
physiologically prepare the body to respond to a threat.  Because those parts of the brain 
do not distinguish between fear of being eaten by a predator or more psychological 
threats, it can be triggered relatively easily.  This is commonly known as the “fight, 
flight or freeze” response and it results in a cascade of hormonal and physiological 
responses.  The impact of this threat response will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3.  What is useful to understand is that threat-based responses in the brain, once 
triggered, are harder to change, because that is how they were designed.  A human 
being’s brain is shaped evolutionarily to remember and react to threats at a pre-
conscious level, because sitting around and thinking as a predatory threat came close 
was not a useful survival strategy.   
 
                                                
73  Yoder C. The Little Book of Trauma Healing. 2005 Good Books, Intercourse (Pennsylvania, 
USA): page 19. 
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Thus, threat based awareness and responses are easy to “wire” and harder to disconnect 
in the brain.  What is then required usually is the development of other pathways, which 
can moderate the threat pathways, using the “thinking” part of the brain.  While 
plasticity enables this to occur, this takes time, awareness and practice, compared to the 
almost instantaneous, instinctive threat reaction. 
 
A threat to identity is the psychological equivalent of the threat from a large carnivorous 
predator – it is a threat to existence, from the perspective of the person’s psychological 
well-being. When someone’s identity and sense of Self strongly coincides with their 
professional identity, a threat to that identity will give rise to the same psychological 
response.  With the primary directive on doctors psychologically to “first, do no harm”, 
preventable patient harm provides an immediate challenge to identity at many levels.  
Chapter 3 will look at how the neurobiology associated with threats to identity and other 
environmental factors associated with medical training and practice, such as long term 
stress and fatigue, impact on human beings and doctors in particular, especially in 
relation to preventable patient harm. 
 
The self-identity of a Doctor involves complex and sometimes conflicting expectations 
which are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  It includes high 
expectations of error-free performance, and a relationship of trust between the treating 
doctor and a patient, where the doctor will benefit, not harm, the patient.  A doctor is 
expected to be both courageous and speedy in saving a life, to reflect on careful 
observations and to “know” everything necessary to cure someone.  Many of these 
expectations create specific vulnerabilities and some even require conflicting skills.  For 
example, a doctor who is able to leap in to save a life in an emergency, with a certain 
and steady conviction that he or she is always right, may have much more difficulty 
reflecting on uncertainty, where watchful waiting may be the appropriate strategy for 
the best outcome for the patient.  Equally a doctor may have great technical skills but 
lack interpersonal skills, which can discourage a patient from communicating with him 
or her.  Where a doctor sees particular characteristics as making a good doctor, these are 
generally internalised as part of their professional identity.   
 
Chapter 2 –Doctors and the Doctor Identity 
 
75 
Both doctors and patient have, for various reasons, adopted an unrealistic concept of 
infallibility in medicine74.  The strength of the various enculturation processes discussed 
in Chapters 5 and 6 occur within a “perfectibility model”75.   Criticisms or apparent 
failures in patient care are seen not only as a threat professionally, but as a threat to their 
perception of themselves as a good person.  There is significant evidence that where a 
patient complains about an error, a bad outcome or inappropriate interpersonal 
behaviours, a doctor’s first response is to externalise the blame for any event and 
criticise the complainant.  The limited research done in this area concludes that 
“Commonly, [for a doctor who has had a complaint made against him or her] the 
reconstruction of a positive sense of identity relies on deconstruction and undermining 
of the complainant and the complaint”76.  The evidence for and consequences for 
doctors of the threat to identity caused by preventable patient harm is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4.  Chapter 3 first outlines some of the common human responses to such 
threats, and their neurobiological underpinnings.  
                                                
74  Leape LL. Error in medicine. Chapter 2 in Rosenthal MM. Mulcahy L. Lloyd-Bostock S. 
Medical mishaps – pieces of the puzzle. 1999 Open University Press, Buckingham (UK): at page 
22. 
75  Mulcahy L. Disputing Doctors – the socio-legal dynamics of complaints about medical care. 
2003 Open University Press, Maidenhead (UK): page 105. 
76  Mulcahy 2003 at note 75: page 104. 
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Chapter 3: Identity under threat – How human psychology 
and neuroscience can impact on patient safety 
A. Defending the Doctor Identity 
This chapter outlines how the ordinary processes of human psychology amplify the 
likelihood of preventable patient harm in medical care, because such harm creates a threat 
to a doctor’s identity. Threat responses include processes that cause errors and potential 
signs of patient harm to be hidden from a doctor’s conscious awareness.  Psychological 
defence processes can also thwart a doctor’s recognition of his or her role in an error or 
preventable harm, even where it is brought to a doctor’s awareness.  For example, intrinsic 
uncertainty involved in much medical understanding, caused by variations in patient 
response and physiology, can serve as a defensive shield to an identity threat.  Furthermore, 
when harm occurs and it is apparent, doctors may well have difficulty acknowledging their 
role in such an error or harm, even to themselves, because of the psychologically protective 
processes of cognitive dissonance. 
 
The Chapter also examines the emerging understanding in neuroscience about the brain’s 
response to threat.  When threatened physically or psychologically, all human beings react 
initially by automatic defensive responses coming from the part of the brain that regulates 
autonomic and emotional responses (the brainstem, amygdala and limbic system), rather 
than the thinking part of the brain (the cortex).  Specific skills and training are required to 
approach such threats in a more cognitively thoughtful manner, and for them to be able to 
be turned into “learning opportunities”. 
 
Not harming a patient is seen as a professional imperative, so when doctors are responsible 
for harm they can feel personal shame.  This internalised shame can be compounded by fear 
of previously experienced or observed shaming processes which can occur in training and 
in peer review processes when an error occurs.  Shame can significantly impact on a 
doctor’s perception of themselves. 
 
Often harm to patients results from errors which may not be considered morally culpable, 
but for which a doctor is nonetheless personally responsible.  Slip/lapse errors are an 
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everyday example.  The human nature of the error made is often overwhelmed by the 
consequences of the error.  In particular, hindsight bias often results in harsh judgements of 
self or others, particularly where significant patient harm results from a simple error or 
missed or unavailable information.  These biases, especially if exhibited by colleagues, can 
also contribute greatly to the underlying threat to identity experienced by a doctor.  
Anticipatory fear provides a background level of stress and elevated threat arousal.  The 
emotions that occur when a threat becomes more concrete can also prime the limbic system 
which moves reactions from the thinking brain at a time when thought may be needed most. 
 
The external observable consequences of all these factors and the undermining of personal 
and professional identity that can arise from an occurrence of preventable patient harm and 
error has wide-reaching effects.  Not only is it likely to contribute to slow progress towards 
reduction in patient harm, but the long term psychological well-being of doctors and their 
resilience are also compromised.  This can lead to emotional burnout and to people leaving 
the profession prematurely.  In a concerning number of cases, the doctor commits suicide or 
suffers long-term trauma-related consequences.  This serves neither patients nor doctors 
well.  It results in high on-going personal and economic costs to users and providers of 
services in the health system, as well as the broader community. 
B. Problems outside of the radar – the psychology of attention 
1. The importance of conscious awareness 
For errors and patient harm to be acted upon and prevented in future, they must first be 
noticed.  A lack of conscious awareness of events can arise from multiple reasons, many of 
which are characteristic of modern healthcare environments.  External factors include a 
busy and chaotic environment, with many distractions and competing demands for 
attention.  Fatigue and stress can aggravate environmental inattention.  Normalisation of 
some errors that occur frequently can result in a lack of recognition of their potential for 
harm or even that they have occurred.   
 
All the triggers of awareness come through sensory input such as sight, hearing, smell or 
touch and this sensory input causes attention to shift to that input and to apply the thinking 
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brain to that input. For many centuries, it has been known1 that a significant amount of 
additional sensory information enters the subconscious mind below the level of awareness, 
some of which can influence behaviour, emotional responses and even regulate what is 
“known” at the conscious level2. 
 
Lack of awareness can arise from what is called “inattentional or perceptual blindness”.  It 
may be affected by various unconscious strategies, employed by the mind to avoid fear and 
anxiety.  It may also be used in pursuit of an overriding goal of the brain’s executive 
function, which is centred in the pre-frontal cortex (a “cortical goal”).  Such goals can 
include such things as acting consistently with one’s sense of identity.  Executive control in 
the brain governs planning, judgment, decision-making, anticipation and reasoning.  A key 
role of this function is to sieve the potential sensory inputs speedily and efficiently at a pre-
conscious stage to allow focus on and exclusion of material from attention:3.  
 
The leading cognitive psycho-physiologist, Professor Emanuel Donchin, argues that 
“information processing is largely pre-conscious or not available to awareness” that the 
executive function’s selective approach to perception means that probably 99.9 per cent of 
                                                
1  For example, in 1704, Liebniz wrote: 
…there are hundreds of indications leading us to conclude that at every moment, there is in us an 
infinity of perceptions, unaccompanied by awareness or reflection; that is, of alterations in the soul 
itself, of which we are unaware because these impressions are either too minute and too numerous, 
or else too unvarying, so that they are not sufficiently distinctive on their own 
Leibniz GW. New Essays on Human Understanding. First published in 1765, but principally written in 
1704, as a response to Locke’s 1690 Essay Concerning Human Understanding. This quote is taken 
from the edition, translated and edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. 1981 Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge: page 53 - see also pages 52-60. 
2  For a brief discussion on historical understandings and scientific disputes about this issue, see Merickle 
P. Perception without awareness. 1992 American Psychologist, volume 47, pages 792-795. 
3  Funahashi S. Neuronal mechanisms of executive control by the prefrontal cortex. 2001 Neuroscience 
Research, volume 39(2); pages 147-165: page 147, who says that: 
 To perform these processes efficiently and successfully, we need to monitor the external world 
continuously, pay attention to necessary information, input wanted information, retrieve related 
information from long-term memory, manipulate and integrate information, and then output 
appropriate information to particular brain areas. We also need to suppress unnecessary output 
to inappropriate brain areas and inhibit inappropriate actions to perform temporally coordinated 
sequential actions. The functions produced by these processes have been called higher cognitive 
functions, or more specifically ‘executive function’.  Executive function is considered to be a 
product of the coordinated operation of various processes to accomplish a particular goal in a 
flexible manner. The mechanism or system responsible for the coordinated operation of various 
processes is called ‘executive control’ 
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cognition may be unconscious, through extremely rapid parallel processing of all perceptual 
input and that these limits are both necessary and desirable.4 
 
How and what the brain brings to an individual’s conscious awareness from the huge 
potential amount of sensory input every moment of the day is not yet completely 
understood, although a number of processes have been subject to considerable experimental 
work.  Such pre-conscious selection functions are important for a doctor, particularly where 
there are overwhelmingly large amounts of stimuli in a busy and chaotic hospital 
environment.  The exact biological mechanisms of selective attention5 and of the various 
forms of error and self-deception that may occur6 remain speculative, but they play an 
important role in attention and in the development and elaboration of mental schema, 
discussed below.  
 
Attention is important because a lack of awareness of a problem will result in a failure to 
prevent harm occurring at the time.  At a wider system level, problems not attended to 
cannot be reported – currently the healthcare system’s trigger for quality improvement 
actions.  Systems for reporting errors or preventable patient harm in hospitals are known to 
be greatly under-utilised7.  Two relatively recent studies – one in the US8 and one in 
Australia9 – showed that only a small proportion of preventable patient harm is notified 
through regular, mandated reporting systems.  In the US study of Medicare patients, 86% of 
adverse events were not reported, and of the most serious cases (resulting in permanent 
                                                
4  Personal correspondence of Donchin with Daniel Goleman, reproduced in Goleman D. Vital Lies, 
simple truths – the psychology of self-deception 1985 Touchstone Books, New York: page 73. 
5  Kanwisher N. Neural events and perceptual awareness. 2001 Cognition, volume 79, pages 89-113. 
6  Von Hippel W. Trivers R. The evolution and psychology of self-deception and commentaries on this 
paper. 2011 Behavioral and Brain Sciences, volume 34, pages 1-56. 
7  See eg, Aspden P. Corrigan JM. Wolcott J. Erikson SM. (editors) Patient Safety – achieving a new 
standard of care. Committee on Data Standards for Patient Safety, Institute of Medicine Quality 
Chasm Series. 2004 National Academy Press, Washington DC. 
8  Levinson DR. Hospital incident reporting systems do not capture most patient harm. Department of 
Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, Report No. OEI-06-09-00091. January 2012.  
This report shows that 86% of patient harm suffered by Medicare patients in the US is not reported.  
The harm was assessed using a retrospective case note analysis methodology and this was matched 
with actual incident reporting system data. 
9  Silas R. Tibballs J. Adverse events and comparison of systematic and voluntary reporting from a 
paediatric intensive care unit. 2010 Quality and Safety in Healthcare, volume 19(6), pages 568-571. 
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disability or death) only 11% had been reported10.  Under-reporting of preventable patient 
harm has been a known issue for a long time.11  The reasons for this have been recognised 
as complex and multifactorial, including intrapersonal, interpersonal, institutional and 
societal level barriers.12  The group of barriers of most relevance here are the intrapersonal 
factors.  Doctors tend to adopt a “deny and defend” attitude if they are identified as having 
caused harm to a patient13.  Many of the barriers to reporting listed are based on fear, 
anxiety, a sense of helplessness and shame.  These negative emotions, in response to the 
threat to identity, can prime the unconscious not to pay attention next time.  While 
deliberate failure to report has been given as a partial explanation for the under-reporting of 
patient harm and error, the psychological threat response offers an alternative explanation 
for a significant proportion of the under-reporting, with a proportion of this coming from 
inattentional blindness.  An example of this effect occurs where doctors appear to have no 
recollection of an event, where a patient was harmed, or what occurred around that event.14  
 
2. Inattentional blindness 
a. The role of working memory 
In neuroscience, inattentional blindness is linked to the limited brain processing capacity 
associated with “working memory”15. Working memory is described as “a cognitive system 
                                                
10 Levinson 2012 – see note 8: page 12 and following. 
11  Stanhope N. Crowley-Murphy M. Vincent C. O’Connor A. Taylor-Adams SE. An evaluation of 
adverse incident reporting. 1999 Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, volume 5, pages 5-12.  
12  See eg, Vincent C. Stanhope N. Crowley-Murphy M. Reasons for not reporting adverse incidents: an 
empirical study. 1999 Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, volume 5(1), pages 13-21; Kaldjian 
LC. Jones EW. Rosenthal GE. Tripp-Reimer T. Hillis SL. An empirically derived taxonomy of factors 
affecting physicians’ willingness to disclose medical errors. 2006 Journal of General Internal 
Medicine, volume 21, pages 942-948; Perez B. Knych SA. Weaver SJ. Liberman A. Abel EM, Oetjen 
D. Wan TTH. Understanding the barriers to physician error reporting and disclosure: A systemic 
approach to a systemic problem. 2014 Journal of Patient Safety, March, volume 10(1), pages 45-51. 
13  Perez et al 2014 – see note 12; Rocke D. Lee WT. Medical errors: Teachable moments in doing the 
right thing. 2013 Journal of Graduate Medical Education, December, volume 5(4), pages 550-552. 
14  The thesis author saw many examples of this both in her role as chair of the Professional Indemnity 
Review, when doctors were accused of negligence, and in her membership of various Quality 
Committees and Root Cause Analysis teams, where the doctors concerned were often apparently not 
aware of much of what had occurred. 
15  The working memory model of Baddeley and Hitch, documented in 1974, superceded the previous 
short term memory model, though terms are still used in relation to attention.  Baddeley AD. Hitch GJ. 
Working Memory. Chapter in Bower GA. (editor) The Psychology of Learning and Motivation. 
Volume 8. 1974 Academic Press, New York: pages 47-89: see especially pages 76-81. 
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in which attention and memory interact to produce complex thought”16.  While there are 
several theoretical models used to explain working memory17, its role is quite different 
from what is commonly called “memory”: 
Working memory is not for “memorizing” per se, but rather, it is in the service of 
complex cognitive activities, such as language processing, visuospatial thinking, 
reasoning and problem-solving and decision making18 
 
Working memory is the process by which bodily sensations and perceptions are integrated 
into thoughts and actions.  It is like a “transit hub’’ where sensory input is linked to 
memories of previous experiences or knowledge, so that future and present actions can be 
determined from a broader footplate of information.  All sensory information is sieved 
before coming to conscious attention, sometimes by the sub-conscious and sometimes in 
working memory, to determine what needs to be brought to conscious attention.  When 
information is received by the senses, it does not automatically transfer to conscious 
attention.  The sieving role is important because the senses are always bombarded by much 
more information than can ever be processed in the conscious mind19. 
 
Theories of “working memory” recognise that there are limits on the capacity of working 
memory, and that the brain’s actions in relation to sense information and stored memory 
information triggered by the sensations, is complex.20  More recent models of “working 
                                                
16  Shipstead Z, Redick T, Hicks K, Egle R. The scope and control of attention as separate aspects of 
working memory. 2012 Memory, volume 20(6), pages 608-628: at page 608. 
17  For a detailed summary of the various models, see Miyake A. Shah P. Emerging consensus, unresolved 
issues, future directions. Chapter in Miyake A. Shah P. (editors) Models of Working Memory – 
mechanisms of active maintenance and executive control. 1999 Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: pages 442-481.  This book also details the common threads among these theories: see 
Chapter 13, pages 442-481. 
18  See Miyake et al 1999 at note 17: page 445. 
19  Ratey J. A user’s guide to the brain – perception, attention and the four theaters of the Brain. 2002 
Vintage Books, New York: page 111. 
20  As noted above, at note 15, in 1974, Baddeley and Hitch hypothesised a three-element model for 
working memory, which included the central executive mediated attentional control system, the visuo-
spatial sketch pad for visual images and the phonological loop, for speech-based information.  
Baddeley A. Working Memory. 1992 Science, 31 January, volume 255, number 5044, pages 556-559: 
Abstract at page 556. Later studies have shown that there is a similar information “buffer system” for 
other senses, and that these specialised buffers work concurrently and independently of each other. 
LeDoux J. The Emotional Brain – the mysterious underpinnings of emotional life. 1996 Touchstone 
Books, New York: pages 270-271. 
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memory” all share a number of common characteristics or understandings.  These were 
summarised in 1999 by Miyake and Shah21: 
• Working memory is not a structurally separate box or place in the mind or brain; 
• Working memory’s maintenance function is in the service of complex cognition; 
• Executive control is integral to working memory function; 
• Capacity limits reflect multiple factors and may even be an emergent property of the 
cognitive system; 
• A completely unitary, domain-general view of working memory does not hold; 
• Long term knowledge plays an integral role in working memory performance. 
 
b. The limited capacity of working memory 
The capacity of human working memory has been the subject of research for a long time.  
Recognition of its limits22 are important in relation to patient safety, because these limits 
also apply to what doctors, as human beings, can keep in their minds at any one time.  It 
also explains why sometimes the unconscious may simply ignore information which may 
later prove to be important. The current scientific consensus is that working memory limits 
exist, and are affected by multiple factors, including: 
• Information decay; 
• Efficiency of controlled attention or executive mechanisms; 
• Limits in the availability of ‘activation’; 
• Limits in processing speed or efficiency; 
• Lack of skill or knowledge for efficient encoding and retrieval; 
                                                
21  Miyake et al (editors) 1999 – see note 17. 
22  The previous theory of short term memory saw it as a limited neural workspace, able to only hold 
about seven (±two) pieces of information at any moment.  Miller G. The magical number 7, plus or 
minus 2.  1956 The Psychological Review, volume 63(2), pages 81-96.  There were various ways this 
volume of information was able to be increased by “chunking” individual items in groups together for 
example - for discussion on “chunking’ see pages 92-95.  However, other researchers showed that the 
actual number of chunked items, which can be brought to and held in attention at any one time is 
probably only around four. Cowan N. The magical number 4 in short-term memory – a reconsideration 
of mental storage capacity. 2001 Behavioral and Brain Sciences, volume 24, pages 87-185: see 
especially Table 1, page 90.  Further research has shown that sometimes different streams of 
information can be managed concurrently, using different parts of the cognitive network, but that as a 
situation becomes more complex, so it becomes more important to have regard to the limitations on 
working memory. Kieras D. Meyer D. Mueller S. Seymour T. Insights into Working Memory from the 
perspective of the EPIC architecture for modelling skilled perceptual-motor and cognitive human 
performance. Chapter 6 in Miyake et al 1999, at note 17, pages 183-223: page 184. 
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• Similarity-based interference; 
• Lack of inhibitory control; and 
• Limitations in communications and interactions among different subsystems or sub-
components 23.  
 
The operational capacity of an individual’s working memory is also affected by individual 
differences in capacity to attend to what is received by someone from their senses – often 
called “bottom up processing”.  For example, a doctor expert in auscultation may be able to 
“hear” subtle auditory input and discriminate sounds, compared to another person without 
those skills.  Operational capacity is also affected by differences in the ability to bring 
attention to goal-related information and to discard goal-irrelevant information – called 
“top down processing”24.  For example, in a busy or chaotic hospital environment, an 
enhanced ability to identify and focus on relevant information and to exclude irrelevant 
information from attention will allow more relevant information to be included in medical 
decision-making.   
 
The operational capacity of working memory can also be affected by fatigue, both physical 
fatigue25 and executive function and self-regulation “use” fatigue26.  Use fatigue commonly 
occurs when there is a need to make consecutive choices or decisions, or to exercise 
extended periods of self-control.  Research indicates that self-regulation and executive 
functioning both require focussed or directed attention27.  The ability to attend to something 
voluntarily (rather than being awash in a sea of unfiltered sensations and memories) is 
pivotal to pursuing a cognitive purpose and to carrying out appropriate and effective 
                                                
23  Miyake et al (editors) 1999: Table 12.1, page 421.  
24  Shipstead Z. Redick T. Hicks K. Engle R. The scope and control of attention as separate aspects of 
working memory. 2012 Memory, volume 20(6), pages 608-628: at page 608. 
25  Nilsson J. Söderström M. Karlsson A. Lekander M. Åkerstedt T. Lindroth N. Axelsson J. Less 
effective executive functioning after one night’s sleep deprivation. 2005 Journal of Sleep Research, 
volume 14, pages 1-6. 
26  Amir O. Tough choices: how making decisions tires your brain. 2008 Scientific American: Mind 
Matters. July 22 at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tough-choices-how-making/ .  Accessed 
on 14 January 2013.  
27  Kaplan S. Berman M. Directed Attention as a Common Resource for Executive Functioning and Self-
Regulation. 2010 Perspectives on Psychological Science, volume 5(1), pages 43-57. 
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action.28.  Such attention requires neural effort and the more complicated and intrusive the 
environment, the greater the effort is required to focus attention.  
 
Factors which can adversely affect a person’s working memory capacity are important to 
understand the possible limitations on conscious awareness of preventable patient harm in 
healthcare.  Whatever the extent of an individual doctor’s working memory capacity may 
be, many of the environmental factors in the everyday operation of healthcare are likely to 
place further limits on that capacity.  This, in turn, can limit the doctor’s capacity for 
executive control functions such as the integration of multiple complex information with 
knowledge learned some time ago, especially when he or she has been on a long and 
arduous shift, or is otherwise suffering from fatigue or stress. 
 
c. Long term memory activation and schemas 
Signals from the senses can also activate information held in long term memory, which is 
the brain’s “system for permanently storing, managing, and retrieving information for later 
use”29.  These signals trigger the retrieval of potentially related information from previous 
experience. This information then becomes part of the new “working memory” 
consideration.  Memories from the past can thus colour the present and impact on what is 
seen and brought to attention in the present.  For example, if the memory triggered is 
remembered as not unusual and low threat, then the sense signal may be ignored by the 
unconscious.  Long term memory and its activation is also one of the mechanisms for 
learning30.  Triggering allows what is now observed to “teach” or refine the stored memory 
from what is now being brought to attention.   
 
Long term memory is often divided into two forms: explicit memories and implicit 
memories.  Explicit memories are essentially conscious memories, such as facts and 
                                                
28  Voluntary, deliberate attention differs from involuntary attention, which occurs automatically when 
new, exciting or interesting information is present and appears to operate in a different neural circuit. 
The human brain is wired to attend to novelty.  Seeley W. Dissociable Intrinsic Connectivity Networks 
for Salience Processing and Executive Control. 2007 Journal of Neuroscience, volume 27(9), pages 
2349-2356. 
29  Definition from http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=15299 , accessed 24 
December 2012. 
30  Ratey 2002 – see note 19: pages 190-191. 
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information, including what happened, when and where.  They are often called “verbal” 
memories as they can be communicated at will in words.31  They include knowledge about 
things (declarative memory), including one’s own life-story (episodic or narrative 
memory).  
 
Implicit memory, in contrast, “is responsible for the laying down of skills and habits that, 
once learned, do not have to be consciously thought about, such as eating, talking, riding a 
bike, and the way to go about making friends.  They are inflexible, slow but extremely 
reliable”32.  Such memories are unconscious and include procedural memory about how to 
exercise skills or do tasks, which have become automatic, so past experiences do not need 
to be consciously recalled each time (that is, when one has become “unconsciously 
skilled”).  Implicit memories also include automatic and conditioned emotional responses 
such as how to respond to fear or joy, or what to do when a threat appears.  Implicit 
emotional memories can include unconscious responses to situations, people or individual 
sensations like a smell or a sight, where an emotional response was produced when last 
encountered.  These reactions can be very rapid and can occur without conscious 
awareness33.  For example, fear responses can be “primed” by context, which is “a 
collection of many stimuli and is dependent on accurate memory of situations”34 where the 
threat has occurred before.   
 
In the case of threats, speed of response is an important evolutionary advantage, because 
the responses (often in the flight, fight, freeze continuum) are triggered quickly, allowing 
rapid action against a threat.35  Emotional memories are essentially either appetitive 
(gaining pleasure) or defensive (avoiding pain)36.  While the complete physiology of 
                                                
31  Verbal memories can be drawn upon as needed, and are mediated through the temporal lobe memory 
system, including the hippocampus.  LeDoux 1996 – see note 20: page 321, note 3. 
32  These forms of implicit memories involve the basal ganglia and cerebellum.  Ratey 2002 – see note 19: 
page 200. 
33  Damasio A. Descartes’ Error – emotion, reason and the human brain. 1996 Papermac, London: pages 
131-134. 
34  Ratey 2002 – see note 19: pages 234-235. 
35  LeDoux 1996 – see note 20: page 266. 
36  Lang P. Bradley M, Cuthbert B. Emotion, motivation, and anxiety: brain mechanisms and 
psychophysiology. 1998 Biological Psychiatry, volume 44, pages 1248-1263. 
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implicit memories and their storage is not clear, the amygdala (a structure in the mid-brain) 
is implicated in both positive and negative emotions37.   Whether emotional arousal comes 
from a potentially life-threatening stimulus (like an explosive noise or an animal attack) or 
from a learned fear, the response generated involves the amygdala38. The proximity and 
close connections of the amygdala to the brain stem allow sense inputs to “short-cut” 
directly to actions to tackle the threat before the thinking brain has had time to react.39 
 
To convert a sensation or an event to an explicit memory, the information must firstly come 
to awareness and then be encoded, through a process called “long term potentiation”40.  The 
hippocampus creates links between the separate pieces associated with the sensation or 
event41 and this becomes what is seen as the memory of that event – the blend of sensations 
and emotions associated with it.  However, each time it is recalled, it is altered by the 
circumstances in which it is remembered, with new information being added and possibly 
forgotten.  
 
The formation of an emotional memory involves several different processes as well.  An 
emotional stimulus goes from the brain’s sensory thalamus through two different pathways 
– a “high road” which involved the sensory cortex and the “low road” involving the 
amygdala.  This dual process allows rapid action on the simplified image in the amygdala, 
and slower, more detailed consideration in the cortex.42  Emotional experience can be 
                                                
37  Lanteaume L. Khalfa S. Regis J. Marquis P. Chauvel P. Bartolomei F. Emotion induction after direct 
intracerebral stimulation of human amygdala. 2007 Cerebral Cortex, June, volume 17(6), pages 1307-
13. 
38  LeDoux 1996 – see note 20: pages 244-246 
39  The role of the amygdala is important in relation to fear and threat: 
The amygdala is the area of the brain most involved in fear.  Stimuli have a direct pathway through 
the sensory filter of the thalamus to the amygdala, which can then mobilize the body through its 
brainstem connections.  If you see a snake, or anything that looks like a snake, in the corner of a 
shadowy garage, the amygdala is immediately triggered and you react before cognizing the image.  
The image triggers the optic nerve to send a signal to the brain.  On its way to the cortex, the signal 
takes a short route to the amygdala, which shouts “Emergency!” to the rest of your body, triggering a 
cascade of reactions: your heart rate soars, your blood pressure increases and your senses become 
heightened as your body prepares to take action. 
Ratey 2002 – see note 19: page 233. 
40  Ratey 2002 – see note 19: page 191. 
41  Ratey 2002 – see note 19: pages 190-193. 
42  The following example shows the complementary and comparative nature of these processes: 
87 
Chapter 3 –Identity under threat 
stored in explicit memory as the fact of feeling an emotion and in implicit memory as the 
emotion itself.  Implicit memory formation is not part of the conscious memory formation 
system43 – implicit emotional memories appear to be directly mediated through the 
amygdala with no hippocampal involvement44.  In addition, when fear is overwhelming, the 
hippocampus is not physiologically able to process the memories of those events as explicit 
memories, so they may remain only as implicit memories45. While implicit memories are 
unconscious, they can be extremely powerful because they “become unconscious sources of 
intense anxiety that potentially exert their opaque and perverse influences throughout 
life”46.  Unconscious fear memories that are “established through the amygdala appear to be 
indelibly burned into the brain … [and] are probably with us for life”, though it is possible 
to exercise control over them.  However, before control can be exercised, for example, by 
the executive control part of the brain, it is necessary to be consciously aware of the fear 
responses and their potential areas of influence.47 
 
                                                
Imagine walking in the woods.  A crackling sound occurs.  It goes straight to the amygdala through 
the thalamic pathway.  The sound also goes from the thalamus to the cortex, which recognizes the 
sound to be a dry twig that snapped under the weight of your boot, or that of a rattlesnake shaking its 
tail.  But by the time the cortex has figured this out, the amygdala is already starting to defend 
against the snake.  The information received from the thalamus is unfiltered and biased towards 
evoking responses.  The cortex’s job is to prevent the inappropriate response rather than to produce 
the appropriate one…. From the point of view of survival, it is better to respond to potentially 
dangerous events as if they were in fact the real thing than to fail to respond.  The cost of treating a 
stick as a snake is less in the long run, than the cost of treating a snake as a stick. 
LeDoux 1996 – see note 20: pages 163-165. 
43  LeDoux J. Emotional memory systems in the brain. 1993 Behavioural Brain Research, volume 5, 
pages 69-79: at page 70. 
44  Izquierdo I. Medina J. Bianchin M. Walz R. Zanatta M. Da Silva R. Silva M. Ruschel A. Paczko N. 
Memory processing by the limbic system: role of specific neurotransmitter systems. 1993 Behavioural 
Brain Research, volume 58, pages 91-98; LeDoux 1993 – see note 43: pages 69-79; McGaugh J. 
Intoini-Collison I. Cahill L. Castellano C. Dalmaz C. Parent M. Williams C. Neuromodulatory systems 
and memory storage: role of the amygdala. 1993 Behavioural Brain Research, volume 58, pages 81-
90. 
45  Van der Kolk BA. The Body Keeps the Score: Memory and the Evolving Psychobiology of 
Posttraumatic Stress. 1994 Harvard Review of Psychiatry, January/February, volume 1(5), pages 253-
265. 
46  LeDoux 1996 – see note 20: page 245. 
47  Hariri A. Mattay V. Tessitore A. Fera F. Weinberger D. Neocortical modulation of the amygdala 
response to fearful stimuli. 2003 Biological Psychiatry, volume 53, pages 494-50. 
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Long term explicit memory stores facts about prior observations and experiences, including 
emotions, associated with these observations in systematic groupings of information, often 
called “schemas”48.  Schemas alter over time, as experiences influence what is perceived.   
Perception is interactive, constructed.  It is not enough for information to flow 
through the senses; to make sense of the senses requires a context that organizes the 
information they convey, that lends it the proper meaning.  The packets that 
organize information and make sense of experience are “schemas”, the building 
blocks of cognition.  Schemas embody the rules and categories that order raw 
experience into coherent meaning.  All knowledge and experience is packaged in 
schemas.  Schemas are the ghost in the machine, the intelligences that guides 
information as it flows through the mind.49 
 
As the organising mechanisms for knowledge in the brain, schema allow the recognition of 
both known and new experiences and their classification.  Schemas facilitate making 
decisions and acting with incomplete information, as doctors are obliged to do all the time.  
The mind does most of this at a level below consciousness – selecting appropriate schemas 
outside of awareness.  Schemas can also hold memories of emotions related to these 
observations from earlier experiences.  Emotions can act as a powerful memory enhancer, 
by reinforcing knowledge with feelings.  However, emotional arousal can also narrow the 
focus of awareness, so it can also impair memories of associated details that are considered 
peripheral to the stimulus that is the focus of the emotional arousal.  In cases of significant 
trauma or overwhelming fear, the emotions triggered may be all that is recorded in the 
brain, and the experience will be recorded in a non-narrative form.  For example, the 
emotions may be associated with a sound or a smell that was laid down at the same time, 
but which does not form part of an explicit memory story.  
 
Past experiences and information stored in particular schema can shape what is brought to 
attention from the senses through a process called “priming”.  Priming occurs when an 
ambiguous observation of the senses activates a schema.  Schema activation allows a very 
rapid sieving of the material received by the senses.  For example, if there are implicit 
memories associated with schema, the priming can result in emotional priming without an 
                                                
48  The concept of schemas (or schemata) was first introduced in Piaget’s work on child development: see 
Paiget J. Biology and Knowledge – An essay on the relations between organic regulations and 
cognitive processes. (Translated into English by Beatrix Walsh from 1967 Gallimard edition) 1971 
University of Edinburgh Press, Edinburgh. 
49  Goleman 1985 - see note 4: page 75. 
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explicit memory to provide context, such as a high level of anxiety not clearly associated 
with the events now happening. Equally, a schema may result in something being ignored, 
because its conscious recognition, rather than its occurrence, may give rise to another 
overwhelming threat.  An example of this kind of schema is a doctor’s experience of 
making an error in training when a senior doctor shames them or where they witness a 
doctor being humiliated in a Mortality and Morbidity committee50.  Because of the implicit 
nature of some emotional memories, much of the psychological turmoil when a doctor 
suffers a threat to identity may work at an unconscious level and is hidden from attention. 
Evidence for this comes from the effect on doctors whose errors becomes public and who 
then experience normal, healthcare environments with a sensitising hyper-vigilance51, akin 
to that which occurs in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder52.  Research has demonstrated that 
what is detected by the senses can have a significant psychological impact, even though 
there is no conscious awareness of having seen or heard the event53.  
d. Sensations and memories – putting it all together 
The psychology of inattentional blindness is complicated.  Evolutionarily, it was important 
to notice something new or novel, because it may have been a threat to survival. If a human 
failed to act when a threat presented, he or she may not live to pass on their genes.  Equally, 
if the working memory was subject to too many stimuli, the brain might become 
overwhelmed and choose attention poorly.  This leads to habituation, where after a period 
many things fall into the background.54  Where errors or practices which potentially create 
                                                
50  The harrowing stories of young doctors are reflected in the research on understanding why doctors 
don’t report when an error or patient harm occurs.  For example, an intern reported: “Mortality and 
morbidity conferences were just brutal.  We wouldn’t go, we wanted nothing to do with them.  The 
students would actually sometimes go to see the residents they didn’t like just get roasted”. Kaldjian 
LC et al. 2006 – see note 12, at page 946.  
51  See eg, Christensen JF. Levinson W. Dunn PM.  Heart of Darkness – the impact of perceived mistakes 
on physicians. 1992 Journal of General Internal Medicine, July/August, volume 7, pages 424-431. 
52  Trauma can arise from many sources. The main characteristic of a traumatic event or environment is 
that it creates a sense of being overwhelmed and powerless, so that normal coping mechanisms are 
overwhelmed.  For example, it can include dignity violations (where people are shamed and 
humiliated), and participatory trauma (where people cause trauma to others or feel powerless to stop 
someone being traumatised).  It can include working or living under abusive or threat-filled 
circumstances over a long period. There are many responses to trauma, including Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder. See Yoder C. The Little Book of Trauma Healing – when violence strikes and 
community security is threatened. 2005 Good Books, Intercourse (Pennsylvania USA) 
53  Mack A. Rock I.  Inattentional Blindness 2000 MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts): see especially 
Chapter 8 – Inattentional blindness and implicit perception and Chapter 11 – Some conclusions. 
54  Van Hecke ML. Blind Spots.  2007 Prometheus Books, Amherst (USA): page 74. 
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harm are habituated, they may well not be noticed.  In relation to identity threat, not 
noticing something which only becomes a threat if brought to attention (like a mistake) can 
create a different form of habituation.  Where implicit memories of shame or humiliation 
from paying attention or noticing an error or harm are triggered, the brain’s response may 
simply be to exclude the information from conscious awareness. 
 
What makes it onto the working memory platform, in the end, is determined by the 
executive control function in the brain.  In 2000 Baddeley added another element to the 
working memory model – the episodic buffer.  This draws information from the various 
specialised sense buffers or slave systems and the activated long term memory and holds 
information from all these sources in an integrated form.  It is from here that the executive 
function of the working memory can draw some or all of that information into conscious 
awareness.55  The information received by the senses and drawn from memory does not 
come to conscious awareness until it is moved onto the working memory platform – 
sometimes known as the global workspace56. 
 
3. Inattentional blindness, preventable patient harm and Self-
Identity 
Inattentional blindness may result directly in preventable patient harm, when information 
that is important fails to come to attention.  For example, the more input the brain is 
receiving (such as in a busy or chaotic environment) or the more conscious material is 
already there (such as when a situation is new or novel), the more likely the brain is to 
suffer from inattentional blindness to other information.  An example of this is the higher 
risk of error recognised in busy emergency departments and with inexperienced doctors57.   
 
Inattentional blindness also accompanies the actions of someone who is an expert.  When a 
set of actions or conditions becomes habituated, such as when someone becomes expert at 
something, these actions move from conscious awareness to unconscious action in the basal 
                                                
55  Baddeley A.  The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory? 2000 Trends in Cognitive 
Science, volume 4(11), pages 417-423. 
56  Baars B. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. 1988 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
57  Bleetman A. Sanusi S. Dale T. Brace S. Human factors and error prevention in emergency medicine. 
2012 Emergency Medicine Journal, volume 29(5), pages 389-393. 
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ganglia.  The advantage of the basal ganglia is that actions carried out from such habits use 
fewer neural resources and less energy.  As an energy-efficient way for the brain to work, it 
frees more of the limited resources available in the working memory to look at novel 
information.  However, it also means less conscious attention is allocated by the brain to 
those habitual actions or conditions.  This, in turn, means that crucial details may be 
missed.  A medical example of the negative patient safety consequences of the blindness 
which accompanies expert habituation may be where a doctor is doing a form of surgery 
that he or she has done successfully many times and does not notice that he or she has 
damaged a blood vessel.  In addition, where someone is an expert, inattentional blindness 
can be driven by the brain’s expectations.  The more expert one is at a task, the more 
frequently the visual impact of the action has been recorded in the brain.  This in turn 
results in an expectation that things will be as they always were before.58 
 
Working memory may also mistakenly link information in a sensation to long term 
memory, through the process of activation.  For example, when a doctor is informed of a 
provisional diagnosis by a colleague in a busy emergency room, the doctor’s memories of 
previous patients, knowledge he or she has been taught, experiences of diagnosing this 
condition and similar conditions, will all be brought into working memory and this may 
wrongly direct the doctor’s thinking about the current patient. 
 
The biological limits on working memory and the brain’s unconscious sieving functions, 
that are necessary to avoid cognitive overwhelm, add to the potential for error.  The greatest 
perception someone can have of what is happening at any one time is, at best, a partial 
awareness, and therefore a partial picture of “reality”.  Only what comes into conscious 
awareness can be consciously “known”.  All people present at an incident then have a 
partial perception of all the things that could be known or observed at any point and most 
will be different one from the other.  The ability to have several people looking at the one 
situation can increase the chances of being able to see more of reality, but it will 
nonetheless be a partial picture, and the sharing of the pictures can introduce other errors.  
A partial picture is the best that any human being can do.  
                                                
58  Summerfield C. Egner T. Expectation (and Attention) in visual cognition. 2009 Trends in Cognitive 
Science, September, volume 13(9), pages 403-409: at page 403. 
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Individual schemas also affect what is brought to attention. The selection and operation of 
schemas is particularly affected by past and present emotions. 
Schemas are intelligence in action: they guide the analysis of sensory input in the 
sensory store, simplifying it and organizing it, weeding out what is not salient.  
They scan information that passes out of the sensory store, and filter it through the 
priorities and relevancies they embody.  Schemas determine which focus attention 
seeks, and hence what will enter awareness.  When driven by emotions like anxiety, 
schemas impose themselves with special force.  Another implication of this model 
is … [that] schemas are the lions at the gate of awareness: they determine not only 
what enters but what does not.59 
 
The anxiety referred to here is the stress reaction caused by either physical or psychological 
threat.  A threat to a primary schema, like an identity schema, will generally create high 
levels of stress.  Anxiety can be generated by both conscious and unconscious memories 
associated with particular stresses in a number of ways.  Stress has a differential impact on 
memory, depending upon the nature of the stress.  Stresses which are short-term and 
traumatic can lead to enhanced memories of the event through the facilitatory impact of 
adrenaline on memory60.  A so-called “flashbulb memory” is “made especially crisp and 
clear because of its emotional implications.”61 For example, a trainee doctor may miss a 
diagnosis leading to immediate harm to a patient and so she or he will always remember the 
missed symptoms or processes and be especially alert to these62.  This can be of benefit in 
the future to prevent repeat events.  However, it may also shape the approach a doctor takes 
to all future patients or a class of patients.  Such shaping – particularly where it is not 
consciously recognised - can skew a doctor’s diagnostic cognitive processes so that the 
doctor is more likely to “jump to a wrong conclusion” in a future case.   
 
The fear of litigation, public complaint or peer criticism can be especially strong, where the 
Doctor Identity schema includes a perfect performance sub-schema.  The fear can be 
compounded by anticipated shame or humiliation, if an error could impact on that person’s 
pubic or professional reputation.  There are also the ever-present confounders of 
                                                
59  Goleman 1985 - see note 4: pages 82-83. 
60  LeDoux 1996 – see note 20: chapter 7 and page 243. 
61  LeDoux 1996 – see note 20: page 206-208. 
62  Groopman J. How doctors think. 2007 Scribe, Melbourne. 
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uncertainty and fear of vulnerability.  In the words of one doctor: “legal anxieties may serve 
as a conscious or – more probably – an unconscious pretext to avoid directly confronting 
other, more difficult issues”. 63  The fear underlying these thoughts can also operate “out of 
awareness” as an initial sieve to perception. 
 
If stresses suffered by doctors are longer term, the physiology of stress results in a negative 
effect on the laying down of longer term memory, principally through long term stress 
hormone inhibition of the operation of the hippocampus.  These situations can occur, for 
example, when a doctor is working long hours in a chaotic environment, which requires 
high level cognitive functioning such as decision-making and analysis.  Persistent long term 
stress gives rise to long term anxiety, and can “impair explicit memory functions in 
humans”64  
 
At a third level, stress impacts on implicit memory.  Golman notes that there are 
physiological responses which dull physical pain and stress to enable humans to function in 
a high threat situation, when objectively they should be experiencing severe disabling pain.  
While this is a very useful survival mechanism when one is facing life-threatening physical 
danger, he goes on to say that “the brain’s tactic for handling physical pain through muting 
awareness offers itself as a template for dealing with psychological and social hurts as 
well”.65 
 
Inattention can be aggravated by distractions and “multi-tasking”, which is now recognised 
as generally diminishing the performance of each task.  Multi-tasking may arise from a 
misguided self-belief that someone can do multiple things equally well at once66 or may be 
imposed by work place demands that are unreasonable.  These environmental effects will 
also actively divert attention, particularly if the inattention is based on an implicit defence 
against an identity threat if it came to conscious awareness.   
                                                
63  Kapp MB. Legal anxieties and medical mistakes – barriers and pretexts. 1997 Journal of General 
Internal Medicine, December, volume 12, pages 787-788. 
64  LeDoux 1996 – see note 20: page 242. 
65  Goleman 1985 - see note 4: page 39 
66  Hallinan JT. Why we make mistakes. 2009 Broadway Books, New York: see especially Chapter 5, 
pages 76-90. 
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Schemas shape and are shaped by the individual’s concept of self.  In fact, self-perception 
is defined through a set of schemas – some of which are core to the person’s identity (for 
example, ‘I am a good doctor’) and others which may be considered lower order schemas 
(for example, ‘I am a good gardener’ or ‘I am not good at sport’.).  Where presented with 
information that challenges lower order schema, these generally do not threaten the sense of 
identity.  However, where a higher order schema is challenged, information that does not fit 
with these important schemas, will be ignored or selectively edited to protect the high-level 
schema.  Whether the identity trait is negative or positive,67 self-confirmatory information 
is sought out and contradictory information is resisted, with people actively reinterpreting 
experiences to fit their self-schemas. 
When a threat to the self-concept looms, anxiety can be warded off by a healthy 
self-schema through an artful manoeuvre or two.  Events can be selectively 
remembered, reinterpreted, slanted.  When the objective facts don’t support the self-
system, a more subjective recounting can.  …  [T]he wherewithal to do this is 
entirely outside awareness.  The self-system can sanitize its portrayal of an event 
through the filtering that goes on prior to awareness.  I need confront only a 
finished, polished view of myself: the dirty work goes on behind the scenes. …  
Such self-serving reinterpretations of reality go on for most of us some of the time, 
but we are rarely found out.  After all, the dissembling goes on discreetly, behind 
the screen of the unconscious: we are only its recipients, innocent self-deceivers.68 
 
The purpose of such self-deceptions is to avoid anxiety – one of the organising motivations 
of the psychological Self-system.  This deep desire to avoid anxiety in the Self results in the 
unconscious acting as a vigilant early warning guard in what it brings to awareness and 
what is not noticed.  Psychologists refer to this as a diversionary schema.  Goleman referred 
to them as “black holes of the mind, diverting attention from select bits of subjective reality 
– specifically, certain anxiety-evoking information”69.  This can happen even more quickly, 
again without conscious awareness, if the schema has been awoken or “primed” by some 
previous trigger.  Priming will impact on what comes to conscious awareness and on 
actions taken, without any awareness that the schema has been triggered.70 
                                                
67  Swann Jr WB. The trouble with change – self-verification and allegiance to the Self. 1997 
Psychological Science, May, volume 8(3): pages 177-180. 
68  Goleman 1985 - see note 4: pages 100-101 
69  Goleman 1985 - see note 4: page 107. 
70  Fine C. A mind of its own – how your brain distorts and deceives. 2006 Allen and Unwin Pty Ltd, 
Sydney: see especially The Secretive Brain – Exposing the guile of the mental butler at pages 111-137. 
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The fundamental organising processes of thinking, memory and sensory input all work 
towards a partial awareness of reality: 
A schema implicitly selects what will be noted and what will not.  By directing 
attention to one pattern of meaning, it ignores others.  In this sense, even the most 
innocuous schema filters experience on the basis of relevancy.  This filter of 
perception becomes a censor when it suppresses available information on the 
ground that it is not just irrelevant, but forbidden.71 
 
The application of this to doctors’ collective and individual awareness of preventable 
patient harm provides a potential explanation for some of the more puzzling aspects of 
clinician behaviour.  The deeply embedded “perfect performance” schema of the Doctor 
Identity is faced frequently with conflicting and fear-generating messages about error and 
patient harm.  The intellectual knowledge that existence of error and patient harm is very 
common sits uncomfortably next to the belief that these are not appropriate in a “good” 
doctor, and the often personal or vicarious experience of the humiliation and shame of 
having an error exposed in training, in the workplace or, worst of all, in public. 
 
These are exactly the kinds of threat, which might lead to the development of diversionary 
schemas in the unconscious and support inattentional blindness.  This would protect the 
doctor’s primary identity schema, from the traumatic awareness of error and patient harm in 
his or her practice.  It is not, then, a question of denial or lying at this level, but rather of a 
Self-protective gap in perception, a psychological blind spot which occurs at a pre-
conscious level.  If the error or preventable patient harm makes it through to a doctor’s 
conscious awareness, then the human mind provides other defences to these potential 
assaults on the Doctor Identity discussed in later parts of this chapter. 
 
C. Decision-making, vulnerabilities and identity defences 
Decision-making is a core activity for doctors – diagnosis, prognosis and treatment choices 
all involve decisions, which could potentially harm a patient.  The ability to make right 
decisions is a core skill in the “good doctor” schema. Unfortunately, decision-making, 
                                                
71  Goleman 1985 - see note 4: page 106. 
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particularly in circumstances of uncertainty, is an error-ridden activity for all human beings.  
For doctors, part of this comes from the uncertainty and “unknowns” that exist when a 
doctor examines a patient and makes a decision, and part comes from the complexities 
associated with working in a strained and dysfunctional health system.   
 
As can be seen in Chapter 5, the education and training of doctors highly values the 
knowledge learned and the ability to “know” things is a core part of being a good doctor.  
With the huge scope of knowledge that now is encompassed by medicine and the large 
variations in patients and diseases, it is highly unlikely that any single doctor could possibly 
“know” everything, so a recognition of ordinary human limits to the acquisition and 
retention of knowledge is important for a doctor to practice safely.  In addition, “knowing” 
is itself an activity in which errors are regularly made, because of how our brains process 
information. 
 
In this section, the thesis looks at how normal characteristics of medical decision-making 
can facilitate doctors’ denial of responsibility for preventable patient harm arising from 
error or lack of knowledge.  This is principally due to the innate and sometimes 
exaggerated claim of “uncertainty” in medicine.  It also looks at the nature of various 
thought processes, such as blind spots, biases and heuristics.  Many of these are associated 
with the valued decision-making skills of doctors, such as pattern recognition and 
diagnosis, rapid processing of information in an emergency and remaining focussed in an 
often chaotic, stressful and distracting environment.  Doctor awareness of the risks in their 
own thought processes and of strategies that can be used to detect and prevent common 
thought errors is a powerful tool for prevention of harm.  Recognition of the probability of 
errors in human thought is the first step towards prevention.  An attitude witnessed in 30% 
of intensive care staff in the research of Sexton, Thomas and Helmreich72, which says “I 
know about errors, but I haven’t ever made one” is a false belief, which produces (and 
reproduces) unsafe healthcare. 
 
                                                
72  Sexton JB. Thomas EJ. Helmreich RL. Error, stress and teamwork in medicine and aviation: cross-
sectional surveys. 2000 British Medical Journal. 18 March, volume 320, pages 745-749: at page 747. 
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1. The utility and risks around uncertainty 
Uncertainty characterises parts of decision-making in medicine, which doctors describe as 
an art rather than strictly a science.  Sir Donald Irvine pondered on its impact:  
[D]octors often have to make decisions – even if it is a decision to do nothing – on 
clinical data that are normally incomplete.  Like most doctors, I have worried 
whether the child who has a headache is in fact suffering from the onset of a minor 
infection or meningitis.  Is the vague pain in that man’s chest a symptom of heart 
disease or indigestion? This kind of problem solving involves considerable 
judgement and pragmatism as the process of unravelling the problem follows its 
course often over some time.  It is therefore prone to error.73 
 
Historically, medicine relied on creating principles from observations and hypotheses, often 
in an environment where the underlying understanding of human physiology, the cause of 
disease and the impact of treatment was itself either partial or limited.  This often led to 
false certainty, because of the limited nature of an individual doctor’s experience. 
… “clinical experience” is frequently personal mythology based on one or two 
incidents, or on stories by colleagues. … Each man (sic) builds up his own world of 
clinical experience and assumes personal … responsibility for the way he manages 
cases in that world.  The nature of that world is prone to be self-validating and self-
confirming. 74 
 
This description of the “method” of medicine was written just before the 1972 publication 
of Archie Cochrane’s landmark work Effectiveness and efficiency: random reflections on 
health services75,which promoted the importance of randomised controlled trials and what 
became known as “evidence-based medicine”.  Within 20 years, the Cochrane 
Collaboration was established76, to expand the evidence base of clinical effectiveness for 
doctors and patients.  “Evidence-based medicine” has also been encouraged through 
government bodies like the National Institute for Clinical Studies in Australia, the UK 
                                                
73  Sir Donald Irvine is a past President of the British General Medical Council.  Irvine D. The Doctors’ 
Tale – Professionalism and Public Trust. 2003 Radcliffe Medical Press, Abingdon (UK): page 23. 
74  Freidson E. Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge. 1970 (2nd edition 
-1988 Impress) University of Chicago Press, Chicago: page 172. 
75  Cochrane AL. Effectiveness and efficiency –random reflections on health services. 1972 The Nuffield 
Provincial Hospitals Trust, Nuffield (England).  Available at: 
http://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/sites/files/nuffield/publication/Effectiveness_and_Efficiency.pdf  
76  For brief history of the Cochrane Collaboration see: http://www.cochrane.org/about-us/history : the 
first Cochrane Centre was funded by the British National Health Service in 1992, after two decades of 
working on the development of a better evidence base for perinatal medicine, funded by the World 
Health Organisation, the US Public Health Service and the UK Department of Health. 
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National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, and the US Agency for Healthcare 
Policy and Research77.   
 
However, an improved evidence base for medical decision-making has not removed 
uncertainty from medicine78.  The expansion of medical knowledge has added complexity 
and uncertainty.  There is also the intrinsic uncertainty which comes from the varying 
circumstances of patients and doctors79.  Where patients enrolled in a clinical trial are 
different from another patient group, in relation to characteristics such as disease severity, 
age or sex, or where other therapies are being used, the evidence available may be 
unhelpful or misleading80. Other patient factors which can affect the relevance of evidence 
include the existence of known and unknown co-morbidities or other physical, mental, 
socio-economic or other characteristics of an individual patient.  Any or all of these may 
impact on a patient’s response to treatment, their recovery and their degree of continuing 
disability.  There remains considerable inherent uncertainty in medicine.   
 
In her classic 1957 sociological article, Renee Fox describes three elements to this 
uncertainty – the impossibility of complete mastery of the body of known medical 
knowledge, the limits of medical knowledge itself, and the difficulty of distinguishing 
between personal ignorance and the current limits of medical knowledge.81  Mizrahi’s 1984 
research82 examined how medical interns learn to deal with mistakes and preventable 
patient harm.  The defences observed in this three-year study were denial, discounting and 
distancing.  Uncertainty was seen as an exculpatory factor in denial, where “the concept of 
                                                
77  Now called the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. 
78  See eg, Rosenfeld RM. Uncertainty-based medicine. 2003 Otolaryngology – Head and Neck Surgery, 
volume 128, pages 5-7.   
79  Plsek PE. Greenhalgh T. The challenge of complexity in healthcare.2001 British Medical Journal, 15 
September, volume 323, pages 625-8. 
80  See eg, the varying evidence for angioplasty vs thrombolysis across different age groups and patient 
cohorts: McNeil BJ. Shattuck Lecture: Hidden barriers to improvement in the quality of care. 2001 
New England Journal of Medicine, 29 November, volume 345(22), pages 1612-1620 
81  Fox RC. Training for Uncertainty. Chapter 2 in Merton RK. Reader G. Kendall PL. (editors) The 
Student-Physician: Introductory Studies in the Sociology of Medical Education. 1957 Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts): pages 207–241.  
82  Mizrahi T. Managing medical mistakes: ideology, insularity and accountability among internists-in-
training. 1984 Social Science and Medicine, volume 19(2), pages 135-146. 
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error [was negated] by identifying the practice of medicine as a ‘gray area’.” Mizrahi noted 
that this tool was often only successful with “relatively minor types of occurrences”.  
Discounting was used when the error or harm caused was too large or consequential to be 
managed by denial and involved externalising blame into “the bureaucratic system outside 
of medicine; superiors, subordinates or colleagues with medicine; and the patient”.83 
 
In medical practice, “diagnostic uncertainty is common … and diagnostic agreement 
between clinicians is surprisingly poor, even over “hard” observable criteria”84.  For 
example, agreements rates between diagnosing doctors that are in the poor-to-moderate 
range occur in a wide range of areas, including interpretation of X-rays85, and diagnosis of 
complex pain syndromes86, cervical abnormalities87 and psychiatric conditions88.  However, 
where best practice is now known, clinical variation is increasingly being seen as potential 
evidence of poor practice, and patient safety bodies, health funders and medical bodies89 
examine such clinical variation critically90.  The “uncertainty” claimed by some doctors to 
justify these variations is being increasingly seen as a result of poor practice, which creates 
risks for patients.91 
 
                                                
83  Mizrah 1984 – see note 82: at pages 137-138. 
84  Wilson T. Holt T. Complexity and clinical care. 2001 British Medical Journal, 15 September, volume 
323, pages 685-688: see especially page 687. 
85  Musch DC. Landis R. Higgins ITT. Gilson JC. Jones RN. An application of kappa-type analyses to 
interobserver variation in classifying chest radiographs for pneumoconiosis. 1984 Statistics in 
medicine, volume 3, pages 73-83.  See also: Groopman 2007 – see note 62: chapter 8 – the eye of the 
beholder, pages 177202. 
86  Van de Vusse AC. Stomp-van den Berg SGM. De Vet HCW. Weber WEJ. Interobserver reliability of 
diagnosis in patients with complex regional pain syndrome. 2003 European Journal of Pain, volume 7, 
pages 259-265. 
87  Stoler MH. Schiffman M. Interobserver reproducibility of cervical cytologic and histologic 
interpretations. 2001 Journal of the American Medical Association, volume 285(11), pages 1500-1505. 
88  Pies R. How “objective” are psychiatric diagnoses? 2007 Psychiatry (Edgmont), October, pages 18-22.  
89  See eg, Royal Australasian College of Physicians. EVOLVE program – sighted on 12 March 2016 at 
https://members.racp.edu.au/index.cfm?objectid=3B8173E6-F3B9-C2FD-24B7E7353586BDEA  
90  See eg, Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC). Medical Practice 
Variation – Background paper. 2013 ACSQHC, Sydney.  ACSQHC and the National Health 
Performance Authority. Australian Atlas of Healthcare Variation. 2015 ACSQHC, Sydney 
91  ACSQHC 2013 – see note 90, page 4.  The Atlas (ACSQHC 2015 – see note 90) is even stronger on 
this point and notes that “more healthcare is not necessarily better healthcare”: page 10. 
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Where speed of decision-making in the face of incomplete knowledge can be important, 
doctors often use heuristic principles to come to a possible solution.  Heuristics are forms 
of mental shortcuts, which often involve their own cognitive errors and risks.  For example, 
“a person is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or 
probability by the ease with which instances or associations could be brought to mind”.92  
Other judgmental heuristics used in decision making with uncertainty include 
representativeness (how closely the data fits a stereotype that comes readily to mind), 
anchoring and adjustment (whatever the first information is sets the path and movement 
goes from there), and familiarity (what normally happens is assumed to be what will 
happen).  The risk for heuristic solutions is that they may also produce wrong results due to 
the inherent biases within them93.  Heuristics are often used in clinical practice, but can 
increase the risk of error, unless their limitations are understood and accounted for. 
 
Uncertainty serves a useful, sometimes unconscious psychological purpose for doctors, 
where error and harm threaten identity.  A doctor can excuse a negative outcome in a 
particular case, because there were many acceptable treatment options, and those chosen 
were within the range.  An apparent failure is just a normal variation because of 
uncertainty.  This protects the Doctor Identity from any implied or actual criticism.  The 
Litigation threat sub-study discussed in Chapter 4 provides a vivid illustration of the power 
of uncertainty as a relief valve for acknowledgement of responsibility and avoidance of 
personal anguish.  Intrinsic and exaggerated ideas of uncertainty provide an alternative 
explanation to knowledge or skilled based errors that threaten the Doctor Identity, whether 
consciously or unconsciously.94 
 
The need to “seem” certain can also cause risks of harm, if it prevents clinical reflection on 
other possibilities: 
                                                
92  Tversky A. Kahneman D. Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. 1973 
Cognitive Psychology, volume 5, pages 207-232: at 208. 
93  Kahneman won the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his and Tversky’s work on 
judgement and decision-making –Tversky died 6 years before.  See also: Tversky A. Kahneman D. 
Judgement under uncertainty; heuristics and biases. 1974 Science. 27 September, volume 185 (issue 
4157), pages 1124-1131. 
94  See eg, a discussion about the exaggerated threat perceived by doctors in relation to litigation and 
medical errors and the defence it provides to deeper questions: Kapp MB. Legal anxieties and medical 
mistakes. 1997. Journal of General Internal Medicine. December, volume 12, pages 787-788. 
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Physicians like everyone else, display certain psychological characteristics when 
they are in the face of uncertainty.  There is the overconfident mind-set: people 
convince themselves they are right because they usually are.  Also, they tend to 
focus on positive data rather than negative data. Positive data are emotionally more 
appealing, because they suggest a successful outcome. … Such data have a 
powerful effect on our psyche, particularly in settings of uncertainty.95 
 
Uncertainty in medicine makes it difficult to determine whether patient harm results from 
“right” or a “wrong” action.  In Marianne Paget’s important 1988 book on medical error 
The Unity of Mistakes96, she notes that clinical work is, by its very nature, uncertain and 
prone to error.97  Later in that work she describes the effect of errors for doctors.  When 
errors are recognised and acknowledged, “their inevitability creates the complex sorrow of 
medical work”98.  This study captures well the overlapping quandaries for doctors arising 
from the combination of uncertainty of causation and the risk of psychological pain and 
other financial and professional risks, if causation is attributed to them. 
 
2. Knowing/Thinking traps 
All human beings make predictable and often repeated errors.  James Reason describes the 
inter-relationship between thinking and errors as a “cognitive balance sheet” where each 
“entry on the asset side carries a corresponding debit”99.  Many of these “transactions” 
occur simply because that is how human brains function, not because of moral failure or the 
desire to cause harm.  Correspondingly, if someone imagines that error cannot happen to 
                                                
95  Groopman 2007 – see note 62: page 150. 
96  Paget MA.  The unity of mistakes – a phenomenological interpretation of medical work. 1988 Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia.   
97  Paget MA. 1988 – see note 96: Foreword at page xiii, and Chapters4-6 especially. 
98  Paget MA. 1988 – see note 96: at page 96.  Ironically, Paget died prematurely from a medical error 
only a year after that book was published.  Her posthumous collection of writings is named after this 
conclusion: Paget M. A complex sorrow: reflections on cancer and an abbreviated life. DeVault MJ. 
(editor). 1993 Temple University Press, Philadelphia. In that she states: “Strangely, my knowledge of 
error has helped me deal with the errors in my care. Had I not known about the prevalence of error in 
medicine I would not have been able to process what has happened to me without bitterness. But I had 
thought these matters through already, and more than once. I now live out the complex sorrow I have 
before described.” (page 20). 
99  Reason J. Human Error. 1990 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK): page 2. 
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them100 and that perfect performance is a reasonable expectation101, it is difficult to prevent 
errors or to put up barriers to stop harm.  The risks of human error are compounded, where 
the person has multiple things on their mind, as occurs with busy doctors and other health 
professionals in chaotic or high stress clinical settings.   
 
Once the ubiquity of human error is recognised, it is tempting to think that errors simply 
occur randomly, and that it is amazing that healthcare-related harm doesn’t occur even 
more often.  However, the science of human error has shown that: 
Human error is neither as abundant nor as varied as its vast potential might suggest.  
Not only are errors much rarer than correct actions, they also tend to take a 
surprisingly limited number of forms [that] appear in very similar guises across a 
wide range of mental activities [including] action, speech, perception, recall, 
recognition, judgement, problem solving, decision making, concept formation and 
the like. 
 
Reason says that searching for these common forms “draws the searcher inwards to the 
common theoretical heartland of consciousness, attention, working memory and the vast 
repository of knowledge structures with which they interact”.  In professions like medicine, 
the vast domain of medical knowledge increases the possibility of error, no matter how 
expert and proficient a doctor becomes.  Specific problems arise, for example where 
experts are “unconsciously skilled”.  While this is a useful way of saving working memory 
resources, it can also lead to predictable errors, such as “strong habit intrusion”.102  James 
Reason and others in the Human Error Psychology field have written extensively about the 
                                                
100  The issue of medical hubris as a contributor to poor patient care is alluded to in a number of 
introspective articles by doctors examining these issues : see for example, Dr John. Changing the 
Culture of American medicine – start by removing hubris. Blog post 28 July 2013, sighted on 12 
March 2016 at http://www.drjohnm.org/2013/07/changing-the-culture-of-american-medicine-start-by-
removing-hubris/ .  Dr John is a cardiac electrophysiologist and his blog relates to a New England 
Medical Journal article, which showed that in studies which had evaluated established medical 
practice, almost half resulted in reversal of these practices in a 10-year period. 
101  Perfectionism was identified as one of the top 10 factors impeding disclosure of medical errors in a 
large literature review of the field: Kaldjian LC. Jones EW. Rosenthal GE. Facilitating and impeding 
factors for physicians’ error disclosure: A structured literature review. 2006 Joint Commission Journal 
on Quality and Patient Safety, volume 32(4), Figure 3, page 186. 
102  Reason 1990 - see note 99: page 68. See also Dekker S. Patient Safety: A Human Factors Approach. 
2011 CRC Press, Boca Raton (Florida USA). “Error and expertise are two sides of the same coin”: 
page 43 
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common forms of human error, their likely precursors, and conditions that enhance the 
likelihood of both error and harm103. 
 
Medical error occurs, in part, because doctors work in complex, stressful and sub-optimal 
environments.  Human error psychology shows that safer healthcare requires an 
understanding of the fallibility of the brain, and the creation of barriers to harm.  
Perfectionism, counsels of perfection in training, and denial of error in practice are 
unhelpful to this goal, as is denial that doctors are affected by ordinary human responses to 
stress.  These harm-tolerant attitudes are prevalent among doctors and other health 
professionals.  For example, in research comparing doctors and pilots104, one in three of the 
intensive care respondents did not acknowledge that they made errors, and more than half 
said that they found it difficult to discuss mistakes.  In relation to fatigue and stress, which 
are known to degrade all human performance, 70% of consultant surgeons believed that 
“even when fatigued, I perform effectively during critical times” compared to 26% of 
pilots.  82% believed that “True professionals can leave personal problems behind when 
working”.  While there were lower figures among other medical and nursing staff, the 
authors stated that “overall only a minority of [healthcare] respondents openly recognised 
the effect of stress on performance”.   
 
A later study, which showed similar results, demonstrated the negative impact of these 
attitudes on potentially protective actions.  Only 40% of surgeons said they would let other 
team members know when their workload was excessive, and only about half felt that the 
level of stress or tiredness should be monitored by team members105.  This and related 
research has also shown that medical teams often operate in a steeply hierarchical manner, 
and junior staff are discouraged from questioning the actions of senior staff.   
 
                                                
103  See eg, Reason J. The Human Contribution – Unsafe acts, accidents and heroic recoveries. 2008 
Ashgate Publishing Limited London (UK); Dekker 2011 – see note 102. 
104  Sexton et al. 2000 - see note 72. 
105  Flin R. Yule S. McKenzie L. Paterson-Brown. Maran N. Attitudes to teamwork and safety in the 
operating theatre. 2006 Surgeon – The Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh and Ireland, olume 
4(3), pages 145-151. 
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These characteristics are all likely to foster an error- and harm-tolerant environment, where 
“individuals will place themselves in error inducing conditions” that reduce “the ability of 
team members to manage both threats and errors in a team environment”.106 This differs 
from pilots, who are trained to be aware of their own feelings of fatigue and to 
communicate this with their flight crew.  This ensures that safety strategies are put in place 
to alleviate their fatigue and to have someone else checking, because of the effect of fatigue 
on attention.  
 
The beliefs that someone has about their own level of intelligence, as a fixed part of their 
identity, can also become a risk factor for error.  If intelligence is seen as an important and 
stable part of identity, questioning actions and decisions can be seen as a threat to identity, 
and so the identification of mistakes will be avoided.  People become focussed “on the trait 
of intelligence and on proving they have it, rather than on the process of learning and 
growing over time”.107  Unfortunately, an intelligent human brain does not appear to be 
automatically protected from many of the common human “thinking traps”.   
 
Doctors have ample evidence that they are intelligent and that this is a highly valued 
characteristic for their chosen profession, as discussed in chapters 5 and 6.  If mistakes are 
not acknowledged, then there is little opportunity to observe and learn from them, or act to 
prevent the harm which may flow from them.  As one author said self-awareness is central 
to address the ordinary “blind spots” and biases that occur in human thinking: 
Our greatest intellectual strengths represent liabilities when they lead us to miss 
something that we might otherwise have noticed.  They create blind spots.  If we 
become aware of our blind spots, we can do something about them.  … Once we 
know about this built-in limitation, we can compensate for it.  … We can’t totally 
eradicate them, since they are built into the system. But once we become aware of 
them, we can try to minimize the influence of their distortion.108 
 
Some of these blind spots arise from very useful skills, like pattern recognition.  The ability 
to recognise similar, but new experiences through a schema is a cognitive survival 
                                                
106  Sexton et al. 2000 – see note 72: at page 745. 
107  Dweck CS. Beliefs that make smart people dumb. Chapter 2 in Sternberg RJ. (editor) Why smart 
people can be so stupid 2002 Yale University Press New Haven (USA) 
108  Van Hecke ML. Blind Spot. 2007 Prometheus Books. Amherst (USA): page 22 
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technique that has served human beings well.  As noted above, it allows the human brain to 
conserve important but limited working memory space for other information necessary for 
the new situation.  For medical decision-making, it is a vital first step109.  Unfortunately, 
pattern recognition capacity also can mislead, for example through anchoring bias, that puts 
higher weight on the first information which comes to attention110. It may also lead to 
“recognition” of a pattern when one does not exist, which is called “illusory correlation”111.   
 
The brain tends to look for information confirming its hypothesised pattern and to ignore 
variations (confirmation bias).  There are many common blind spots which create a risk for 
patients by encouraging a doctor to miss something, which, with hindsight, looks 
obvious.112 Another blind spot arises when doctors do not know that they do not know 
                                                
109  Croskerry P. Achieving quality in clinical decision making: Cognitive strategies and detection of bias. 
2002 Academic Emergency Medicine. November, volume 9(11), pages 1184-1204: see especially 
Table 2- strategies in decision making, page 1185. 
110  See eg, Strack F. Mussweiler T. Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: mechanisms of selective 
accessibility. 1997 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, volume 73(3), pages 437-446. 
111  See eg Hamilton DL. Gifford RK. Illusory correlation in interpersonal perception: a cognitive basis of 
stereotypic judgments. 1976 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, volume 12(4), pages 392-
407. 
112   Some practical examples of blind spots in medicine are:  
• focussing on a specific detail and ignoring the bigger picture, such as focussing carefully on a 
specific organ in an operation, and accidentally nicking a major blood vessel;  
• not thinking sufficiently before acting, such as sending someone home when it is a busy night 
without doing a specific test, which would ensure the patient’s complaint was not an imminent 
threat to life;  
• jumping to conclusions without seeking better information, for example assuming that a fat 
patient’s problems are weight related when they are not;   
• simply not noticing an important piece of information or forgetting to ask, for example, a 
patient’s allergies, or not checking what was in the syringe before they inject a patient;  
• not seeing themselves and their actions as others see them, for example, when a senior doctor 
provides a shaming response to a young doctor who asks a question;  
• seeing everything through their own personal, doctor lens, for example, a doctor labelling a 
patient’s failure to take medicine as “non-compliance”, without asking the patient why they 
aren’t taking their medication – further inquiry might reveal issues that the doctor could address, 
for example, if the patient cannot open the bottle, cannot read the instructions, cannot remember 
when to take it, or the medicine makes them feel ill;  
• using their own values and beliefs as evidence or to reinforce ambiguous evidence, for example, 
a regular patient who is seen as a complainer comes for a consultation outlining further non-
specific symptoms and the doctor dismisses the patient without checking his or her vital signs or 
ordering tests, with the result that the patient’s cancer remains undiagnosed until too late. 
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something and assume they do113.  There are ways to tackle these and other blind spots and 
to reduce their potential for negative impact on patients.  However, to put in place barriers 
to address blind spots requires a recognition that they exist and can impact on practice.114 
 
The feeling of “knowing” and of “being certain” involve other processes of the mind, 
which can give rise to medical errors and preventable patient harm, or to mistaken 
“knowledge” about events.  While the issue of uncertainty provides a fertile ground for 
alternative explanations for preventable patient harm, absolute and unquestioning certainty 
can also provide a strong defence of identity.  In this case, no alternative explanation is 
necessary, because the person “knows” what they did was right.  The processes of laying 
down memory and the brain’s construction of “knowing” can, in fact, mislead someone 
about what, in fact, happened.  This is particularly so when alternative explanations of 
events may give rise to threats to identity.  The incontrovertible understanding of an event 
that is “known” with certainty may, in fact, be a creation of the brain itself, rather than 
observable facts.   
 
A study of students’ recollections of what they were doing when they first heard of the 
Challenger space shuttle disaster compared an immediate post event diary record (recorded 
the following day) with a recollection two and a half years after115.  Only 25% of the 
students who participated in the second questionnaire even recalled having completed the 
survey immediately after the disaster116.  Despite this being the kind of “flash bulb” 
memory that people would be expected to clearly recollect, the two records were quite 
different for the majority of the students who participated.  The accuracy of the subsequent 
recollection had a mean score of only 2.95, when 7 was a perfect match117.  7% of students 
                                                
113  This is called the Dunning-Kruger Effect eg. Hodges B. Regehr G. Martin D. Difficulties in 
recognising one’ own incompetence: novice physicians who are unskilled and unaware of it. 2001 
Academic Medicine. October, volume 76(10 Supplement), s87-89. 
114  Van Hecke ML. 2007 – see note 108.  This book sets out a range of common “blind spots” with 
strategies for how these can be tackled to reduce their incidence and to allow understanding of how 
they arise. 
115  Neisser U. Harsch N. Phantom Flashbulbs: False recollections of hearing news about Challenger. 
Chapter in Winograd E. Neisser U. (editors) Affect and Accuracy in Recall: Studies of “Flashbulb” 
Memories.  1992 Emory Symposia on Cognition, Cambridge University Press, New York: pages 9-31. 
116  Neisser et al. 1992 – see note 115: page 14. 
117  Neisser et al. 1992 – see note 115: page 18. 
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had a 7 score. 25% were wrong about everything and 50% scored 2 or less.  Perhaps the 
most interesting result was that there was no significant correlation between the accuracy of 
their recall and their certainty of its accuracy at the time of recall.  When they saw their 
conflicting responses, many still only “remembered” their false recollection and had no 
memory of the event as recorded at the time.118. 
 
Hindsight bias is another example of this kind of response.  Hindsight bias has a 
complicated role in relation to error.  People who are involved can recast the events to 
avoid an identity-threatening dissonance 119, which can result in very different “factual” 
stories about an incident.  This is not because any of these people are lying and seeking to 
deceive, – rather their subconscious mind has either selectively remembered or even altered 
facts120.  This bias also affects those who are looking at an incident, once they have an 
outcome to consider.  James Reason warns that: 
Being blessed with both uninvolvement and hindsight it is a great temptation for 
retrospective observers to slip into a censorious frame of mind and to wonder how 
these people could have been so blind, stupid, ignorant or reckless. … The 
perceptual biases and strong-but-wrong beliefs that make incipient disasters so hard 
to detect by those on the spot also make it difficult for accident analysts to be truly 
wise after the event.  Unless we appreciate the potency of these retroactive 
distortions, we will never truly understand the realities of the past, nor learn the 
appropriate remedial lessons.121 
 
Mortality and Morbidity Committees and many Risk Management investigations are 
examples of these kind of retrospective, simplification processes.  The complexity of the 
actual event may be ignored in the hunt for a responsible person.  Rather than an effort to 
tease out complexity to learn from mistakes, the process can become a ‘blame and shame’ 
process for all concerned, with simplified presentations of right and wrong.  These pay little 
attention to the environmental and personal complexities that exist around most instances of 
preventable patient harm.  Alternatively, they can become exculpatory forgiveness or 
responsibility avoidance processes.  Neither of these are effective ways of “learning from 
                                                
118  Neisser et al. 1992 – see note 115: pages 21 and 25-26. 
119  An excellent example of this is provided in the following editorial by the Chair of the Australian 
Patient Safety Foundation, Professor Bill Runciman.  Runciman WB. Complete Retrograde 
Dysmnesia. 1995 Journal of Clinical Monitoring, January, volume 11(1), pages 3-4. 
120  Fine 2005 – see note 70: “The Deluded brain – a slapdash approach to the truth”: pages 59-85. 
121  Reason J. 1990 – see note 102: at pages 214-215. 
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mistakes” by examining what happened.  Both processes and outcomes will discourage the 
recognition of errors as part of everyday reflection on practice. 
  
In Caplan, Posner and Chaney’s classic 1991 study on hindsight bias122, they looked at 
whether outcome affected judgments about the quality of care in peer review based on an 
implicit standard of care.  1500 closed claims cases were drawn from 22 malpractice 
insurers, and were included in the study where there was either a temporary or permanent 
injury, the outcome of which could readily be changed and where there was no gross error 
or obvious breach of clinical management.  The 21 cases that fulfilled these criteria were 
then made into 2 matched sets, with only the outcomes changed.  Changes were between a 
permanent injury and a temporary one.  Doctors were asked to determine whether the care 
was appropriate, whether it was less than appropriate or whether it was impossible to tell.  
When a temporary injury was changed to a permanent one, the decision about care being 
appropriate decreased by 31%, while less than appropriate care increased by 14% and 
“impossible to judge” went up by 17%.  When the movement was the other way, (outcome 
from permanent to temporary harm), the appropriate care rating increased by 28%, less than 
appropriate care decreased by 12% and “impossible to judge” decreased by 16%.  While 
this study clearly shows the impact of hindsight bias, it also confirms the defensive or 
avoidant use of uncertainty discussed above.  When the outcome was more serious, a 
significant proportion of the bias shifted from certainty of appropriateness to “impossible to 
judge”, rather than “less than appropriate”, and vice versa when the outcome was 
temporary harm.  
 
Hindsight bias can also result in an exaggeration of moral culpability and an imputation of 
awareness and knowledge which was not possible at the time.  Anthony Hidden QC, the 
Chief Investigator of a British railway accident in 1988 at Clapham Junction, that resulted 
in 35 deaths and 500 injuries, outlined the risks associated with hindsight bias in his report: 
                                                
122  Caplan RA. Posner KI. Cheney FW. Effects on the outcome of physician judgments of appropriateness 
of care. 1991 Journal of the American Medical Association, volume 265(15), page 1957-1960. 
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There is almost no human action or decision that cannot be made to look more 
flawed and less sensible in the misleading light of hindsight. It is essential that the 
critic should keep himself constantly aware of that fact.123 
 
Sidney Dekker in his book on Patient safety talks about how both the people involved in 
adverse events and errors, and investigators often assume blame lies on themselves or 
someone else.  Those involved are wracked with guilt about their role and the “if only” 
thoughts that tell them, after the fact, that they could have avoided the harm if they had just 
acted differently.  The reality may be far different, but the tendency is encouraged by the 
underlying acceptance that perfect performance is a consistently achievable end-point.124 
 
A lack of awareness of hindsight bias can result in psychological threat responses for 
everyone engaged in healthcare delivery and, particularly, those subject to peer review.  It 
can also lead to inappropriate self-blame and inappropriately retributive processes 
characterised by humiliation and shame.  These are likely to act as limbic triggers both 
consciously and unconsciously, which make future detection and action on errors and 
preventable patient harm less likely. 
 
3. Stereotypes, special skills and vulnerabilities 
Doctors are selected for high academic achievement, which tends to attract people who 
have common psychological characteristics even before they become doctors, as is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  Different characteristics can be associated with particular 
specialty groups and this may result in poor communication between specialists.  In 
addition, doctors and other health professionals may have quite different “lenses” on the 
same information.  A simple example of this comes from the studies of operating theatre 
teams discussed above.  These teams consist mainly of surgeons, anaesthetists and nurses.  
Surgeons consistently rated their teamwork with other surgeons and residents as high 
(64%) and their overall teamwork even higher (73%) while the anaesthetic and nursing 
                                                
123  Hidden A. Investigation into the Clapham Junction Railway Accident. Department of Transport. 
November 1989 HMSO, London: page 170.  A copy of this report is available on the web at 
http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/DoT_Hidden001.pdf  
124  Dekker 2011 – see note 102: page 46. 
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staff rated their overall view of the teamwork in these same teams much lower than their 
consultants (10-28%)125.   
 
Characteristics associated with medical trainees include perfectionism, determination to 
succeed, “quick thinking”, and high respect for academic achievement and success.  Many 
of these have both positive roles and potential downsides when it comes to addressing 
preventable harm to patients.  For example, trying not to make mistakes and associating 
perfect performance with being a good doctor produces a range of positive goals.  
However, when inevitably errors occur or patients suffer harm, these laudable goals also 
result in psychological defences at both the conscious and unconscious level that make the 
continuation of error and harm more likely.  Similarly, while decisive action might be a 
good attribute in an emergency where someone’s life is in peril, this can come with a desire 
for action without consideration of other options or when a delay may lead to better 
outcomes.  Wrong heuristics, while speeding up the decision-making process, can also lead 
to harmful results for patients, when a more reflective, questioning approach may have 
avoided it. 
 
The training of doctors seeks to encourage important skills for doctors such as the capacity 
to make decisions where information is incomplete, sometimes very quickly and in a crisis, 
and to determine diagnosis, which is an advanced form of pattern recognition as discussed 
above.  This uses the schema mechanisms in the brain to sort patients and symptoms and 
can often allow rapid perception of necessary information and conclusions from this.  This 
skill of pattern recognition and attribution is also what underpins the development of 
stereotypes, which can quite often be misleading or result in harm to patients.  This can be 
whether the stereotype is positive or negative.  One example of this is provided in 
Groopman’s book How Doctors Think,126 when he describes a young doctor who sees an 
extremely fit, 40-year old park ranger who was experiencing chest pain.  He looked 
extremely healthy and after doing a range of tests, the doctor reassured the patient he could 
go home.  Unfortunately, his appearance belied the existence of unstable angina.  The next 
morning the park ranger returned with a myocardial infarction, which fortunately was not 
                                                
125  Sexton et al. 2000 – see note 72: Differing perspectives of teamwork in medicine at page 747. 
126  Groopman J. 2007 – see note 62: see especially Chapter 2, pages 41-44. 
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fatal.  The doctor reflected that the patient looked too healthy for it to be a heart attack.  
While the doctor identified in a positive way with the patient, this was, nonetheless, an 
unsafe situation for the patient.  This kind of stereotyping can lead to “representative” 
errors.  Nonetheless, there is evidence that when a patient and doctor like each other, the 
quality of care is better than if this mutual affection is absent127. 
 
Groopman128 notes that far more common is the attribution errors associated with negative 
stereotypes, which research has shown can have a negative impact on the quality and nature 
of medical care the person receives.  It has long been recognised that as human beings, 
doctors can experience negative emotions in relation to their patients and when the doctor 
feelings “are disowned or denied, errors in diagnosis and treatment are more likely to 
occur.”129.  A considerable body of evidence exists that patients, who do not conform to 
expected “good patient” behaviour or other norms, can experience poorer healthcare and 
poorer outcomes.  Such negative attitudes arise towards patients with mental illness or drug 
and alcohol problems.  Researchers believe this contributes to the significantly worse 
general health outcomes for patients with a co-morbid medical condition with their mental 
illness.130  Similarly, people who self-harm, even when admitted as psychiatric patients, are 
not ‘liked” as patients and often have worse outcomes.131 In a 2012 systematic review of 
                                                
127  Hall JA. Horgan TG. Stein YS. Roter DL. Liking in the physician-patient relationship. 2002 Patient 
education and counselling, volume 48, pages 69-77. 
128  Groopman 2007 – see note 62: pages 44 and following 
129  Groves JE. Taking care of the hateful patient. 1978 New England Journal of Medicine 20 April, 
volume 298(16), pages 883-887: at page 887. 
130  Noblett JE. Lawrence R. Smith JG. The attitudes of general hospital doctors toward patients with 
comorbid mental illness. 2015 International Journal of Psychiatry in Medicine, November, volume 
50(4), pages 370-382. 
131  In a number of studies in the 1960s, it was shown that patients who were perceived as “troublesome, as 
demanding too much attention, and as not fitting in with the general pattern of ward behaviour” and 
“made a poor relationship with the doctors and nursing staff” were more likely to have a short length 
of stay, to leave against medical advice and to commit suicide See Flood RA. Seager CP. A 
Retrospective examination of psychiatric case records of patients who subsequently committed suicide. 
1968 British Journal of Psychiatry, volume 114, pages 443-450: see especially pages 449 -450; House 
A. Owens D. Patchett L. Deliberate self-harm. 1999 Quality in Healthcare, volume 8, pages 137-143, 
where it was noted that “people who harm themselves are not popular with health services staff … Self 
harmers suffer from the stigma of psychiatric problems and they are often seen as undeserving and 
detracting from the clinical care of others whose illnesses are not perceived as self-inflicted” (page 
138); Saunders KEA. Hawton K. Fortune S. Suhanthini F.  Attitudes and knowledge of clinical staff 
regarding people who self-harm: A systematic review. 2012 Journal of Affective Disorders, volume 
139, pages 2015-216, which showed that most staff (except psychiatric staff) had negative attitudes, 
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studies on the attitudes of clinical staff to patients who self-harm, one of the reasons given 
for the particularly negative attitude of medical staff to these patients was that doctors 
describe feeling frustrated, helpless and as failures when dealing with these patients.132.  
These emotions impact on and derive from the Doctor Identity. 
 
Other stigmatised groups in healthcare are those who are fat133; those who have certain 
diseases134, those who have intellectual disabilities135 and a range of other people, 
particularly those who are blamed for causing the problem they have by their “life-style 
choices”136.  These groups can be argued to have “spoiled identities” in healthcare.  Where 
someone’s identity is seen as spoiled, Goffman describes it as a deeply discrediting form of 
social identity, which is incongruous with the “normal” stereotype137.  For example, people 
who smoke and suffer some variety of obstructive pulmonary disease are sometimes seen 
by medical and nursing staff as authors of their own bad fortune, who were not strong 
enough to stop smoking and so, less worthy of healthcare.  People worthy of healthcare are 
those who look after themselves properly, according to whatever the current meaning 
attributed to the term.  This can result in carers and patients having to emphasise that their 
condition is idiopathic or has some other non-stigmatised cause, rather than smoking 
induced, to avoid the negative stigma. 
                                                
particularly to those who repeatedly self-harmed.  Perhaps of most relevance here, the attitudes of 
doctors in the general hospital was the most negative (page 213). 
132  Saunders KEA et al.  2012 – see note 131: page 213. 
133  Pausé C. Die another day: the obstacles facing fat people in accessing quality healthcare. 2014 
Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics, volume 4(2), pages 135-141.  Pausé describes fatness as being a 
“spoiled identity” – this is where someone is “held responsible or blamed for the stigma” they 
experience.  This is a common problem in a range of healthcare services, when the health system 
names the conditions “life style” related. See also, Salder JZ. Risk Factor Medicalization, Hubris and 
the Obesity Disease. 2014 Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics, volume 4(2), pages 143-146 
134  See eg, Sartorius N. Stigmatized illnesses and healthcare. 2007 Croation Medical Journal, volume 48, 
pages 396-7: this doctor lists AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, leprosy and certain skin conditions.  
It is likely that some of the stigmatised diseases will change over time with increased knowledge and 
awareness in any country.  However, the stigma against some conditions is remarkably constant in 
healthcare eg mental illness. 
135  While AE. Clark LL. Overcoming ignorance and stigma relating to intellectual disability in healthcare: 
a potential solution. 2010 Journal of Nursing Management, volume 18, pages 166-172. 
136  “Life style choices” can be a very elastic concept and varies over time, but inevitably has moral 
overtones of failed volition, even though it is recognised more broadly that health inequalities and risk 
factors are often socio-economically determined. 
137  Goffman E. Stigma – Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. 1963 Touchstone, New York: see 
especially Chapter 1. 
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Whether the patient fits a positive or negative stereotype, this can influence the clinical 
judgment of their treating doctor, and create a risk of harm for the patient.  A doctor needs 
to be aware of their potential cognitive biases, and of their emotional reaction to specific 
patients (whether positive or negative).  This conscious self-knowledge is important to 
reduce the errors and potential harm which can proceed from these biases.138 
D. Actively Defending the Doctor Identity 
Once medical errors (particularly that causing preventable patient harm) come to conscious 
awareness, another set of defences come into play.  Within the broad rubric of cognitive 
dissonance theory, these actively defend the doctor’s self-schema when anything that is 
inconsistent with this schema challenges it.  It is an active defence mechanism for the 
Doctor Identity, and when a primary identity is threatened, it happens automatically.  To 
those on the outside, it can be seen simply as denial, as a defensive stance, as self-
justification.  In many ways that is exactly how it functions.  Even with self-awareness and 
an understanding of how cognitive dissonance works, it can be hard not to fall into its 
characteristic pattern of reaction.  The greater the threat to identity, the stronger is likely to 
be the defence. 
 
1. An outline of Cognitive dissonance theory 
Cognitive dissonance theory relates to the human need to resolve conflicting beliefs and 
information, which otherwise produce distress and anxiety.  The theory was originally 
developed from the work of Leon Festinger139, and has been subject to extensive 
experimental confirmation over the past 50 years140.  Psychological understanding of 
human motivation and decision-making until then had mainly been governed by the 
behaviourist approach, which saw all human behaviour as explainable in terms of reward 
and punishment, as had been shown in many animal behaviour experiments.  However, 
                                                
138 For details of how more potential impacts of bias and how to detect it and reduce its negative impact o 
clinical decision making, see: Croskerry 2002 – see note 109. 
139  Festinger L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. 1957 Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
140  Harmon-Jones E. Mills J. (editors) Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory in Social 
Psychology. 1999 American Psychological Association Washington DC. 
114 
Chapter 3 –Identity under threat 
human thinking has been shown to be much more complex than this.  For example, if 
people go through pain, effort or discomfort to achieve a goal, they have often been shown 
to be happier with the achievement of that goal, than if they had not been through the 
negative experience141.  While such a conclusion is an anathema to a behaviourist world-
view, the theory of cognitive dissonance provides a “rational” explanation for it. 
 
The theory of cognitive dissonance says that when someone holds two cognitions – that is 
beliefs, ideas, attitudes or opinions - that are psychologically inconsistent, then this 
dissonance produces mental discomfort, which might range from minor tension to deep 
anguish.  The tension or discomfort does not reduce until the person has found a way to 
reduce the dissonance.142  In the preceding example, the two potentially dissonant 
cognitions are “I am a sensible person, who would not voluntarily suffer pain without great 
benefit” and “I have just been through a lot of discomfort for something that has no 
inherent value”.  To conclude that the end-point was not worth the effort brings the self-
perception as being a sensible person into doubt.  Instead, a person concludes that the thing 
gained must be worthwhile and valuable – a process called self-justification.  Self-
justification occurs often at a subconscious level, because of the human psychological need 
for consonance and sense-making: 
Dissonance is disquieting because to hold two ideas that contradict each other is to 
flirt with absurdity and … we humans are creatures who spend our lives trying to 
convince ourselves that our existence is not absurd.  Festinger’s theory is about how 
people strive to make sense out of contradictory idea and lead lives that are, at least 
in their own minds, consistent and meaningful143. 
 
This process is even more likely when the dissonant information is a direct threat to the 
person’s identity.144  So strong is the psychological desire for consonance that when 
                                                
141 For example, a ritual for entry into a club or the training and socialisation of doctors through 
internship. See eg, Aronson E, Mills J. The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group. 1959 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, volume 59, pages 177-181; Gerard H. Mathewson G. The 
effects of severity of initiation on liking for a group – a replication. 1966 Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 1966, volume 2, pages 278-287. 
142  Tavris C. Aronson E. Mistakes were made (but not by me) – Why we justify foolish beliefs, bad 
decisions and hurtful acts. 2007 Harcourt Books, Orlando (USA): page 13. 
143  Tavris et al. 2007 – see note 142: pages 13-14. 
144  See eg, Munro GD. Stansbury JA.  The Dark Side of Self-Affirmation: Confirmation bias and illusory 
correlation in response to threatening information. 2009 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
volume 35, pages 1143- 1153. 
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presented with information that is inconsistent with the dissonance resolution, people will 
find ways to disregard the new evidence, either by reading down its significance and 
discounting it, criticising it or distorting it – another example of the power of “confirmation 
bias”145.  This is an important concern in the prevention of patient harm, as decisions which 
arise from the heuristics used to manage the natural uncertainties in medicine are 
particularly subject to this and other kinds of biases146.  
 
Recent neurological research has shown that the desire for resolution of dissonance is 
hardwired into the way the brain processes information.  The reasoning part of the brain 
virtually shuts down when faced with dissonant information and those parts of the brain, 
which register emotion, respond positively when consonance is restored.147  Once a 
decision is made or a belief held, the brain’s natural tendency is to notice evidence that 
confirms the decision or belief and to ignore, or label as irrelevant, any evidence which 
disagrees.  The mind will unconsciously “scan” dissonant evidence out of conscious 
awareness, or where it is impossible for this to occur, read down the importance of the 
conflicting evidence or derogate the source of the information.  This is called “motivated 
reasoning”.148  While in some forms of thinking, intelligence is a factor that can reduce the 
effect of some biases, there is growing evidence that having higher than average 
intelligence is unlikely to prevent My-side Bias, associated with motivated reasoning, from 
happening.149 
 
The intensity of the cognitive dissonance felt by someone is affected by the importance and 
relevance of the sources of the conflicting information, and the importance of the issue over 
                                                
145  Nickerson R. Confirmation Bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. 1998 Review of General 
Psychology, volume 2, pages 175-220. 
146  Unless conscious reflective processes are put in place to enable careful consideration of inconsistent 
data or information, normal biases may lead to wrong conclusions and potentially to harm.  It is also 
why on-going outcome data gathering is needed in medicine and why doctors understanding what 
constitutes “evidence” in medicine and what the evidence shows is so important. 
147  Jarcho J. Berkman ET. Lieberman MD. The neural basis of rationalization: cognitive dissonance 
reduction during decision-making. 2011 Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, volume 6(4), 
pages 460-467. 
148  Kunda Z. The case for motivated reasoning. 1990 Psychological Bulletin, volume 108(3), pages 480-
4978. 
149  Stanovich KE. West RF. Toplak ME. Myside bias, rational thinking and intelligence. 2013 Current 
directions in psychological sciences, volume 22(4), pages 259-264. 
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which the potential dissonance occurs.  Dissonance does not arise in a period when a person 
is gathering information and has not yet made a decision. At that point there is no position 
to defend.  Especially where an important decision involves making a moral choice or a life 
option, Aronson and Tavris describe the decision as sitting at the peak of a pyramid.  At 
that point the various options may seem very close and require considerable weighing up.  
However, once a decision is made, the process of self-justification results in the options 
moving further and further apart in the mind of the decision-maker, and this can have an 
important consequence where two people make different decisions at the decision-point.150 
 
Cognitive dissonance and the need for self-justification are likely to be strongest when a 
doctor’s care leads to a patient’s preventable death or harm.  The admission of a mistake or 
harm produces a major threat to the Doctor Identity and is thus a deeply psychologically 
troubling event.  The Doctor Identity includes several components: their way of seeing 
themselves (an individual personal identity); how they are perceived by others (a social 
identity); and their membership of “the medical clan” (professional “group” identity).  Each 
of these components of the Doctor Identity are threatened by this event.  
 
Doctors may feel a failure in their own eyes, and in the eyes of the patient.  At least as 
significantly, doctors feel the critical eyes of their peers.  Doctors gain much of their 
personal affirmation and sense of self-worth from the approval of the medical group151.  
Fear of loss of their positive perception is therefore another significant threat to identity.  
This is even more so when a doctor’s professional and personal identity are, to a large 
extent, one and the same.  The need to resolve the cognitive dissonance between harming a 
patient, being a good doctor, or arguably a doctor at all, and at the deepest level a good 
person, results in further complex psychological responses. 
 
                                                
150  Tavris et al. 2007 – see note 142: page 33. 
151  Beginning with the work of George Herbert Mead set out posthumously in Mind, Self and Society: 
from the standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. 1934 University of Chicago Press, Chicago, and that of 
Charles Horton Cooley in Human Nature and the Social Order 1902 Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
Chicago, the relationship between self-perception and the perception of self by others (particularly 
those identified with groups who someone sees themselves as a member of) has been recognised as 
critical to someone’s identity and their sense of self-worth.  See, eg Shaffer LS. From Mirror Self-
recognition to the Looking-Glass Self: Exploring the Justification Hypothesis. 2005 Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, volume 61(1), pages 47-65. 
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2. The resolution of dissonance and psychological defences 
Denial is the first way of resolving dissonance.  The doctor may deny there was harm, deny 
that it was preventable or deny that they were responsible for the harm.  Where denial is not 
possible, dissonance reduction and self-justifications of decisions and actions come in many 
forms, which broadly fit in three groups: 
• Diminutions –These are statements which reduce either the significance of the issue, 
or the contribution of the action or decision to any harm caused.  Some common 
healthcare examples are: “The patient was seriously ill and was likely to die soon 
anyway”, “The evidence was ambivalent and I took my best shot”, “With all the 
chaos that night, it is not surprising that I forgot to do it”.  “Anyway, despite all the 
problems, it all ended up OK.” 
• Support-seeking – This involves talking to others (particularly peers) who will 
confirm that what was done was the only sensible thing; that they would have done 
the same thing in those circumstances; and that there was no other real choice. Self-
affirmation is actively sought in situations of identity threat. 152Confirmation bias 
strongly influences the choice of people or support sought, so that conflicting 
opinions or evidence is likely not to be obtained or to be disregarded, diminished or 
derogated.   
• Derogation–Dissonance reduction statements based on derogation often include 
negative or blame-worthy statements about the patient: “The patient was 
old/sick/fat/confused/mentally ill” or fulfilled some other stereotype which meant 
they could, in fact, be blamed for what occurred to them.  It can also include negative 
statements about someone who has drawn attention to the problem in the healthcare 
team.  For example: “The doctor or nurse who was critical of an action is 
inexperienced/ young/old/ irritating/ not a team player/ foreign” or another stereotype 
which allows their dissonant voice to be ignored or silenced. 
 
Self-justification can often lead to a vicious cycle, where actions and self-justifications 
create further tensions and problems, particularly between healthcare team members.  For 
example, where a nurse draws attention to a doctor’s error in time to stop a patient being 
                                                
152  Steele CM. Spencer SJ. Lynch M. Self-image resilience and dissonance: the role of affirmational 
resources. 1993 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, volume 64(6), pages 885-896. 
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harmed, it is not unusual for the doctor concerned to ask for the nurse to be disciplined or 
fired.153  From an external or patient perspective, the doctor might be expected to be 
grateful that the error was picked up before any real harm had occurred.  However, such a 
consequence makes sense in the context of cognitive dissonance resolution.  The external 
assertion that the doctor made an error creates so much cognitive dissonance for the doctor, 
that he or she needs to believe that the other person should be ignored.  Casting them as 
unprofessional and to be dismissed confirms that any of their assertions are valueless.  In 
institutions where the power differential is greatest, and those in the high-power positions 
are doctors, a nurse who acts in this way may be seen as insubordinate and to have 
questioned the power of the hierarchy.  Cognitive dissonance could arise from merely being 
questioned.  
 
The resolution of cognitive dissonance is different from deliberate dissimulation, though 
the end effect may seem similar to a patient or family.  Cognitive dissonance occurs 
essentially unconsciously as a response to the actual or perceived insoluble conflict 
between two pieces of information.  The ethics professor, John Banja154, describes the 
operation of cognitive dissonance in relation to preventable patient harm as a series of 
avoidant and deflecting actions, which if “successful, they will result in the health 
professional’s having minimized the error, its harm or his responsibility for it’.  Self-
justification and the tools that reduce cognitive dissonance fulfil that role. 
 
3. The biological reality of threat responses 
When psychological or physical stress is experienced, physiological stress responses occur 
that are deeply rooted in human biology.  Connected to the deeper parts of the brain, the 
limbic system responds with a flood of hormones, which results in changes in heart rate, 
blood pressure, sweating, cessation of bodily movements and the facial expressions 
associated with fear.  The messages from these parts of the brain are powerful and designed 
                                                
153  Johnson C. Bad blood: Doctor-nurse behaviour problems impact patient care. 2009 Physician 
Executive Journal. November – December issue, pages 6-11: Table 6, page 8. 
154  Banja J. Medical errors and medical narcissism. 2005 Jones and Bartlett Publishers, Boston see page 
88 and chapter 2. 
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for human survival.  They are known to override the messages associated with knowledge 
and reasoning. 
 
A fear response comes principally from the amygdala155 – the part of the brain that 
recognises, processes and remembers emotional reactions.  Such feelings are deeply 
embedded in the neural circuitry of the human brain and can be triggered even before there 
is conscious awareness or actual knowledge of a reason for fear.  At a human survival level, 
this has important biological advantages.  If one had to know intellectually that the sabre 
tooth tiger was about to pounce, the chances of avoiding being eaten would have been 
significantly reduced.  However, even where the cause of the fear is more abstract, for 
example, where there is a fear of professional shame, of being wrong, or of harming a 
patient, the biological consequences are the same. 
 
The initial physiological response cannot be prevented by reason.  The brain does not allow 
this, with the trigger going first to the autonomic system, and only later to the neo-cortex.  
At best, training for a fear-inducing event can create other automatic reactions, even when 
the fear response is triggered.  For example, soldiers can be trained to run towards harm in 
a battle situation; pilots can be trained to follow emergency procedures to avoid a plane 
crash when something unexpected and dangerous occurs; or doctors can be trained to 
follow an emergency algorithm when a patient gets into trouble in surgery.   
 
However, such training requires a clear awareness of the risks and the circumstances when 
they arise, and more importantly an acceptance and an understanding that people (including 
doctors) are first and foremost human beings, subject to the same biological impediments to 
the operation of reason as everyone else.  Doctors also need to understand that responses to 
these human vulnerabilities, which give a doctor a better chance to use his or her reasoning 
brain, can be taught through appropriate training, reflection and practice156. 
. 
                                                
155  LeDoux J. The emotional brain, fear and the amygdala. 2003 Cellular and Molecular Neurobiology, 
volume 23(4/5), October, pages 727-738. 
156  While emergency response algorithms can allow doctors to respond quickly, there is always a need to 
ensure that doctors can calm themselves sufficiently to correctly identify the right emergency response 
or to vary their response, because the trained response may not be completely appropriate in the 
circumstances. 
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4. Examples of these effects in preventable patient harm 
These powerful psychological mechanisms relating to a threat to identity apply to all 
humans.  It is a natural protective mechanism for physical survival and well-being.  
Medical error and patient harm can be seen as by a Doctor as a threat to his or her 
psychological existence, which can have a profoundly negative effect for patients and 
doctors.   
 
One consequence can be a gradual shift in a doctor’s ethical practices, through a series of 
minor shifts to resolve dissonance, followed by self-justification of the shifts.  For example, 
non-disclosure of a known error “for the patient’s benefit” can lead by small increments to 
further secrecy and self-justification, until significant issues remain uncommunicated.  
Memory itself comes to the aid of identity protection, as it unconsciously trims and even 
fabricates personal experience to protect the self.  The cognitive bias of “beneffectance” 
shapes memory so that “people perceive themselves readily as the origin of good effect and 
reluctantly as the origin of ill effects” or they tend “to take credit for success while denying 
responsibility for failure”.157-In addition, once one has gone down such a path, it can be 
difficult to determine when to stop or change direction158.  The individual may have lost 
their original sense of what is the appropriate thing to do, but be completely unaware of 
shift.  In the words of Tavris and Aronson “How do you get an honest man to lose his 
ethical compass? You get him to take one step at a time, and self-justification will do the 
rest.”159  Similarly, once self-justification has operated on any dissonant views of the 
events, and memory has been doing its work in service of the Self, the person actually 
believes their understanding of events to be true.  Once someone has “justified his actions 
to himself, believing that he has the truth, [he] becomes impervious to self-correction”.160 
                                                
157  Greenwald AG. The totalitarian ego – fabrication and revision of personal history. 1980 American 
Psychology, July, volume 35(7), pages 603-618: at page 605. 
158  In the famous experiment by Milgram where people were asked to administer an electric shock to help 
people learn, gradually the amount of shock given was increased and two-thirds of the participants 
kept going to the dangerous level small increment by small increment, each time justifying to 
themselves the apparently increasing level of distress of the “learner”.  While the study is generally 
given as proof of obedience to authority, Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson describe it also as “a 
demonstration of long term results of self-justification”. Tavris et al. 2007 – see note 142: pages 36-37.  
For detailed information about the range of Milgram’s experiments in this area, see Milgram S. 
Obedience to authority – an experimental view. 1974 Tavistock Publications, London. 
159  Tavris C. 2007 – see note 142: page 37. 
160  Tavris C. 2007 – see note 142: page 7. 
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The immediate impact of cognitive dissonance on patient harm is that errors that are seen 
by someone may go unremarked and consequent harm may occur.  Perhaps more 
insidiously, it breeds a harm-tolerant culture, where errors are less likely to be noticed and 
brought to awareness by anybody.  It may be argued that this results in normalisation of 
preventable harm, which could lead to higher levels of death and disability in health care.  
Some evidence to support this view comes from doctors, who participate in “adverse event” 
studies.  Many are shocked at the levels of harm discovered.  For example, a study of the 
intensive care unit at the Royal Children’s Hospital in Melbourne, reported in 2010161, 
showed a quarter of all children treated in the Intensive Care Unit suffered preventable 
harm over a period of 176 days.  There were 405 adverse events affecting 165 patients, 28 
per cent of which required a significant medical intervention and 3 per cent of which 
resulted in death or permanent disability.  Only 40% of these were recorded in the 
hospital’s voluntary reporting system, which recorded 166 events affecting 100 patients.  
There were no catastrophic results noted in the voluntary reporting system and only 2% 
were identified as requiring significant medical intervention.  When the doctors were 
interviewed by the Age newspaper, one of the researchers Professor Tibballs, who is a 
senior intensive care specialist at that hospital, described the research as suggesting “an 
epidemic of adverse events … that the medical and broader population knew little about”.  
He criticised current sentinel event recording as “trying to tell the score in a football match 
by watching the number of footballs that come over the stadium wall – very few footballs 
come over the wall.”162  The normalisation of patient harm is sometimes more easily 
observed by “outsiders”.  For example, in relation to the above study, Professor Jeff 
Richardson, a health economics professor at Monash University said that: 
it was astonishing the so little had been done since the Quality in Australian 
Healthcare study in 1995 estimated that about 12,000 Australians were dying each 
year because of preventable adverse events.  The issue of adverse events in the 
                                                
161  Silas R. Tibballs J. Adverse events and comparison of systematic and voluntary reporting from a 
paediatric intensive care unit. 2010 Quality and Safety in Health Care, volume 19(6), pages 568-571. 
162  Madew J. Hospital blunder probe. 2011, 7 March: accessed via the internet on 12 August 2011 at: 
www.theage.com.au/victoria/hospital-blunder-probe-20110306-1bjmn.html  
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Australian healthcare system should dominate all others.  However, it would be 
closer to the truth to describe it as Australia’s best kept secret.163 
 
Historically, the landmark research of sociologist Marcia Millman, published in 1977 in 
The Unkindest Cut – Life in the Backrooms of Medicine164 described as pervasive this 
normalisation of harm and the use of the tools of cognitive dissonance by doctors in dealing 
with mistakes and patient harm.  Professor Millman’s observations were carried out over 
two years, as she studied the doctors and staff of a private US University affiliated hospital.  
Her observations about medical mistakes still resonate today: 
To protect themselves against [the extraordinary feelings of responsibility for 
damaging a life that has been entrusted to their care], those in the medical 
profession employ several collective rationales for distancing themselves from the 
outcomes of their mistakes. … [O]ne could not hope to understand what medical 
work is about without understanding how the neutralization of mistakes fits into the 
ideology and organization of medical work.  By “neutralization” of medical 
mistakes I mean the various processes by which medical mistakes are systematically 
ignored, justified or made to appear unimportant or inconsequential by the doctors 
who have made them or those who have noticed that they have been made. At every 
stop and turn of medical work, there are built-in professional protections for the 
doctor against having to recognize and take responsibility for mistakes made on 
patients.  These defences against acknowledging mistakes reside in the very heart of 
medical work, philosophy and organization.  Furthermore, every aspect of medical 
work is shaped by this group collusion to ignore and justify errors.165   
 
While these comments related to observation made about 40 years ago, consumers who 
have participated on quality and safety committees and in clinical audit processes continue 
to make similar observations about the cultural protection and self-justifications inherent in 
many processes of peer review.166 
 
                                                
163  Madew J. Thousands dying from preventable hospital errors, says professor. 2011, 8 March: accessed 
via the internet on 12 August 2011 at: http://www.theage.com.au/national/thousands-dying-from-
preventable-hospital-errors-says-professor-20110307-1bl7e.html  
164  Millman M. The Unkindest Cut – Life in the Backrooms of Medicine. 1977 Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 
New York. 
165  Millman 1977 - see note 164: page 91. 
166  From the author’s own observations and from comments made by consumer representative to the 
author.  See also Banja 2005 – see note154: Appendix 1 – Error rationalization and the somatically 
marking brain, pages 205-214. 
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E. Emotional responses to medical errors and preventable 
patient harm 
1. Introduction 
Despite all the above self-protective processes, a doctor may have to acknowledge, either 
personally or to others, that his or her actions involved a significant error or harmed 
someone.  There are several common psychological responses to this explicit threat to the 
Doctor identity, including fear, shame, guilt and humiliation.  In his classic research on the 
impact of their errors on doctors167, Christensen states: 
Discussion with physicians about the emotional impact of their mistakes has been 
equivalent to a descent into the underworld of medicine. It is a journey into a place 
of shame, fear and isolation. 
 
That study also noted the presence of longer term mental health disturbances including 
depression and anxiety.168  The intensity and duration of the emotions experienced 
appeared to depend not only on the doctor’s reported sense of his or her identity as a doctor, 
but on events which followed the error that often caused further shame and humiliation.  
 
Some of the emotions doctors experience if they believe they are responsible for patient 
harm are “basic emotions”, like fear, sadness and sometimes anger.  The six basic human 
emotions are fear, anger, sadness, surprise, happiness and disgust, and these are identified 
as being shared by all humans across cultures, evidenced by similar facial expressions.169  
Homologous emotions appear to exist in a range of other mammals, with basic emotions 
understood to be driven from the evolutionally older parts of the brain that humans share 
with other mammals170.   
 
Doctors also experience the more complex emotions of shame, guilt and embarrassment.  In 
psychology, these are called “moral emotions”.  These are “negatively valenced” emotions, 
                                                
167  Christensen et al. 1992 – see note 51: page 430. 
168  While these conditions are linked to different emotions, both basic and complex emotions, they are not 
emotions themselves.  For a discussion of this, see Power MJ. Tarsia M. Basic and complex emotions 
in depression and anxiety. 2007 Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, volume 14, pages 19-31. 
169  Ekman P. An argument for basic emotions. 1992 Cognition & Emotion, volume 6(3/4), pages 169-200. 
170  Panksepp J. Affective neuroscience of the emotional BrainMind: evolutionary perspectives and 
implications for understanding depression.  2010 Dialogues in clinical neuroscience, volume 12(4), 
pages 533-545. 
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which are intrinsically aversive so people seek to avoid them. The four moral emotions171 
are said to “provide the motivational force – the power and energy – to do good and to 
avoid doing bad.172”  They are also described as “self-conscious emotions”, which are 
cognitively complex.  They require, among other things, self-awareness, the knowledge of 
social rules against which the nature and moral quality of behaviour will be judged, and the 
capacity to reflect and self-evaluate one’s own actions, thoughts and behaviours against 
these rules. 173  The role of moral emotions appears to be a self-and social regulatory one: 
Put simply, society tells us what kind of person we should be; we internalize these 
beliefs in the form of actual and ideal self representation; and self-conscious 
emotions motivate behavioural action towards the goals embodied in these self 
representations.  By reinforcing prosocial behaviours – encouraging us to act in 
ways that promote social acceptance – self conscious emotions facilitate 
interpersonal reciprocity, a social arrangement that is highly beneficial in the long 
term.174  
 
Self-conscious emotions can also be relational – that is involving Self in relation to others. 
Empathy and humiliation are both relational emotions175.  Humiliation is a frequently 
identified emotion in medical training and in processes that deal with preventable patient 
harm in practice, as well as being “endemic in power-over cultures”176 like medicine.   
Shame is strongly implicated in decreased empathy,177 and can be a result of deep or long 
                                                
171  Pride, the fourth so-called moral emotion is said to be, in contrast, a “positively valenced” moral 
emotion. 
172  Tangney JP. Stuewing J. Mashek DJ. Moral emotions and moral behavior. 2007 Annual Review of 
Psychology, volume 58, pages 345-372. 
173  Tracy JL. Robins RW. The Self in Self-conscious emotions – a cognitive appraisal approach. Chapter 
1 in Tracy JL. Robins RW. Tangney JP. (editors) The Self-Conscious Emotions: theory and research. 
2013 Guilford Publications New York (USA): pages 3-20. 
174  Tracy JL. Robins RW. Putting the self into Self-Conscious emotions: A Theoretical Model. 2004 
Psychological Inquiry, volume 15(2), pages 103-125: at page 107. 
175  Relational cultural theory considers that shame and humiliation are both components of power 
relationships, which will be discussed further below.  Hartling LM. Rosen W. Walker M. Jordan JV. 
Shame and humiliation: from isolation to relational transformation. Work in progress No. 88. 2000 
Wellesley Centers for Women, Wellesley (Massachusetts). 
176  Hartling et al. 2000 – see note 175: page 9. 
177  Research indicates that guilt has a synergistic effect on empathy, while shame interferes with an 
empathic response.  Tangney JP. Dearing RL. Shame and Guilt. 2002 The Guilford Press, New York: 
Moral Affect: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly, pages 81-89. 
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term humiliation, when some of the ridicule often associated with humiliation is accepted 
and turned in on the Self.178 
 
2. Shame, Guilt and Humiliation 
Humiliation, guilt and shame are three emotions which have variable effects on the 
identification of and action on preventable patient harm. In ordinary parlance, sometimes 
these words are used interchangeably, but there are important differences in their nature and 
consequences, so far as preventable patient harm is concerned.  Psychology researchers 
argue that they leave different legacies for the person who experiences these emotions. 179  
While all are identified as “moral emotions”, not all are positive in their effect on the 
desired outcome of behaviour, nor on the long-term mental health of the person who feels 
them.180 
 
The different focus of shame and guilt was first posited by the psychoanalyst Helen Block 
Lewis in 1971,181 and has subsequently been substantiated in many other studies182.  
Tangney and Dearing177 conclude that the distinguishing feature between shame and guilt 
is that the person who feels shame is “impaired by global devaluation”183 of their self-
identity.  The experience of shame produces powerful negative self-judgments that they are 
small, worthless and powerless.  Shame produces a desire to hide, escape or strike back.  In 
fact, Kaufman and Raphael conclude that: 
                                                
178  Klein DC. The Humiliation Dynamic: An Overview. 1991 The Journal of Primary Prevention, volume 
12(2), pages 93-121: at page 117. 
179  The theoretical study of shame and guilt includes those who do not consider that there is such large 
differences between these emotions.  See eg, Harris N. Reassessing the dimensionality of the moral 
emotions. 2003 British Journal of Psychology, volume 94, pages 457-473.  See also Braithwaite J. 
Crime, shame and reintegration. 1989 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK). 
180  Tangney et al. 2002 – at note 177: see Chapter 8 – The Bottom Line – Moral Emotions and Moral 
Behaviour, pages 130-138. See also Tangney et al 2007 – see note 172: Shame and Guilt are not 
equally “moral” emotions at pages 349-354. 
181  Lewis HB. Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. 1971 International Universities Press, New York. Of 
particular assistance is Table 1, page 88.  
182  A significant number of these studies are listed in Tangney et al. 2002 – at note 177: at page 20-21.  
See also Lewis M. Shame – the exposed self. 1995 The Free Press, New York: Self Thoughts and 
Shame, pages 59 and following.  For his diagrammatic explanation of the relationship between shame, 
guilt, pride and hubris, see pages 64 and following. 
183  Tangney et al. 2002 – at note 177: Table 2.1, page 25. 
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Shame is the most disturbing experience individuals ever have about themselves; no 
other emotion feels more deeply disturbing because in the moment of shame the self 
feels wounded from within.  The disturbance produced by shame affects not only 
self-esteem but also the development of identity and the pursuit of intimacy.184 
 
This compares with guilt, where the focus of the emotion is on the action done, rather than 
on the person’s self-perception or identity.  The feelings generated by guilt are generally 
tension, remorse and regret for the action, and the motivation afterwards to “confess, 
apologize and repair” what the action caused185.  Another important difference is that 
because shame involves “critical, painful scrutiny of the self as a whole”186, it focuses the 
person’s attention on their own feelings and reduces their attention to the feelings of others.  
In contrast, guilt is claimed to work positively on empathy through encouraging perspective 
taking187, which in turn focuses the attention on addressing the needs of the other.  
Enhancing empathy is an important action in the doctor patient relationship, as empathic 
care benefits both patients188 and doctors189. 
 
Negative emotions cause psychological pain, but the intra-psychic pain of shame is 
generally perceived as much worse that generated by guilt alone, because shame impacts on 
someone’s identity, their sense of Self190.  Guilt on the other hand says that person is a good 
person who has done a bad thing.  Guilt and shame are both emotions which society seeks 
                                                
184  Kaufman G. Raphael L. Dynamics of Power: Fighting Shame and Building Self-Esteem. Revised 2nd 
edition 1991 Schenkman Books, Rochester (Vermont USA): page xiii.  
185  Tangney et al. 2002 – at note 177: Table 2.1, page 25. 
186  Leith KP. Baumeister RF. Empathy, shame. guilt and narratives of interpersonal conflicts: Guilt-prone 
people are better at perspective taking.  1998 Journal of Personality, February, volume 66(1), pages 1-
37: at page 3. 
187  Leith et al 1998 - see note 186. 
188  See eg, Rakel D. Barrett B. Zhang Z. Hoeft T. Chewning B. Marchahand L. Scheder J. Perception of 
empathy in the therapeutic encounter: effects on the common cold. 2011 Patient Education and 
Counselling, December, volume 85(3), pages 390-397, which showed that patients who received more 
empathic care recovered faster.  For hypotheses on why patients get better faster and more often with 
empathic care, see Decety J. Fotopoulou A. Why empathy has a beneficial impact on others in 
medicine: unifying theories. 2015 Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience, January, volume 8, article 
457, pages 1-11.  
189  Gleichgerrcht E. Decety J. Empathy in clinical practice: How individual dispositions, gender and 
experience moderate empathic concern, burnout, and emotional distress in physicians. 2013 LPOS 
One, April, volume 8(4) e61526. Available free at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0061526 . 
190  Tangney et al. 2007 – see note 172: at page 349. 
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to engender to impact favourably on behavioural compliance with norms and values191.  
However, shame-generating actions are less likely to encourage someone to learn from 
their mistakes and to act to prevent any future mistake or consequent harm.  Tangney and 
Dearing go further and say shame “can lead to a profound sense of hopelessness and 
despair”.  They confirm the finding in their own and other research of an association 
between the experience of shame and suicide or suicidal ideation, and shame proneness and 
depression.192  Perhaps most importantly for the prevention of patient harm and medical 
errors, shame is “silencing and disempowering”193.  Despite the widely-held view that 
shame helps people to avoid doing wrong or to change their behaviour, there is little 
evidence to support this view and much which shows that shame is both debilitating and 
threatening to identity194, particularly where the shame-inducing act involves public 
humiliation.195 
 
Humiliation is generally felt when “one is ridiculed, scorned, held in contempt, or 
otherwise disparaged for what one is rather than what one does”196  It can be seen as an 
undeserved impingement on the person’s human dignity197, an imputation of inferiority in 
the Self, and almost inevitably involves the exercise of “power over” the person who is 
humiliated.  Leask defines humiliation as “a demonstrative exercise of power against one or 
more persons, which consistently involves a number of elements: stripping of status; 
rejection or exclusion; unpredictability or arbitrariness; and a personal sense of injustice, 
                                                
191  Health promotion programs, using negative, shaming images of fat people to encourage weight loss is 
an example.  Parents expressing disappointment at their child’s negative behaviour when they are said 
to be bad, or to behave badly, are using shame or guilt to reinforce chosen behaviours. 
192  Tangney et al. 2002 – at note 177: pages 136-137. 
193  Hartling 2000 - see note 175: page 12. 
194  Tangney et al. 2002 – at note 177: pages 126. 
195  The difference between Braithwaite’s concept of re-integrative shaming in the criminal context is that 
it involves shame within a respectful, relational treatment of an offender, and it may be that it is 
therefore closer to Tangney and Dearing’s concept of guilt. 
196  Klein DC. 1991 – see note 178: page 117. 
197  Bourdieu made a similar analysis of an insult, which he said “sullies both the picture of himself that 
the individual intends to project and that which he imagines to be his.” Bourdieu P. The sentiment of 
honor in the Kabyle Society. Chapter in Peristany JG. (editor). Honor and shame: the values of 
Mediterranean society. 1965, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, pages 191-242: at page 211. 
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matched by the lack of any remedy for the injustice suffered”198.  Where humiliation occurs 
in a public forum, it is sometimes seen as “being disgraced”, which can have a profound 
effect beyond the Self, through damage to reputation199.  This speaks to the notion of 
“spoiled identity”, discussed in the work of Erving Goffman, where the person is “thus 
reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one”200.   
 
Humiliation involves a strong feeling of “being wronged”, compared to the feeling of 
shame, which involves “being wrong” when measured against one’s own internal norms or 
values or those of others.  Hartling and Luchetta conclude that: 
Theorists have suggested that shame can serve an appropriate adaptive function by 
inhibiting aggression or protecting an individual from unnecessary personal 
exposure.  In contrast, humiliation has not been identified as serving an adaptive 
function.201 
 
In Lazare’s research on humiliation in medicine202, doctors and patients describe five 
characteristics of the experience of humiliation: 
• Visual exposure (feeling blemished, exposed or stigmatized); 
• Feeling reduced in size (feeling belittled, put down or humbled; 
• Being found deficient (feeling degraded, dishonoured or devalued); 
• Being attacked (experiencing ridicule, scorn or insult); and 
• An avoidant response (wanting to hide one’s face or sink into the ground). 
While some of these feelings are associated with shame, humiliation differs from shame in 
that “people believe they deserve their shame; they do not believe they deserve their 
humiliation”.203  Shame can be generated by the same actions, when the humiliated person 
feel that the humiliation may have some underlying truth.  However, humiliation can exist 
                                                
198  Leask P. Losing trust in the world: Humiliation and its consequences. 2013 Psychodynamic Practice, 
volume 19(2), pages 129-142: at page 131. 
199  Burton N. Heaven and hell – the psychology of the emotions. 2015 Acheron Press, Oxford: page 54. 
200  Goffman E. Stigma – Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. 1963 Touchstone Books, New 
York: page 12. 
201  Hartling LM. Luchetta T. Humiliation: Assessing the impact of derision degradation and debasement. 
1999 Journal of Primary Prevention, volume 19(4), pages 259-278: at page 263. 
202  Lazare A. Shame and humiliation in the medical encounter. 1987 Archives of Internal Medicine, 
September, volume 147, pages 1653-1658. 
203  Klein 1991 – see note 178: page 117. 
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without giving rise to shame, for example, when the person internally rejects the slur made 
against them or recognises the humiliation as unjust.  This alternative leaves a profound 
sense of unfairness or injustice, rather than shame, and this can also result in short and long 
term negative effects.204 
 
Humiliation also occurs typically within “relationships of unequal power, where the 
humiliator has power over the victim”.  It generally involves three roles: humiliator, victim 
and witness.  All role actors are psychologically affected by the act of humiliation: 
While a humiliator may be emboldened by feelings of power, a victim of 
humiliation will feel degraded, confused, powerless, paralyzed, ostracized, violated 
or assaulted.  Witnesses of humiliating events may escape being cast as the target, 
but they may develop a fear of humiliation that influences their behaviour to an 
equal or greater degree as those who have been the victims of humiliation.  
Regardless of one’s role in an interaction, fear of humiliation can have a formidable 
influence on an individual’s behaviour.205 
 
Resistance to humiliation can occur where the humiliation relates to something to which the 
victim considers they hold a higher obligation.  For example, in the case of political 
dissidence206, people may be subject to humiliation, but see it simply as part of the political 
perfidy they are opposing.  They also see the lack of fairness and absence of a right of 
redress as symptoms of the injustice they are standing against207.  A medical context 
analogy might occur when someone informs on a colleague because of concerns about their 
behaviour or performance which creates a high risk to patients.  If the informant is 
ostracised by peers or subject to other forms of ritual humiliation, then they may see their 
role as an informant as patient-focussed resistance to an unsafe medical culture208.   
 
                                                
204  Miller DT. Disrespect and the experience of injustice. 2001 Annual Review of Psychology, volume 52: 
pages 527-553: pages 532-535 especially. 
205  Hartling LM. et al. 1999 – see note 201: at pages 261-262. 
206  Leask describes this as where someone’s activities “demonstrate that they do not accept or share the 
norms and values of those in power”.  He goes on to argue that “resisters see their punishment and 
exclusion as predictable consequences of the power struggle they are involved in.  They see 
themselves as temporarily defeated, not as victims of humiliation”. Leask 2013 – see note 198: at page 
134. 
207  Leask 2013 – see note 198: Humiliation and resistance at pages 134-135. 
208  The role and implications for medical whistle-blowers is discussed in Chapter 6 below. 
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When a person is humiliated in a personal, pedagogical or other trust relationship, which 
would normally include support and where there is a significant imbalance of power 
physically, emotionally or socially209, the consequences of humiliation can be significant.  
Examples of these relationships in the medical professional context include the relationship 
of teacher/student or supervisor/trainee.  In these circumstances, the impact of the sense of 
injustice or shame can have serious and negative emotional and relational consequences for 
the student or trainee210.  The sense of injustice arising from the humiliation normally gives 
rise to feelings of anger, indignation, disappointment, surprise, physical symptoms of 
arousal and threat, helplessness, depression and envy211, and is very destructive of 
relationships212.   
 
In either case, whether there is resistance or not, an act of humiliation produces profound 
feelings of vulnerability and powerlessness.  Some of these arise directly from the power 
relationship which underpins any humiliation dynamic.  Even when people resist the 
criticism of Self in the humiliation, they can still be strongly adversely affected at a 
practical level, where the person who humiliated them continues to have power over them.  
If the victim asserts in any way their resistance or rejection of the humiliation, the 
humiliator can see this as a threat to their power and redouble their efforts.  It can result in 
an on-going pattern of humiliation, as the person with the “power over” seeks to 
consolidate that power.  This pattern is likely to result in a long-term trauma response in the 
victim.  Initially, “the likely consequences of humiliation are a sense of permanent loss, and 
feelings of impotence, frustrated rage, despair and a ‘foul thirst for revenge’”213.  However, 
over time, when humiliation is repeated or observed being done to others, victims tend to 
pass through “different sets of responses, from a sense of bewildered helplessness to rage 
                                                
209  Leask 2013 – see note 198: at page 135. 
210  Frank E. Carrera JS. Stratton T. Bickel J. Nora LM. Experiences of belittlement and harassment and 
their correlates among medical students in the United States: longitudinal study. 2006 British Medical 
Journal, 30 September, volume 333(7570,) page 682:  doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.38924.722037.7C .  This study showed that belittlement and harassment, 
when significant, contributes to long term serious psychological correlates. 
211  Mikula G. Schere KR. Athenstaedt U. The role of injustice in the elicitation of differential emotional 
relationships. 1998 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, July, volume 24(7), pages 769-783. 
212  Mikula et al 1998 – see note 211: page 780. 
213  Leask 2013 – see note 198: at page 131. 
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and then from there to revolt, resistance or submission, which may also involve despair and 
self-destruction.”214 
 
Humiliation does not appear to need to be repeatedly endured or witnessed to cause harm.  
It has been said that the first act of humiliation creates a breach of trust, a loss of hope and a 
residue of fear that remains forever215.  Because humiliation is a form of trauma to Self, 
inflicted by another, and often observed or reported on by others, it can also have a 
profound impact on a much broader group of people.  Fear of humiliation is said to drive 
many aspects of human behaviour.   
…[O]ne doesn’t have to be an actual victim of humiliation to develop the desire to 
avoid it.  Merely participating in or observing someone else’s humiliation is 
enough.   …  The fear of humiliation appears to be one of the most powerful 
motivators of individual and collective human behavior.  So powerful, indeed, that 
people kill themselves to escape humiliation and others, even against their deeply 
held principles, go to war to kill other human beings rather than run the risk of 
being publicly humiliated by being labelled “coward” or “traitor”.  
 
When any act of humiliation occurs in front of others, and they feel impotent to defend the 
person who is subjected to humiliation for fear of the consequences for themselves, their 
sense of trust and fairness and their belief in their own courage and faith in themselves may 
also be permanently harmed.  Inaction produces a strong cocktail of reflected humiliation 
and shame.  For example, where a medical student sees a senior teaching doctor humiliating 
another student, in front of students, patients and other doctors, for not knowing something 
or making an error, all those present can be marked by the humiliation.  These complex 
individual and group psychological mechanisms are why the effects of humiliation can be 
so profound. 
 
Shame and humiliation usually give rise to anger, either directed outward or inward.  
Inwardly directed, “humiliated fury” can result in depression and despair.  Outwardly 
directed, humiliation can lead to vengeful acts or unkind or cruel behaviours that contribute 
                                                
214  Leask 2013 – see note 198: at page 136. 
215  Jean Améry in his book about his torture and humiliation by the Gestapo states that it is the first act of 
humiliation which breaches one’s trust in the world, and that when this happens “a part of our life ends 
and it can never be revived.” Amery J. At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a survivor on 
Auschwitz and its realities. Translated by Rosenfeld S. Rosenfeld SP. 1980 Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington (Indiana, USA): page 28. 
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to cycles of violence at multiple levels.  Another consequence of humiliation is a protective 
closing off from the world both physically and psychologically, and the development of a 
protective shell to manage what goes in and out.  Such self-protective mechanisms can play 
havoc with the development and maintenance of empathy and establish patterns of 
distancing and closing off from others, so that all relationships are harder to establish and 
maintain.  Some proponents of relational cultural theory see humiliation as a relational 
violation, which involves being made to feel unworthy of connection.216 
3. Error and patient harm as shame and humiliation 
Where a medical student or doctor makes a mistake or harms a patient, their emotions can 
include fear, shame and humiliation.  Those who witness the shaming of a colleague or 
even hear about it, will often also suffer these same emotions.  Witnesses and participants 
are each likely to feel anxiety in the long term.  All these emotions have a negative impact 
on patient safety.  As discussed above, guilt unmarred by shame can lead to other-focussed 
corrective action and to enhanced empathy.217  However, it is arguable that the acts of 
making a mistake or causing harm to a patient are intrinsically shameful and humiliating to 
the Doctor Identity. 
 
Shame and humiliation were traditionally identified as ways of reinforcing pro-social 
behaviour.  Humiliation was seen as useful, because of its ability to affect the behaviours of 
those who witness rather than experience it directly, because of the universal human fear of 
humiliation.  Shame and humiliation, particularly around making mistakes, harming a 
patient or even identifying the mistakes of a more senior doctor often form part of medical 
education and training, as discussed in Chapter 5 below.  Most of this occurs in a strongly 
hierarchical institutional setting, where the student or trainees progress depends on the 
grace and favour of those higher up the hierarchy.  Its role in socialisation and 
professionalization can be seen through the lens of establishing dominance and in forcing 
conformity: 
One’s degradation is shared by others of equivalent status.  Moreover, the aim of the 
experience, as everyone is aware at some level or another, is to help one become an 
acceptable equal of those doing the humiliating.  There is light at the end of the 
                                                
216  Hartling LM et al. 2000 – see note 175: ‘The relational dynamics of humiliation’ at page 3. 
217  Tangney et al. 2002 - see note 177: Chapter 5 Moral emotions and interpersonal sensitivity: especially 
page 87. 
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tunnel and, if the process goes as planned, everyone involved – including one’s 
humiliators, one’s fellow victims, and witnesses – conspire to enable one to survive 
the ordeal and emerge transformed at the other end.218 
 
Unfortunately, the consequences of such shame and humiliation are often damaging to the 
person, their environment and the systems in which they operate, even where there is a 
“pro-social” intention, like the “professionalization” of medical students.   
 
Through the lens of cognitive dissonance, discussed above, someone who has been through 
a ritualised humiliation process may see it as positively linked to their status, as something 
one must endure to become the new status, and so proceed to do it to others. 
Having undergone ritual humiliation and emerged at the other end of the process 
with a new group identity, the erstwhile victim has found significance, usually 
lifelong, in the fact of having gained membership within the group of erstwhile 
humiliators. 
 
As well as running the risk of continuing the pattern of ritual humiliation219, it also leaves 
“the lifelong sense of vulnerability to the possibility of further humiliation instilled in those 
who survive”.220  Lazare concludes that humiliation in medical training can also mean that 
when the trainees become doctors, they “may be unable to accept criticism or hostility from 
patients”, “may be unable to acknowledge mistakes or apologize”, “may have difficulty 
learning from others” and “may be unable to relax and enjoy other aspects of their lives.”221 
 
In addition, the priming of the emotional threat mechanism, by experiencing these emotions 
directly or by witnessing someone else suffering, can cause inattentional blindness and 
denial into the future.  Unaddressed and internalised, the psychological consequences 
associated with shame and humiliation result in depression, anxiety and burn-out for the 
doctor.  Unaddressed and externalised, the loss of empathy and embodied anger often 
associated with these experiences can result in poor quality care. Shame or humiliation 
                                                
218  Klein DC. 1991 – see note 178: at page 103. 
219  This intergenerational pattern was identified in the recent Royal Australasian College of Surgeons’ 
survey, which revealed long term abuse and humiliation of surgical trainees, as discussed in Chapter 6.  
Such patterns of behaviour have a negative effect not only on the doctor concerned, but on another 
doctor (or indeed any other clinician like a nurse or other member of a treating team).  
220  Klein DC. 1991 – see note 178: at page 103. 
221  Lazare A. 1987 – see note 202: at page 1656. 
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because of error or preventable patient harm, can be produced in medical education, 
professional training, in peer review or in the complaint and litigation process.  Wherever it 
occurs, there is a strong risk that these psychological experiences will compromise patient 
safety and the well-being of doctors and patients long after the triggering events are 
forgotten222. 
 
                                                
222  Actions which create these emotional responses act as a dysfunctional form of training about how to 
deal with mistakes.  That is, if you make a mistake, hide it to avoid punishment and humiliation.  This 
form of negative training does not provide either corrective behaviour or guidance about why the 
mistake happened in the first place and what could have been done to avoid repetition.  Because the 
response is likely to be stored in implicit memory, it may well be triggered as a first response and be 
passed on to those who observe the person as trainees. 
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Chapter 4: Patient harm and vulnerabilities of the Doctor 
Identity  
A. Introduction 
Chapter 3 sets out the normal human psychological and neural responses that can occur 
when a threat to identity occurs.  The human brain is likely to avoid attention to 
information that, if brought to conscious awareness, may crystallise into an identity threat.  
Methods of avoidance outside of conscious awareness include inattentional blindness, and 
the exclusion or redefinition of information outside of attention as not relevant.   
 
If this avoidance is unsuccessful, then the brain can use various techniques like cognitive 
biases to interpret information in an identity-protective manner.  These are intended to 
resolve cognitive dissonance because information that is a threat to identity is the 
psychological equivalent to a mortal threat to the body.  It gives rise to high levels of 
anxiety and an overwhelming psychological need for resolution to protect identity.  It is 
therefore not surprising that the brain prefers an identity-protective view of information that 
has come to its attention.   
 
Once there is no further psychological way of avoiding awareness of a threat to identity, a 
range of strong emotions are triggered, depending upon the circumstances.  These include 
fear, anxiety, guilt, embarrassment, shame and humiliation.  This chapter looks specifically 
at how these normal human responses apply to the threat to the Doctor Identity that comes 
from medical error and patient harm.  It posits that the “error-free idealised doctor” that 
walks around in the minds of most doctors in a “Perfect Performance” schema, thwarts its 
own idealised achievement in the real world of medicine.  It looks at the historical roots of 
this schema and how other professions have sought to address a similar mistaken denial of 
human performance limitations.  It seeks to support the first hypothesis of the thesis:  
The occurrence of patient harm and medical error can be perceived psychologically 
by a doctor as a fundamental threat to his or her identity (Hypothesis 1) 
 
The chapter then seeks to provide support for the second hypothesis of the thesis: 
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A serious threat to identity causes a range of psychological defences, often rooted in 
the biological responses of the brain to threats to existence, and these defences can 
make it hard for a doctor to recognise, identify or accept the risk of patient harm; 
(Hypothesis 2) 
It looks at denial and re-characterisation of patient harm as a primary identity defence 
strategy.  Sometimes called the “contested” nature of medical error and patient harm, the 
issue is considered through the Harvard Medical Practice Studies Litigation Sub-study, 
which provides a unique window into the ways doctors can differentially perceive the same 
fact situation around preventable patient harm.  This chapter also notes how the voice of the 
patient often remains “out of scope” when looking at preventable patient harm.  When it is 
brought in through complaints or litigation, the voice of the patient or family is also 
perceived as a direct threat to the Doctor Identity, with significant adverse relational 
implications.  
 
The chapter then considers the maladaptive but predictable responses created in the lives of 
doctors, by the emotions associated with medical error and patient harm upon which its 
third hypothesis is based: 
Elements of the Doctor Identity deny ordinary human psychological responses and 
physical limitations, and thus promote unrealistic self or group perceptions. This 
creates risks to both doctors and patients.  Many of these risks may be avoidable 
through modifying these perceptions and developing more realistic self-and 
professional schemas. (Hypothesis 3) 
The common maladaptive responses to the threat to identity frequently impact negatively 
on the doctor’s well-being and long term mental health, on their relationship with other 
health professionals and medical peers, on their relationship with patients and the wellbeing 
of their patients.  This chapter closes with a case study of the effects that a distorted 
understanding of what is to be both a human being and a doctor can have on doctors and 
patients, through an analysis of fatigue in the lives of doctors and student and trainee 
doctors.  
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B. The Doctor Identity, error and patient harm 
1. Why change has been limited – the first hypothesis 
As shown in Chapter 1, the high incidence of medical error and patient harm has been 
known about for more than half a century and significant efforts have been expended over 
the past two decades to try and address the problem.  However, the achievements of these 
efforts have been modest at best.  Further new strategies need to be considered to hasten 
action to reduce the unacceptable human toll on patients and doctors1.  Despite more recent 
explicit discussion about medical errors as an unavoidable consequence of being human, 
the error-free performance medical Schema remains embedded in the hidden curriculum in 
medical education and training detailed in Chapter 5, and in many of the implicit values and 
practices in health care and in the means for consolidation and maintenance of the Doctor 
Identity, set out in Chapter 6.  Medical error and patient harm continue to be perceived 
often as a fundamental threat to the good Doctor Identity. 
 
This works actively against the explicit efforts that have been made to create a medical 
culture that recognises and responds actively to the ubiquity of medical error.  
Understanding and accepting ordinary human limitations should allow safer systems of 
working to be developed.  For example, doctors would be able to admit to themselves and 
tell others when they are tired, distressed or distracted.  Once the existence of normal 
human limitations is acknowledged, this should also allow employment of strategies and 
actions to reduce the risk of patient harm from errors. 
 
However, the traditional medical view of mistakes as a moral failing is irreconcilable with 
the more modern understanding that errors are a normal and relatively predictable part of 
human behaviour.  While part of the public and professional discourse around medical error 
recognises the occurrence of error in medicine and the need to develop better, safer health 
care systems and practices to support excellence within an error-prone environment2, there 
                                                
1  The patient toll is evident from the data in Chapter 1. The following book provides an excellent 
analysis of how doctors, nurses and other health professionals often become the second victim, when 
preventable patient harm occurs Dekker S. Second Victim – Error, Guilt, Trauma and Resilience 
2013 CRC Press, Boca Raton (Florida USA). 
2  The 1999 US publication of the report To Err is Human was a significant milestone in that 
recognition internationally, though in Australia, the 1995 publication of the Quality in Australian 
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are strong legacies from the perfect performance paradigm that confuse and oppose this 
message.  For example, an oft-quoted precept in the new paradigm is that preventable 
patient harm occurs because “good people work in flawed systems”3.  For the Doctor 
Identity, embedded so long in a perfect performance paradigm, this can readily be 
interpreted as meaning that those who possess moral and professional virtue (good people) 
don’t make mistakes, rather than that healthcare error and patient harm are the products of 
something outside them (the flawed system).  
 
This causes two dissonance issues for the Doctor Identity, in relation to the identification of 
errors and the prevention of harm to patients.  First, being a good person and a good doctor 
is equated with never personally causing harm or making mistakes which can lead to harm.  
While it is desirable that doctors strive for excellence, an expectation of perfect 
performance is not achievable.  To rely on perfect performance as a patient safety strategy 
means that more reliable “safety nets” for detecting errors before harm occurs are not 
generally developed or put in place.  After all, the argument goes, why put in a safety net if 
there is no problem?  The partnering of perfect performance with the Doctor Identity also 
perpetuates a source of cognitive dissonance for doctors.  Throughout their training and 
professional practice, doctors experience and observe mistakes and preventable patient 
harm on a regular basis, even among the best doctors.  At the same time, from their early 
days as medical students, they see behaviour modelled by their supervisors, colleagues and 
peers, which does not admit vulnerability to error or responsibility for medically caused 
harm.  As students and trainees, doctors learn not to bring errors and harm to anyone’s 
attention.  If they observe errors consciously, they learn to see them not as mistakes or 
preventable patient harm where doctors have agency, but as disconnected “adverse events” 
caused by “the system”. They learn and see enacted daily many of the denial and 
dissonance resolution strategies discussed in Chapter 3, because the other cultural 
understanding that is absorbed is that to be a good doctor means to “First, do no harm.”. 
                                                
Health Care study, commissioned as part of the Review of Professional Indemnity Arrangements for 
Health Care Professionals and the Review’s Final Report in 1996 had already brought the issue to 
national attention in Australia. Kohn LT. Corrigan JM. Donaldson M. (editors). To err is human: 
building a safer health system. Committee on Quality of Healthcare in America. Institute of 
Medicine. 1999 National Academy Press, Washington DC. 
3  See Chapter 2 above, section D, 1. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the second consequence of this tenet is that the disembodied 
“system” becomes the source of harm, and this exists outside of the desired identities of 
“good doctor” and “good person”.  The sentiment behind the tenet could be expressed more 
fully as “Even good people make mistakes, but barriers can be put in place to reduce the 
risk of patient harm arising from these mistakes”.  Instead the “Good people in flawed 
systems” meme4 is absorbed into the healthcare environment where it provides a 
convenient, seamless resolution to the cognitive dissonance of the doctor’s lived experience 
of ubiquitous medical error and patient harm.  The resolution comes as a rationalisation that 
“Error and harm exist, but it is not my responsibility –it is the ‘system’”. 
 
The meme thus reinforces the unrealistic ideal of harm-free medical practice, as proof that 
someone is a “good” doctor or virtuous person.  It inextricably links perfect performance 
with moral virtue, so medical error and causation of harm to a patient become not just a 
recognised part of the human condition shared by all people, including doctors.  Instead, it 
becomes a sign of moral and professional failure – a potential cause of fear, shame and 
humiliation.  The meme also reduces the agency a doctor may feel to create a safer process 
or to change practice because its seen as a “system problem”.  It is not, therefore, the 
doctor’s responsibility to identify or fix the problem. 
 
2. “Perfect performance” – ideal and curse 
This interpretation falls on fertile psychological and cultural ground, because of a doctor’s 
traditional ethical duties to a patient.  At the core of the professional medical expectations 
sit the ethical concepts of beneficence and non-malfeasance: to act selflessly in the interest 
of a patient and to do no harm to patients.  The societal expectation that doctors will put 
their patient’s interest first recognises the inherent power differential between doctors and 
patients and the potential for the power of a doctor to be misused.  The governance of this 
power underpins many of the ethical obligations required of doctors5.  These obligations 
                                                
4  ‘Meme’ is used here in its more traditional sense of an element of a culture or system of behaviour 
passed from one individual to another by imitation or other non-genetic means, rather than its more 
colloquial internet-based meaning. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/meme  
5  See eg, Brody H. The Healer’s Power, 1992 Yale University Press New Haven (USA). 
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also shape and support the Doctor Identity shared by doctors and by society as a whole, as 
discussed in Chapter 6.  One of medicine’s oldest and most cherished cultural stories is 
embodied in the legacy (and legend) of Hippocrates:  
…the meaning of the Hippocratic Oath and the reason for its enduring value is this 
highly personal quality which reflects the basic concepts of devotion to people and a 
desire to serve them, …  In his statement, Hippocrates makes everything else 
emanate therefrom:  the physician’s relation with the patient is sacrosanct.6 
 
The community expects that doctors will show high standards of selfless conduct in their 
relationships with patients.  These expectations underpin a framework of trust, in which 
patients and their families can feel safe in the care of a doctor when they are vulnerable.  
The occurrence of preventable patient harm, when it is brought to the attention of a patient 
or their family, can often thwart these expectations and cause the doctor and patient 
relationship to break down.  
In 1992 Christensen and others described the difficulties doctors have in assimilating a 
recognition of the ubiquity of medical error into their understanding of what it is to be a 
doctor, because of the training and professional socialisation processes of medicine: 
These processes that motivate the physician to maintain excellent standards of 
practice do not incorporate the notion of fallibility, in contrast to the premises of the 
science of medicine, which are founded on probability and error.  The absence of 
fallibility as a category in physicians’ concepts of their profession may be a product 
of the lack of serious discussion of mistakes in medical training, in the medical 
literature and in the conferences, grand rounds and symposia through which 
physicians are continuously socialized into the way that medicine works.7 
 
The impact this has on doctors when an error occurs, which cannot be denied or minimised, 
can be profound, particularly if a patient dies unexpectedly.8  As Hilfiker said in a 1982 
article9, doctors “work in an impossible situation”, where they know that every day they 
make “myriad decisions … [which] have the potential for drastic consequences if it is not 
                                                
6  Bulger RJ. (editor). In search of the modern Hippocrates. 1987 University of Iowa Press, Iowa City: 
page 11. 
7  Christensen JF. Levinson W. Dunn PM.  Heart of Darkness – the impact of perceived mistakes on 
physicians. 1992 Journal of General Internal Medicine, July/August, volume 7, pages 424-431. 
8  Christensen et al. 1992 – see note 7; Millman M. The Unkindest Cut – Life in the Backrooms of 
Medicine. 1977 Morrow Quill Paperbacks, New York 
9  Hilfiker D. Sounding Board – Facing our mistakes. 1984 New England Journal of Medicine. 12 
January, volume 310(2), pages 119-122. 
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determined properly”.  He goes onto argue that it is virtually inevitable that a mistake 
causing harm to a patient will occur and then: 
painfully, almost unbelievably, we physicians are even less prepared to deal with 
our mistakes than the average lay person is.  The climate of medical school and 
residency training, for instance, makes it nearly impossible to confront the 
emotional consequences of mistakes.  … The medical profession simply seems to 
have no place for its mistakes.  There is no permission given to talk about errors, no 
way of venting emotional responses.  Indeed, one would almost think that mistakes 
are in the same category as sins: it is permissible to talk about them only when they 
happen to other people.10 
 
Sir Donald Irvine, past President of the UK General Medical Council, sees the public 
reputation of what it is to be a doctor, discussed in detail in Chapter 6, as a driver to hide, 
deny or explain away preventable harm.  He describes the tension inherent between the 
fallibility and uncertainty doctors experience all the time, and the perception that they and 
many patients have that they should be certain.11 
 
The common university training of doctors internationally12 has replicated these attitudes 
throughout the world because of the common training pathways used.  In relation to the US 
system, Professor Lucian Leape said in 1999: 
Physicians are socialized in medical school and residency to strive for error-free 
practice.  There is a powerful emphasis on perfection, both in diagnosis and 
treatment.  In everyday hospital practice, the message is equally clear: mistakes are 
unacceptable.  Physicians are expected to function without error, an expectation that 
physicians translate into the need to be infallible.  One result is that physicians … 
come to view an error as a failure of character.  … Role models in medical 
education reinforce the concept of infallibility.  The young physician’s teachers are 
largely specialists, experts in their fields, and authorities.  Authorities are not 
supposed to err.  It has been suggested that this need to be infallible creates a strong 
pressure to intellectual dishonesty, to cover up mistakes rather than to admit them.13 
 
                                                
10  Hilfiker 1984 – see note 9: at page 121.  
11  Irvine D. The Doctors’ Tale – Professionalism and Public Trust. 2003 Radcliffe Medical Press, 
Abingdon (UK): page 25. 
12  The World Federation of Medical Education has established international standards for all medical 
education since 2003, so this common approach has been expanding from the Anglo-American 
medical education systems, which shared common features for very much longer. 
13  Leape LL. Error in medicine. Chapter 2 in Rosenthal MM.  Mulcahy L. Lloyd-Bostock S. Medical 
mishaps – pieces of the puzzle. 1999, Open University Press, Buckingham (UK): page 22. 
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The link between elements of the Doctor Identity and medical error and harm has been 
recognised for a long time.  In John Gregory’s 1770 Lecture One on the duties and 
qualifications of a physician, he ends with an important reflection on medical error. 
I may reckon among the moral duties incumbent on a physician, that candour which 
makes him open to conviction, and ready to acknowledge and rectify his mistakes.  
An obstinate adherence to an unsuccessful method of treating a disease, must be 
owing to a high degree of self-conceit, and a belief of the infallibility of a system.  
This error is the more difficult to cure, as it generally proceeds from ignorance.  
True knowledge and clear discernment may lead one into the extreme of diffidence 
and humility, but are inconsistent with self-conceit.  It sometimes happens, too, that 
this obstinacy proceeds from a defect in the heart.  Such physicians see that they are 
wrong, but are too proud to acknowledge their error, especially if it is pointed out to 
them by one of the profession.  To this species of pride, a pride incompatible with 
true dignity and elevation of mind, have the lives of thousands been sacrificed.14 
 
However, most doctors are poorly prepared in the apprenticeship parts of their education 
and training to effectively manage the threat, risk and consequences of preventable patient 
harm for patients and themselves.  Where they see more appropriate behaviour modelled, 
there is some evidence that they want to aspire to this: 
Many medical students made or observed significant errors. … Some students also 
experienced considerable uncertainty as to whether an error had occurred and how 
to prevent future errors.  Many errors may not have been disclosed to patients and 
some students who desired to discuss or disclose errors were apparently discouraged 
from doing so by senior doctors.  Some students criticised senior doctors who 
attempted to hide errors or avoid responsibility.  By contrast, students who 
witnessed senior doctors take responsibility for errors and candidly disclose errors 
to patients appeared to recognise the importance of honesty and integrity and said 
they aspired to these standards.15 
 
However, it is apparent from this and other studies discussed in Chapter 5, that this 
example of good practice is less common than will be needed to transform the cultural 
heritage that has shaped the “perfect performance” component of the Doctor Identity.  
 
                                                
14  Gregory J. Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician. 2nd edition (revised by his son 
Dr James Gregory) 1803 William Creech & T. Cadell & W. Davies Edinburgh [Access to this 
historic book was provided through the Royal Australasian College of Physicians History of 
Medicine Library]: end of Lecture 1, pages 26-27. 
15  Martinez W. Lo B. Medical students’ experiences with medical errors: an analysis of medical student 
essays. 2008 Medical Education; volume 42(7) July; pages 733-41: in Abstract. 
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As mentioned by Gregory in 1770, acknowledgement of the real probability of error 
requires a degree of humility and self-doubt which is often not strongly associated with 
medical professionalisation.  At a deeper level, as well, experiences or observations of 
shame or humiliation when errors are uncovered can have a lasting impact on all doctors 
and produce great anxiety about admitting errors throughout their career.  It is therefore less 
surprising that openness about errors is not well modelled in training, as discussed in 
Klitzman’s study of doctors who have become ill.  These doctors commented that: 
“all doctors think they’re important,” [one of the doctors] said, “critical to the 
survival of themselves and everyone around them”.  Such arrogance often abetted 
poor communication.  Frequently, physicians resisted challenges to their authority, 
feeling they were right and patient wrong.  Such pride can prompt doctors to 
conceptualise successes and failures of treatment in self-affirming ways.  At times, 
doctors overreported successes and downplayed failures, defining the risks and 
benefits differently than did their patients. …Admitting negative outcomes, despite 
the promise of modern scientific triumphs, is to confess and confront medicine’s 
limitations.  Hence, doctors may frame prognoses and treatments in unrealistic and 
self-serving ways. [As one doctor said]: 
“Doctors lie to themselves and their patients, because of the limitations of 
what they’re doing.  Medicine has made immense progress, but there is a 
whole lot more to do, and a lot of doctors … just mislead patients.”16 
 
The consequence of these attitudes can be very significant, when preventable harm occurs, 
particularly if the doctor has not suggested that there could be any risks or problems prior to 
treatment and obtaining consent17.  Equally, if harm has occurred, the problems can be 
compounded if the doctor acts in a defensive way or the patient or family are unable to find 
out what happened to cause the unexpected harm.18  
                                                
16  Klitzman R. When doctors become patients. 2008 Oxford University Press, New York: pages 109-
110. 
17  In Australia, the failure to disclose risks of treatment to a patient can be treated as a breach of duty of 
care in a negligence action. Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, (1992) HCA 58. 
18  This has been known as a trigger for anger, complaint and litigation for more than two decades.  See 
eg, Lloyd-Bostock S. Mulcahy L. The Social Psychology of making and responding to hospital 
complaints: An account model of complaint processes. 1994 Law & Policy, April, volume 16(2), 
pages 123-147: the most frequent request in letters of complaint in this study were requests for 
provision of information.  Coventry G. Daly J. Evans M. Lowy C. McMahon M. Roberts G. The 
health/medical care injury case study project. Prepared by the National Centre for Socio-Legal 
Studies, La Trobe University for Review of Professional Indemnity Arrangements for Health Care 
Professionals, Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing and Community Services. February 
1993 Australian Government Publishing Service (AGPS), Canberra. See also Wu AW. Handling 
hospital errors: Is disclosure the best defense? 1999 Annals of Internal Medicine, volume 131(12), 
pages 970-972. 
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The psychological links in the Doctor Identity between perfect performance, not harming a 
patient and being a “good doctor/person” affect the whole of the communication stream 
across health care.  For example, it can make it difficult for doctors to talk about the risks of 
various treatments in consultations with a patient.  As a way of reassuring patients (and 
possibly themselves), they can provide an overly optimistic view of what the outcome of a 
particular treatment may be and minimise the risks.  This can lead patients to have an 
unrealistically positive view of the likely outcomes and to accept the treatment, without 
understanding the risks they are taking.  A consequence of this common scenario is that if 
either a mistake results in harm or a bad outcome occurs for any reason, then the patient 
may experience anger or disappointment from their frustrated, and probably false, 
expectations.   
 
At the same time, the doctor will experience cognitive dissonance between what occurred 
and his or her expectation of what should have occurred.  A doctor’s first response is likely 
to be to seek to resolve this dissonance by denial of either the event or their agency in it.  
The second level of response is likely to be fear and possibly shame associated with the 
error or harm.  None of these emotional responses is likely to led to effective 
communication about what went wrong and why.  This, in turn, will widen the patient’s 
and/or family’s sense of breach of trust. These emotions are also unlikely to lead to the 
doctor accepting responsibility by apologising or by acting to prevent recurrence.  Trauma 
for both doctor and patient can be significantly increased19.   
 
3. When a patient complains 
While there is consistent strong evidence that the frequency of litigation and complaint 
occur in only a small proportion of cases of patient harm20, doctors remain extremely 
                                                
19  Vincent CA. Pincus T. Scurr JH. Patients’ experience of surgical accidents. 1993 Quality in Health 
Care, volume 2, pages 77-82; Ennis M. Vincent C. The effects of medical accidents and litigation on 
doctors and patients. 1994 Journal of Law and Policy, April, volume 16(2), pages 97-121. 
20  For most recent data the number of medical indemnity claims across the public hospital and Medical 
Defence Organisations in Australia was estimated as 4,250 in 2012-13, while the number of adverse 
events recorded in 2013-14 across public and private hospitals was 546,544.  This latter figure is 
generally accepted as a significant underestimate of all adverse events, but even at that level, the 
number of medical indemnity claims is less than 0.8% of adverse events recorded on hospital 
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fearful of the possibility.21  Studies of the responses of doctors to complaints and litigation 
show that both are perceived as a significant identity threat.  A common way of coping with 
this is to externalise blame – on the system, on other care providers, on the patient.  This 
has a profound effect not only on the relationship with the specific complainant and those 
providers upon whom blame is placed, but often with other patients.  Mulcahy’s research 
on medical complaints in the 1990s concluded that “the reconstruction of a positive sense 
of identity [for a doctor] relies on a deconstruction and undermining of both the 
complainant and complaint”.  She found that doctors generally rebuild their own identity by 
diminishing that of the patient, leaving the doctor unable to acknowledge or even hear the 
views of the patient about what occurred.  She concludes that “while doctors present 
themselves as rational scientists they see complainants as putting forward irrational or 
illogical accounts while they defended their own work in medical terms, and pay little heed 
to the contrasting discourses and concerns expressed by complainants”22.   
 
When a doctor receives a complaint, it has a powerful emotional impact on the doctor.  
Allsop and Mulcahy’s research across both general practitioners and hospital doctors 
involved in complaints23 show that most emotions were associated with shame and 
humiliation, whether or not the doctor felt the complaint against them was justified.  These 
included anger related feelings, like irritation (52%), annoyance (37%) and anger (33%); 
anxiety related emotions, like worry (42%), concern (38%), distress (32%) and anxiety 
(28%); and vulnerability (28%).  As one doctor said:  
                                                
medical files.  In addition, the MDO data covers liability incurred outside of the hospital system as 
well, but there is no public data of the frequency of adverse events in medical care delivered outside 
of hospital.  Data from: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). Australia’s medical 
indemnity claims 2012-13. Safety and Quality of Healthcare Series No. 15vCat No. HSE 149, 2014 
AIHW, Canberra: page vii; and AIHW. Australian Hospitals at a glance 2013-14: Admitted patient 
care, What was the safety and quality of the care, Performance indicator: Adverse events at Table 6 
http://www.aihw.gov.au/haag13-14/admitted-patient-care/#t9 . 
21  See eg, Kapp MB. Legal anxieties and medical mistakes – barriers and pretexts. 1997 Journal of 
General Internal Medicine, December, volume 12(12), pages 787-788. 
22  Mulcahy L. Disputing doctors – to socio-legal dynamics of complaints about health care. 2003 Open 
University Press, Maidenhead (UK): pages 104-105. 
23  Allsop J. Mulcahy L. Doctors’ responses to patient complaints. Chapter 9 in Rosenthal MM. 
Mulcahy L. Lloyd-Bostock S. (editors) Medical Mishaps – pieces of the puzzle. 1999 Open 
University Press, Buckingham (England): pages 124-140 – see especially pages 129-130. 
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Complaints are very hurtful. One gets emotionally involved because they strike at 
one’s perception of one’s self as a doctor. 
 
Denial is often one of the first responses to a complaint and, even where the doctor agrees 
that the patient has been harmed, the vast majority blame external causes (often including 
the complainant)24.  In part because of the psychological need to protect and affirm their 
sense of identity, almost all doctors continue to believe the complaints are not justified.  For 
example, in Mulcahy and Allsop’s research, 85% of the hospital consultants and 96-98% of 
the general practitioners considered the complaints against them to be unjustified25.  The 
conclusion of Mulcahy is that the doctors in these studies “rarely internalized blame for 
mishaps or grievances”.26  In the case of litigation, the experience of the doctor in a medical 
negligence action has been described as akin to the bereavement felt with the loss of a close 
family member27.  Doctors often do not see that a patient had a right to complain or that the 
doctor should be held to account. These responses are typical of cognitive dissonance and 
the desire to protect their identity.  They see “complaining as a morally reprehensible 
activity which had an adverse effect on their ability to care for other, more worthy 
patients”28.  
 
Complaints are also seen by doctors as transgressions of the norms of the doctor patient 
relationship, because they challenge the doctor’s assumptions that the patient accepts the 
doctor’s “superior technical knowledge and their moral authority”. Allsop and Mulcahy29 
say that “[A] complaint is interpreted as a challenge to expertise and authority which goes 
to the heart of the doctors’ sense of identity”.  Through this, complaints create a 
“legitimation crisis”, which results in great anxiety for the doctor’s sense of self.  They 
                                                
24  Mulcahy 2003 – see note 22: at page 109-111, especially Figure 6.1; see also Allson J. Two sides to 
every story: complainants’ and doctors’ perspectives in disputes about medical care in a general 
practice setting. 1994 Law and Policy, April, volume 16(2), pages 149-183, especially pages 171-
175. 
25  Allsop et al 1999 -  see note 23: at page 130. 
26  Mulcahy 2003 – see note 22: at page 110. 
27  Lavery JP. The physician’s reaction to a malpractice suit. 1988 Obstetrics and Gynecology, volume 
71(1), pages 138-41. 
28  Mulcahy 2003 – see note 22: at page 106. 
29  Allsop J. Mulcahy L. Maintaining professional identity: doctors’ responses to complaints. 1998 
Sociology of Health & Illness, volume 20(6), pages 802-824. 
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challenge the core of the Doctor Identity. Because a doctor’s professional identity and self-
identity are often so closely linked through the professionalisation process described in 
detail in Chapter 5, complaints are a direct threat to the doctor’s identity at multiple levels.  
The strength of response by doctors to complaints relates heavily to this threat.  At the core 
of his or her identity, a doctor is ill-prepared to recognise an error when it occurs in his or 
her work, particularly if it results in harm to a patient, and is even less prepared when a 
patient or family member complains.  This is despite the overwhelming evidence presented 
earlier that such incidents are ubiquitous in modern health care and that the voice of 
patients is being sought more and more in the policy setting and accreditation processes. 
 
4. Lessons from other professions 
Through their training and professionalisation and the normative processes doctors 
experience every day, doctors often come to believe that they are less affected by common 
human frailties or consequences.  This includes their perceptions about the making of errors 
and the causing of harm to patients.  This kind of self-belief is shared with other 
professional groups, such as pilots, whose heroism in emergencies and very difficult 
circumstances, is akin to the public face of parts of medicine, as discussed in Chapter 6.  
However, as Helmreich and Merritt found in their work on pilots, surgeons and 
anaesthetists, the same cultures that can give rise to these positive attributes can also give 
rise to what they call “a dark side of professional cultures”. 
The elements of self-perception that give professionals the confidence to persevere 
in the face of great challenges also have negative sequealae.  Pride in doing one’s 
job well can lead to flying when fatigued or suffering from a serious head cold.  
This can result in a crew not fully capable of coping with emergencies. The same 
pride may make pilots reluctant to admit error, which in turn can keep valuable 
information about human limitations from the organization … Confidence can turn 
into arrogance and machismo can lead to a disregard of others’ opinions and a 
failure to consider alternative courses of action.  The negative consequences of 
perceived invulnerability are readily found.  An unrealistic view of normal human 
limitations may lead pilots to disregard standard operating procedures, to proceed 
into dangerous situations to complete a flight and/or to fail to utilize other crew 
members as safeguards against mishap.30 
 
                                                
30  Helmreich RL. Merritt AC. Culture at Work in aviation and medicine: national organizational and 
professional influences. 1998 Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot (UK): page 34. 
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Helmreich and Merritt’s first precept for error management is the need to recognise that “In 
any complex system, human error is inevitable” and the second precept is that “There are 
limitations on human performance”.31  The training and education of young doctors 
discussed in Chapter 5 are often inconsistent with these precepts.  For example, the “perfect 
performance” aspiration can create dissonance with the idea that error as an intrinsic 
characteristic of decision-making in uncertainty. An unrealistic expectation of error-free 
performance as a core characteristic of what it is to be a good doctor arguably can lead to a 
cascade of unsafe practices, including an absence of systems to detect problems early.  
These are likely to be supported by a range of powerful psychological defences.   
 
Trainee doctors can be painfully aware of the occurrence of errors in their practice, as they 
are learning32.  However, their experience of shaming and humiliation in training either 
directly or by observation when someone makes a mistake33, and their often unsuccessful 
experiences of trying to come to terms with errors that have caused harm or death to a 
patient, increase the psychological dissonance they experience around error and patient 
harm.  Research shows that trainees who perceive they have made an error not only 
experience personal distress and burnout, but they show decreased empathy for patients in 
future.  This research also notes that they have a higher likelihood of another self-perceived 
error occurring34, though one possible explanation for this is that they have a greater 
awareness of the risk and occurrence of error than their peers, rather than that they are more 
error-prone.   
 
Research into error, stress and team work in doctors and pilots35 shows that even now, 
where doctors accept at a theoretical level that errors do occur in medicine, they have a 
                                                
31  Helmreich et al. 1998 – see note 30: page 141. 
32  Bosk CL. Forgive and remember – managing medical failure. 1979 University of Chicago Press 
New York: page 3.  
33  Bosk 1979 – see note 32: page 73.  
34  West CP. Huschka MM. Novotny PJ. Sloan JA. Kolars JC. Habermann TM. Shanafelt TD. 
Association of perceived medical errors with resident distress and empathy – a prospective 
longitudinal study. 2006 Journal of the American Medical Association, 6 September, volume 296(9), 
pages 1071-1078. 
35  Sexton JB. Thomas RJ. Helmreich RL. Error, stress and teamwork in medicine and aviation: cross 
sectional surveys. 2000 British Medical Journal, 18 March, volume 320, pages 745-749. 
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limited psychological integration of the idea that they, themselves, make mistakes36.  There 
is some training in undergraduate medical courses about error and patient harm37.  
However, those who are in senior training positions, whose behaviour is more likely to be 
modelled, were trained and have practiced in an environment that promotes many personal 
characteristics and beliefs, inimical to developing safer practices in health care.   
 
When doctors become aware of mistakes or harm they have caused to a patient, the 
negative impact on their well-being has also been linked back to the experiences they had 
during training: 
The dysphoric emotions of shame, guilt, depression and anxiety triggered by the 
mistake can be influenced both by perfectionism derived from the physician’s 
family of origin, and by the way doctors are socialized into the profession.  
Professional standards of excellence are learned and incorporated during medical 
school and residency training into the physician’s internal self-regulation.  Once 
incorporated, standards of professional behaviour may be maintained by such 
processes as fear of humiliation, fear of litigation, self-expectations of perfection, 
self-comparison with other physicians, and concerns about external scrutiny by 
professional oversight bodies.38 
 
Such training including physical demands that extend well-beyond normal human 
limitations provide a poor ground for an understanding of the ubiquity of error in modern 
health care.  They also provide an unpromising seedbed for the development of patient 
safety strategies which address human fallibility and limitations.  The case study on 
Doctors and Fatigue later in this chapter provides a practical example of the consequences 
of this.  
 
                                                
36  Sexton et al – see note 35: page 747. 
37  World Health Organisation (WHO). WHO Patient Safety Curriculum Guide for Medical Schools. 
2009 WHO, Geneva. See also World Health Organisation (WHO). Patient Safety Curriculum Guide. 
Multi-professional Edition. 2011 WHO Geneva.  
38  Christensen JF. Levinson W. Dunn PM. The heart of darkness – the impact of perceived mistakes on 
physicians. 1992 Journal of General Internal Medicine, volume 7, pages 424-431. 
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C. Risks arising from the Doctor Identity  
1. Denial and redefinition 
It is little wonder that doctors develop many defences to resolve the cognitive dissonance 
they experience, between the ideal of a “good doctor” who makes no errors and causes no 
harm, and the reality of the ubiquity of error and harm they see around them and, at some 
level, may be aware of in their own practice, even sub-consciously.  These defences are 
generally modelled for them in their training and every day practice by more experienced 
clinicians. For example, senior doctors and residents may delineate some errors as merely 
technical or alternative judgements, to minimise them.  Others may say they are not errors 
at all, simply opportunities to learn.39   
 
Clinical uncertainty, discussed in Chapter 3, and clinical pragmatism, such as the 
imposition of time constraints either because of clinical urgency or a pressured 
environment, also provide useful tools to resolve this dissonance.  The perceived need to 
retain the confidence of the patient and the doctor’s own need to feel confident in 
themselves and their medical knowledge and skills, also work against a doctor resolving the 
dissonance by admitting the error and treating as a puzzle to be solved, rather than a moral 
failing.  If the doctor is unable to confront and deal with an error when it happens, denial is 
likely to be the first option used to resolve the dissonance created by a threat to identity.  
Rationalisations expressed as “The patient was beyond my help” and “There were 
unexpected circumstances” provide useful cognitive explanations that do not threaten 
identity, in much the same way that “It was a system problem” has been recruited to the 
defence of identity.   
 
When a doctor needs to disclose preventable patient harm to a patient or their family, these 
kinds of “coping strategies” can exacerbate perceptions of breach of trust.  This occurs, for 
example, when what a patient or family perceives as preventable harm is read down or 
rationalised by the doctor or hospital.40  In some cases, there may well be a non-error based 
                                                
39  Bosk 1979 – see note 32:  page 72. 
40  Fein SP. Seymann GB. Kagaw-Singer M. The many faces of error disclosure: a common set of 
elements and a definition. 2007 Journal of the Society of General Internal Medicine, volume 22, 
pages 755-761. 
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explanation for why the results of treatment were not as expected, but if the doctor is 
anxious about speaking to the patient and therefore acts in a defensive manner, the patient 
may sense the anxiety.  The anxiety then may be perceived as a sign that the doctor is 
hiding something from the patient or family.  If a doctor acts in an arrogant or dismissive 
manner, or deals with the patient’s concerns without empathy, the patient’s negative 
emotional response may make the doctor feel more threatened.  There can be very different 
judgments from the patient’s and the doctor’s perspectives.  For example, a doctor may see 
an operation as technically successful or as “correct treatment”, even where a patient dies, 
or mistakes were made41.  Once again, trainees and less experienced doctors see this 
behaviour modelled and emulate it because they are unsure what else to do.   
 
To challenge this approach and discuss problems directly with patients or their families 
without “clearance” from relevant doctors or administrators may bring the wrath of senior 
staff or management onto the vulnerable head of a young doctor.  The fear and anxiety 
suffered by trainees and less experienced doctors, and even very experienced doctors can 
limit their capacity to reflect on and think about what actually happened.  With memory 
being both malleable and self-protecting as discussed in Chapter 3, it is hardly surprising 
that the “recollections” of doctors in these situations are coloured and shaped by the path 
their minds choose to resolve the dissonance  
 
Dissonance and denial also undermine doctors’ ability to effectively meet the needs of 
patients and families immediately after preventable harm has occurred.  There is significant 
evidence that providing a good, early explanation to patients about what occurred will 
reduce the distress to the patient, and their likelihood of complaining formally or 
litigating42.  However, often doctors are not psychologically or emotionally well placed to 
do this, and they often lack the skills.  Acceptance of responsibility would create a further 
threat to their identity as a “good doctor/good person”.  Not only is the doctor’s own sense 
                                                
41  Jauhar S. Intern: a doctor’s initiation. 2008 Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York: Chapter 7; 
Millman 1977 see note 8: Part II - Overlooking Medical Mistakes. 
42  Wu AW. Cavanaugh TA. McPhee SJ. Lo B. Micco GP. To tell the truth – ethical and practical issues 
in disclosing medical mistakes to patients. 1997 Journal of General Internal Medicine, December, 
volume 12(12), pages 770-775. 
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of identity threatened by an admission of error or contribution to patient harm, but there are 
additional identity threats from the perception of the patient of the doctor as a competent 
social actor and the perception of other doctors and health professionals.  Where the ideal 
of perfect performance is shared with the other professional observers, such an admission 
may be seen as “losing face”.   
 
Goffman describes the strong drive to protect “face” not only for self but for others, 
particularly those who share the same “face” because they are also doctors.43  The shame of 
one becomes a shared shame, so “face-saving” actions are more likely in these forms of 
interaction, to also protect the shared Doctor Identity.  In contrast, the “face” expected by a 
patient or family member is likely to be one which is empathetic and honest about what has 
happened.  This conflict between the two “faces” can create even more difficult social 
interactions for the doctor who seeks to acknowledge their contribution to the patient harm.  
Where the doctor saves face for self and others, it may be that this contributes to a 
collective, often unconscious, recasting of events, so that the doctor and his or her 
colleagues “see” the event and “remember” it through that lens. Doctors can also interpret 
the actions of other doctors through a sense of shared fear and anxiety. Epitomised in the 
phrase: ‘there but for the grace of God, go I”44, this can result in wide variance in the 
interpretation of what has occurred in any clinical situation. 
 
2. Lessons from the Harvard Medical Practice Study 
The identification of preventable patient harm may appear relatively straightforward, 
though the evidence shows that reporting rates overall are very poor, even where the harm 
is significant.45  Even where doctors are looking for an adverse event or preventable patient 
                                                
43  Goffman E. On Face-Work – An analysis of ritual elements in social interaction. (written in 1967). 
Essay one in Goffman E. Interaction Ritual – essays in face-to-face behaviour. 2008 edition Aldine 
Transaction, New Brunswick (NJ. USA), pages 5-45: at page 11. 
44  Irvine 2003 – see note 11: page 24. 
45  See eg, Classon D. Resar R. Griffin F. Federica F. Frankel T. Kimmel N. Whittington J. Frankel A. 
Seger A and James B. ‘Global Trigger Tool’ shows that adverse events in hospitals may be ten times 
greater than previously measured. 2011 Health Affairs, April, volume 30(4), pages 581-589: see 
especially Exhibit 4, page 586.  See also Olsen S. Neale G. Schwab K. Psaila B. Patel T, Chapman 
EJ. Vincent C. Hospital staff should use more than one method to detect adverse events and potential 
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harm, there is relatively poor agreement on what constitutes an adverse event, whether it 
was caused by health care, whether it was preventable and whether health care was of 
satisfactory quality. 46  
 
The scope of the problem is significant and is illustrated by the inter-rater unreliability47 of 
judgments on quality, safety and preventable patient harm.  For example, a large 1996 
study, showed that two physician reviewers using a structured review tool disagreed 
strongly (12.9%) on the occurrence of an adverse event in more cases than they agreed 
(10%).48  The outlier variation in that study was extreme, with the range being from 9.9% 
to 43.7% adverse event rates across the 127 physicians.49  Kappa scores (which show the 
level of agreement beyond chance) in this and other studies have shown that the rate of 
agreement between expert medical reviewers on adverse events and also judgments on 
quality of care50 is usually only in the poor to moderate range51.  These levels of agreement 
                                                
adverse events: incident reporting, pharmacist surveillance and local real-time record review may all 
have a place. 2007 Quality and Safety in Health Care February, volume 16(1), pages 40-44. 
46  For a useful summary of older studies on reliability of adverse event measures, see Walshe K. 
Adverse events in health care: issues in measurement, 2000 Quality and Safety in Health Care, 
volume 9, pages 47-52: at Table 4, page 51; see also Goldman RL. The reliability of peer 
assessments of quality of care. 1992 Journal of the American Medical Association, 19 February, 
volume 267(7), which looked at 12 studies on peer assessments of quality of care and found 
agreement only slightly better than chance. See also Hayward RA. Hofer TP. Estimating hospital 
deaths due to medical errors: preventability is in the eye of the reviewer. 2001 Journal of the 
American Medical Association, 25 July, volume 286 (4), pages 415-420: at pages 419-420.   
47  In research involving judgments of more than one rater, inter-rater reliability gives a score about how 
much consensus or homogeneity there is between the raters. 
48  Localio AR. Weaver SL. Landis JR. Lawthers AG. Brennan TA. Hebert L. Sharp TJ. Identifying 
adverse events caused by medical care: degree of physician agreement in retrospective chart review. 
1996 Annals of Internal Medicine, 15 September, volume 125(6), pages 457-464. 
49  See note 48, table 2. 
50  Weingart SN. Mukamal K. Davis RB. Davies DT. Palmer RH. Cahalane M. Hamel MB. Phillips RS. 
Iezzoni LI. Physician-reviewers’perceptions and judgments about quality of care. 2001 International 
Journal for Quality in Health Care, volume 13(3); pgaes 357-365: pages 359-360 and Table 3. 
51  See Goldman 1992 -  note 46. See also Lilford RJ. Mohammed MA. Braunholz D. Hofer TP. The 
measurement of active errors: methodological issues. 2003 Quality and Safety in Health Care, 
volume 12 (supplement II); ii8-ii12: esp. ii9-ii10.  The World Health Organisation(WHO) 
commissioned a study into the issues with different methodologies, which details the experience of 
inter-rate reliability as well as other issues with this and other quality and safety measures.  Michel P. 
Strengths and weaknesses of available methods for assessing the nature and scale of harm caused by 
the health system: Literature Review. 2003 WHO, Geneva. 
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are even lower on questions to do with negligence52 or preventability – sometimes falling to 
levels which are no greater than chance.53  While it was hypothesised that agreement could 
be increased by reviewers talking together, research has shown that, while the degree of 
agreement within pairs who discussed a case increased with discussion, the level of 
disagreement between two pairs looking at the same case did not.   
 
Some deeper insight for why there might be this variation in detection and attribution of 
adverse events to health care comes from the original Harvard Medical Practice Study, 
which included a physician interview component in the Litigation Threat sub-study.  93 
physicians, who had worked in one of the 51 study hospitals in 1984, were mailed 
invitations to participate in the interviews, and 47 interviews were completed (response rate 
51%).54  The sample of doctors was limited to 3 specialty groups – Obstetrics and 
gynaecology, General surgery and Internal medicine.  The interviews, which took between 
one and one and a half hours, asked all doctors introductory questions about what they 
thought were the most difficult things about practising medicine today, their experience and 
views about being sued and their views on institutional and regulatory controls.55   
 
To understand how a physician understands the concepts of causation, error and negligence, 
they were then shown two clinical cases studies specific to their specialty group.  These 
described two different patient experiences, both of which involved sub-optimal clinical 
care and an undesirable outcome from the patient’s perspective, ranging from death or 
severe disability, through failure to diagnose a potentially disabling condition, to the need 
to re-operate.  Doctors were required to give reasons for their judgments, whatever they 
                                                
52  See eg, Posner KA. Caplan RA. Cheney FW. Variation in expert opinion in medical malpractice 
review. 1996 Anesthesiology, November, volume 85(5), pages 1049-1054 
53  Thomas EJ. Studdert DM. Brennan TA. The reliability of medical record review for estimating 
adverse event rates. 2002 Annals of Internal Medicine, 4 June, volume 136(11), pages 812-816. 
54  Harvard Medical Practice Study. (HMPS) Patients, doctors, and lawyers: medical injury, 
malpractice litigation, and patient compensation in New York: the report of the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study to the State of New York. 1990 Harvard Medical Practice Study Boston. [HMPS 
Study Report] A full copy of the scanned Report is available electronically through the New York 
State Library, via WebCat Call no: HEA 302-4 PATDL – 90 33997, as a 4 part download.  Accessed 
27 September 2006: pages 9-37 to 9-38. 
55  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: page 9-36. 
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were.  The Report presents the results of their judgments on whether the adverse event was 
caused by medical management, whether the standard of care was met, whether an error 
had occurred, whether there was negligence and whether compensation should be available 
for the relevant set of two cases for their specialty.  There was disagreement on one or more 
of these important concepts, most especially where a decision on negligence is to be made.  
There was no case where there was agreement among all the doctors interviewed on all 
concepts, and few where they were even close to agreement.  The Study conclusion is that 
“doctors may have difficulty recognising error and negligence.”56 
 
For example, in one of the surgery cases, only one doctor found no error.  The Study 
comments on his reasoning as follows: 
… the only surgeon who found no error in the second case reflects the kind of 
reasoning that diminishes the perception of error.  …   By concentrating on the 
potential complications of what initially seems like a preferable course of action, he 
makes the actual negative outcome of the chosen action seen less adverse.  This line 
of reasoning pays heed to the contingencies, the circumstances, the uncertainty and 
the delicate balance between alternatives.  There is also a heightened awareness of 
the potential of error, no matter what is done, and the ultimate unavoidability of 
mistake.  Thus, while the majority found evidence of error, the minority view shows 
how difficult it was for clinicians to recognise it.57 
 
There were surgeons who thought an error had been made and yet that the care had met the 
appropriate standard – the negative consequence for the patient was called a 
“complication”.  The Report commented that “claiming a complication fits the standard of 
care is a way of not being too judgmental or disapproving of a certain class of errors.”58  
Two surgeons found a standard of care which the Study describes as a “wide-ranging 
standard of care [within which] any possible complication could fall”59.  In this case, the 
question was a bleeding blood vessel that had been inadequately tied off.  One of the 
surgeons with the wide-ranging standard says of this “I don’t think there is any surgeon 
who can guarantee that every single tie he is going to put on for the rest of his life is going 
                                                
56  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: page 9-39. 
57  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: page 9-43. 
58  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: page 9-43. 
59  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: page 9-43. 
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to be secure and not come loose.” 60 The majority of surgeons did not accept this standard.  
In one of the surgical cases, the question of negligence was even more problematic.  A third 
of surgeons were on each of the far ends of the negligence spectrum, while the remaining 
third could not decide.  The Report notes: 
One reason for this difficulty became obvious in the comments of one representative 
surgeon: “One of these days, I am going to be wrong.  So far, I have not, but I will 
be.”  Surgeons who identified most easily with the situation had the greatest 
difficulty deciding about negligence.  This natural tendency to identify with 
colleagues presumably makes judgments of negligence more difficult.61 
 
It goes on to say: 
All of this tends to highlight the problems that surgeons, and in fact, all physicians, 
have in judging negligence.  They do not equate failure to meet the standard of care 
with negligence.  Rather they seem to believe negligence requires culpability 
beyond the standard of care threshold.    In short, they cannot admit negligence and 
so have difficulty labelling care provided by others as negligent.  … Most 
physicians believe they are competent.  Even so, they realize that they can make 
mistakes.  The label of negligence, however, appears to make physicians feel as if 
they were incompetent.  Therefore, they are willing to recognize and admit to 
mistakes but have difficulty naming and acknowledging such mistakes as 
negligence.  Moreover, physicians are unreceptive to the efforts of others to identify 
negligence, especially those outside the medical profession.62 
 
The same difficulties faced the Internal medicine physicians and the 
obstetrician/gynaecologists.  For example, in one of the internal medicine cases, more than 
half of the physicians thought there had been a failure to meet the standard of care and most 
thought there has been a definite error, but they differed on whether the care had been 
negligent.  Some of the comments from those who did not find negligence show the 
reluctance of doctors to find negligence in the conduct of another doctor63. 
“I think it’s bad judgment, not negligence; people make wrong decisions after 
considering.  You know – after careful consideration of the facts you can make what 
turns out to be a bad decision: that’s clearly not negligence.” 
 
“I don’t think I would call this negligence.  In fact, luckily, it didn’t lead to the 
guy’s death.  And probably will not lead to any permanent disability.  And so, no, I 
would not call it negligence.  It’s just inappropriate, not up to snuff.” 
                                                
60  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: page 9-43. 
61  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: page 9-44. 
62  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: pages 9-44 to 9-45. 
63  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: pages 9-49 to 9.50. 
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Significant divergence of views also occurred on causation by medical management, even 
where there was greater agreement on failure to meet the standard of care and recognition 
of error, particularly among the internal medicine group64.   Even those internal medicine 
group members who found negligence were reluctant to agree that compensation should be 
paid – a less marked but consistent pattern with the surgical group65.   
 
The obstetric cases which were presented both had bad outcomes – one a damaged child 
and the other a dead mother.  Most obstetricians felt that medical management had 
contributed to the outcome.  The comments of one of those who didn’t find such 
contribution are instructive, as are the Study conclusions following these: 
“It seems not [that medical management contributed to the patient’s outcome] … 
the patient post-operatively was managed correctly.  I think there can be surgical 
bleeders that are missed or ties that slip or whatever, or even vessels that were 
tacked and then start to bleed in half an hour, you know, after the surgery.  Tragic 
outcome.”  Thus the lack of a completely avoidable mistake meant for this 
obstetrician that medical care did not contribute to the adverse outcome.  Such a 
stringent view of contribution was not shared by the majority of obstetricians.  But 
this reflects how for some individual physicians, unless there is a major, or even 
perhaps wilful blunder, the medical care is exonerated.66 
 
Hindsight bias is often seen as a reason why negligence is found more often in cases with 
particularly bad outcomes67, but in all the cases looked at across the three specialty groups, 
this doesn’t seem to have occurred for the physicians surveyed.  In the four cases with 
serious outcomes (death or permanent high level disability), the majority of doctors found 
                                                
64  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: pages 9-50 to 9-51. 
65  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: Table 9.11, page 9-48 and Table 9.10, page 9-42: see also page 
9-51. 
66  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: page 9-55. 
67  See eg, Henriksen K. Kaplan H. Hindsight bias, outcome knowledge and adaptive learning. 2003 
Quality and Safety in Health Care, volume 12 (Supplement II), pages ii46-ii50. 
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negligence in only 2 of these cases68.  In the two less serious cases, negligence was found in 
one 69 and not in the other70. 
 
This study showed doctors make decisions that defend their collective identity when 
looking at even simplified cases.  These were cases in which they had no personal stake, 
and yet still identifying patient harm as causally connected to doctor performance was 
difficult.  This was also the case in all the adverse event studies, where the doctors were 
specifically looking for these events, where they had not been involved in these cases.  
Similar problems have arisen in judgments about quality of care, and may also be reflected 
in the poor levels of voluntary reporting of incidents by doctors.  Low reporting has often 
been blamed on the fear of litigation, but poor reporting and high levels of adverse events 
seem to be independent of the nature of the litigation system.  This problem persists across 
countries which have fault-based tort systems and no-fault medical injury schemes, as 
noted in Chapter 1.  Another explanation has been the fear of disciplinary proceedings – 
with the consequent recommendation of the need for a “no-blame” approach to the 
reporting of adverse events.  While these may be contributors to low levels of reporting, 
they cannot explain the significant variation in identification in these studies.  The doctors 
in these studies were not under threat from either discipline or litigation, and yet, there was 
still wide variation in what they perceived about the facts provided. 
 
3. The contested space 
The case studies in the Litigation Threat sub-study show a different mechanism at work – 
what the medical sociologist Bosk calls the “essentially contestable nature of medical 
error”.  He notes that while it is unarguable that better knowledge and understanding could 
come from improved reporting of errors, this is not a simple thing to achieve and a doctor’s 
ability to do this should not be taken for granted: 
                                                
68  HMPS Study Report – see note 54. Compare Case 2, Table 9.10 at page 9-42 (negligence); Case 2 
Table 9.11 at page 9-48 (not negligence – evenly balanced) and Table 9.12 at page 9-54, case 1 
(negligence) and case 2 (no negligence).   
69  In this case it was by a 9/7 majority.  HMPS Study Report – see note 54: Table 9.11, page 9-48. 
70  Case 1 in Table 9.10: HMPS Study Report – see note 54: page 9-42. 
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For such reporting to be effective, … the participants in the current system have to 
be able to “see” the events that they need to report for system performance. … 
Everyone knows that errors are an untoward event whose occurrence need to be 
minimized. What workers do not agree on as events unfold is what happened and 
why.  They do not agree on whether a specific event was an error.  The more neutral 
language of adverse event helps some. But, even here, to be reported, an event 
needs to be perceived and whether such “seeing” occurs in the current system is an 
open question.71 
 
This failure, limitation or lack of agreement in perception is consistent with the action of 
human psychological defences to a threat to identity.  When a doctor notices an incident, 
there are often several plausible explanations, some of which would operate as a threat to 
their identity as a “good” doctor.  If the incident could involve a colleague in that same 
threat, there is the additional loyalty owed to peers – the “tribal” obligation discussed in 
Chapter 6.  These threats unconsciously or consciously affect the categorisation of the 
incident by the doctor.  They influence the possible explanation chosen by the doctor.  That 
choice is likely to shape whether the event is reported as an incident, and how (or even if) it 
is noted on the patient’s medical record.  Not reporting such an incident is even more likely 
when the event is common.  Even where the threat of death or injury is substantial, such 
events may well go unreported, unless the risk crystallises and death or permanent injury 
trigger reporting.  These responses contribute to a health care environment which is both 
error prone and harm tolerant.   
 
Those who have been actively trying to bring about safer health care over the past two 
decades sometimes express despair about the lack of progress across the system.  While 
there are a number of centres of excellence, it has proved difficult to propagate these across 
the health care system.  Patient safety leaders have experienced great frustration, and some 
have criticised the medical profession for its failure to take prompt and effective action in 
relation to reducing the level of preventable patient harm – what Don Berwick72 called “a 
                                                
71  Bosk CL. Continuity and change in the study of medical error – the culture of safety on the shop 
floor. Occasional Papers of the School of Social Sciences, Paper Number 20. February 2005 
Unpublished. This paper can be accessed on the web at the following address 
http://www.sss.ias.edu/files/papers/paper20.pdf : accessed 21 August 201: page 9.  
72  Dr Berwick was on the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on Quality of Health Care in America that 
prepared To Err is Human and chaired its Subcommittee on Building the 21st Century Health Care 
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deficiency of will and ambition”73.  The inadequate professional response to the known 
issues relating to preventable patient harm has led to public questioning (and questioning 
by doctors themselves) of the commitment of the profession to providing safe care to 
patients.  This has been one of the drivers towards establishing consistent national 
standards and greater external scrutiny of safety and quality in Australian health care.74.  It 
is arguable that until the psychological consequences of the threat to the Doctor identity 
posed by medical error and patient harm are recognised and addressed, even these 
regulatory approaches will not achieve the breadth of change necessary for health care to be 
made safer for patients, as well as more emotionally and psychologically satisfying for 
doctors. 
 
D. The Doctor Identity and emotional responses to preventable 
patient harm 
1. Emotions and self-image 
Chapter 3 noted that threats to identity give rise to a range of emotions, depending upon the 
context.  The emotions triggered for doctors, when they become aware that they have made 
a mistake or harmed a patient, include fear, anxiety, shame, humiliation, guilt and 
embarrassment.  Which emotions are experienced will depend on a range of environmental 
circumstances, such as whether the event is known only to the doctor or to others, whether 
the patient recovered or died because of the event, and whether the event becomes subject 
to a formal process, like a complaint, disciplinary process or litigation.  Sometimes an 
initial emotional response will give rise to others, including anger and resentment, or one of 
                                                
System.  He is also the Chief Executive Officer of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement based in 
Boston. 
73  Galvin R. A Deficiency of Will and Ambition: A conversation with Donald Berwick.  
74  The Standards are established as part of the Australian Health Services Safety and Quality 
Accreditation Scheme endorsed by all Australian Health Ministers in November 2010.  The first 
standards were established with two kinds of actions under the standards – those which were care, 
with which compliance was mandatory and those which were developmental.  To pass accreditation 
from that date a health service had to pass all core actions – there are 10 standards, with 209 core 
actions and 47 developmental actions, in November 2015.  The status of these actions will be 
reconsidered in the development of the Review of the National Standards to be completed in 2017. 
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the other emotions like fear or anxiety with future interactions with patients, or fear of 
discovery of a mistake and shame, if it later becomes public.  
 
While doctors may opt to leave medicine or to stop practicing clinical medicine in response 
to some of these emotions, often they simply internalise these emotions75.  This can have a 
profound effect on their mental well-being76, their susceptibility to burn-out and their 
capacity to manage their emotions towards patients, other staff and themselves, as it can 
leave the brain’s threat system permanently on alert.  It may also deeply impact on their 
therapeutic capacity to provide empathic care.  For example, one defence to a doctor’s 
emotional responses to the suffering of a patient widely modelled by doctors and other 
health professionals is “professional detachment”, which is incompatible with empathic 
care77. 
 
The doctor’s identity, as a professional and social actor, has common characteristics which 
can interact with these emotions and the doctor’s sense of self in complex ways.  For 
example, doctors frequently exercise significant power in their professional life, in a 
hierarchy, where in most cases, they sit at or near the peak, so doctors see the exercise of 
power and control as part of “being a doctor”. However, the imposed and self-imposed 
“demands” of their work on their time and energy often result in little time for reflection on 
their emotions or their practice.  These demands can result in a feeling of not being “in 
control” of their work and sometimes their lives.  The conflict between the “in-control” 
medical image and feelings of being out of control can result in doctors exercising power in 
ways which may be maladaptive, as discussed below. 
 
                                                
75  Elwahab SA. Doherty E. What about doctors? The impact of medical errors. 2014 The Surgeon – 
Journal of the Royal Colleges of Surgeons of Edinburgh and Ireland, December, volume 12(6), 
pages 297-300; Waterman AD. Garbutt J. Hazel E. Dunagan WC. Levinson W. Fraser VJ. Gallagher 
TH. The emotional impact of medical errors on practicing physcians in the United States and 
Canada. 2007 The Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety, August, volume 33(8), 
pages 467-476. 
76  See Beyond Blue. National Mental Health Survey of Doctors and Medical Students. October 2013 
Beyond Blue, Sydney at https://www.beyondblue.org.au/docs/default-source/research-project-
files/bl1132-report---nmhdmss-full-report_web. 
77  See Halpern J. From detached concern to empathy – humanizing medical practice. 2011 Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
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2. Lack of emotional support 
As concluded in Chapter 5, young doctors are often isolated from supports outside of their 
professional colleagues.  They often shed other activities that can potentially provide 
supports throughout their training because of the intensity of their professionalisation.  This 
isolation can reduce their resilience when their identity is threatened and leave them with a 
deep sense of disconnection.  As discussed in Chapter 6, the “tribal” nature of the 
profession then ensures that the maintenance of these professional relationships becomes 
central both professionally and personally.  As discussed above, the maintenance of the 
myth of perfect performance serves to enhance not just the individual medical reputation 
but the collective professional one.  Because at some level all doctors know they make 
mistakes, but the maintenance of the peer relationships is crucial to their professional 
survival and well-being, they face two dilemmas.  
 
First, if a doctor admits an error in his or her own performance, this may lead them to 
experience shame before peers.  Second, if a doctor notices errors, harm or poor 
performance in another doctor, they may face ostracism if they raise concerns.  Denial and 
mutual support, based upon loyalty to “the profession” provide a safer option for the Doctor 
identity.  This is one of the explanations of “late notice” where a doctor is a dangerous 
practitioner.  As well as the absence of accurate and “real time” performance data, “the 
norms of professional etiquette and equality among peers make it difficult to pass 
judgement on a fellow doctor”: 
This reluctance to criticize grows, of course, out of the way doctors think about 
mistakes.  Uncertainty, necessary fallibility and shared vulnerability buttress such 
reticence.  Clinical freedom, particularly among senior doctors, is deeply cherished.  
All these, along with hesitation to interfere in another’s livelihood, combine to delay 
taking action at all points along the continuum of informal mechanisms [of self-
regulation].78 
 
Unfortunately, the thin carapace of loyalty often simply sits upon a mess of conflicting 
fears and does not provide certain protection for the Doctor.  Intra-professional 
relationships often also involve competition and jealousies that mean that loyalty may be a 
                                                
78  Rosenthal MR. How doctors think about medical mishaps. Chapter in Rosenthal MR. Mulcahy L. 
Lloyd-Bostock S. (editors) Medical mishaps – pieces of the puzzle. 1999 Open University Press, 
Buckingham (England), pages 141-153: page 150.  
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fragile shield.  The fear that the self-serving, collective blindness to error and harm will be 
uncovered at any time creates on-going anxiety at a deep level.  So far as their duty to 
patients are concerned, it is likely that a doctor experiences further internal conflict – a 
form of “imposter syndrome”.  This occurs where the doctor experiences self-doubt about 
their virtue as a doctor because of the possibility of error and patient harm.  As discussed in 
Chapter 6, doctors live in a position of privilege and status inside and outside of their 
profession, and this means they have a deep stake in maintaining their professional identity.  
The combined fear of betrayal, of exposure and of humiliation and having a lot to lose at a 
practical level, is a powerfully unsettling combination. 
 
Another example of the trauma and psychological complexity associated with being unable 
to be open about mistakes comes from the work of Dr David Hilfiker in his 1984 article 
“Facing our mistakes”: 
Doctors hide their mistakes from patients, from other doctors, even from 
themselves.  … Unable to admit our mistakes … we are thwarted, stunted, we do 
not grow.  …  But if we are unable to deal openly with those that do occur, we will 
find neurotic ways to protect ourselves from the pain we feel.  Little wonder that 
physicians are accused of playing God.  Little wonder that we are defensive about 
our judgements, that we blame the patient or the previous physician when things go 
wrong, that we yell at nurses for their mistakes.79 
 
Paget in her book The Unity of Mistakes considers doctor’s responses to medical error.  She 
notes that clinical medicine is an “error-ridden activity” to its core.  By this conclusion, she 
determines that the ordinary usage of the term “error” implies acts that are “uncommon, 
aberrant or culpable” is not appropriate for medicine, where “it is the whole activity that is 
exceptional, uncommon, and strange because it is error-ridden, inexact, and uncertain and 
because it is practiced on the human body”80.  She describes doctors’ reactions to medical 
mistakes as “complex sorrows of actions going wrong … not unmediated expressions of 
grief”.  She concludes that the busy, conflicted life of medicine, where there is always more 
work to be done than time available, makes it impossible for doctors to grieve their 
mistakes in the usual way, because they are “too common, too endemic, to be released” by 
                                                
79  Hilfiker 1984 – see note 9. 
80  Paget MA. The Unity of Mistakes – a phenomenological interpretation of medical work. 1988 
Temple University Press, Philadelphia: Chapter 4 – The semantic sense of mistakes at page 58. 
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periods of grief.81  Because of the incompatibility of this aspect of clinical care with the 
Doctor Identity story of perfect performance, there becomes no place for doctors to resolve 
their grief and anxiety about actual or potential harm to patients.  In a particularly poignant 
statement, the French surgeon Rene Leriche expressed the consequences this way “Every 
surgeon carries within himself a small cemetery, where from time to time he goes to pray – 
a place of bitterness and regret, where he must look for an explanation for his failures”.82   
 
3. An untrustworthy system for doctors and patients 
This is compounded by the legal and cultural context of the hospital environment or other 
health care environments in which a doctor may practice.  Because of the threat to the 
Doctor Identity posed by an admission of error or preventable patient harm, mixed 
messages about the consequences of disclosure create an untrustworthy space for doctors to 
acknowledge and deal with their own errors and harms contributed to by them.  There is a 
prevalent spoken institutional message that errors and harm are the consequence of the 
“flawed system” – the “good people in flawed systems” meme discussed earlier.  However, 
in most hospitals, the responsible agent for system-based problems for legal purposes is 
likely to be the hospital itself.  The superficial nature of the “institutional commitment” to a 
systems-based approach can become immediately apparent when it is most needed by the 
doctor.   
 
Instead of acknowledging the hospital’s collective responsibility for system problems and 
working to address the issue as a systemic level, hospital administrators and managers will, 
in all likelihood, place the critical spotlight back onto the doctor.  This can be for financial 
reasons, because the doctor is now seen as a potential financial contributor to any 
compensation that may be payable.  It may sometimes be for political reasons, when the 
perceived failure of the hospital may be targeted back to the bureaucratic leader (such as 
the head of the hospital or the Health Department) or the relevant political leader (such as 
                                                
81  Paget 1988 – see note 80, Philadelphia, Chapter 6 – The complex sorrow of clinical work at page 96-
97. 
82  This is a quote from La philosophie de la chirurgic, published in 1951.  Its appears in the epigraph to 
a book by the neurosurgeon Henry Marsh. Do no harm – stories of life, death and brain surgery. 
2014 Weidenfeld & Nicolson (Orion Books), London. 
165 
Chapter 4 – Patient harm and vulnerabilities of the Doctor Identity 
 
the Health minister).  In either case, suddenly, the individual doctor becomes a convenient 
scapegoat for the leadership, rather than a valued part of the system for which the leaders 
are responsible.  A doctor quite accurately sees the hypocrisy and understands the fragility 
of the system as protection.  Publicity and litigation often result in humiliation, which itself 
is described as “losing trust in the world”83 and this works not only against the doctor 
involved but creates a fear of humiliation in all others.  These practices work powerfully 
against a recognition or admission of error or harm and against a supportive change in 
culture for both doctors and patients.  With litigation providing a very public form of 
humiliation for doctors, when a doctor is left unprotected by the institution at that time, it is 
witnessed by all other doctors as betrayal and banishes the trust necessary for a more 
transparent and honest accounting for preventable harm. 
 
A hospital risk management approach focussed first on avoiding litigation, allegedly to 
protect the hospital’s finances84, can also compromise the good intentions of doctors who 
wish to discuss what happened with a patient.  Despite the evidence that openness and an 
effective apology often avoids litigation and complaint escalation and minimises payments 
when damages are payable85, hospitals often seek to put overt protection of the organisation 
before the doctor’s ethical duty of truth-telling to the patient.86  The language used in a risk 
management approach, compared to a truth-telling, explanatory, apology-based approach 
often comes across to patients and families as insincere, duplicitous and as if the hospital is 
“hiding something”.   
                                                
83  Leask P. Losing trust in the world: humiliation and its consequences. 2013 Psychodynamic Practice, 
volume 19(2), pages 129-142. 
84  There is now significant literature that truth-telling and responsible financial management are in fact 
complementary strategies – see note 85 below. 
85  Perhaps one of the longest term living studies of this occurred when the Veteran’s Affairs Medical 
Center at Lexington decided to adopt a pro-active policy in medical cases that had the potential to 
result in litigation.  The concept was not risk management, but clinical care continuation (set out in 
next paragraph above).  The unexpected result of this policy was that the number of patients who 
received compensation was more, the total paid was significantly less and the transaction costs were 
very significantly reduced. These results have been replicated in other environments.  Woods MS. 
Healing Words: the power of apology in medicine. 2nd edition. 2007 Joint Commission Resources, 
Illinois (USA): see especially Chapter 10.  See also Kraman SS. Hamm G. Risk management: 
extreme honesty may be the best policy. 1999 Annals of Internal Medicine, 21 December, volume 
13(12), pages 963-967. 
86 Wu AW. et al 1997 – see note 42. Wu et al discuss the ethical and practical issues in disclosing 
medical errors. 
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This was often the outcome for patients in the Australian Open Disclosure pilot, where the 
standard set out that a doctor should make an “expression of regret”, rather than an 
apology87.  When it was being drafted by Standards Australia, a decision was made not to 
use an approach based on the doctor’s duty towards the patient, but to instead use an 
institutional risk management focus88.  This differed strongly from the approach taken in 
the US disclosure models, based on the Veteran’s Administration model in Lexington, 
Kentucky, which was based on a practice and intention “to maintain a humanistic care-
giving attitude to those who had been harmed, rather than to response in a defensive and 
adversarial manner”.  The Australian risk management focus often left both patients and 
doctors unhappy.  As noted in the evaluation, this is “the tension at the heart of the Open 
Disclosure apology”.   
A sincere apology from the right person can clear the air, even in very serious 
situations.  The Open Disclosure Standard limits staff to the partial apology.  Yet it 
is evident from both health care staff and the consumer interviews that sincerity is 
most valued and performed if deemed possible and/or necessary, the limit inscribed 
into the Standard notwithstanding.  A problem posed by this limit is that – 
paradoxically – people’s sincerity will lead them to transgress the formal limit.  
People resolve problems and misunderstandings by being sensitive to their and the 
others’ morality and humanity, not by rigidly observing a rule that loses its 
relevance in the face of lived experience.  The unique opportunity offered by Open 
Disclosure resides in the radical notion that being open about adverse events is more 
congruent with the objective to provide care and therefore more effective than any 
legal or bureaucratic protections. 
 
Following the evaluation and Review of the Standard, a new Open Disclosure Framework 
was proposed, in part, to address this paradox89.  The Review Report stated that “[o]verseas 
evidence and Australian experience suggest that disclosure is more effective as an ethical 
                                                
87  Iedema R. Mallock N. Sorensen R. Manias E. Tuckett A. Williams A. Brownhill S, Perrott B. 
Hegney D. Hor S.  Piper D. Scheeres H. Evaluation of the Pilot of the National Open Disclosure 
Standard – Final Report got the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2007 
University of Technology, Sydney: page 98. 
88  The thesis author was a consultant to Standards Australia, and the first draft of the standard was 
focussed on the patient’s right to know what has happened to them, and, so far as possible, for the 
doctor to honestly inform the patient what had happened to them.  Standards Australia rejected that 
approach and opted to use an insurance risk manager to prepare the standard.  This fundamentally 
shaped the Open Disclosure pilot process in Australia. 
89  Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC). Open Disclosure 
Framework 2013. 2014 ACSQHC, Sydney. 
167 
Chapter 4 – Patient harm and vulnerabilities of the Doctor Identity 
 
practice that prioritises organisational and individual learning from error than solely as an 
organisational risk management strategy”90.   
 
The new framework, while focussing much more on the obligations to honestly inform 
patients and families when things go wrong, remains partially focused on potential liability 
and risk avoidance91.  While the words “apology” and “saying sorry” now appear in the 
standard, there remains a mixed message about various potential legal and insurance issues 
around disclosure92.  This continues to create a dilemma for the doctor, who is already 
anxious from the identity threat arising from preventable harm or medical error.  The doctor 
may feel compelled by guilt, ethical or moral duties to tell the patient exactly what 
happened, to apologise and accept responsibility and to make amends but there is no 
certainty that they will be supported in this process by their hospital or their medical 
defence organisation.  This in turn creates further internal conflict about whether to give 
highest regard to the ethics and values relating to the doctor patient-relationship or to run 
the risk of losing employment or insurance cover, by going against the risk averse advice of 
the institution or insurer, neither of whom feel bound by the same ethical altruistic 
obligation as the doctor.  While the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality 
Commission’s new Framework moves from the older primary focus on risk management, 
these changes are relatively new and have not been universally implemented.  This 
magnifies the degree of uncertainty that a doctor perceives about his or her safety in “doing 
what is right”, when already in a state of threat arousal.  This uncertainty magnifies the fear 
and anxiety felt by a doctor faced with telling a patient about preventable harm or medical 
error involving a “near miss”.  
 
It is not inappropriate that a doctor wants to avoid harming a patient or feels guilt when 
involved in harming a patient.  These may be seen as emotions leading to moral behaviour, 
                                                
90  Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC).  Open Disclosure 
Standard Review Report. 2012 June ACSQHC, Sydney: page IX. 
91  For details of the differences between the original standard and the new Framework, see Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC). Key differences between the 
Australian Open Disclosure Framework and the Open Disclosure Standard. 2013 ACSQHC, 
Sydney. 
92  ACSQHC 2013 – see note 89:see for example Appendix 1, and section 10.2. 
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as discussed in Chapter 3.  However, where a doctor has no place or person to debrief with, 
and no way to acknowledge the accompanying emotions, such as grief and guilt, the 
emotions may result in maladaptive behaviours in doctors and a failure to act more safely 
next time.  Fear remains a natural, useful human warning signal that there is danger and 
care is required.  Where it leads to a doctor putting in place better clinical processes to 
provide barriers between errors and the generation of harm, then this can be a positive 
response.  For example, many of the changes in behaviour which doctors describe to avoid 
patient complaints include better record-keeping, more testing, more follow-up, better 
communication with patients and families, better risk disclosure before treatment and 
reviewing out-of-hours processes to better meet patient needs93.  This has become known as 
positive defensive medicine and can have benefits for both patients and doctors.  In 
contrast, negative defensive medicine occurs when doctors feel compelled to carry out tests 
or treatments for their own protection from complaint or criticism, even if this exposes the 
patient to unnecessary risk94  It is an illustration of a maladaptive response to fear in the 
context of the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
The complexity of emotions relating to medical error and patient harm, and the various role 
attributes of doctors as social actors are a rich psychological soup, which doctors cope with 
in many different ways.  Some of these may be considered adaptive, in that they enhance 
their capacity to perform as doctors.  Others may be considered maladaptive, because they 
can make clinical care and relationships generally more difficult within medical practice 
and in life more generally.  
 
                                                
93  Jain A. Ogden J. General Practitioners’ experiences of patients’ complaints: qualitative study. 1999 
British Medical Journal, 12 June, volume 138 (7198), pages 1596-1599; Mulcahy 2003 – see note 
22: page 108-109. 
94  Summerton N. Positive and negative factors in defensive medicine: a questionnaire study of general 
practitioners. 1995 British Medical Journal, 7 January, volume 310, pages 27-29. 
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4. Maladaptive responses to identity threats caused by medical 
errors and preventable patient harm: Arrogance and hubris 
Arrogance is said to be common among doctors.  Berger95 describes it as “manifested in 
diverse ways, such as a lack of proper respect, consideration, and good manners toward 
patients, nurses, and other ancillary staff; failure to pause, listen and share a friendly word 
or two; being abusive or critical of subordinates, sometimes even in the patient’s presence; 
and for male physicians addressing women condescendingly using terms such as “dear” or 
“honey”.”  The past editor of the British Medical Journal, Dr Richard Smith describes 
hubris as extreme pride or arrogance – of men acting as gods, and then adds further that 
hubris involves a disconnection from reality and an over-estimate of one’s own competence 
and capacities, often in someone exercising power96.  Other doctors provide examples of 
medicine’s collective hubris in the gradual exposure by properly constituted clinical 
research that common practices, agreed between expert doctors, are wrong.97  Yet others 
talk of the arrogance of the health system, where “the patient is seen not as a person but 
merely as a job to be done cost-effectively”.98 
 
Coulehan’s article On Humility describes the development of arrogance in doctors through 
a sense of personal entitlement.  He sees this as arising from the combined effect of popular 
culture of instant gratification and medical education and training in a hospital culture that 
“undervalues introspection and vulnerability and “teaches self-interested behavior under the 
cover of idealizing devotion to the patient’s best interests”.  He observes the negative 
impact of arrogance on hospital morale and its amplification of stress in the workplace, and 
the high staff-turnover that results from these.99 
                                                
95  Berger AS. Arrogance among physicians. 2002 Academic Medicine, February, volume 77(2), pages 
145-147. 
96  Smith R. Should hubris be a disease?  2013 BMJ Group Blogs, 12 February. 
97  Mendrola J. Changing the culture of American Medicine – start by removing hubris. 28 July 2013  
http://www.drjohnm.org/2013/07/changing-the-culture-of-american-medicine-start-by-removing-
hubris/ commenting on Prasad V. Vandross A. Toomey C. Cheung M. Rho J. Quinn S. Chacko SJ. 
Borkar D. Gall V. Selvaraj S. Ho N. Cifu A. A decade of reversal: an analysis of 146 contradicted 
medical practices. 2013 Mayo Clinic Proceedings, August, volume 88(8), pages 790-798: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mayocp.2013.05.012 
98  Berger AS. 2002 – see note 95: Abstract. 
99  Coulehan J. Williams PC. Vanquishing virtue: the impact of medical education. 2001 Academic 
Medicine, June, volume 76(6), pages 598-605. 
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Doctors may also respond to the identity threat of error and harm through a defensive 
stance that is a false or inadequate understanding of how human beings function, 
particularly if they consider that doctors are not subject to the negative effects of stressors 
(including busyness, fatigue and anxiety) in the same way as other human beings.  
Sometimes this latter trait is labelled as “hubris”100, “narcissism”101, or the “God 
complex”102, but it may also be seen as a psychological defence that allows doctors to 
believe in themselves, their capacities and an optimistic probability of perfect 
performance103.  Historically when much of medicine was simply based on the patient’s 
intrinsic capacity to heal, faith in an omnipotent doctor may have served to increase the 
chance of recovery by the patient through the placebo effect.104  However, where the belief 
of omnipotence exists in the doctor, rather than the patient, this level of self-belief becomes 
a risk factor for preventable harm to a patient and for failure to set up systems to detect 
error before harm occurs.  
 
Arrogance and hubris can be seen as defensive strategies to threats to the Doctor Identity, 
through exerting power over others (though knowledge or hierarchical power), when the 
primary emotion felt by the doctor is, in fact, fear and powerlessness.  Attacking or 
posturing when feeling vulnerable is a relatively common human response.  Arrogance is 
also a detaching and distancing mode of response to patients and others, often when the 
doctor is feeling overwhelmed and stressed. A doctor may be unaware that they are being 
arrogant.   
 
                                                
100  See eg, Mendrola 2013 – at note 97 
101  Banja J. Medical errors and Medical Narcissism. 2005 Jones and Bartlett Publishers, Boston. 
102  Dowd M. Decoding the God Complex. 2011 New York Times – the Opinion Pages. 27 September. 
Sighted on 12 March 2016 at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/opinion/dowd-decoding-the-god-
complex.html?_r=0   
103  See Fine C. A mind of its own – how your brain distorts and deceives. 2006 Allen and Unwin, 
Sydney: “The vain brain – for a softer kinder reality”: pages 1-29. 
104  Specter M. The power of nothing – could studying the placebo effect change the way we think about 
medicine? 2011 New Yorker – Annals of Science. 12 December.  Sighted on 12 March 2016 at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/12/12/the-power-of-nothing  
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Chapter 6 below discusses various societal and professional privileges that reinforce the 
high status of the Doctor Identity, as well as the heroic media images that may foster 
hubristic pride.  Hubris is delineated from authentic pride in research by several specific 
features.  Compared to authentic pride, hubristic pride is characterised by striving after 
extrinsic goals that lead to public recognition, such as popular fame and financial success, a 
focus on continual striving for a higher place in the hierarchy (an evolutionary dominance 
strategy), low concern with interpersonal connectivity, aggression and disagreeableness, 
higher levels of impulsivity and lack of restraint105.   
 
These kinds of doctor behaviours associated with both hubris and arrogance have been the 
subject of some study in Australia and overseas, and are implicated in poor patient care and 
poor staff morale.  The Doctor-Nurse Behavior Survey106, conducted by the American 
College of Physician Executives in 2009 revealed a picture of significant poor behaviour 
between doctors and nurses107, with doctor behaviour being more problematic108, but nurses 
being terminated more often than doctors109.  The five most frequent forms of bad 
behaviour included degrading comments and insults (84.5%), yelling (73.35), cursing 
(49.4%), inappropriate joking (45.5%) and refusing to work together (38.4%).  There were 
also a high number of incidents involving trying to get someone disciplined unjustly 
(32.2%) or fired unjustly (18.6%) and 18.9% involved throwing objects such as surgical 
instruments, power tools, telephones, floor mats and clipboards110.  While some of the 
                                                
105  Carver CS. Johnson SL. Authentic and hubristic pride: differential relations to aspects of goal 
regulation, affect and self-control. 2010 Journal of Research in Personality, volume 44(6), pages 
698-703.  At its edges, hubristic pride begins to shift into more problematic psychiatric conditions, 
like narcissistic personality disorder.  Specific mental illnesses associated with medicine and medical 
error are beyond the scope of this thesis but there is an excellent book on one aspect of this subject 
by John Banja. See Banja 2005 at note 101 
106  Johnson C. Bad Blood: Doctor-Nurse Behavior Problems impact patient care. 2009 Physician 
Executive Journal, November-December, volume 35(6), pages 6-11. 
107  There were also reports of poor behaviour between nurses and nurses 
108  Overall 47.9% of organisations reported both nurses and doctors equally exhibited problem 
behaviours, while 45.4% said it was doctor behavior, and 6.8% said it was nurse behaviour.  Johnson 
C. 2009 – see note 106, table 7, page 10.  
109  The Survey showed 61.2% of organisations had terminated nurses for behaviour problems, and 
22.2% had terminated doctors for behaviour problems.  Johnson C. 2009 – see note 106, tables 8 and 
9, page 10. 
110 Johnson C. 2009 – see note 106, table 5, page 8 and discussion of what was thrown on page 7. 
172 
Chapter 4 – Patient harm and vulnerabilities of the Doctor Identity 
 
behaviours described such as throwing a scalpel or squirting a syringe in a co-workers face 
may involve criminal liability, the respondents noted that “It’s the everyday lack of respect 
and communication that most adversely affects patient care and staff morale”.111 The 
frequency of bad behaviour was concerning as well, with almost 40% of organisations 
reporting such behaviour daily to weekly, just over a quarter monthly and a further 31% 
several times year.112  The Survey report notes that patients’ lives are put at risk by these 
kinds of bad behaviour, providing several examples where patients remained untreated and 
died as a result of the delays caused by the bad behaviour.  Families and patients who 
witnessed abusive behaviour between team members had their confidence in the care being 
received by their loved one undermined, resulting in unnecessary stress for them.113 
 
Australian studies have looked instead at the incidence of bullying behaviour by doctors, 
some of which overlaps with disruptive behaviours, but its seems unlikely to include the 
less egregious “everyday discourtesies” discussed in the US Survey results.  The most 
recent bullying studies published by the Royal College of Surgeons and the ACT Health are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.  A 2012 study involving a cohort of doctors currently 
in paid work across Australia and in a variety of settings 114 showed 25% of the 747 doctor 
participants115  had experienced bullying in the previous 12 months and that 45% had been 
perpetrated by other doctors and 27% by managers.  There was also 15% where the 
bullying was perpetrated by patients or relatives, possibly reflecting the higher incidence of 
general practice involvement in this survey and 4% where nurses or midwives were the 
perpetrators. 116  While not as ubiquitous as the incidence of medical error and patient 
harm, the frequency of disruptive behaviours by doctors (and others) appears to be 
                                                
111  Johnson C. 2009 – see note 106, page 6. 
112  Johnson C. 2009 – see note 106, table 4, page 8. 
113  Johnson C. 2009 – see note 106, page 19 – Patients in the middle. 
114  Askew D. Schluter PJ. Dick ML. Régo PM. Turner C. Wilkinson D. Bullying in the Australian 
medical workforce: cross-sectional data from an Australian e-Cohort study. 2012 Australian Health 
Review, May, volume 36(2), pages 197-204. 
115  Askew D. 2012 – see note 114. The survey population consisted of 27 interns, 549 specialists 
including General Practitioners and 188 were neither interns or specialists. One third of participating 
doctors were General Practitioners. 58% of doctors worked in hospitals and 38% in general practice. 
Half worked in the public sector and 30% in the private for profit sector: page 199. 
116  Askew D. 2012 – see note 114: Table 3, page 201. 
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unacceptably high in health care, and there is sufficient recent evidence to believe that it 
remains a significant problem, notwithstanding some proscriptive or guidance actions by 
regulatory bodies117.   
 
The explanation for these kinds of behaviours among doctors and, to a lesser extent, others 
in health care is often linked to stressful work environments, where expectation and 
workloads place unreasonable demands on doctors and others.  However, the significantly 
greater incidence of these behaviours observed in doctors, is consistent with the higher 
levels of hubris and arrogance reported among doctors.  While some of this may be a 
circular consequence of imputing arrogance from the disruptive behaviours, it seems 
plausible that the higher incidence of these behaviours in doctors come from the 
combination of the stressful health care environment, combined with their own additional 
stress levels arising from their protection of the Doctor Identity.  
 
Some of this may be generated by fear of mistakes, and other stresses may be a 
consequence of the hubristic response to any challenge to medical authority.  Where such 
challenges might be seen as inferring an error or risk of harm, a doctor may see this as a 
direct threat to his or her identity, power and position.  In the delusional world of perfect 
performance, where one’s core professional identity is shaped around the jealous protection 
of knowledge as part of the power over others, questioning behaviour is also a direct threat 
to identity.  Each of these threats result in the trigger of both denial and the “fight-flight” 
response.  Where a doctor becomes triggered in this manner, it may give rise to what is 
called a “neural hijacking” centred on the amygdala118, which can involve behaviour not 
unlike a child, who has a tantrum.  The purpose of the single focus of the response to threat, 
in evolutionary terms, was to survive an attack.  A threat to identity is a psychological 
                                                
117  In the US, the Joint Commission issued a Sentinel Event Alert entitled Behaviors that undermine a 
culture of safety. (Issue 40, 9 July 2008), which introduced two Leadership requirements related to 
addressing these concerns.  These were a code of conduct relating to disruptive and inappropriate 
behaviours and a process for managing these behaviours.  In Australia, the 2014 Good Medical 
Practice: A code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia issued by the Medical Board of Australia 
(against which the appropriateness of doctor behaviour is determined, refers only briefly to bullying 
and harassment (4.4.5) and to teamwork including mutual respect (4 more generally).  Behaviour 
reported in Medical College surveys conducted over the past year and a half indicate that negative 
behaviours remain prevalent in health care and that further efforts are needed to address these. 
118  Goleman D. Emotional Intelligence. 1995 Bantam Books, New York: page 13. 
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version of this.  In a small child, who has not yet learned to self-regulate, the flood of 
emotions when their want and needs are thwarted can result in tantrum behaviours.  
Tantrums, like neural or amygdala hijacking as this is sometimes called, involve a response 
which short-circuits the neo-cortex, thus preventing the brain’s capacity to emotionally 
regulate the response.  The executive function of the neo-cortex, which normally moderates 
more basic threat responses, does not have the opportunity to become engaged119.   
 
These reactive behaviours are similar to some of the disruptive behaviours described in the 
above studies.  One incident reported in the 2009 US Doctor-Nurse Survey epitomises 
exactly such a response, where “one surgeon … threw himself on the [Operating Room] 
floor while a patient was still open and under anaesthesia because an instrument was not 
working properly”.  While it is an unusual response to such a frustration, it is consistent 
with the kinds of behaviour that might occur in an “neural or amygdala hijacking” 
experience, where the triggered response related to a much deeper threat.  These provide 
further evidence of unregulated emotional responses to threats to identity. 
 
5. Mental health and the Doctor Identity: anxiety and trauma 
The unacknowledged psychological stresses relating to the various threats to the Doctor 
Identity and the failure of supports for healthy ways to deal with the natural consequences 
of being human, in combination, cause health and well-being risks to doctors120.  The 
results are evidenced by the incidence of burn-out and mental ill health among doctors.  A 
doctor knows at some level, that his or her humanity means perfect performance is 
unachievable, but that anything less may expose them to shame and humiliation.  This 
produces a powerful source of continuous anxiety.  Having few places to talk about these 
issues means that it is significantly more difficult to manage the anxiety and to work on 
other strategies to relieve the stress.  This in turn, can impact negatively on resilience. 
 
                                                
119  This neural short-cut, where the emotional rather than thinking brain is engaged, was proved through 
the work of Joseph LeDoux, discussed in Chapter 3 below.  See LeDoux J. The Emotional Brain – 
the mysterious underpinnings of emotional life. 1996 Touchstone Books, New York. 
120  This is evident in the National Mental Health Survey of Doctors and Medical Students, produced by 
Beyond Blue in October 2013, which showed very high levels of psychological stress among 
doctors, compared to the Australian population and other professionals. – see note 76. 
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In addition, doctors frequently do not look after their own health121– physical, 
psychological or emotional – in part absorbing the schema discussed in Chapter 6, where 
doctors do not see themselves as vulnerable to illness or lack of well-being.  Sometimes 
this lack of self-care arises from an overzealous sacrificial effort of putting the needs of 
patients before any of their own needs.  Whatever the reason for not looking after their own 
health, it can have significant and sometimes tragic results for the doctor.  Combined with 
fatigue and stress, doctors are set up to experience burn-out and mental ill health. There is 
significant evidence of this in data on substance abuse by doctors122, in increased rates of 
suicide123 and evidence of depression and other signs of “burn-out”124. 
 
These issues can be aggravated when a doctor causes harm to a patient.  As well as 
emotions like shame and humiliation, doctors experience a deep sense of isolation where 
they can talk to no-one and where no-one will understand their sadness, guilt and even 
despair.125  Where a feeling of shame accompanies the harm or error, this can amplify the 
silence and secrecy surrounding the event.  Brown describes the interconnected “shame 
web”, which surrounds a person with the images and ideas of what they should be, how 
they should be and who they should be and how they have somehow failed in one or more 
of these areas126.  As described in Chapter 6, there are many narratives within medicine and 
society about what it is to be a doctor that maintain schema that do not support a healthier 
                                                
121  See eg, Sanchez-Reilly S. Morrison LJ. Carey E. Bernacki R. O’Neill L. Kapo J. Periyakoil VS. 
Thomas JdL. Caring for oneself to care for others: physicians and their self-care. 2013 Journal of 
Supportive Oncology, June, volume 11(1), pages 75-81. 
122  See eg, Devi S. Doctors in distress. 2011 The Lancet, 5 February, volume 377, pages 454-456.  
123  Schernhammer ES. Colditz GA. Suicide rates among physicians: a Quantitative and Gender 
Assessment (Meta-Analysis). 2004 American Journal of Psychiatry, December, volume 161(12), 
pages 2295-2302. 
124  Beyond Blue 2013 - see note 76.  
125  Christensen JF. Levinson W. Dunn PM. The heart of darkness: The impact of perceived mistakes on 
Physicians. 1992 Journal of General Internal Medicine, July/August, volume 7, pages 424-431: page 
430. 
126  Brown B. I thought it was just me – Women reclaiming power and courage in a culture of shame. 
2007 Gotham Books, New York: page 19. Brown also produced a TED talk on shame and 
specifically referred to doctors in the following way: “We heard a brilliant solution to not killing 
people in surgery[earlier], which is to have a checklist.  You can’t fix that problem without 
addressing shame because when they teach those folk how to suture, they also teach them how to 
stitch their self-worth to being all powerful, and all powerful folk don’t need a checklist.” At 10.39-
11.00 http://youtu.be/psN1DORYYV0?t=10m45s.  
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understanding of what it is to be a doctor.  Further the intensity of professional education 
and training discussed in Chapter 5 often results in the absorption of conflicting values (the 
difference between the overt and the hidden curriculum in medical education) which can 
give rise to cynicism.  Role conflicts arise between the doctor as a caring, empathic, self-
effacing, beneficent helper idealised in their training and the business focussed, detached, 
impatient and arrogant doctor that is often modelled where their professional apprenticeship 
is served.  Whatever has influenced and shaped an individual’s Doctor Identity, the impact 
of causing harm to a patient can be emotionally devastating. 
 
When a doctor’s actions cause harm to a patient, especially if it results in death, it can result 
in long term psychological effects, because the event is traumatic both professionally and 
personally.  There is much that can be done to assist a doctor in these circumstances, so that 
the impact does not cause pathology, but this can only occur if the harm is recognised and 
assistance put in place to support the doctor through the process.127 
E. Doctors and Fatigue: A case study in the practical 
consequences of unrealistic self-belief 
1. Sleep and sleep deprivation 
Before discussing doctors’ approach to sleep and fatigue, some basic information about 
sleep and the current scientific understanding of sleep is needed.  While the depth of 
understanding about sleep and fatigue has increased over the past three decades, much of 
the information discussed here has been known and considered in the context of medicine 
since the early1980s128.  Though the biological reasons for the human need to sleep are not 
well understood, sleep is a physiological imperative for human beings, with the normal 
response to inadequate sleep being sleepiness129.  Just as thirst drives people to drink and 
                                                
127  See eg, Herman J. Trauma and Recovery. 1997 Basic Books, New York; Yoder C. The Little Book of 
Trauma Healing. 2005 Good Books, Intercourse (Pennsylvania USA).  This later book discusses 
Ongoing, and Structurally induced trauma, that arises from living under unsafe conditions that are 
long term and continuous, where there is a constant threat.  
128  See eg, Asken MJ. Raham DC. Resident performance and sleep deprivation. 1983 Journal of 
Medical Education. May, volume 58(5), pages 382-388. 
129  Saper CB. Cano G. Scammell TE. Homeostatic, Circadian and Emotional Regulation of Sleep. 2005 
Journal of Comparative Neurology, volume 493, pages 92-98: at page 96 
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hunger leads people to eat, sleepiness alerts someone that their body needs sleep.  It is 
possible to continue to stay awake when sleepy, but if the body remains deprived of sleep, 
then the brain can take charge to ensure the need for sleep is met (the homeostatic sleep 
drive)130. 
Eventually, when deprived of sleep (acutely or chronically) the human brain can 
spontaneously, in an uncontrolled fashion, shift from wakefulness to sleep in order 
to meet its physiological need for sleep.  The sleepier the person, the more rapid and 
frequent are these intrusions of sleep into wakefulness.  These spontaneous sleep 
episodes can be very short (ie microsleeps lasting only seconds) or extended (ie 
lasting minutes).  At the onset of sleep, an individual disengages perceptually from 
the external environment, becoming unresponsive to outside information.  
Therefore, even a micro-sleep can be associated with a significant performance 
lapse, when an individual does not receive or respond to external information.  With 
sleep loss, these uncontrolled sleep episodes can occur while standing, operating 
machinery and even in situation that would put an individual at risk, such as driving 
a car.131 
 
Alertness and sleepiness occur within a regular pattern called the circadian rhythm.  The 
circadian cycle affects many biological systems, not just sleep and alertness cycles.  It is 
managed by cells in the brain collectively called the “endogenous circadian pacemaker” 
which operates through the suprachiasmatic nuclei (SCN) of the anterior hypothalmus132.  
These cells respond, among other things, to ambient light.  While there are some individual 
variations in the amount of sleep required, these natural patterns are embedded in our 
humanness.  There is no evidence that people who choose to become doctors have any 
greater resilience to sleep deprivation or that people whose genetic make-up means they 
need less sleep are over-represented in the ranks of doctors.133 
 
                                                
130  Dinges DF. Sleep Deprivation, Fatigue and Effects on Performance – the Science and its 
implications for resident duty hours. Paper presented at the American College for Graduate Medical 
Education (ACGME) Annual Educational Conference, 6-7 March 2003, Chicago Illinois. 
131  Rosekind MR. Co EL. Johnson JM. Smith RM. Weldon KJ. Miller DL. Gregory KB. Gander PH. 
Lebacqz JV. Alertness Management in Long-Haul Flight Operations. Proceedings of the 39th Annual 
Corporate Aviation Safety Seminar. 1994 Flight Safety Foundation, St Louis, Missouri, pages 167-
178. 
132  Hastings M. The brain, circadian rhythms and clock genes. 1998 British Medical Journal, 19-26 
December, volume 317, pages 1704-1707: at page 1704. 
133  Czeisler CA. Medical and genetic differences in the adverse impact of sleep loss on performance: 
ethical considerations for the medical professions. 2009 Transactions of the American Clinical and 
Climatological Association, volume 120, pages 249-285: at pages 249-250 and generally. 
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The circadian rhythm leads to two periods of natural sleepiness in humans - between 
approximately 2-7am and, to a lesser extent, 2-5pm.  This pattern occurs whether or not 
someone has slept134, but the sleepiness is increased if someone has had insufficient sleep, 
either acutely following a long period of wakefulness, or where there is a pattern of sleep 
debt, such as when each night’s sleep is insufficient over time.  Sleepiness can also be 
affected by activities, which impact on circadian rhythms, like night shifts or jet lag, or if 
the sleep someone has had has been disrupted.  These interruptions may be work-related, 
such as when someone is on call and gets called out in their sleeping time, or not work-
related, such as if someone in the household is sick or wakeful or neighbours have a noisy 
party.  Dinges listed some of the neuro-behavioural effects of sleep loss as follows135: 
• Voluntary and involuntary sleep latencies shorten (ie the time it takes to fall asleep 
intentionally or accidentally reduces); 
• Microsleeps intrude into wakefulness (state instability); 
• Behavioural lapsing (errors of omission); 
• False responses (errors of commission); 
• Time-on-task decrements (fatigue); 
• Cognitive speed/accuracy trade-off; 
• Learning and recall deficits; 
• Working memory and related executive functions decline. 
Even a sleep deficit as small as 1 or 2 hours can “exaggerate the tendency for error during 
the time zones of vulnerability”136.  NASA research has also shown that “regardless of 
training, professionalism, or having the “right stuff”, extreme sleepiness can precipitate 
uncontrolled and spontaneous sleep”.137  The impact of inadequate sleep on risk of error in 
                                                
134  Mitler MM. Carskadon MA. Czeisler CA. Dement WC. Dinges DF. Graeber RC.  Catastrophes, 
Sleep, and Public Policy: Consensus Report. 1988 Sleep; volume 11 (1), pages 100-109: at page 101. 
135  Dinges 2003 – see note 130: slide 25. 
136  Mitler et al. 1988 – see note 134: at page 107.  See also: Rosekind MR, Gander PH.  Managing 
fatigue in operational settings1: Physiological considerations and countermeasures. 1996 Behavioral 
Medicine; volume 21(4) Winter; pages 157-168; section headed Sleepiness affects waking 
performance, vigilance and mood. 
137  Hayward B. Pilot fatigue and the limits of endurance. 1999 Flight Safety Australia; volume April; 
pages 36-39; at page 39, commenting on research reported in Rosekind MR. Graeber RC. Dinges 
DF. Connell LJ. Rountree MS. Spinweber CL. Gillen KA. Crew Factors in Flight Operations IX: 
Effects of Planned cockpit rest on crew performance and alertness in long-haul operations. NASA 
Technical Memorandum 108839; July 1994 NASA, California. 
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health care was confirmed by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in the United States in its 
2008 Report Resident Duty Hours – Enhancing sleep, supervision and safety.138  The IOM 
Report analysed all of the scientific literature on the impact of fatigue on the frequency of 
error and cognitive impairment both in doctors and people more generally, and concluded 
that poor sleep in medical trainees and in medical practitioners created a significantly 
increased risk of harm to patients, even where the clinician did not “feel” sleepy.139 
 
2. Fatigue and performance deficit 
Fatigue and the risks from its impact can be very insidious.  As was the case with some of 
the doctors noted in the IOM Report above, sometimes people will subjectively feel alert, 
because the environment is stimulating or because they have been physically active, but 
they will still be physiologically sleepy140. If the need for sleep remains unmet and is 
aggravated by physical or cognitive demands or psychological exhaustion, then fatigue 
follows141. The potential for error related to sleep debt is further exacerbated by stressful 
working conditions.  Because people may be unaware they are fatigued (or of their level of 
fatigue) or of the limitations the fatigue they are feeling can have on their performance, the 
negative impacts on performance may go unnoticed by the person until something 
catastrophic occurs.   
 
However, the negative impacts on performance are well documented.  In the aviation field, 
degradation of skills and capacities by fatigue has been noted in the following areas:  
• Muscular strength and coordination; 
• Vision and perception; 
• Memory; 
                                                
138  Institute of Medicine.  Resident duty hours: enhancing sleep, supervision and safety. Prepared by the 
Committee on Optimizing Graduate Medical Training (Resident) Hours and Work Schedules to 
Improve Patient Safety. Ulmer C. Miller Wolman D. Johns M. (editors) 2009 National Academy 
Press, Washington DC: pages 188-205. 
139  Institute of Medicine 2009 – see note 138: page 234. 
140  Rosekind MR. Gander PH. Managing fatigue in operational settings 1: Physiological considerations 
and countermeasures. 1996 Behavioral Medicine; volume 21(4) Winter; pages 157-168: section 
headed physiological versus subjective sleepiness. 
141  Dinges 2003 – see note 130: slide 7. 
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• Performance monitoring; 
• Error management; 
• Decision making; 
• Motivation and attitudes; 
• Communication; and 
• Ability to cooperate.142 
 
The impact of these performance deficits can be compared to those caused by drinking 
alcohol.  For example, Dawson and Reid in Nature found the impact of fatigue from 17 
hours of sustained wakefulness on cognitive psychomotor performance equivalent to 0.05% 
blood alcohol concentration (BAC).  Further, 24 hours of wakefulness produced a 
performance deficit equivalent to 0.10% BAC143.  It would neither be ethically or legally 
permissible for a doctor with either of these blood-alcohol levels to treat a patient.  Yet in 
many hospitals, both in Australia and overseas, doctors who have had these and longer 
periods of wakefulness are treating patients.  The risks associated with these long periods of 
wakefulness are often compounded when the doctors are inexperienced, and so even more 
stressed.   
 
The scientific evidence for the risk to patient safety and preventable harm to patients from 
doctors working when fatigued is unambiguous.  The important conclusions from the sleep 
research to date are: 
• If a human being gets inadequate sleep, they will incur a sleep debt, which will 
result in performance limitations in many areas and will run the risk of spontaneous 
sleep occurring; 
• Working in a stimulating environment or being busy does not stop the sleep debt 
arising – and neither training nor “will” can prevent the negative performance 
consequences of sleep debt and fatigue. 
                                                
142  Hayward 1999 – see note137: at page 38. 
143  Dawson D. Reid K. Fatigue, alcohol and performance impairment. 1997 Nature, volume 388, 17 
July, page 235. 
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While there is some variation in the sleep required by humans with age and individual 
genetic variation, studies show this is normally between 7.5 and 9 hours: approximately 1 
hour of sleep for each 2 hours of wakefulness144.   
 
3. Medicine, sleep and patient safety 
Much of this information has been known for a long time, but it is only within the last 
decade that this knowledge has started to have any impact on the practice of medicine and 
its training methods.  As noted above, professional culture can have both positive and 
negative effects.  Helmreich and Merritt’s work on doctors and pilots show that in both 
cases, one of the negative impacts of their cultures is a sense of invulnerability, and the 
integration of this sense into their self-concept145.  For many years, doctors saw the capacity 
to work for very long hours without seeming to become fatigued as a quintessential quality 
for a doctor.  The folk history of medicine contains hero stories of doctors who worked 
impossibly long hours – this one is of a doctor, Lewis Thomas, whose internship occurred 
in 1937 at the Harvard Medical Service at Boston City Hospital.  
No job I’ve ever held since graduating from medical school was as rewarding as my 
internship.  Rewarding may be the wrong word for it, for the salary was no money 
at all.  A bedroom, board, and the laundering of one’s white uniform were provided 
by the hospital; the hours of work were all day every day, and on call for admissions 
and emergencies every other night all night long.  There was no such thing as a 
weekend.  The hours were real working hours; when the night came especially in 
the winter months, the intern was even more on the run than during the daytime 
shift. 146 
 
The imposition of these very long hours on young doctors were seen as one of the “rites of 
passage”147 to be a doctor.   
Many doctors have a self-image which incorporates the capacity to stay alert and 
make good decisions even after very long hours of work.  Stories abound of people 
working for 36 hours straight, and operating for 18 hours at one go.  There is almost 
                                                
144  Dement W. Vaughan C. The Promise of Sleep. 2000 Dell Publishing, New York 
145  Helmreich et al. – see note 30 1998 Ashgate, Aldershot (UK):  
146  Thomas L. The Youngest Science – Notes of a Medicine Watcher. 1995 Penguin Books, New York: 
pages 36-37. 
147  Nocera A. Strange Khursandi D.  Doctors’ working hours: can the medical profession afford to let 
the courts decide what is reasonable? 1998 Medical Journal of Australia, volume 168, pages 616-
618: at page 616 
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a view amongst some practitioners that showing physical tiredness is a sign of 
weakness - a sign that you “really aren't cut out to be a doctor”.148  
 
While limitations on resident working hours in some jurisdictions have heeded the science 
of sleep149, others like those imposed in the United States, seem to reinforce the notion that 
doctors are more impervious to the effects of fatigue than other humans.  For example, the 
United States Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) introduced 
limitations on resident working hours in 2003150.  These were 80 hours a week averaged 
over 4 weeks with a 24-hour limit on continuous duty, with provision for an additional 6 
hours for “continuity of care” and “education” (this allowed for 30 hour shifts)151.  The 
2011 ACGME standards152, which commenced in July 2011, reduced the number of hours 
                                                
148  Review of Professional Indemnity Arrangements for Health Care Professional. Compensation and 
Professional Indemnity in Health Care – Final Report. November 1995 Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra (PIR Final Report): para 5.23, page 93 – this extract relates the 
evidence given by Dr Drew Dawson to the South Australian Industrial Commission, recorded in an 
article by Van Santen J. Van Santen J. Trainee docs work dangerously long hours. 1994 Medical 
Observer 28 October: page 1, where Dr Dawson states that for some senior medical administrators 
the issue was an emotional one rather than an economic one.  "People feel you have to work these 
hours to become a real doctor.  They think because they did it in their day, so should the new 
generation of trainee doctors.": page 2. 
149  See eg, the Council of Europe’s European Work Time Directive 2003/88/EC, which sought to limit 
working hours for all workers to 48 hours per week including overtime and a minimum rest period of 
11 consecutive hours per 24 hours.  8 years after the directive becoming law, there were a significant 
number of jurisdictions which sought extended “transitional” provisions to accommodate the 
working hours of doctors in training, while working towards these limits. See eg, Commission 
Opinion 2009/C 245/01, in the Official Journal of the European Union, in relation to the UK.  The 
limits applied to UK junior doctors from August 2009.  Transitional arrangements in the end were 
extended to a maximum of 2012.  For discussion of the various positions, around the world, see 
Temple J. Resident duty hours around the globe: where are we now? 2014 BMC Medical Education, 
Supplement, pages S1- S8. Available at 
http://bmcmededuc.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-6920-14-S1-S8 
150  On October 4, 2002, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rejected a 2001 
petition by Public Citizen and other organizations, requesting federal regulatory intervention in the 
area of resident duty hours.  OSHA cited the ACGME’s then proposed duty hours standards and the 
likelihood of better enforcement processes through revocation of accreditation of residency 
programs.  A similar petition lodged in 2010 appears to have preceded the revisions to the Standards 
which are to commence in July 2011. 
151  The original hours were based on limitations introduced in New York State by legislation (Code 405 
in 1989), following the recommendations of the Bell Commission, which was established to look 
into the death of Libby Zion in 1984.  This case involved an 18 year old young woman admitted to 
New York Hospital’s Emergency Department, but who died 7 hours later.  The residency 
arrangements of the time, including long hours of work and poor supervision, were strongly 
criticised in the inquiry.  
152  Copies of the 2003 and 2011 standards can be found at 
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/dutyHours/dh_index.asp : accessed 17 May 2011 
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on duty for first year residents to 16 hours.  After first year, the hours remain at 24 hours of 
continuous duty.  To address the risks associated with fatigue which were expected to arise 
with such arrangements, the standard notes that residents were to be “encouraged to use 
alertness management strategies”, including “strategic napping after 16 hours of continuous 
duty and between the hours of 10pm-8am”.  In both standards, there is provision for longer 
periods than the 80 hours, where necessary for “a sound educational rationale”!153  Both 
standards appear to ignore the evidence that 24 hours without sleep has an impact on 
human performance equivalent to a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1 or twice the 
Australian limit for a drink-driving offence.   
 
The new draft standards of the ACGME154 which were released for discussion in October 
2016 and closed for comment on 19 December 2016, take back the gains of 2011 and revert 
to 80-hour working weeks (averaged over a month) and 24-hour shifts for interns and all 
College training programs regulated by them.  There is a minor reduction for the period 
allowed in excess of 24 hours – down from 6 hours in 2003 to 4 in 2016 – leaving the 
capacity for regular approved shifts of 28 hours, to allow interns to “fit better” with other 
residents and staff.  The push for these proposals apparently came mainly from medical 
specialty colleges.155  
 
The existing and draft ACGME standards ignore findings from the Institute of Medicine’s 
2008 Report156.  The Report itself prevaricates between an acknowledgement of the 
scientific evidence that sleep deprivation causes safety concerns, and an apparent desire to 
                                                
153  A useful comparison of the two standards can be downloaded from the Accreditation Council for 
Graduate Medical Education (ACGME)’s website at: 
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/dutyHours/dh-ComparisonTable2003v2011.pdf  
154  The draft standards are available as a “tracked changes” document on the ACGME.  
http://www.acgme.org/Portals/0/PFAssets/ReviewandComment/CPR_SectionVI_ChangesTracked.p
df Interestingly, the reference to Duty Hours has been removed as a title and it has been substituted 
with a heading “Clinical Experience and Education”: http://www.acgme.org/What-We-
Do/Accreditation/Clinical-Experience-and-Education-formerly-Duty-Hours .  This is also reflected 
in the tracked changes – with focus being on the “Learning and Work Environment” rather than on 
“Duty hours”.  
155  Steka BS. Overworked, underslept and the politics of resident shift hours – new proposals reignite an 
old dispute. 30 November 2016 Medscape. At: http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/872349  
156  Institute of Medicine 2009 – see note 138: page 163 and pages 5-6. 
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placate the hospital and medical training establishment by saying 30 hour shifts are still 
allowed, but there must be a protected period of sleep of 5 hours after 16 hours of 
wakefulness.157   
 
In Australia, the issue of fatigue in medicine also started with junior doctors, 
with the Australian Medical Association conducting a risk assessment of 
junior doctor rosters, which was published in 2001.  This showed a range of 
practices which would be expected to lead to fatigue, including long shifts, 
long continuous periods of work and few days off.  It also demonstrated 
consistent patterns of these poor practices over time158, which would be 
expected to lead to cumulative sleep deficit that amplifies the effects of 
immediate fatigue.  Some of these data are summarised in  
Table 4.1.  The professional sub-groups which had the highest representation in the 
significant and higher risk categories were Surgery (51% and 35% respectively); 
Medicine/Physicians (65% and 21% respectively); and Obstetrics and Gynaecology (52% 
and 41% respectively), with almost 80% of respondents overall being in these risk 
categories.159 
 
Table 4.1: Australian Medical Association Junior Doctor Roster Audit 2001 
N=417 doctors 
 
Risk 
Category 
All respondents 
in risk category 
% 
Registrars  
(36% N) % 
Interns & 
RMOs (56%N) 
% 
Hours per audit 
week- range in 
hours [average] 
Longest periods 
of continuous 
work in hours  
[average] 
Lower 22 25 20 10-74  [45] 5-21  [11] 
Significant 54 48 56 34-86  [60] 5-24  [13] 
Higher 24 27 23 45-106  [79] 7-63   [16] 
Source: Australian Medical Association. Risk Assessment of Junior Doctor Rosters. July 2001 
 
Following this, in 2003 the Australian Medical Association and the Australian Healthcare 
Association issued a Best Practice Rostering: Training and Resource Kit to assist hospitals 
                                                
157  Institute of Medicine 2009 – see note 138: see eg, discussion on pages 5-6 of the risks, and compare 
this to the recommendations summarised on page 13, Table S1. 
158  Australian Medical Association (AMA). Risk Assessment of Junior Doctor Rosters. July 2001 AMA, 
Canberra. 
159  AMA July 2001 – see note 158: Table V, page 5. 
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in addressing what it described as the risks for hospitals and their patients from excessive 
levels of doctor fatigue.  In the foreword to that kit, the two Presidents noted that: 
Historically, long working hours have been viewed as part of the medical culture 
and perhaps even a “rite of passage” for young doctors.  Staff shortages can play a 
significant part, as can the desire by staff for increased remuneration.  A 
contributing factor in many cases is staff rostering practices that are based on an 
incomplete understanding of the range of factors that can lead to excessive fatigue 
and increased risk of error.160 
 
Despite the promotion of the issue and emphasis on the need to act for patient safety and 
doctor well-being, the movement to safer hours for trainees was generally leisurely and 
inconsistent.  In 2006, the Australian Medical Association conducted a similar survey of 
employed doctors – of the 573 respondents, 39% were Interns or Residents, 53% were 
Registrars and 8% were consultants or career medical officers161.  While there were fewer 
doctors in the higher and significant risk categories in this survey, 62% overall still fell into 
these groups.  Emergency medicine had shown the greatest improvement, with a decline 
from 59% in these risk categories in 2001 to 29% in 2006.  Except for surgery, most other 
specialties had shown a decrease in the proportion of doctors in the highest risk categories, 
but only anaesthetics and Emergency medicine had a majority of doctors in the lower risk 
categories.  Surgery had more than twice the average proportion of doctors in the top risk 
category162.  So far as hours of work are concerned, of the 17% of doctors in the top risk 
category, the median hours worked in the survey week was 79 hours, with a range of 50-
113 hours.  The longest single period of continuous work was 39 hours in this group, with 
the median being 15 hours.  The AMA report noted that: 
While the longest continuous shift in the 2006 survey was 39 hours, it is well down 
on the 63 hours recorded in 2001, but a serious concern nevertheless.  There was 
also a reduction in the longest continuous period of work for the lower risk category 
(down from 21 hours).163 
                                                
160  Australian Medical Association (AMA) and the Australian Healthcare Association (AHA). Best 
Practice Rostering: Training and Resource Kit – Practical Tools for Rostering Doctors. A joint 
initiative of the Australian Medical Association and Australian Healthcare Association. July 2003 
AMA and AHA, Canberra: Foreword. 
161  Australian Medical Association (AMA). Safe Hours = Safe Patients. AMA Safe Hours Audit 2006. 
October 2006. AMA, Canberra: page 7. 
162  AMA 2006 – see note 161: Table 4, page 9. 
163  AMA 2006 – see note 161:: page 10.  A more recent survey has been undertaken by the AMA, but 
this survey looked at the health and well-being of junior doctors more generally, and the data 
available on hours worked was not comparable: Australian Medical Association (AMA).  AMA 
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The Australian Medical Association conducted another survey in 2011164, covering 1,486 
junior and salaried doctors, which showed a modest improvement from 2006, with 53% of 
doctors in the higher and significant risk categories (compared to 62% in 2006).  However, 
other data showed worse results, with the longest shift being 43 hours and the maximum 
numbers of hours worked in the audit week increasing to 120 hours.  Even doctors in the 
lower risk categories were working shifts up to 19 hours, and 77% in the surgery discipline 
were in the significant and higher risk categories165.  The AMA conducted another similar 
audit in October 2016, but the data is not yet available.  
 
The Royal Australasian College of Surgeons developed its own Standards for Safe 
Working Hours, which were introduced in 2007.  The maximum hours per week under 
these standards for Trainees is 70 hours per week, with maximum day shifts of 14 hours 
and 12 hours for night shift, and the opportunity for 8 hours of sleep in every 24 hours.166  
However, these do not apply to surgeons who have completed their training.  The 
differences between these standards and those of the AMA are justified on the claim that 
surgeons’ practices “encompass a large number of responsibilities and activities that often 
differ from those of a hospital doctor”167.  It is unclear why this means hours of practice can 
be safely longer for surgeons.   
 
In 2010 study168 looking at Australasian surgery trainees and their working hours, it 
appeared that 86% of trainees worked longer than 12 hour days (median 15 hours).  13% 
worked more than 70 hours per week and 5% worked more than 80 hours per week.  In 
                                                
Survey Report on Junior Doctor Health and Well-being. October 2008 AMA, Canberra: see page 15.  
A new survey is to be undertaken in 2016-17. 
164  Australian Medical Association (AMA). AMA Safe hours audit 2011 - Managing the risk of fatigue 
in the medical workforce. Audit Analysis. July 2012 AMA, Canberra. 
165  AMA 2012 – see note 164, Table 4, pages 12-13. 
166  Royal Australasian College of Surgeons (RACS). Standards for Safe Working Hours and Conditions 
for Fellows, Surgical Trainees and International Medical Graduates. December 2007 RACS, 
Melbourne: page 13. 
167  RACS 2007 – see note 166: page 6. 
168  O’Grady G. Loveday B. Harper S. Adams B. Civil I. Peters M. Working hours and roster structures 
of surgical trainees in Australia and New Zealand. 2010 ANZ Journal of Surgery, volume 80, pages 
890-895: at pages 891 and 894. 
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Australia, where there is no statutory regulation of trainee conditions as there is in New 
Zealand, there were frequent on-call but off-site duty cycles, where the median period of 
uninterrupted sleep was only 3-5 hours.  In addition to these hours, it appeared that trainees 
also spent an average of 10.6 hours on study or research.  
 
Of real concern when reading these studies is that even the measures chosen as indicators 
for potential doctor fatigue appear to be based on an implicit denial of the human need for 
sufficient sleep to have safe performance.  The normalisation of extended work hours that 
are clearly likely to be putting patient safety at risk is demonstrated by the reporting of the 
“achievement” that only 50% of all doctors are now working longer than 15 hour shifts.  
This records only shift length, not hours awake, for example travelling to work, eating, 
showering, and other ordinary activities of daily living.  With a 15-hour shift, it is highly 
likely that a doctor will have been awake for at least 17 hours with the probability of 
significantly impaired performance.  Looking from such a perspective, this “favourable 
achievement” approach would appear to emphasise the level of denial of impact. 
  
At the Government level, doctor fatigue was first raised in the Final Report of the 
Professional Indemnity Review in 1996, but little was done for the next 7 years169.  In 2003, 
the issues were again put on the patient safety agenda by the Australian Council for Safety 
and Quality in Health Care’s Safe Staffing Discussion Paper, released in July 2003170.  It is 
salutary to note that despite the overwhelming evidence of the human reality of fatigue and 
its negative effects on performance, the Safe Staffing Consultation Report in March 2005 
noted that: 
[T]ere was much debate about what fatigue is and the difficulties with measuring an 
individual’s level of fatigue.  There was also a variety of opinions on the effect of 
fatigue and the ability of medical staff to function at different levels of fatigue.  
Some, although a minority, were not accepting of the evidence presented in the 
paper of the physical effects of fatigue on medical staff.  … Most felt that health 
professionals were aware of fatigue and the surrounding safety issues but that it 
simply was not a priority in management of work practices at present, it is “not on 
the agenda”.  There was general agreement that there is currently no formal process 
                                                
169  PIR Final Report – see note 148: paras 5.22-5.28, pages 92-93. 
170  Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care. Safe Staffing: Discussion Paper. July 
2003. 
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to identify and manage fatigue and that the culture of the health profession meant 
that individuals would not act even if they knew they were fatigued.171 
 
In Australia, there remain no formal controls on the hours worked by doctors in the private 
sector, or doctors who work in many hospitals or other settings.  At an ethical level, the 
need to address fatigue has been included in several places in the 2009 National Code of 
Conduct for medical practitioners.  For example, chapter 9 “Ensuring doctors’ health”, 
clause 9.2.5 of the Australian Medical Council’s Code of Conduct172, refers to the need for 
doctors to recognise “the impact of fatigue on your health and your ability to care for 
patients, and endeavour … to work safe hours wherever possible”.  It also imposes an 
obligation in clause 9.3.4 on doctors to recognise “the impact of fatigue on the health of 
colleagues, including those under your supervision, and facilitating safe working hours 
wherever possible”. In the chapter on minimising risk, clause 6.3.2 states that good medical 
practice involves “recognising and taking steps to minimise the risks of fatigue, including 
complying with relevant state and territory occupational health and safety legislation”. 
4. Denial of fatigue and its effects 
Given the widespread evidence about fatigue, it is striking that doctors and other health 
professionals appear to discount its application to themselves and their industry. Helmreich 
and Merritt noted that 60% of doctors (compared to around 30% of pilots) believed they 
performed effectively when fatigued.  Health professionals appear to have very mixed 
views about fatigue.  They recognise that fatigue exists and is a problem.  However, they 
appear unable or reluctant to see that fatigue puts patients at risk of harm of poor 
performance.  The risk of such an attitude is that it puts professional face-saving, inflated 
self-perception and the need or desire to comply with organisational imperatives that lead 
to fatigue, ahead of the health professional’s duty to protect their patients.   
 
This complex dichotomy is also consistent with research that shows that once something is 
integrated into the self-concept (in this case that doctors are not effected by fatigue like 
                                                
171  Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care. Safe Staffing Consultation Report. March 
2005: pages 19-20. 
172  Australian Medical Council. Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia. 
Developed by a working party of the Australian Medical Council on behalf of the Medical Boards of 
the Australian states and territories. July 2009 AMC, Canberra. 
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“everyone else”), people seek to maintain that self-concept against other potentially 
conflicting evidence.173  As Helmreich and Merritt conclude: “The resistance of self-
concepts to disconfirming evidence can explain why attitudes about personal limitations 
seem to fall on deaf ears and why change proceeds at a slow pace.”174 
 
An idealised but misguided medical self-concept is reflected in strong beliefs that their 
performance is not affected by fatigue and this forms part of the Doctor Identity.  For 
example, in the work of Helmreich and Merritt, both doctors and pilots showed a “sense of 
personal competence and a denial of human weakness, specifically to the ubiquitous effects 
of stress, with more than 30% of pilots and 60% of doctors believing that they “performed 
effectively when fatigued”.  The depth and the influence of the myth that being a doctor (or 
even trainee doctor) somehow transcends human fatigue is deeply ingrained in medical 
culture, and the fact that the hours which young doctors can work are well beyond any 
other safe working-hours standards in any other industry is further evidence of this.   
 
In a submission175 to the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration about the 
length of doctor working hours, the submitters drew on a chilling extract from an intern’s 
diary, which shows the depth of negative impact that fatigue can have on a doctor’s 
capacity to provide good quality, compassionate healthcare: 
One of the strongest arguments for reducing resident physician work hours is an 
ethical one: overwork interferes with the development of professional values and 
attitudes that are an essential part of being a physician.126 Fatigue can cultivate 
anger, resentment, and bitterness — often directed at the patient — rather than 
kindness, compassion, or empathy. As was evident from many of the studies on 
                                                
173 Swann W. Hill C. When our identities are mistaken: reaffirming self-conceptions through social 
interaction. 1982 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, volume 43(1), pages 59-66; Swann 
W. Chang-Schneider C. Larsen McClarty K. Do people’s self-views matter? Self-concept and self-
esteem in everyday life. 2007 American Psychologist, February-March, volume 62 (2), pages 84-94. 
174  Helmreich et al. 1998 – see note 30: page 33. 
175  This submission was forwarded from a group of concerned citizens and medical doctors: Public 
Citizen, a consumer and health advocacy group with 150,000 members and supporters; the 
Committee of Interns and Residents/SEIU Healthcare (CIR/SEIU), a housestaff union, part of SEIU, 
representing over 13,000 resident physicians; the American Medical Student Association (AMSA), a 
national organization representing over 33,000 physicians-in-training; Bertrand Bell, M.D., Professor 
of Medicine at Albert Einstein College of Medicine and author of New York State Health Code 405 
restricting resident physician work hours; Charles A. Czeisler, Ph.D., M.D., Baldino Professor of 
Sleep Medicine, Harvard Medical School; and Christopher P. Landrigan, M.D., M.P.H., Assistant 
Professor of Pediatrics and Medicine, Harvard Medical School. 
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negative mood and its relationship to long work hours, this attitude is promoted 
when meeting a patient’s needs becomes incompatible with meeting a resident 
physician’s own needs. The following entry from a resident physician’s diary 
illustrates the types of feelings engendered by typical resident physician work 
schedules:  
 
1AM and I’m ready to go to bed: one should never be ready to go to bed in 
the ICU [Intensive Care Unit] — you’ll always be disappointed. Anyway, 
I’m on my way to the EW [Emergency Ward] … when there’s a code 
[cardiac arrest]. Get up there and find [a resident physician] trying to 
intubate a lifetime asthmatic who is as blue as this ink. I keep thinking — 
he’s blue enough to go to the ICU. I keep hoping he’s going to be too blue to 
go anywhere. Probably a nice man with a loving wife and concerned 
children, but I don’t want that SOB to make it because I’ve got one special 
who is going to keep me up 2 more hours. I don’t need an intubated, blue, 
pneumothoraxed SOB coming to my unit… I don’t want the asthmatic SOB 
to live if it means I don’t sleep. I don’t want the special to live if it means I 
don’t sleep. I just want sleep. 
 
This extract formed part of an article on the nature of medical internship as moral 
education, published in 1987176, when hours of work were even longer.  The author reflects 
on his own experiences and those of his fellow interns at a major urban teaching hospital in 
the United States and it provides salutary reading as an example of negative conditioning.  
Hobson, a sleep deprivation specialist, said in 1969: 
There never was a good reason to indulge in the false heroism of 36-hour duty stints 
by the interns.  We now appreciate excellent reasons for abandoning this practice.177 
 
More than 40 years later, there are continuing debates about the impact of sleep deprivation 
on doctors.  These debates show the resilience of the false myth that doctors, alone among 
humans, have less need for sleep and do not suffer the fatigue performance deficit 
experienced by other humans.  Like the deceptive ideal of perfect performance, these false 
ideals create mistaken beliefs of what it is to be a good doctor.  These, in turn, reduce the 
opportunity for honestly looking at risks and limitations to create safer care for patients.  
                                                
176  Groopman LC. Medical internship as moral education: an essay on the system of training physicians. 
1987 Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, volume 11, pages 207-227. 
177 Hobson JA. Sleep: Physiologic aspects. 1969 New England Journal of Medicine, 11 December, 
volume 281(4), pages 1343-1345. 
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They also reduce critical attention to better working conditions and more satisfying and 
safe care relationships for doctors.  
 
In some ways, the illusion is even harder to tackle when unsafe hours are misguidedly said 
to be for patient safety reasons.  For example, in the 2016 re-draft of the US Accreditation 
Council for Medical Education working hours standards 178, the maximum shift hours are 
proposed to increase to 24 hours with an optional increase of 4 hours (making the total 
hours 28) if these hours are used “for activities related to patient safety such as ensuring 
effective transitions of care, and/or resident education”. 179  Given the known risks to 
patient safety and doctor well-being from such excessive hours and the evidence that 
learning is impeded by fatigue, these statements show either transparent cynicism, reckless 
disregard for patients and doctors, or strong continuing evidence of mistaken beliefs about 
fatigue and doctor performance. 
 
The next two chapters look at how the Doctor Identity, which underpins these myths and 
delusional beliefs, is created and maintained and why it is not easily changed. 
                                                
178  The need to disguise the practices which can compromise patient safety and doctor well-being is 
indicated by a shift in the title in the 2016 draft standards from Duty Hours to Clinical Experience 
and Education: see http://www.acgme.org/What-We-Do/Accreditation/Clinical-Experience-and-
Education-formerly-Duty-Hours, sighted 25 December 2016. 
179  ACGME Common Program Requirements – Proposed Major Revision, page 17, lines 574-579 and 
lines 586-594:, see 
http://www.acgme.org/Portals/0/PFAssets/ReviewandComment/CPR_SectionVI_ChangesTracked.p
df , sighted 25 December 2016. 
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Chapter 5: Formation of the Doctor Identity  
A. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the formation of a Doctor’s professional and personal identity, 
because it is this identity which appears to respond to error and patient harm as a threat, as 
set out in the first hypothesis of the thesis.  Understanding its process of formation may 
enable the development of different strategies to improve the recognition of patient harm 
and its prevention. 
 
The chapter commences with a brief explanation of identity formation and conflicts that 
can arise between different aspects of identity.  It then looks at those people who choose to 
train to be a doctor and their backgrounds prior to entering medical school.  Once in 
medical school, people enter a deep process of socialisation and professionalisation, which 
creates their Doctor Identity.  Despite developments in medical education theory and a 
greater awareness of and understanding of the impact of different practices on the well-
being of medical students and junior doctors, there remain some pervasive behaviours and 
patterns of training which negatively affect many students and junior doctors.   
 
This chapter also looks at the psychological impact of the medical education and training 
processes, including attitudes to error and patient harm that underpin the threat to identity 
discussed in Chapter 4. This explicit and implicit learning can create long term patterns of 
thought and action which undermine some of the key social goals of medicine and the 
safety and quality of care. 
 
B. Identity formation and identity conflict 
Individuated self-identity formation is a long-term process, which reaches a peak in late 
adolescence and early adulthood1, the period during which many medical students 
                                                
1  Meeus W. Iedema J. Helsen M. Vollebergh W. Patterns of adolescent identity development: review 
of literature and longitudinal analysis. 1999 Developmental Review, volume 19, pages 419-461.  See 
also Erikson EH. Erikson JM. The Life Cycle completed – extended version. 1998 W. W. Norton and 
Company, New York: Adolescence and School Age at pages 72-76; Marcia JE. Development and 
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commence their studies.  For example, in 2012, almost 38% of commencing medical 
students in Australia were less than 20 years old, and 44% were between 20-242.  Rather 
than being a single monolithic psychological structure, a person’s identity usually consists 
of several different parts, and over someone’s life time, these parts can change3.  A person’s 
identity includes their own conception of their personal characteristics, such appearance, 
gender, race and sexual orientation.  It may include social and relational roles, such as 
being a parent, being the first child in a family, being married or in a sexual relationship, 
being a friend, attending a church, and participating in certain hobbies or activities.  It may 
include identities related to beliefs, such as spiritual or political views.  These different 
aspects of identity are sometimes called self-schemas4.   
 
Most people develop an occupational component to their identity as they finish school or 
during vocational training.  The strong personal identification with occupation has 
traditionally been associated with the professions.  The sociologist Freidson expresses it 
thus: 
With their material interests secured by their control over their work and their 
protected position in the market place, members of professions can develop a deep 
life-long commitment to and identification with, their work.5 
 
In fact, the identification with and commitment to an occupation is not limited to traditional 
professions.  For example, someone who has done an apprenticeship is likely to define 
themselves through their occupational choice, such as “I am a hairdresser”, “I am a 
fitter/machinist”.  Experience and pride in a job, even where no extended training is 
required, may also result in a person’s occupation forming part of their identity, often 
                                                
validation of ego-identity status. 1966 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, volume 3(5), 
pages 551-558. 
2  Medical Schools Outcomes Data base (MSOD) Project Team. 2012 CMSQ [Commencing Medical 
School Students Questionnaire] National Data Report. Produced from the Medical Deans of 
Australia and New Zealand, Medical Schools Outcomes Data base: 
http://www.medicaldeans.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012-CMSQ-Report.pdf : Table 3, page 6. 
3  See eg, Carter R. Multiplicity: the new science of personality, identity and the self. 2008 Little 
Brown, London. 
4  Horowitz MJ. Self-identity theory and research methods. 2012 Journal of Research Practice, volume 
8(2), Article M14. Retrieved from http://jrp.icaap.org/index.php/jrp/article/view/296/261  
5  Friedson E.  Professionalism Reborn – theory, prophecy and policy. 1994 University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago: page 175. 
195 
Chapter 5 –Formation of the Doctor Identity 
expressed as “I am a good labourer”, “I am a great salesperson”.  How any individual sees 
their occupation in relation to their identity often reflects the meaning and significance they 
attach to the work.  For example, a job may be seen as something being done, while waiting 
to become something else, such as “I washed cars while I studied to become a writer.”  
Often the difference in significance to an individual is expressed in the words used to 
describe their connection to the work.  For example, someone may see a job as something 
they “do” or something that they “are”: “I sell fruit and vegetables” compared to” I am a 
green grocer”.  For most people who become doctors, becoming a doctor is an important 
occupational identity for them – “I am a doctor”, rather than simply “I work as a doctor”. 
 
Most people retain or develop other identities that co-exist with an occupational identity.  
For example, someone may have identities as a doctor, a wife, a mother, a friend, an 
athlete, a writer and a gardener of rare orchids.  The significance of each identity and its 
prominence will often vary over time and setting, and can be role specific.  In addition, the 
actual nature of each of these identities is not absolute.  They are partly personal (that is, 
defined by the person’s own beliefs and experiences) and partly mediated by the culture 
and society in which someone lives.  For example, the identity and role expectations 
associated with being a parent often vary between individuals, between socio-economic 
groups and between genders.  Cultural role expectations are often shown through the 
stereotypes and images commonly depicted for that identity, for example, in stories, 
advertising and the media.  Identities are often developed and exist in a specific relational 
and interactional context6. 
 
Different identities can give rise to internal conflicts in a person, particularly as these 
identities are forming, because role expectations associated with them may be internally 
inconsistent.  For example, a medical career (and medical training) often requires long 
hours away from family.  It often does not provide flexibility for unexpected but 
predictable events like the illness of a dependent child.  These role expectations can create 
stress between a person’s identity as a committed medical professional and their identity as 
                                                
6  The relational and interactional contexts are often given little weight in medical education:  
Monrouxe LV. Identity, identification and medical education: why should we care?  2010 Medical 
Education, volume 44, pages 40-49: see especially page 44. 
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a caring, nurturing parent7.  Attempts to resolve these specific identity tensions are often 
evident in medical students’ choices about their future medical careers at the end of their 
medical school training, when many are also contemplating or have commenced family 
formation.  For example, about 5% of Australian medical students finishing in 2012 had 
children under 16, just under 11% were married, 14% lived with a partner and almost 18% 
were “in a relationship” though not living with the partner8.  The impacts and 
interrelationships between these important and sometimes conflicting identities are also 
strongly reflected in some of the medical student biographies, particularly when a student 
commences his or her studies later than average and thus already has already taken on these 
other identities9.   
 
To add further complexity, some parts of identity are conscious and some are not.  In the 
language of sociology, the unconscious component of identity is called “habitus”10. 
Summarised by Costello11, habitus includes: 
• An individual’s unconscious assumptions about how the world works – their 
worldview or “weltanschauung”; 
• An individual’s tastes or preferences, which often mark generational, ethnic, class and 
subcultural identities;   
                                                
7  An excellent study which looks at these role conflicts for medical students is: Broadhead RS. The 
private lives and professional identity of medical students. 1983 Transaction Books, New Brunswick 
(NJ. USA). 
8  Carberry A. Dumbrell D. 2012 Medical Students Exit Questionnaire National Data Report, produced 
by the Medical Deans of Australia and New Zealand, Medical Schools Outcomes Database and 
Longitudinal Tracking Project: available at: http://www.medicaldeans.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/2012-EQ-Report.pdf  , Table 8, page 10 and Table 9, page 11. More recent surveys 
have used a different tool, collecting less data and focussing more on career intention. 
9  See eg, Konner M. Becoming a doctor – a journey of initiation in medical school. 1987 Penguin 
Books, New York.  The author was 35 years old, married and had small children when he 
commenced his medical training.  He notes, on page 364, the differences these life events and 
identities had on his understanding of medicine and the training process.  See also LeBaron C. 
Gentle Vengeance – an account of the first year at Harvard Medical School. 1981 Richard Marek 
Publishers, New York (USA). LeBaron worked for a decade as a social worker in hospitals before he 
started his studies and experienced the death of both his parents. 
10  This term was a central concept in the work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who saw 
habitus as regulating behaviour without obedience to rules – for a full discussion of the concept, see 
Maton K. Habitus.  Chapter 3 in Grenfell M. (editor) Pierre Bourdieu: Key concepts. 2012 (2nd 
edition, Acumen Publishing, Durham (UK), pages 48-64. 
11  Costello CY. Professional Identity Crisis – race, class, gender and success at professional schools. 
2005 Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville (USA): pages 20-24. 
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• An individual’s embodied identity, which can include their gestures, body language, 
need for personal space; and 
• An individual’s emotional identity, including, for example, their natural degree of 
emotional warmth or coolness. 
An individual will often not be aware of these parts of their identity and they can be quite 
difficult to change.  They can give rise to significant stresses, if the requirements of other 
more conscious identities, such as a new professional identity, are inconsistent with those 
that are unconsciously based.  These conflicts often give rise to “feelings of discomfort, 
disjuncture or incompetence”12, but can be difficult to express and deal with because of 
their source in the parts of identity that are carried sub-consciously or unconsciously.  
 
When different identities are consistent, they can support, complement and reinforce each 
other.  For example, if a medical student believes they are compassionate and caring in 
their family relationships, they will see that a professional identity which encompasses 
these same values as a consistent or “consonant” part of their identity.  Both identities 
reinforce the validity of the other.  However, identity conflict or dissonance can occur when 
clashes between the values, worldviews or expected actions of these different identities are 
not readily reconcilable.13  Where the student becomes aware of this dissonance and 
decides to change themselves, this can result in negative impacts on their other affected 
identities, such as family relationships, where the changes required by the taking on of the 
professional identity are not positively accepted by others.  This in turn creates stress and 
disruption for the student.14   
 
These differences can involve professionally significant issues and the dissonance may be 
experienced with awareness or unconsciously.  For example, a medical trainee may 
experience anxiety and distress, without a clear understanding of the reasons.  This can 
negatively affect student performance, because “an attempt to escape the forces of 
professional socialization … endangers their professional success ... because one cannot be 
                                                
12  Costello 2005 – at note 11: page 136. 
13  The concept of identity dissonance has been used by others, but the notion of identity dissonance and 
consonance in relation to professional education is drawn from the work of Costello: Costello 2005 – 
at note 11:see especially pages 25-28 and Chapter 6.  
14  Costello 2005 – at note 11: pages 124-163. 
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a successful professional without a well-integrated professional identity”15.  For example, 
in a study of students in non-medical professional schools, Costello found that those who 
experienced professional and personal identity dissonance had only a few choices.  They 
could leave their training and not become a professional; they could manage the dissonance 
they felt; or they could edit the conflicts (either consciously or unconsciously) and embrace 
the change.  Where the change was embraced, the students in Costello’s study found a new 
sense of identity that was empowering.  Where the change was not welcomed, the students 
felt “they were losing themselves”, which was described as “disconcerting and 
unpleasant”16.  The experiences of medical students and residents losing themselves (or 
losing touch with who they were) is described often in the literature and research about 
medical training, because of the depth and intensity of the socialisation process and 
professional identity formation.17 
 
Identities also carry different social values and these can also be context dependent.  Where 
there is a hierarchy of prestige and importance among identities, “physician” generally 
carries a high social rank.18  For this and other reasons discussed below, the Doctor Identity 
often becomes a dominant identity in the medical student, sometimes to the exclusion of 
other previous identities.  The development of the professional identity of a doctor involves 
a psychological movement away from a point when a person doesn’t see himself or herself 
as a doctor.  “Becoming a doctor” in a professional sense occurs over time through the 
process of learning skills, attitudes, assumptions, definitions and values, so that in the end, 
the person sees themselves as a doctor, and the society around them recognises them as 
such19.  The process then is both a movement away from how the person once was, as well 
as a movement towards the new professional identity.   
 
                                                
15  Costello 2005 – at note 11: page 127. 
16  Costello 2005 – at note 11: pages 128-9. 
17  See eg, Duncan DE. Is this any way to train a doctor? Medical residencies: the next healthcare crisis. 
1993 Harper’s Magazine. April, volume 286, issue 1715, pages 61-66: at page 62, where the author 
describes his wife losing “interest in food, exercise, the kids, me and everything else she loved” to 
survive her residency. 
18  Broadhead 1983 – see note 7: pages 39-40. 
19  Broadhead 1983 – see note 7: page 38. 
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During that period, a period of significant uncertainty occurs, where the person feels 
“betwixt and between”.  They do not see themselves as they were, nor are they yet what 
they are becoming.  At this time, their identity state is probably the most malleable.  Many 
of the elements of medical training contribute and heighten this sense of uncertainty and 
separation from a previous way of being.  This journey of socialisation is very powerful.  In 
these periods of uncertainty, medical students are even more vulnerable to the modelling of 
those who have already made the transition.  At such points of identity confusion when 
students ask “What would I do, if I really was a doctor?”, they readily adopt the behaviours 
observed by them in other physicians.  They manage their professional identity at the outset 
of training by “acting like other professionals”.20  
 
This “acting like a doctor” does not initially form part of their identity.  Rather, it is a 
means of reducing their sense of uncertainty about what to do.  It is sometimes called a 
“situated adjustment” to the overwhelming demands of their training process21.  However, 
over time, these actions, either consciously or unconsciously, start to form a part of their 
professional identity22.  This professional identity can sit beside their other identities, which 
they bring to their education, and alter their sense of self by addition.  In some cases, the 
new identity can create significant discomfort, particularly where the professionals they 
observe act differently than both the student’s internal preference and what they had 
expected of that professional.   
 
In some situations, the adoption of the Doctor Identity can be more dramatic.  Through a 
process called by social psychologists “conversion”, the new identity substitutes for 
previous identities, some of which are negated. “Conversion is signalled by a radical re-
organisation of identity, meaning and life”23 and can lead to psychological trauma, 
maladjustment and the abandonment of other identities and relationships.  This can have 
                                                
20  Broadhead 1983 – see note 7: page 37. 
21  Broadhead 1983 – see note 7: page 36. 
22  Beagan BL. Neutralizing differences: producing neutral doctors for (almost) neutral patients. 2000 
Social Science and Medicine, October, volume 51(8), pages 1253-1256: see especially pages 1259-
1260. 
23  Travisano RV. Alteration and conversion as qualitatively different transformations. Chapter in Stone 
GP. Faberman HA. (editors) Social psychology through symbolic interaction. 2nd edition 1981 Wiley 
& Sons, New York, pages 237-248o. 
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long term impacts on the emotional well-being of those people so affected.  Even where the 
results of socialisation are not so profound, some have described the process of 
“successful” medical professionalisation as “doctrinal conversion”. This is described as 
“the social psychological process whereby students come to exchange their own lay views 
and imagery of the profession for those of the profession itself”24. 
 
For many students, the identity they take on as a doctor may have familiar elements.  For 
example, when the students come from a high socio-economic background, there is no 
dissonance when this is seen as part of their new professional identity.  There is evidence, 
however, that for other students, the “development of a professional medical identity might 
entail the adoption of a different world-view, different values and emotional orientations” 
and this can affect their progress at medical school and create anxiety and stress25.  The 
move within medical schools to seek broader inclusion of people, from across the socio-
economic, racial and cultural spectrum, appears likely to inadvertently compound this risk.  
The existing medical education and training system has, over many decades, sought to 
create homogeneity in those who graduate through a common professional identity (or 
specialty identity)26. When people with more diverse identities are brought into this mix, 
the chance of professional identity dissonance is likely to increase.27  
 
C. Choosing to train to be a doctor 
1. Starting early 
There is evidence that many recruits to medical school choose their career from an early 
age and show “an extraordinary degree of personal commitment to this career”28.  For 
                                                
24  David F. Professional socialization as subjective experience: the process of doctrinal conversion 
among student nurses. Chapter 17 in Becker HS. Geer B. Reisman D. Weiss RS. (editors) 
Institutions and the person – Festschrift in Honor of Everett C. Hughes. 2010 Aldine Transaction, 
New Brunswick (NJ. USA), pages 235-251: at page 237. 
25  Monrouxe 2010 – see note 6. 
26  Beagan 2000 – see note 22; see also Shapiro M. Getting Doctored: Critical reflections on becoming 
a physician, 1987 New Society Publishers, Philadelphia: see especially chapter 2. 
27  Frost HD. Regehr G. ‘I AM a doctor’: negotiating the discourses of standardization and diversity in 
professional identity construction. 2013 Academic Medicine, October, volume 88(10), pages 1570-
1577. 
28  Coombs RH. Mastering Medicine. 1978 The Free Press, New York: page 35. 
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example, in a 2005 study of Brazilian medical students, 40% of them had made the decision 
to become a doctor before turning 15 years of age, and a further 51.7% chose the option 
during high school29.  Auto-biographical stories of young doctors also show this as a 
common theme, and often it is a powerful driver for those from disadvantaged backgrounds 
to make extraordinary efforts to become a doctor30. 
 
The degree of commitment required to get into medical school and the length of time that a 
medical education takes are considerable.  Entrance requires some of the highest academic 
grades achievable and often various highly competitive admission tests, as discussed in the 
next section of this Chapter.  The costs involved in medical school education may be 
significant and the hours required mean that many ordinary activities are foregone.  This 
process often commences even before starting formal medical studies.  Conclusions from 
an older American study of medical students, still resonate today and internationally: 
Rather than floundering in search of a meaningful direction, like so many of their 
youthful peers, these students decided on a medical career at an early age; most 
have not even entertained the possibility of any other career.  Moreover, all have 
overcome formidable obstacles in gaining admission to medical school, such as 
competing successfully for the best grades and politicking effectively to impress 
premedical advisors and medical school admissions committees. And, equally 
impressive is their demonstrated willingness to shoulder heavy financial burdens 
and in other ways sacrifice personal pleasures to achieve their goals.  Such 
commonality makes clear that career socialization is well underway before a recruit 
even gains admission to medical school.31  
 
Studies of pre-medical students intending to seek entry to medical school show that 
students are aware, before they commence medical studies, that the road they are choosing 
is a difficult one.  They express concerns about levels of debt, the compatibility with plans 
to have a family and the rigours and competitiveness of their current and future academic 
                                                
29  Millan LR. Azevedo RS. Rossi E. Neves de Marco OL. Millan MPB. Vaz de Arruda PC. What’s 
behind a student’s choice to become a doctor? 2005 Clinics, volume 60(2), pages 143-150: at page 
145.  This has been a longstanding pattern – see the 1961 classic: Becker HS. Geer B. Hughes EC. 
Strauss AL. Boys in white – Student Culture in medical school. 2004 (8th printing) Transaction 
Publishers, New Brunswick (NJ.USA): Table IV, page 77, where 32.3% of sample decided as a 
child, and 40.3% in high school. 
30  See eg, Takakuwa KM. Rubashkin N. Herzig KE. What I learned in medical school – personal 
stories of young doctors. 2005 University of California Press, Berkley: page 41-42.  
31  Coombs 1978 – see note 28: page 35. 
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studies.32  The length of time that people have dreamed of becoming a doctor during their 
early years of identity formation in their adolescence as well as the effort, resources and 
sacrifices expended to achieve this goal may impact strongly on how extensively their 
professional identity comes to dominate other identities in their self-perception. 
 
2. Reasons for wanting to be a doctor 
In studies that asked medical students or applicants what motivated them to seek to become 
a doctor, a range of reasons are given33.  Some of these are intrinsic motivations, internal to 
the person, such as an interest in biology or science, a desire for intellectual challenge, 
wanting to help people, and wanting to be useful.  These motivations are signs of genuine 
interest within the person’s identity and research shows they are associated with greater 
chances of success, better application to study and greater well-being34.  By contrast, 
external motivators, such as desire for monetary rewards, prestige of the profession or 
pressure from parents, appear to be less predictive of success and less protective of well-
being.  Several studies have shown that male students tend to be more motivated by 
external factors, and female by internal.35  Where motivations for medical students are 
intrinsic, it is likely that these characteristics form part of their self- identity.  Idealism or 
altruism appears to have been a common, pre-existing characteristic of those who seek 
entry into medical school.36   
 
                                                
32  See eg, Lovecchio K. Dundes L. Premed survival: understanding the culling process in premedical 
undergraduate education, 2002 Academic Medicine. July, volume 77(7), pages 719-724: see 
especially Table 2, page 721.   
33  See eg, Millan et al. - see note 29; Barondess JA. Glaser RI. Attitudes toward the medical career: 
findings from the Alpha Omega Alpha Survey of College and university undergraduates. 1993 
Academic Medicine, May, volume 68, pages 323-328; McManus IC. Livingston G. Katona C. The 
attractions of medicine: the generic motivations of medical school applicants in relation to 
demography, personality and achievement. 2006 BMC Medical Education, February, volume 6, 
pages 11-26: accessed at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/6/11 on 18 April 2014; 
Kusurkar RA. Croiset G. Galindo-Garré F. Cate OT. Motivational profiles of medical students: 
association with study effort, academic performance and exhaustion. 2013 BMC Medical Education, 
volume 13, page s 87- 95: accessed at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/13/87 on 18 April 
2014.  
34  Kusurkar et al. 2013 – see note 33. 
35  Kusurkar et al. 2013 - see note 33: at page 93; Millan et al. 2005 - see note 29: at page 146. 
36  See eg, Becker et al. 2004 – see note 29. 
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In one study37, where 60 medical students were interviewed in the first weeks of 
commencing their studies, they were asked what they saw as the 5 attributes most important 
for being a doctor.  92% gave personality characteristics such as altruism (54 answers), 
having a humanitarian attitude (12), being dedicated (9) and being responsible (8).  80% 
gave professional skill and 60% gave having a good relationship with patients, which was 
characterised through such actions as being attentive, transmitting confidence, respecting 
the patient and knowing how to listen.  These positive and important attributes for doctors 
establish a high-performance ideal in the formative development of the student’s self-
identity and their prospective doctor identity.  Combined with the actual academic 
requirements to get to medical school, the stage is set for both positive and negative 
perfectionism in their training years. 
 
Some studies also suggest that choosing medicine as a career is attractive for some 
prospective students, especially males, because it is seen as a “way of life” which 
encompasses all other aspects of life. 38  In such students, as the Doctor Identity develops, it 
is more likely to become their identity.  Such attitudes can mean that the necessary social 
supports that can protect a doctor from the stresses of medical practice – family, friends, 
other interests - are harder to establish and maintain.  As can be seen later, the intensity of 
medical school, internship and residency are themselves barriers to maintenance of these 
relationships and life choices.  The capacity to empathise with a range of people from 
different backgrounds will often be an important skill for doctors.  Maintaining a broader 
understanding of life beyond medicine can be an important professional and life skill that 
may be under-valued, when becoming a doctor is seen as such a singular calling.  An 
expectation that a medical career would be someone’s whole life can also add even more 
stress to a young person, who seeks to gain entry and then excel at medical school, because 
failure at any point may go to the core of their identity. 
 
                                                
37  Millan et al. 2005 at note 29: at page 146. 
38  See eg Ewan CE. Bennett MJ. Medicine in prospect – the first-year student’s view. 1981 Medical 
Education, volume 15, pages 297-293: at pages 288-289. 
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3. Socio-economic background 
As well as these personal characteristics, many medical students share a similar socio-
economic background.  Those who become doctors are more than likely to have grown up 
in a household with a higher socio-economic status and high educational achievements.  
Such a background tends to shape the person’s initial self-image in a complementary 
fashion to the power, income and privileges associated with the social status that 
accompanies “being a doctor” discussed in Chapter 6.  The higher socio-economic 
background of many medical students may also mean that they have greater familial and 
social connections with other doctors in their early years and have observed the social and 
economic benefits of being part of the medical profession.  This pattern is similar across 
nations.  For example, in a study of Canadian medical school first year students conducted 
in 200139: 
• 43.5% of the medical students came from neighbourhoods with median family 
incomes in the top quintile;  
• 39.0% of fathers and 19.4% of mothers of these students had masters or doctoral 
degrees (compared to 6.6% male and 3.0% female of the Canadian population aged 
45-64 years); 
• 69.3% of fathers and 48.7% of mothers were professionals or high level managers 
(compared to. 12% of Canadian population); and  
• 15.6% of the students had a physician parent. 
A 2013 General Medical Council study showed a pattern of relative privilege for medical 
students in the United Kingdom.  65% of medical students came from the top two socio-
economic quintiles of the population, with only 6.3% coming from the lowest quintile.  
65% of doctors in training had one parent or guardian who attended university and more 
than 57% attended either private schools or selective state schools40.   
 
                                                
39  Dhalla IA. Kwong JC. Streiner DL. Baddour RE. Waddell AE. Johnson IL. Characteristics of first-
year students in Canadian medical schools. 2002 Canadian Medical Association Journal, 16 April, 
volume 166(8), pages 1029-1035 
40  General Medical Council. National training survey 2013: socioeconomic status questions. October 
2013. Available at http://www.gmc-
uk.org/Report___NTS_Socioeconomic_Status_Questions.pdf_53743451.pdf , accessed on 25 March 
2014. 
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Such patterns have also been shown to be resistant to change over time, even where 
selection processes have been altered to attempt to recruit more widely41.  They have also 
been demonstrated across many countries42, including Australia43.  In Table 5.1 below, 
entrants to medical training in Australia had a significantly higher socio-economic status 
than both general entrants to tertiary studies and the population as a whole44.   
Table 5. 1: Commencing medical students, other students and population by 
socio-economic status, Australia, 1996 
 
 
Source: Australian Medical Workforce Advisory Committee. 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. Characteristics of students 
entering Australian Medical Schools 1989 to 1997. AMWAC Report 
1997.7. AIHW cat. HWL 6. December 1997 
                                                
41  See eg, the 2008 US Association of Medical Colleges conclusion that despite efforts to increase 
diversity of parental income in those entering medical school between 1987 and 2005, little or no 
progress has been made.  Jolly P. Diversity of US Medical students by parental income. 2008 
Analysis in Brief, January, volume 8(1). Available at 
https://www.aamc.org/download/102338/data/aibvol8no1.pdf , accessed on 16 February 2016.   
Research in Denmark and other jurisdictions have shown a similar experience.  In the Danish case, 
the equalizing effect of a quota system in 1992 had lost its impact by 2006-7: Pederson LT. Bak NH. 
Petersson BH. The social recruitment of medical students in year group 2006-2007 at the University 
of Copenhagen. 2010 Ugeskr Laeger, 18 January, volume 172(3), pages 206-210. 
42  See also similar data for the US: Grbic D. Garrison G. Jolly P. Diversity of US Medical School 
Students by Parental Education. 2010 Analysis in Brief - Association of American Medical Colleges, 
August, volume 9 (10); for Canada: Dhalla et al. – see note 39; for New Zealand: Heath C. Stoddart 
C. Green H. Parental backgrounds of Otago medical students. 2002 New Zealand Medical Journal, 8 
November, volume 115(1165), pages U237-U243. 
43  See eg, Puddey IB. Mercer A. Socio-economic predictors of performance in the Undergraduate 
Medicine and Health Sciences Admission Test (UMAT), 2013 BMC Medical Education, volume 13, 
page 155: accessed at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/13/155 on 18 April 2014. 
44  While somewhat dated, this is the most recent data available. 
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Coming from a higher socio-economic group from birth brings with it a range of privileges 
and expectations that are often unconsciously built into the identity of an individual45.  This 
is likely to mean that some of the elements of the Doctor Identity, which are associated 
with the exercise of power and the possession of income and social status, may already 
have been established in the self-perception of medical students, both through exposure and 
expectation, before they even begin medical training.   
 
Freidson also emphasised social and economic individualism, independence and class 
dignity as characteristics of such a background.46  More recently, it is likely that the impact 
of increased numbers of women graduates47 and the increased availability of other medical 
employment options, which provide a better work family balance for both male and female 
doctors, has altered the weight attached to economic individualism for many doctors48, as 
discussed further below.  However, a privileged background can prime medical students’ 
identities with an unconscious or sometimes conscious expectation of success and result in 
them having high expectations of themselves.  For someone who enters medical school 
                                                
45  The unconscious nature of unacknowledged, unearned privilege when one has grown up with it – the 
“invisible knapsack” - was described in a 1988 article by Peggy McIntosh.  McIntosh M. White 
privilege and Male privilege - A personal account of coming to see correspondence through work in 
Women’s Studies. Working Paper 189. 1988 Wellesley Centers for Women, Massachusetts (USA).  
Paper available at: http://nationalseedproject.org/peggy-mcintosh-s-white-privilege-papers. 
46 In his 1970 seminal sociological work on doctors, Profession of Medicine, Freidson commented on 
the impact of social class on the worldview of professionals generally:  
Part and parcel of professional performance and the ideology surrounding it are the historical 
accretions of an occupational status and the social origins of its incumbent.  Being 
predominantly from the bourgeoisie, the professional emphasises independence, social and 
economic individualism and class dignity in his status 
Freidson E. Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge. 1970 (2nd 
edition -1988 Impress) University of Chicago Press, Chicago: pages 172-173.  
47  Women made up 51% of medical graduates in 2014. Medical Deans Australia and New Zealand. 
Workforce Data Report 2015. November 2015, page 1. 
48  See McMurray J. Jordan JV. Relational dilemmas of women physicians. Work in Progress, Paper no. 
WP89. 2000 Wellesley Centers for Women, Wellesley (Massachusetts).  See also Bavley A. Day 3: 
For young doctors, hospital paycheck trumps solo practice. 2013 The Kansas City Star, Monday 30 
December at: http:// http://www.kansascity.com/2013/12/30/4721805/for-young-doctors-hospital-
paycheck.html accessed on 23 April 2014; 
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from a lower socio-economically background, there can be pressures not to acknowledge 
their background as well as a pressure to succeed, which can add even more stress49.   
 
These elements of identity and background can be strengths or vulnerabilities.  For 
example, with the high level academic requirements to achieve entry into medical school, 
new students are also likely to have an evidence based view that they are, in a range of 
ways, above average.  However, once they commence studies, they are in a milieu where 
all the other students are high achievers as well, and so they become “average” in this 
environment, which leads a proportion of students to have self-doubt.50  Rather than being a 
“high achiever”, as they had always perceived themselves, they see their new status of 
“average” as the equivalent of failure, even though this is a mean in a very skewed sample 
of students.  Research is beginning to show that this can increase student vulnerability to 
depression and anxiety.51 
D. Training to be a doctor 
1. Duration of education and training 
At a practical level, the period of training to become a doctor is long – one of the longest 
training periods across all occupations.  In Australia for example in 2012, 41.5% of 
commencing medical students enrolled in a five to six-year undergraduate medical degree, 
after competing for entry in an Undergraduate Medical and Health Sciences Admission 
Test (UMAT).  Their admission requirements included their final year school scores, which 
                                                
49  See Takakuwa et al. 2005 at note 30: this book includes a range of stories from medical students 
from non-traditional backgrounds, some of whom discuss pressures to “fit in” and not acknowledge 
those differences for fear of stigma.  
50  This is a variety of the “imposter syndrome or phenomenon”, which has been evidenced in other 
environments where high achievers are clustered. The concept was first recognised and named by 
Clance and Imes in 1978.  Clance PR. Imes SA. The imposter phenomenon in high achieving 
women: dynamics and therapeutic intervention. 1978 Psychotherapy Theory, Research and Practice, 
Fall, volume 15(3), pages 241-247. 
51  See PBS Special. Struggling in Silence: Physician Depression and Suicide. Viewed at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k_tQgB-722Y, see especially 12.16-15.00, where the University 
of California San Diego School of Medicine staff and students discuss this issue in some detail.  See 
also Villwock JA. Sobin LB. Koester LA. Harris TM. Imposter syndrome and burnout among 
American medical students: a pilot study. 2016 International Journal of Medical Education, 31 
October, volume 7, pages 364-369. Available at:  doi:  10.5116/ijme.5801.eac4  
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generally need to be in the top grouping52 and generally some form of interview53.  In 2012, 
58.5% of medical students in Australia enrolled in graduate medical school54.  This 
involves completing an undergraduate degree (often at an honours level) for three to four 
years, sitting a highly competitive Graduate School Admissions Test (GAMSAT) and then 
undertaking a four-year graduate medical training degree.  After completing either medical 
degree, a medical graduate is required to do a one-year Post Graduate intern year in a 
hospital (or other approved setting for non-core rotations) to be qualified for admission to 
independent practice by the Medical Board of Australia.  Trainee doctors generally 
continue to work in hospital for a further 1-3 years as a Resident, often as a precursor to 
specialty training, including General Practice.  Some of this training can commence after 
the intern year, but some require a longer period of practice before entry.  Often young 
doctors also take some time to determine where they want to go with their career.  With the 
number of medical graduates in Australian universities increasing by 270% since 200055 
but with limited specialty training places, an increasing number of young doctors are also 
working as career medical officers, in hospitals without an expectation of entering specialty 
training. 
 
                                                
52  Medical admissions generally require an Australian Tertiary Admission Rank of 99/100 or an 
Overall Position of 1, where the grading goes from a high of 1 to 25 for those directly leaving school. 
53  Following a study of the impact and predictive use of interviews on academic success, the University 
of Queensland removed its interview process – for discussion see, Wilkinson D. Zhang J. Byrne GJ. 
Luke H. Ozolins IZ. Parker MH. Peterson RF. Medical school selection criteria and the prediction of 
academic performance – evidence leading to change in policy and practice at the University of 
Queensland. 2008 Medical Journal of Australia, 17 March, volume 188(6), pages 349-353: at page 
353.  More recently, a study has shown that this change has markedly biased the gender profile of 
domestic, direct graduate entry medical students, with male students increasing from 50.9% before 
the interview was removed to 64.0% after removal of the interview.  The main testing differential 
appears to be in the GAMSAT section III – Reasoning in Biological and Physical Sciences. See 
Wilkinson D. Cassey MG. Eley DS. Removing the interview for medical school selection is 
associated with gender bias among enrolled students. 2014 Medical Journal of Australia, February 3, 
volume 200(2), pages 96-99. 
54  MSOD Project Team. 2012 CMSQ [Commencing Medical School Students Questionnaire] National 
Data Report, produced from the Medical Deans of Australia and New Zealand, Medical Schools 
Outcomes Data base: available at: http://www.medicaldeans.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012-
CMSQ-Report.pdf : Table 2, page 5. 
55  Australian domestic medical school graduates increased from 1,195 in 2000 to 3,128 in 2015, and 
International graduates from Australian universities increased from 152 in 2000 to 521 in 2015.  
Combined data from Medical Deans Australia and New Zealand website: Data from 2000 in 2015 
Medical Student statistics and data from 2015 in Workforce Data Report 2015 
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Once a young doctor decides on their area of interest for long term work, they will 
commence Specialist or General Practice training.  Depending upon which specialty is 
chosen this can take a further 3-6 years of full-time training (undertaken through, and while 
in, employment as a doctor), at the end of which an unconditional Medicare Provider 
number can be provided to allow independent practice.  Alternatively, a doctor may decide 
to continue working in a hospital – as a Registrar or as a career medical officer.   
 
Whichever course is chosen, the decision to become a doctor is an enormous commitment 
of time in education and training, even before any earning capacity can be exploited.  A 
career in medicine is also a commitment to lifelong learning, even after formal 
qualifications are completed, with significant Continuous Professional Development 
requirements for registration and maintenance of College Fellowships.   
 
2. Socialisation and medical training 
Becoming a doctor involves more than this long period of technical training and in-depth 
education to provide care to patients.  Both university and clinical training comprise an 
intensive socialisation process into the medical profession with its own complex norms.  
Socialisation is the “collection of processes by which people acquire the values and 
attitudes, the interests, skills and knowledge – in short, the culture – current in the groups of 
which they are, or seek to become, a member”.56  It is also a means of occupational identity 
formation and professionalisation, where a student doctor is taught to identify firstly with 
medical students’ colleagues and then later, with other doctors57.  Medical school not only 
teaches the technical skills of medicine, but also “functions as a moral community” for 
“transmitting normative rules regarding behaviour and emotions to its trainees.  Medical 
training is said to be “at root a process of moral enculturation”.58   
 
                                                
56  Hafferty FW. Into the Valley – death and the socialization of medical students. 1991Yale University 
Press, New Haven (USA): page 2. 
57  Weaver R. Peters K. Koch J. Wilson I. ‘Part of the team’: professional identity and social exclusivity 
in medical students. 2011 Medical Education, volume 45, pages 1220-1229. 
58  Hafferty FW. Franks R. The hidden curriculum, ethics teaching, and the structure of medical 
education. 1994 Academic Medicine, November, volume 69(11), pages 861-871: page 861. 
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Medicine was once predominantly a male occupation59, with a long history of elitism60 and 
individualism61, and entry into the profession was likened to entering the priesthood62.  
Important changes have happened in medicine in Australia and elsewhere over the past 
decades that have impacted on these traditions, and altered at least some of them.  For 
example, this has included significant increases in the numbers of women studying 
medicine63 and becoming doctors64, increased diversity in the cultural and linguistic 
                                                
59  In Australia, women did not commence practising medicine until the last decade of the 19th Century.  
The first female doctor registered in Australia was Constance Stone, who was registered in 1890, 
having had to travel overseas to gain her qualification. Macdonald W. The Life of Constance Stone – 
Australia’s First Woman Doctor. 2003 East Melbourne Historical Society Newsletter, September: 
accessed at http://emhs.org.au/catalogue/emvf0144-p2 on 14 May 2014.  By 1986, 25% of general 
practitioners and 16% of specialists were women. See: Australian Bureau of Statistics. Australian 
Social Trends, April 2013 Doctors and Nurses, Publication Number 4102.0, section: Are there more 
male doctors than female doctors? 
60  Irvine D. The Doctors’ Tale – Professionalism and Public Trust. 2003 Radcliffe Medical Press, 
Abingdon (UK): pages 12 and 25. 
61  Freidson 1988 impress – see note 49: pages 172 and 191. 
62  Klitzman R. When doctors become patients. 2008 Oxford University Press, New York: page 297. 
63  Women made up 51.4% of commencing medical students in 2015, and 51% of medical graduates in 
2014. Medical Deans Australia and New Zealand. Workforce Data Report 2015. November 2015, 
page 1, see also Health Workforce Australia. Australia’s Health Workforce Series - Doctors in focus. 
2012 Health Workforce Australia, Adelaide, page 11.  The proportion of women has been more than 
50% for all but one year (2012), since 2000.  The highest proportion of women entering Australian 
medical schools was 57.3% in 2004.  Medical Training Review Panel. Eighteenth Report. May 2015, 
Table D1, page 209. 
64  For example, the proportion of female specialists in training rose from 36% in 1999 to 44% in 2009, 
and across all working doctors the rise was from 29% to 36% over that same period.  Health 
Workforce Australia 2012, at note 63: pages 11-12.  
 The numbers of female specialist doctors continue to vary significantly across different specialities, 
with average gender proportion of Fellows across Australian Colleges in 2013 at 35.1%.  For 
example, Surgery and oral and maxillofacial surgery have 9.7% and 9.3% female fellows, and 
Intensive Care 16.8%, while women are in the majority in only Palliative medicine 51.8% and 
Sexual health medicine 54.1% in 2013. Medical Training Review Panel. Eighteenth Report. May 
2015, Table D35, page 250. 
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composition of the medical workforce65 and the proliferation of new models of healthcare 
which focus more on group practices66 and team work67.   
 
Despite these changes, many of the underlying medical beliefs, values and attitudes remain 
influential in professional training and socialisation, particularly in the hospital setting.  
This often occurs through the so-called “hidden curriculum”, which is described as “the set 
of influences that function at the level of organizational structure and culture”68.   There is 
                                                
65  The number of indigenous Australian doctors remains low, at only 0.5% of total medical 
practitioners employed being indigenous., though the number of new medical students identifying as 
Aboriginal of Torres Strait Islander was 2% in 2015. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
(AIHW). Workforce 2014 – Medical Practitioners Detailed Tables: Table 1 Australia 2011-2014; and 
Medical Deans Australia and New Zealand 2015 – see note 63, page 1. 
In relation to international cultural and linguistic diversity, the number of overseas trained general 
practitioners rose from 30.3% in 2005-2006 to 37.4% in 2011-12.  In 2009, around 16% of medical 
practitioners who received their first medical qualification overseas, obtained their qualification from 
a country other than Australia, UK/Ireland and New Zealand. Health Workforce Australia. Health 
Workforce by Numbers. Issue 1 – February 2013, Australia’s Health Workforce Series, 2013 Health 
Workforce Australia Adelaide: pages 16-17.   
2014 data from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare shows 31.5% of doctors in clinical 
practice gained their initial medical qualification in a country other than New Zealand or Australia. 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). Workforce 2014 – Medical Practitioners 
Detailed Tables: Table 1 Australia 2011-2014 
 33.3% of new medical students in 2012 spoke a language other than English, the 5 largest language 
groups being: 24.2% Mandarin, 15.5% Cantonese, 5.7% Vietnamese. 5.0% Tamil and 4.7% 
Sinhalese. MSOD Project Team 2012 - see note 2, Tables 13 and 14, page 9.  
66  For example, in 2012, while 46.4% of doctors worked in private practice, only 27.1% were in solo 
practice.  Female doctors were more likely to be working in group practices.  Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare (AIHW). Medical Workforce 2012. National Health Workforce series No. 8, cat. 
No. HWL 54. 2014 AHIW Canberra: see pages 20-21.   
More recent 2014 estimates are that fewer than one in ten general practices remain solo practitioner 
based and there is a growing trend in the specialty area as well. McGilvray A. Strength in numbers. 
2014 MJA Careers, 3 March, volume 200(4), pages C1-C2.   
Self-employed general practitioners working in group practices receive a higher income on average, 
with this peaking in practices of 10 or more doctors. Cheng TC. Scott A. Jeon S-H. Kalb G. 
Humphreys J. Joyce C. What factors influence the earnings of GPs and Medical Specialists in 
Australia? Evidence from the MABEL survey. Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 12/10. July 2010, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, 
Melbourne. 
Clinicians working in group practices also worked fewer hours than solo clinicians (39.5 v 45 hours). 
AIHW 2014 above in this note: page 25.  
67  See eg, Baker DP. Gustafson S. Beaubien J. Sala E. Barach P. Medical Teamwork and Patient Safety 
– the evidence-based relation. 2005 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality AHRQ 05-0053, 
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/findings/final-reports/medteam/medteamwork.pdf . 
68  Hafferty FW. Beyond curriculum reform: confronting medicine’s hidden curriculum. 1998 Academic 
Medicine, April, volume 73(4), pages 403-407: at page 404. 
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also the “informal curriculum” which is defined as that part of the hidden curriculum that 
occurs outside formal classes and hospital rounds – over lunch, in the scrub room, in cars, 
in corridor meetings, behind closed doors between students and between doctors.69   The 
formal curriculum encapsulates the explicit values of medicine in the lessons taught in 
formal classes, but the implicit values of the profession are transferred every day through 
the continuous socialisation processes of the hidden and informal curricula.70 
 
Professional socialisation begins in medical school and continues through the period of 
internship and residency.  As noted earlier, a central role in this aspect of training is the 
shift of identity from a non-medical to a medical perspective.  This movement is both 
towards being a doctor and away from being a lay person and, arguably, a potential or 
actual patient.  This identity shift can be an overwhelming experience, as the student 
struggles to learn not only the vast subject matter, but the ways of thinking and seeing the 
world, required of a doctor.71  There are many biographical and autobiographical books 
about the experience of both medical education and internship72, as well as several 
sociological studies73.  Student experience of medical training is one of immersion in a 
                                                
69  Hundert EM. Characteristics of the Informal Curriculum and trainees’ ethical choices. 1996 
Academic Medicine, June, volume 71(6): pages 624-628 
70  Coulehan J. Williams PC. Vanquishing virtue: the impact of medical education. 2001 Academic 
Medicine, June, volume 76(6), pages 598-605: pages 599-600. 
71  Good BJ. DelVecchio Good MJ. “Learning medicine”: the constructing of medical knowledge at 
Harvard Medical School. Chapter 4 in Lindenbaum S. Lock M.(editors) Knowledge, power and 
practice – the anthropology of medicine and everyday life.  1993 University of California Press, 
Berkley (California): pages 94-97, where the transformation of a patient into an object for “the 
medical gaze” is discussed. 
72  See eg, Konner M. Becoming a doctor – a journey of initiation in medical school. 1987 Penguin 
Books, New York; Marion R. The Intern Blues 2001 Harper Collins Perennial, New York; Klitzman 
R. A Year Long Night – Tales of a Medical Internship 2010 IUniverse, New York; Takakuwa et al. 
2005 - see note 30; Jauhar S. Intern – a doctor’s initiation. 2008 Farrar Straus and Giroux, New 
York.  There are also a range of older books – some of these are listed in: Conrad P. Learning to 
doctor: reflections on recent accounts of the medical school years. 1988 Journal of Health and Social 
Behavior, December, volume 29(4), pages 323-332. 
73  An in-depth observational study of the impact of medical training on students over the course of their 
training conducted in the later 1950s by sociologists Becker, Hughes, Geer and Strauss remains an 
important iconic study of the socialising effects of medical training and its effects on students’ 
attitudes and behaviour over the course of the socialisation process. Becker et al. 2004 – see note 29.  
Other more recent examples of such studies include: Bucher R. Stelling JG. Becoming Professional. 
Volume 46 Sage Library of Social Research. 1977 Sage Publications, Beverley Hills (USA); Haas J. 
Shaffir W. Becoming Doctors – the adoption of a cloak of competence. Department of Sociology, 
McMaster University Ethnographic. 1987 JAI Press, Greenwich (Connecticut). 2nd edition 2009 Jack 
Haas Publishing (Kindle format), Victoria (Canada). 
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learning and socialisation experience of extreme proportions.  The result of this is often that 
“the medical-clinical perspective permeates the very tissue of consciousness, forming a new 
and specific lens for viewing the world.”74  The intensity of the process of socialisation 
often experienced in medical school is frequently described in first-party accounts.75 
 
Different approaches to medical training and assessment exist in Australia and elsewhere, 
with less focus on examinations, basic science, and rote-learning, and with more focus on 
the application of medical skills and problem-based learning, particularly in graduate 
medical courses76.  It has been argued that these changes make the process of learning more 
democratic and humanistic and so more compatible with expectations of modern 
healthcare77.  However, there is no doubt that whatever the course structure and 
methodologies, university medical education remains an intense, busy educational 
experience and the first stage of the enculturation of students into the practice and 
profession of medicine.   
 
Studies show that the level of intensity of the training period, the identification with this as 
part of the professionalisation process and the subsequent impact on other relationships and 
                                                
74  Conrad 1988 - see note 72: at page 330. 
75  This is an example of this intensity and its impact on young doctors: 
Because prospective medical students are so focussed on getting in and on their eventual 
membership in the prestigious and powerful medical profession, they are primed to be 
particularly susceptible to the indoctrination that typically occurs.  ....  Your life is hijacked.  
You’re told what to do every minute of the day and overloaded with homework at night.  Always 
trying to catch up, you devise ways to try to make up for lost time.  You shorten your 
conversations with friends and family until you virtually no longer talk with them.  You limit 
your daily routines until they’re unfamiliar.  Before you know it, little of your previous life 
remains. Your only focus is academic survival.  You purge independent thought and don’t ask 
larger questions relating to the educational process 
Takakuwa et al. 2005 - see note 30: page xv-xvi. 
76  Universities such as University of Queensland, University of Newcastle, the Australian National 
University and Sydney University all use problem-based learning in their medical degrees.  For 
discussion of the history of this change, see Barrows H. Problem-Based learning in medicine and 
beyond. 1996 New Directions for teaching and learning, Winter, volume 68, pages 3-12.  For the 
research and theory behind it, see eg, Colliver JA. Effectiveness of problem-based learning curricula: 
research and theory. 2000 Academic Medicine, March, volume 75(3), pages 259-266.  Some 
universities retain the more traditional approach to medical training: Richard P. Stockill S. Learning 
Medicine. 16th edition 2003 BMJ Books, London: pages 59-60. 
77  Sanson-Fisher RW. Lynagh MC. Problem-based learning: a dissemination success story. 2005 
Medical Journal of Australia, 5 September, volume 183(5), pages 258-260: at page 259. 
214 
Chapter 5 –Formation of the Doctor Identity 
activities has a long-term impact on the practice of medicine and on the emotional well-
being of doctors.  Broadhead’s 1983 study of the private and professional identity of 
medical students showed that “medical training delivers a jarring blow to private life” 
through: 
… a prolonged period in adult life of socioeconomic dependency and sacrifice, 
compromises in private relationships which evoke feelings of inadequacy, 
unfulfillment, and resentment, a system of motivation which thrives on anxiety, 
intimidation, competitive aggression, fear of failure, humiliation of self and so on.78 
 
While this study is more thirty years old, the intensity of medical training and the 
expectations of medical students appear to have changed little.  Broadhead concludes that 
this is an active professional conditioning strategy used in much of medical education and 
training, so that doctors will put their demands of the professional life ahead of their 
personal or any other concerns.  “Students are expected to give unequivocal assurances that 
personal matters will not hinder their total involvement in and commitment to training in 
any way”.79  He argues that such processes undermine the service ideals of medicine, 
through the compensatory need for medical students to establish priority for their long-
suspended private lives and to earn money80.  Students come into medical school with a 
rich range of other identities which are often “squeezed out” in the training and education 
process, so that medical services lose the beneficial perspectives which would otherwise 
come from “students’ collective identities as members and heads of families, members of 
ethnic groups, residents of communities and neighbourhoods and so on.”81   
 
The intensity of the training serves other socialisation purposes.  Firstly, it is argued to act 
as a testing ground for levels of professional “commitment” to the doctor role,82 though it is 
also arguable that this fails to recognise the importance of other identities to their 
                                                
78  Broadhead 1983 - see note 7: at page 102. 
79  Broadhead 1983 - see note 7: at page 104.  While the Australian Medical Council requirements for 
Medical Colleges include requirements like part-time work and leave arrangements, specialist 
trainees still describe supervisor reluctance to accommodate more family-friendly arrangements. 
Comments provided to the Canberra Region Medical Education Council, where the thesis author is a 
member. 
80  Broadhead 1983 - see note 7: at page 108. 
81 Broadhead 1983 - see note 7: at page 109.  
82  Bucher et al. 1977 – see note 73: see pages 215-216. 
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development as a clinician.  Secondly, the impact of the clinical hierarchy in hospital-based 
training, combined with the intensity of the process, acts as a form of socialisation akin to 
that experienced in childhood.  By comparison to other forms of adult education where 
someone is socialised for a specific role, the socialisation of doctors can be seen as more 
allied to the primary socialisation of children.  This is reflected in the power differential 
between medical teacher and student, the formal “learner role”, and the content and intent 
of the socialisation experience, which is intended to mould basic values and beliefs in 
conformity with the dominant values. 
Medical school typically provides the student with a core of attitudes, values and 
norms which have as their content what medical school professors believe doctors 
“should” and “should not” do and think in a variety of situations.  These attitudes, 
values and norms are addressed to the generalized abstract role of “doctor”, not to 
the specific roles which the students will, in fact, one day occupy.83 
 
The intensity of the medical school experience (and later internship and residency) also 
adds to the feelings of uncertainty and anxiety for a student84.  They are separated 
physically from other emotional supports, by the intensity of their studies - their world 
becomes “medical” at its core. “More and more they find themselves alone or with other 
medical people. The socialization experience is intense, extensive, anguishing and 
exhausting”.85 The separation from their “ordinary” pre-medical school life and the 
concomitant anxiety for students is described as a necessary component of a “ritual ordeal” 
which forms an important component of socialisation into the medical profession.  One of 
the purposes of this ritual is to bind those who have been through such an experience with 
each other86.  
 
                                                
83  Olmsted AG. Paget MA. Some theoretical issues in professional socialization. 1969 Journal of 
Medical Education, August, volume 44, pages 663-669: at pages 664-665. 
84  Haas J. Shaffir W. The professionalization of medical students: Developing competence and a cloak 
of competence, 1977 Symbolic Interaction, Fall, volume 1(1), pages 77-88: at pages 74-75.  It is 
interesting to note in that study that the problem-based learning/continuous assessment environment 
is seen as aggravating the students’ sense of uncertainty, when compared to other learning and 
assessment methods. 
85  Haas et al. 1977 - see note 84: at page 77. 
86  Ryynänen K. Constructing Physician’s professional identity – experiences of students’ critical 
experiences in medical education. Dissertation for the Department of Psychiatry, University of Oulu 
delivered 14 December 2001.  2001 Oulu University Press, Oulu (Finland): at pages 33-35. 
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It also serves a symbolic purpose related to the “power” associated with becoming a doctor, 
discussed further in chapter 6.  With the psychological persuasion of cognitive dissonance 
discussed in Chapter 3, the achievement of the status of doctor at the end is embedded with 
even greater significance.   
A would-be professional must undergo a process of mortification, of testing and 
ritual ordeal before he/she can be elevated to the special status and role afforded by 
a profession.  This ordeal is important to the professionalization process because it, 
on the one hand, fosters an image of participants having worked to achieve special 
competence and on the other, because it mirrors the required professional image.  … 
The perception of exaggerated expectations from their audience and the ritual ordeal 
nature of the professionalization process contribute to the model of omnipotence 
that students believed is helpful for performance success [as doctors].87   
 
Socialisation of medical students in these various ways produce significant vulnerabilities 
and risks associated with preventable patient harm. While their identity is still very 
malleable, these strands of vulnerability are often unconsciously woven into the student’s 
new professional self through the very structure of the educational and training experience.  
Not the least of these can be a subtle association between feelings of power and 
invulnerability, and becoming a doctor. 
 
3. Learning a new language and new ways of “seeing” 
A common metaphor for medical education is that it is like learning a foreign language88.  
Students are required to memorise essentially a new technical vocabulary to describe things 
such as body parts, bodily functions and statuses, dysfunctions, diseases, biochemical and 
neurological flows and processes.  This is very different from the day-to-day language they 
used when they entered medical school.89  The language reflects and embodies the values 
and priorities of the discipline at multiple levels.  At its core, it is a language of “scientific 
knowledge” that “largely replace[s] other forms of communication.  The emotional 
                                                
87  Haas et al. 1987 – see note see note 73: See Chapter IV, as well as locations 591 and 1406. 
88  See eg, Sobel R. MSL – Medicine as a second language. 2005 New England Journal of Medicine, 12 
May, volume 352(19), pages 1945-46. 
89  Ofri D. What doctors feel – how emotions affect the practice of medicine. 2013 Beacon Press, 
Boston: pages 37 -38; Kindle edition, location 569-583 of 3897.  
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(affective) and symbolic (imaginative) aspects of human experience are distanced and 
diminished.” 90  
 
Medical students also learn to present the descriptions of patient symptoms in this 
language, in a manner which is professionally recognised by their colleagues and 
“efficient” in communicating what may be clinically significant.  The form of writing is not 
biographical from the patient’s perspective.  It is a narrative which constructs the patient 
from the lens of what the doctor wants to know to make a diagnosis and what will be 
written on the medical record91.  The needs of the doctor shape the questions asked and the 
responses recorded as the patient’s “history”.  Such recording forms a large proportion of 
the daily tasks of both medical students and interns – learning the skills and gaining 
competence in this area are central in their training92.  The writing down of this information 
(or recording on a computer) serves multiple purposes.   
It authorizes the medical student [to question and examine the patient], justifies the 
interaction with the patient.  It organizes the conversation with the patient, the 
whole process of working up the patient.  It is written for an audience: other 
physicians who will not only make decisions based on the document, but judge the 
student based on its writing.  And it is a critical dimension of formulating the 
patient as a project for treatment.93 
 
The acquisition of the specific skills of case presentation, required in many different 
contexts in medical training and practice, is a significant goal in professional socialisation.  
Generally, these follow similar ritualised forms, but can be of varying lengths and 
formality, depending on their purpose.  For example, they can be the short, informal 
information conveyed in daily rounds to formal case conferences or presentations at quality 
assurance and mortality and morbidity committees.  The written form often includes 
                                                
90  Coulehan et al. 2001-  see note 70: page 599. 
91  Good BJ. Medicine, rationality and experience – An anthropological perspective. 1994 Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge (UK): see chapter 3 “How medicine constructs its objects” – see 
especially page 79. 
92 Indeed, much of this record-keeping work is delegated to interns and junior doctors – a process 
which both ensures that it becomes everyday language to them, and also structurally reinforces the 
hierarchy of medicine, where such tasks are seen as too insignificant for those higher up the 
hierarchy to do themselves.  At a different level, it diminishes the importance of tasks which are the 
main tools of communication between patients and doctors and other members of the treating team.  
93  Good 1994 - see note 91: especially pages 77-78. 
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abbreviations, which a student needs to learn.  Common features, which have been 
identified are94: 
• Initial presentation of the patient through key, potentially medically salient features 
and sometimes observations on examination - “60-year-old man, obese, presented 
with chest pain of three hours duration, BP 170/110, SaO2 94, temp 37.”; 
• The separation of the biological process from the person (de-personalisation) - “The 
cervix and vagina were clear”, “The ribs do not appear to be fractured despite the 
fall.”; 
• Omission of the agent, by using the passive voice - “The patient was transferred to 
Cardiac”. “The oxygen was turned off for 15 minutes.”  “Patient was extubated.”  
• Treating medical technology as the agent - “X-ray revealed broken tibia.”  
“Pathology showed elevated creatinine.”  “CAT scan showed disseminated 
malignancy.” 
• Account markers, such as “states”, “reports”, “denies” which emphasis the 
subjectivity of an account by the patient - “Patient denies smoking and use of 
recreational drugs.”  Patient reports very painful metatarsophalangeal joint on right 
foot.”; 
• Use of specific markers, such as a negative followed by a passive voice to soften the 
perception of an accusation, where there may have been a failure of care - “No 
morphine was administered.”  “No further details were noted on the referral.” 
• References to treatments that were not effective as the responsibility of the patient -
“Patient failed to respond to the antibiotic.”  “Patient continued to exhibit pulseless 
ventricular tachycardia, despite defibrillation”. 
 
Learning the techniques of case presentations and the conventional language forms 
expected are important markers of achievement of professional competence in medical 
training.  Consistent with the use of other passive descriptors discussed earlier like “adverse 
event” to describe preventable patient harm, these also pave the way for neutral 
descriptions of adverse events often found in the record of a patient. For example, a skilled 
student is likely to record “Post-op bleeding ++ occurred following the failure of a suture – 
transfusion initiated.” rather than a more informative explanation, such as “Patient suffered 
significant blood loss, requiring transfusion, when the knot on Dr X’s sutures came 
undone.” 
 
                                                
94  Drawn primarily from observations of the author during root cause analyses, observation of case 
presentations during hospital visits and supplemented from Anspach RR. Notes on the sociology of 
medical discourse: the language of case presentation. 1988 Journal of Health and Social Behaviour, 
December, volume 29(4), pages 357-375. 
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Medical students are also expected to learn what a vast array of body tissues, cells, 
microbes and many other substances look like under the microscope, through various forms 
of radiographic technology and physically (both in a living body and a dead one).  They 
must be able to describe the likely impact of any observations of these on the health or 
illness of a patient.  Initially, students often have difficulty determining what these different 
things look like and how to “see” them, but as their training progresses, they begin to see 
“like a doctor” – in some anthropological literature called the “medical gaze”.  While 
students recognise that this is a specialised way of looking at other people and not 
appropriate in other contexts, this can be particularly hard during this intense period of 
learning of medical school.  One anthropologist who was merely an observer in an anatomy 
class stated: 
During anatomy, this way of seeing is not neatly contained in the laboratory or 
limited to the appropriate contexts for the medical perspective.  While participating 
in anatomy as an observer, I would occasionally be walking along a street and find 
myself a body amidst bodies, rather than a person amid persons.  I found myself 
attending to anatomical features of persons I passed, rather than perceiving them as 
persons with social characteristics or imagined lives.  Students describe vivid 
experiences of this sort.95 
 
The multiple levels of observation required for a doctor – principally based on physical 
layers from the gene through cells into organs and into whole bodies – are all learned in 
medical school and clinical training.  They are crucial skills for diagnosis, and complex to 
learn.  They form one of the foundations of the world of medical experience – “a world 
filled with objects that simply are not part of our everyday world – [this] requires an entry 
into a distinctive reality system”.96  It is not hard to see why this would be a disorienting 
and consuming experience, and why students work so hard to obtain competence.   
 
Combined with the new language and different world view, it is also not surprising that the 
experience can create tensions with their pre-medicine identities and relationships.  The 
intensity of the student and later, intern, experience and the personal need to succeed found 
within most medical students, act as powerful drivers to become proficient in both the 
language and the medical way of seeing the world.  It is also modelled by their teachers and 
                                                
95  Good 1994 - see note 91: at page 73. 
96  Good 1994 - see note 91: at page 71. 
220 
Chapter 5 –Formation of the Doctor Identity 
clinical supervisors and is intrinsic to the content and structure of their training and 
education, providing layers of impact, both consciously and unconsciously, on their 
identities as doctors. 
 
4. Rites of passage 
As noted above, medical education and training is a journey away from being a lay-
person97, with a non-medical person’s sensibilities about such important life events as birth 
and death. It is also a journey towards being a doctor with a greater tolerance for observing 
and acting in the presence of pain and suffering, illness and disease.  The actual nature of 
medical practice means that medical students and later doctors engage in activities which 
are outside the realms of normal human experiences.  They share some of these experiences 
with other people, like paramedical staff, nurses and carers.  However, there are many parts 
of their training and professional socialisation – sometimes called rites of passage – which 
appear to set them apart from those who are not doctors and join them together with those 
who are.  In the words of Haas and Shaffer “in order for individuals to makes such 
significant status changes they must undergo public initiations or rites of passage that 
prepare them for the adoption of their new role”.98  Many biographical accounts of medical 
training describe these “seminal moments of clinical development”99. 
 
In some places entry into medical school or the clinical years is marked by a ritual designed 
to represent this new stage in the student’s life, such as the “White Coat ceremonies” used 
in some parts of the United States and other countries100.  It is argued that this serves to 
                                                
97  Hafferty 1991- see note 56: pages 1 and 2. 
98  Haas et al. 2009 - see note 87 : location 584. 
99  Ofri 2013 -see note 89: page 10-11, Kindle location 148. 
100  The concept was initially developed by the Arnold P. Gold Foundation as a symbol of the need for 
humanism - in particular, compassion and humility - in healthcare and included the making of an 
oath. For further information, see http://www.humanism-in-
medicine.org/index.php/programs_grants/gold_foundation_programs/white_coat_ceremony accessed 
20 April 2014.  The theory of these ceremonies has been explained as a formal way of impressing 
medical students with the importance of compassion and humility. Gillon R. Culture and medicine – 
white coast ceremonies for new medical students.2000 Western Medical Journal, September, volume 
173, pages 206-2007. However, others argue that such ceremonies can contribute to feelings of 
elitism, and being set apart, in particular from patients. Karniele-Miller O. Frankel RM. Inui TS. 
Cloak of compassion, or evidence of elitism? An empirical analysis of white coat ceremonies.  2013 
Medical Education, volume 47, pages 97-108. 
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“bond” the set-apart students to his or her white-coated peers, so that they lose their identity 
of origin and instead come to see themselves only as a doctor101 – a strong manifestation of 
the expected move towards a separate Doctor Identity.  While such ceremonies are not 
generally used in Australia, the intensity of medical undergraduate and post-graduate 
training can also result in the actual separation of people from their previous sources of 
identity – family, friends, religion, hobbies, non-medical work, ethnic and community 
connections – just because of the time needed to pursue their studies102.  They come to mix 
only with those who are studying and working with them, and so develop a shared identity 
with this group103, like the symbolic separation of the white coat ceremony.  As one 
graduate said, despite being older and already having other identities as a father and 
husband: 
I have been absorbed into the “teamness” of medical training.  During my last few 
months on the wards I tried to be decent to the patients, but my bonds, my 
emotional energy – what the psychoanalysts call cathexes – were all with doctors 
and medical students and to a lesser extent nurses [not with patients].104 
 
It is argued by some that this preferential identification with others in the profession is, one 
of the core roles of the professional socialisation process.105  The bonding with colleagues 
who share these intense experiences, combine with the actual separation from previous 
identities to help forge the person’s professional identity.  This is reinforced and to some 
extent accelerated by the response of others, such as family, friends and non-doctor 
colleagues, who often begin to treat them differently and ask different things of them, such 
as asking for advice about their own health. 
                                                
101  Veatch RM. White coat ceremonies: a second opinion. 2002 Journal of Medical Ethics, volume 28, 
pages 5-6.  Wear D. On white coats and professional development: the formal and the hidden 
curricula. 1998 Annals of Internal Medicine, 1 November, volume 129(9), pages 734-737. 
102  For example, the Medical Schools Outcomes Database showed that 40.7% of medical students did 
not work in paid employment while completing their medical degree.  37.9% worked for less than 9 
hours per week. Carberry A. Dumbrell D. 2012 Medical Students Exit Questionnaire National Data 
Report. Medical Deans Australia and New Zealand Medical Schools Outcomes Database and 
Longitudinal Tracking Project. Table 11, page 12.  See also Haidet P. Hatem DS. Fecile ML. Stein 
HF. Haley HLA. Kimmel B. Mossbarger DL. Inui TS. The role of relationships in the professional 
formation of physicians: case report and illustration of an elicitation technique. 2008 Patient 
education and counselling, volume 72, pages 382-387:at page 384, where students discuss the 
importance of maintaining relationships outside medicine during training. 
103  Weaver et al. 2011- see note 57. 
104  Konner 1988 - see note 9: at page 365. 
105  Ryynänen 2001 - see note 86: pages 34-35. 
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Another rite of passage occurs at the point in medical school training where students begin 
to interact with patients, which, in some cases, occurs very early in medical school.  The 
kinds of clinical skills learned are often personally intrusive such as medical examinations, 
injections and the insertion of cannulas.  The experiences of being present when medical 
procedures or operations are done and performing various simple medical procedures on 
patients accelerate the socialisation process.  Some have described these as breaches of 
previously-held social and cultural “taboos” that can significantly impact on their sense of 
identity. 
Breaking taboos shakes up the experience of familiar sameness that Erikson called 
the sense of ego identity.  Medical students ask, “How can I do that and still be me? 
They fear medical school will be “dehumanising” because the training requires a 
reorientation to parts of the self close to our humanity: the body and its products, 
relationships with others, and our sense of who we are.106 
 
Other kinds of rites of passage may be being present at the birth of a baby107 or when a 
patient dies.108  In all these events, the “normal” (non-medical) reactions” someone may 
feel in these situations may not be considered “professionally” appropriate.  Often senior 
clinicians model emotional disconnection and detachment for students, because often they 
were not trained to deal with their own emotional needs or those of their patients in their 
training109.  This can mean that while the experiences operate as rites of passage, students 
can be left without emotional support at these important times110.  Efforts are being made in 
some medical schools to foster awareness and reflection, and enhance empathy through 
                                                
106  Harper G. Breaking taboos and steadying the self in medical school. 1993 Lancet, 9 October, volume 
32, issue 8876, pages 913-915 : at pages 913-914. 
107  Davis-Floyd RE. Obstetric training as a rite of passage. 1987 Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 
September, volume 1(3), pages 288-318.  
108  Rhodes-Kropf J. Carmody SS. Seltzer D. Redinbaugh E. Gadmer N. Block SD. Arnold RM. “This is 
just too awful; I just can’t believe I experienced that … ”: medical students’ reactions to their “most 
memorable” patient death. 2005 Academic Medicine, July, volume 80(7), pages 634-640. 
109  See eg Wear D. “Face-to-face with it”: Medical students’ narratives about their end-of-life education. 
2002 Academic Medicine, April, volume 77(4), pages 271-277:at 273-275. 
110  Rhodes-Kropf et al. 2005 – see note 108: at page 638, where 70% of students found their medical 
teams’ support inadequate. 
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these rites of passage, often though journaling111, supportive professional modelling112 or 
through reflection groups113. 
 
Another example of a rite of passage experienced by most medical students, which can give 
rise to emotional and physical responses, is where medical education includes cadaveric 
dissection.114  Students can face significant challenges as they learn anatomy from an actual 
human body,115 as this is often seen as breaking a deeply culturally ingrained taboo.  They 
are thus fundamentally separated from who they were before they started medical 
training116.   
To dissect a cadaver is not simply a neutral technical exercise, but raises questions 
about the relationship between human biology and human dignity, mortality, grief, 
and how to deal with emotions experienced by both patients and doctors.117 
 
As well as a centuries-old training method for human anatomy, the experience of dissecting 
a deceased human is also argued to be a professional conditioning experience about 
acceptable emotional responses to the cadaver and even death itself.  The socialisation 
message is that “within the culture of medicine, the cadaver should exist as a learning tool 
and an object for manipulation, rather than as a formerly living human being”118.  This 
provides a fertile ground for later messages on death and emotions learned from the 
behaviours of teachers and more senior clinicians – that “doctors should not have emotional 
                                                
111  Wald HS, Reis SP. Monroe AD. Borkan JM. ‘The loss of my elderly patient’: Interactive reflective 
writing to support medical students’ rites of passage. 2010 Medical Teacher, volume 32, pages e178-
e184. 
112  Ratanawonga N. Teherani A. Hauer KE. Third year medical students’ experiences with dying 
patients during the internal medicine clerkship: a qualitative study of the informal curriculum. 2005 
Academic Medicine, July, volume 80(7), pages 641-647. 
113  Ryynänen 2001 - see note 86: pages 105-116 and pages 148-157. 
114  Godeau E. Dissecting cadavers: learning anatomy or a rite of passage? 2009 Hoktoen International – 
a Journal of Medical Humanities, November, volume 1(5): sighted at 
http://www.hektoeninternational.org/Dissecting_cadavers.html on 16 May 2014. 
115  See eg, Chen PW. Final Exam: A Surgeon’s Reflections on Mortality. 2008 Vintage Books, New 
York: see Chapter 1 – Resurrectionist, pages 3-34. 
116  Harper 1993 – see note 106. 
117  Charlton R. Dovey SM. Jones DG. Blunt A. Effects of cadaver dissection on the attitudes of medical 
students. 1994 Medical Education, volume 28, pages 290-295, at page 294. 
118  Hafferty FW. Cadaver stories and the emotional socialization of medical students. 1988 Journal of 
Health and Social Behavior, December, volume 29(4), pages 344-356: at page 350.  
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reactions to death; and that death is a failure and caring for the dying is not an important 
part of medicine”.119 
 
Often students and teachers engaged in human dissection tell macabre jokes.  Cadaveric 
humour, like many other forms of black humour used in medicine, is used as a way of 
“releasing tension regarding anxiety-provoking phenomena”.120  The “jokes”121 also act as 
socialisation tools, through norms which encourage students to “identify with the 
emotionally tough, cool protagonists at the expense of the emotionally weak, vulnerable 
victims”.122 It is also recognised that “ ‘[a]natomy lab’ humour, though a traditional means 
of coping, demeans both the subject matter and student and so does not relieve shame and 
guilt” which the student may be feeling as a consequence of the dissection123.   
 
Some medical schools seek to ensure that students reflect on the humanity and the gift of 
the deceased person to the students.  These include spending a few minutes of silence to 
honour the person who donated their body at the beginning of the anatomy dissection 
process124 or remembrance services held at the end of the dissection period, which can last 
for several months125.  Nonetheless, the focus tends to be on the cadaver as a thing apart – 
very different from a person.  The view of the separateness of their own identity from that 
of the cadaver is self-protective in many ways.  Not identifying with the cadaver is easier 
than with a living patient, because the colours of the often long-dead, preserved body are 
quite different from a living being-  Through a process of intellectualisation and 
                                                
119  Rhodes-Kropf et al 2005 – see note 108: at page 638. 
120  Costello 2005 - see note 11: chapter 5 Lessons learned – the socializing influence of pedagogy; The 
use of humor, page 89. 
121  It is often based around an archetypal student doing inappropriate things with the bodies or body 
parts of cadavers, and springing a surprise on another either vulnerable student or non-medical 
person.   
122  Hafferty 1988 - see note 118, at page 350. 
123  Harper 1993 – see note 106: page 914. 
124  Bergeron L. Rite of passage for first-year medical school students: meeting their cadavers. 2005 
Stanford Report, 14 September accessed at http://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/september14/med-
anatomy-091405.html  
125  Johnson M. The course of their lives. 2013, Milwaukee-Wisconsin Journal Sentinel, 12 October 
published on-line, Chapter 4 at http://www.jsonline.com/news/health/The-Course-of-Their-Lives-
Medical-College-of-Wisconsin-students-gross-anatomy-class-225058322.html#!/the-weight-of-her-
brain/ - the last section of webpage discusses the remembrance service for the “silent teachers”. 
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habituation, the students desensitise themselves to the basic human response of emotional 
and physical stress they may, otherwise, have experienced with dissection of a human 
body126.  However, it is arguable that this starts a process of changed perception, where 
both the human body and then patients become seen as purely biological entities – “as 
plumbing and chemistry, not as persons”.127   
 
In commenting about the cadaveric experience, students have said that it prepares them for 
the active practice of medicine – where a student is taught to work out what is wrong with a 
living person and then seek to fix what is wrong.  One of the Harvard students, interviewed 
by BJ Good in his study, expressed it this way: 
The response to coming across an accident, or somebody falls down and breaks 
something or is bleeding … has more to do with the way you react to a cadaver, 
which is, what do I see here, what could I put back, how could I put it together, how 
can I stop the bleeding? That kind of active response as opposed to just a purely 
emotional or other kind of response is a crucial change that happens [over the period 
of dissection]. … The hands-on experience with a dead person three times a week 
for three months is really the most important for that kind of thing I’ve had.128 
 
Medical anthropologists argue that this is part of the education of the students in a 
mechanistic view of the body, consonant with developing the “medical gaze”.  Much of the 
early scientific training in medical school is based on learning ways of finding out 
information about the body as a physical object.  For example, doctors must learn to 
understand radiographic imaging to show the inside, microscopes to examine the cell 
minutiae and cadaveric dissection to gain physical entry into the body and its 
“compartments”129.  Development of this view of the body as a machine, in which they will 
be required to diagnose what is not working, is one of the central features of the body of 
expert knowledge expected of a doctor as a professional130.  It is thus another core element 
in the socialisation of a doctor.   
 
                                                
126  Charlton et al 1994 - see note 117, at page 294. 
127  Charlton et al 1994 – see note 117, at page 290. 
128  Good et al. 1993 – see note 71: at page 97. 
129  Good et al. 1993 – see note 71: at pages 86-97. 
130  Freidson 1988 – see note 49: pages 185-187 and 335-339. 
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While gaining this knowledge is important in the skills expected of a doctor, it supports an 
illusion that a doctor can know all there is to know about the operation of the human body, 
specifically from examining the structures in it.  It also creates an expectation within the 
students that if they know enough about the body, they can defeat disease and death, which 
is also an illusion.  Both of these illusions form part of the cultural narrative underpinning 
parts of the Doctor Identity, discussed in Chapter 6.  Professional self-understanding is that 
a doctor is the agent who can “fix” the machine, so long as what is wrong can be 
ascertained.  Observation of medical students show that they see this experience as 
changing how they view themselves and other people, as a significant step in their 
professional transformation.  In some of these descriptions, there is also the germ of 
medical hubris: 
You take people, you take them completely out of context from their normal life, 
subject them to a whole new set of rules, and have them do a lot of things you never 
thought you could do.  And then when you take that back into your life in general 
and realize you’re capable of that is when you realize you have grown so much. 
(sic)131 
 
While this description is about the experience of being a medical student through these 
various rites of passage, it encourages a particular view of patients.  A presenting patient is 
a “medical case” to be solved by the expertise of a doctor from the bio-medical information 
available, rather than as someone who is a social being, living in a network of relationships.  
This has a wide range of implications for the professional identity of a doctor and the 
identity conflicts medical students and young doctors can face in their medical 
socialisation.  It can also have a particularly strong negative psychological impact on 
medical students, who are often led to medicine by their altruism and the desire to help 
people. 
 
5. Psychological attributes of medical students 
Studies have shown that medical students tend to share a range of psychological 
characteristics and that their medical training can result in various psychological changes.  
They are also subject to various psychological vulnerabilities that can be aggravated by 
                                                
131  Good et al. 1993 – see note 71: at page 95.  
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their medical training.  Some of these can have a long-term impact on their identity and 
their well-being. 
Five Factor categorisation 
Studies of the psychological profile of medical students show that they share a number of 
common psychological characteristics across many countries.  Many of these studies use 
the Five Factor Model of human personality132  While subject to criticism133, the 
categorisation is widely used in psychological research and in the medical student and 
doctor research discussed here. The Five Factors are: 
• openness to experience (inventive/curious high score to consistent/cautious low 
score continuum), which includes intellect and openness;  
• conscientiousness (efficient/organized high score to easy-going/careless low score 
continuum) which includes industriousness and orderliness;  
• extraversion (outgoing/energetic high score to solitary/reserved low score 
continuum), which includes enthusiasm and assertiveness;  
• agreeableness (friendly/compassionate high score to analytical/detached low score 
continuum) which includes compassion and politeness; and 
• neuroticism (sensitive/nervous high score to secure/confident low score continuum), 
which includes volatility and withdrawal.  134 
While many of these phrases have different positive and negative valances in other 
contexts, for the purposes of this categorisation, these descriptors are supposed to be simple 
neutral descriptors across a continuum of personality traits, without the moral meaning and 
value normally attached to them.  The Factors are underpinned by tools to measure specific 
                                                
132  See eg, McCrae RR. John OP. An introduction to the Five-Factor Model and its applications. 1992 
Journal of Personality, June, volume 60(2), pages 175-215.   
133  The Five Factors are a contested but nevertheless, consensus derived way of describing human 
personality.  For various criticisms of the Five Factor method, see Block J. The Five-Factor framing 
of personality and beyond: some ruminations. 2010 Psychological Inquiry, volume 21, pages 2-25; 
and Boyle GJ. Critique of the five-factor model of personality. 2008 Humanities and Social Sciences 
Papers, Paper 297. At http://epublications.bond.edu.au/hss_pubs/297 .  For the history and 
development of these scales, see McCrae et al.1992 – see note 133.  There is considerable argument 
remaining about how fixed these are in time, in specific environments and cultures and over a 
lifespan, See eg, McCrae RR. Terracciano A. and 79 members of the Personality Profiles of Culture 
Project. Personality Profiles of cultures: aggregate personality traits. 2005 Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, volume 89(3), pages 407-425. 
134  The inclusions in this list are seen as separate from but correlated with the Five Factors as indicated.  
They are also seen as sitting above what are called “facets”, as set out in Table 5.2. 
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characteristics called “facets” in this Model.  Table 5.2 shows the 6 facets measured under a 
common tool used in some of the medical student studies, the NEO PI-R135  
  
                                                
135  This acronym stands for Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness Personality Inventory - Revised. 
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Table 5.2: Five Factors and Associated Facets measured by the NEO PI-R 
5 Factors Neuroticism  Extraversion  Openness 
to 
experience  
Agreeableness  Conscientiousness 
Associated 
Facets 
Anxiety  Warmth  Fantasy  Trust  Competence 
Hostility  Gregariousness  Aesthetics  Straightforwardness  Order 
Depression  Assertiveness  Feelings  Altruism  Dutifulness 
Self-
consciousness  
Activity  Actions  Compliance  Achievement 
Striving 
Impulsiveness  Excitement 
Seeking  
Ideas  Modesty  Self-Discipline 
Vulnerability 
to Stress  
Positive 
Emotion  
Values  Tender-mindedness  Deliberation 
Source: Wikipedia entry on the Revised NEO Personality Inventory, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revised_NEO_Personality_Inventory 
 
Successful medical students had high conscientiousness scores– the most important facet 
being self-discipline.136  High extraversion and agreeableness scores were further predictors 
of success in the later clinical placement years.  Conscientiousness was also a strong 
predictor against attrition from medical training137, but medical students were not found to 
be the most conscientious students138. Medical students who scored low in 
conscientiousness and high in gregariousness and excitement-seeking are significantly less 
likely to be successful in exams and to drop out139.  However, where high 
conscientiousness is combined with introversion and neuroticism, it is a risk factor for 
vulnerability to stress.140  Interestingly, in other studies, low levels of conscientiousness 
was also associated with stress in these same circumstances.141 
 
                                                
136  Lievens F. Coetsier P. de Fruyt F. de Maeseneer J. Medical students’ personality characteristics and 
academic performance: a Five-Factor Model perspective. 2002 Medical Education, volume 36, pages 
1050-1056: at page 1053-1054. 
137  Lievens F. Ones DS. Dichert S. Personality scale validities increase throughout medical school.  
2009 Journal of Applied Psychology, volume 94(6), pages 1514-1535. 
138  Lievens et al 2002 – see note 136: Table 2, page 1053, which shows that the mean scores of students 
majoring in Economics, Law, Engineering, and Science all exceeded medical students in the 
conscientiousness factor. 
139  Lievens et al 2002 – see note 136: page 1055. 
140  Doherty EM. Nugent E. Personality factors and medical training: a review of the literature. 2011 
Medical Education, volume 45, pages 132-140: at page 138. 
141  McManus IC. Keeling A. Paice E. Stress, burnout and doctors’ attitudes to work are determined by 
personality and learning style: a 12-year longitudinal study of UK medical graduates. 2004 BMC 
Medicine, August, volume 2, pages 29-40: at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/2/29. 
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Generally, high scores on the neuroticism continuum for medical students was a predictor 
of stress in training and of longer term stress.142  Neuroticism in the Model is a long-term 
tendency to be in a negative emotional state.  High neuroticism scores indicate a tendency 
to experience unpleasant emotions, such as anger, anxiety, guilt, depression, envy and 
vulnerability more readily and more deeply.  The person may also exhibit greater 
impulsivity, have trouble controlling urges and be more self-conscious.  Neuroticism can be 
created or made stronger when someone is given conflicting values to incorporate into their 
own sense of values.  This is a common issue leading to cynicism in medical students over 
the course of their training, as discussed below.   
 
Given the intensity of the course requirements and the post-graduate training expectations, 
it is not surprising that those who are most likely to be successful have high levels of 
conscientiousness.  In addition, conscientiousness and agreeableness are also likely to be 
helpful in ensuring that medical students more readily absorb and comply with many of the 
implicit values of the medical profession, which are core to successful “professional 
socialisation”.  The Five Factor model is used in some of the research discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
Perfectionism 
Perfectionism is another psychological attribute often seen in medical students143, who have 
often had to achieve very high academic standards to get into medical school.  It is also 
commonly associated with higher scores on the conscientiousness scale, and 
conscientiousness can predict longer term increases in perfectionism.144  The common scale 
for measuring perfectionism, the Multidimensional Perfection Scale, defines three kinds of 
perfectionism145.   
 
                                                
142  McManus et al 2004 – see note 141: pages 9-11. 
143  Henning K. Ey S. Shaw D. Perfectionism, the imposter phenomenon and psychological adjustment 
in medical, dental, nursing and pharmacy students. 1998 Medical Education. volume 32, pages 456-
464, at page 457. 
144   Stoebr J. Otto K. Dalber C. Perfectionism and the Big Five: conscientiousness predicts longitudinal 
increases in self-oriented perfectionism, 2009 Personality and individual differences, volume 47, 
pages 363-368. 
145  Henning et al. - see note 143: at page 458. 
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Self-oriented perfectionism is where someone believes that striving for perfection is 
important and sets high standards for themselves, as well as criticising their own 
performance.  It can be an adaptive trait, if it leads the medical student to strive to achieve 
high standards and to be pleased with their results.  Equally, if the person always believes 
that they could have done better and is not happy unless they achieve the unachievable, the 
trait can be maladaptive and result in psychological anguish.  Other-oriented perfectionism 
relates to expecting a lot from others, and again can be adaptive, such as when working in a 
team and expecting them to all to be able to contribute to high quality results.  It can also be 
maladaptive, and lead to poor relationships in a team if the person doesn’t have other skills 
to manage this trait in relationship.  Socially prescribed perfectionism occurs where 
someone believes that their own self-worth and acceptance by others requires perfect 
performance, and that the person will be criticised or punished if they do not achieve these 
standards.  In many ways, this describes the lived experience of many medical students.  
This last form of perfectionism is generally accepted as having negative psychological 
consequences for the student.   
 
Compared to arts students, medical students showed a high degree of adaptive 
perfectionism, including higher personal standards and achievement striving, as well as 
higher levels of some maladaptive aspects of perfectionism.  This study also showed that 
perfectionism was significantly correlated with neuroticism in medical students.   Often 
resulting in depression and feelings of hopelessness, their perfectionism was linked to their 
perceptions of discrepancy between their concept of what performance they expected of 
themselves and their actual performance. 146   
 
Medical students (in fact a range of health profession trainees) have a higher than average 
experience of one of the negative results of perfectionism, the Imposter Phenomenon147.  
This is where “high achieving individuals believe they are less intelligent and less 
competent than others perceive them to be. …[They] attribute… their success to factors 
unrelated to their intelligence (eg luck, charm) and live with a constant fear that they will 
                                                
146  Enns MW. Cox BJ. Sareen J. Freeman P. Adaptive and maladaptive perfectionism in medical 
students: a longitudinal investigation. 2001 Medical Education, volume 35, pages 1034-1042. 
147  This issue is also discussed above at notes 50 and 51 
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eventually be discovered as frauds” resulting in significant psychological stress and 
distress.148 Overall, 30.2% of the health profession students in this study showed clinically 
significant levels of this condition, with more women (37.8%) than men (22%) affected.  
The existence of this condition was a strong predictor of psychological distress.149   
 
On the other hand, first-year medical student self-oriented perfectionism can also act as a 
resilience factor in relation to negative life events, either personal or professional.  Those 
medical students with low measures of self-oriented perfectionism showed higher levels of 
neuroticism and greater levels of psychological distress.  Self-oriented perfectionism 
appeared to remove the association between negative life events and hopelessness.150 
 
Striving for perfection in medical school may also be a tricky task for medical students, as 
the requirements for success vary over the period of training.  During the first pre-clinical 
years, cognitive skills are the best predictors of success.  However, at the clinical stage of 
undergraduate training, where students begin to interact with patients, those with significant 
non-cognitive social traits such as extraversion, sociability and higher levels of self-esteem 
are likely to do better.151   
 
The competitiveness encouraged in some medical schools can also foster perfectionism.  
The general high level of altruistic and idealistic motivations for a career in medicine, 
expressed by many students and prospective students provide additional psychological 
reinforcement for drives to “do well”.  It is perfectionism with a social purpose, but it still 
comes with potential risks to psychological well-being, if students are not given 
opportunities and skills to discuss their experiences and emotional responses to them, and 
given a realistic understanding of what is humanly possible.   
                                                
148  Henning et al at 1998 - see note 143: page 457.  See also PBS Special at note 51, where students 
describe feeling like this once they enter medical school. 
149  Henning et al. at note 143: page 459.  See also Villwock et al 2016 at note 51. 
150  Enns MW. Cox BJ. Clara IP. Perfectionism and neuroticism: a longitudinal study of specific 
vulnerability and diathesis-stress models. 2005 Cognitive Therapy and Research, August, volume 
29(4), pages 463-478. 
151  Haight SJ. Chibnail JT. Schindler DL. Slavin SJ. Associations of medical student personality and 
health/wellness characteristics with their medical school performance across the curriculum. 2012 
Academic Medicine, volume 87, pages 476-485. 
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This is particularly so, where a student makes an inevitable error.152  As discussed below, a 
common outcome is that the student is criticised and sometimes verbally abused, in front of 
the patient, the patient’s family, professional colleagues and other health professionals.  
Such shaming behaviour has long-term psychological consequences which, this thesis 
hypotheses, may impact on their perception and management of errors into the future.  
 
However, where an error occurs and it is managed more appropriately, sometimes the 
pendulum swings too far the other way and the student is protected from incorporating the 
idea of their natural human imperfection.  There is evidence that, where an error occurs and 
is acknowledged as having happened, junior doctors are often given support which 
prioritises “reassurance over learning”.153  Where mistakes occur which could have or did 
involve harm to a patient, they should be managed sensitively.  However, the management 
needs to ensure the student understands their role in the mistake, the impact on the patient 
and the importance of telling the patient what happened.  Otherwise, the student loses the 
opportunity to learn and remains unskilled in how to manage mistakes at a later point in his 
or her career.  Practices which are focussed mainly on reassurance and which eschew 
notions of responsibility or prevention may well protect the young doctor’s ego, and 
support an unrealistic perfectionist view of their own performance and medical practice 
more generally. 
 
Where the primary goal of a student is to become a doctor, perfectionism can also 
unconsciously support the uncritical emulation of clinical behaviours modelled by senior 
clinicians.  Research shows that the modelling of values by those in positions of power can 
be sometimes inconsistent with good medical practice (the so-called “hidden curriculum).  
Modelled behaviour can be uncaring, inappropriate and even unethical, such as misleading 
                                                
152  Khullar, D. When medical student make errors. 2014 The New York Times, 15 May at 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/when-medical-students-make-
errors/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0  
153  Kroll L. Singleton A. Collier J. Jones IR. Learning not to take it seriously: junior doctors’ accounts 
of error. 2008 Medical Education, volume 42, pages 982-990. 
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patients about what has happened to them,154 not recording accurate information on the 
medical record155, and being disrespectful to patients, for example, through using 
derogatory humour156. Sometimes called the acquisition of “non-reflective 
professionalism”157 it can result in a student acting in ways that are inconsistent with their 
original desirable motivating psychological drivers, that is, to help people.  Identified as a 
common problem in the decline of student idealism discussed below, it is argued to result 
from the cultural strength of the hidden curriculum within medical training, being what 
actually occurs compared to the explicit teachings in the curriculum.  One of the negative 
consequences observed in the behaviours of young doctors in these circumstances is an 
adoption of behaviours that are more “profession”-focussed than “patient”-focussed.  
Perfectionism can also become a psychological problem for medical students and doctors, 
where it comes to drive behaviours which are maladaptive either professionally or 
personally, such as hubris or arrogance, as was discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Idealism and cynicism 
Commitment to helping others and altruism are strongly identified with students choosing 
to study medicine, and the virtues of compassion, empathy and concern for the suffering of 
others are considered important attributes of doctors.  The ability to show empathy for the 
suffering of patients and to treat them with respect and dignity are also important ethical 
duties of both doctors and medical students.  For more than 50 years, there has been 
evidence of an apparent decline in idealism, altruism and empathy over the course of 
medical training158. Originally this was associated with “traditional” medical education, 
                                                
154  Feudtner C. Christakis DA. Christakis NA. Do clinical clerks suffer ethical erosion? Students’ 
perceptions of their ethical environment and personal development? 1994 Academic Medicine, 
volume 69, pages 670-679. 
155  Martinez W. Lo B. Medical students’ experiences with medical errors: an analysis of medical student 
essays. 2008 Medical Education, volume 42, pages 733-741: at page 737. 
156  See eg, Berk R. Derogatory and cynical humor in clinical teaching and the workplace: the need for 
professionalism. 2009 Medical Education, volume 43, pages 7-9.  Wear D. Aultman JM. Varley JD. 
Zarconi J. Making fun of patients: medical students’ perceptions and use of derogatory and cynical 
humor in clinical settings. 2006 Academic Medicine, volume 81, pages 454-462. 
157  Coulehan et al. 2001 at note 70, pages 600-601. 
158  A seminal study on this issue was Becker HS. Blanche G. The fate of idealism in medical school. 
1958 American Sociological Review, volume 23(1), pages 50-56, at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/meo.v18i0.21194 ; see also Eron LD. Effect of medical education on 
medical students’ attitudes. 1955 Journal of Medical Education, October, volume 30(10), pages 559-
566.  The evidence has been collected since then and at the date of writing this thesis is still being 
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where student clinical exposure commences in the third year.159  However, further studies 
have argued that there is an observable increase in cynicism over the whole training 
period160 and in “new” problem-based learning environments as well.161   
 
Such loss of idealism is both illustrated and raised in the personal tales of medical 
training.162 
                                                
documented: see eg, Mader EM. Roseamelia C. Morley CP. The temporal decline of idealism in two 
cohorts of medical students at one institution. 2014 BMC Education, volume 14, page 58: accessed at 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/14/58 . 
159  This should be compared with a more recent study (n=124) which showed that in one US medical 
school using a problem-based learning methodology, there was a significant initial decline in 
cynicism and a modest increase trust and altruism between 1st and 2nd year, with a reversal of these 
between years 2 and 3.  Analysis of this study shows that the questions asked were somewhat 
different – using a validated scale about their perceptions of human nature generally, rather than 
within themselves. Roche III WP. Scheetz AP. Dane FC. Parish DC. O’Shea JT. Medical students’ 
attitudes in a PBL curriculum: trust, altruism and cynicism. 2003 Academic Medicine, April, volume 
78(4), page 398-402. 
160  See eg, Kopelman L. Cynicism among medical students. 1983 Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 21 October, volume 250(15), pages 2006-2010, and recently Morley CP. Roseamelia C. 
Smith JA. Villarreal AL. Decline of medical student idealism in the first and second year of medical 
school: a survey of pre-clinical medical students at one institution. 2013 Medical Education Online, 
volume 18, item 21194: accessed at http://www.med-ed-
online.net/index.php/meo/article/view/21194. 
161  Maheux B. Beaudoin C. Berkson L. Côté L. Des Marchais J. Jean P. Medical faculty as humanistic 
physicians and teachers: the perceptions of students at innovative and traditional medical schools. 
2000 Medical Education, volume 34, pages 630-634. 
162  For example, Charles LeBaron’s biography of his period at Harvard Medical School makes some 
observations about this transition.  He was an older entrant at 34 years of age and had worked in the 
San Francisco health and welfare system as a social worker before gaining entrance to medical 
school.  His experience of doctors’ behaviour towards patients and other professionals had not been 
positive, and he sees the medical training he is now participating in as a precursor to this.  
For the last 10 years … I’ve worked in medical facilities.  And there’s one memory that just 
keeps coming back now.  I’d be sitting talking to a patient, in would sweep twelve coats, grab 
the chart from my hand, never introduce themselves to me or to the patient, discourse loudly 
over the bed in technical jargon as if they were dealing with a chunk of beef, then sweep out 
without a word.  Onto the next case.  Always in a rush.  I don’t want to become that kind of 
doctor.  And what’s particularly strange to me is that the people in my class don’t seem that 
way at all.  Perhaps a little competitive, but that’s about all.   
So the question in my mind for the last two weeks has been what’s the hamburger machine that 
chops up nice kids and turns them into the doctors I got to know? I don’t have a lot in the way 
of an answer yet, but I can see a couple of clues.  One is starting off by not having weekends 
like everyone else, then moving on to the continuous round-the-clock work shifts on the wards. 
Combine this with an isolated setting, intellectually and emotionally. Eight or ten years later 
you emerge. You’re in your thirties.  You never really had your twenties.  You realize you 
never really had a youth.  Everyone else did. But you didn’t.   
So how do you start treating the cause of this irretrievable loss, the patient? You treat him 
angrily, bitterly, you resent your job, you resent sick people.  Maybe you decided that the only 
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Examples of the impact of these patterns of decline in idealism and empathy and increased 
cynicism include a decreased interest in working in under-served communities,163 jadedness 
about the medical profession,164 cynicism about the application (or avoidance) of various 
ethical standards in everyday medicine,165 less satisfaction with career choice or change of 
career path,166 and various negative attitudes to patients or types of patients.167  The term 
coined to describe the process is called “traumatic de-idealization”.168   
 
A number of theories about the reasons for this decline have been developed over the past 
two decades.  One theory called the “professional identity model” sees the cynicism as an 
ordinary part of the normal maturation process of a doctor, as he or she struggles to develop 
a professional identity and becomes more realistic about the career he or she has embarked 
upon169.  A second theory has been that students become cynical in response to the nature 
of the arduous and sometimes bullying training process.  Testerman calls this the “inter-
generational” model, and bases his theory on the intensity of training, exhaustion, an 
acknowledged history of student abuse and cynical role models170.  A third model, which is 
                                                
thing you can get out of this ordeal is cash.  Isn’t there some way we can figure out to make a 
tiny inroad into that process, like switching a Saturday class to give people weekends? 
LeBaron 1981 – see note 9:  page 58.  The book later notes that no change was made to the Saturday 
classes (page 79). 
163  Morley et al. 2013 – see note 160. 
164  See eg Feudtner et al. 1994 - see note 154. 
165  Hafferty et al. 1994 – see note 58: see especially page 866. 
166   Phillips SP. Clarke M. More than an education: the hidden curriculum, professional attitudes and 
career choice. 2012 Medical education, volume 46, pages 887-893. 
167  See eg, Szauter K. Turner HE. Using students’ perceptions of internal medicine teachers’ 
professionalism.; Higashi RT. Tillack AA. Steinman M. Harper M. Johnston CB. Elder care as 
frustrating and boring: Understanding the persistence of negative attitudes towards older patients 
among physicians-in-training. 2012 Journal of Aging studies, volume 26, pages 476-483: at page 
481. 
168  Kay J. Traumatic deidealization and the future of medicine. 1990 Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 26 January, volume 263(4), pages 572-573. 
169  Testerman JK. Morton KR. Loo LK. Worthley JS. Lamberton HH. The natural history of cynicism in 
physicians. 1996 Academic Medicine, October supplement, volume 71(10), pages S43-S45. See also, 
Griffith III CH. Wilson JF. The loss of student idealism in the 3rd-year clinical clerkships. 2001 
Evaluation and the Health Professions, volume 24, pages 61-70 pages 67-68. 
170  There is some evidence that the more oppressive the training process, the higher are the levels of 
cynicism and negative psychological consequences. See, eg, Bing-you RG. Changes in students’ 
attitudes and values during medicine versus surgery clerkships. 1991 Medical Education, volume 25, 
pages 383-388. 
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probably now the most widely accepted, merges these two models together. The current 
socialisation process for doctors involves the active transmission of conflicting values 
through all parts of the training system. Student cynicism is an adaptive, coping mechanism 
to this environment171, but one that has a lasting negative impact on the virtues, which 
medical education is supposed to teach and reinforce.   
 
The teaching environment, particularly in the clinical parts of medical school and later in 
residency, is shaped by both the nature and structure of the training, by the values explicitly 
stated and by the actions of faculty and clinicians.  Ideally, the modelling of behaviours by 
faculty, clinical and other hospital staff and the organisation of education and training 
would provide a coherent and consistent reinforcement of each other.  These would be 
consistent with the expectations of a “good doctor” and model behaviours which reinforced 
the virtues expected of doctors once their training is completed.  In reality, both the 
organisation of the training and the clinicians delivering it may enact behaviours and 
processes which are not consistent with the explicit values or behaviours.   
 
While initially, the concept of the “hidden” or informal curriculum originally put forward 
by Hafferty and others172 encompassed the transmission of all normative rules, more 
recently, the concept has also been used to describe “a set of unauthorised, unacceptable 
values masquerading as those of the institution”173, which are what students and residents 
see operating.  Once in the hospital setting, there are also the managerial imperatives, 
which add further conflicting pressures on the ethics and values of the student and doctors. 
Some examples of these include “bed management demands” relating to patient throughput, 
services driven by funding imperatives rather than patient need, and financial “risk 
                                                
171  Kopelman L. Cynicism among medical students. 1983 Journal of the American Medical Association, 
21 October, volume 250(15), pages 2006-2010: at pages 2007 and 2010. 
172  Hafferty et al 1994 –see note 58; Hafferty 1998 – see note 68; see also Hundert EM. Hafferty F. 
Christakis D. Characteristics of the informal curriculum and trainees’ ethical choices. 1996 
Academic Medicine, June, volume 71(6), pages 624-633.  (This last article was the published 
proceedings of the opening plenary session of the Association of American Medical Colleges 
Conference on Students’ and Residents’ Ethical and Professional Development, held in October 
1995). 
173  Phillips SP. Blinded by belonging: revealing the hidden curriculum. 2013 Medical Education, 
volume 47, pages 122-125. 
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management”, where the obligation to “protect the hospital’s coffers” can conflict with 
ethical duties to patients. 
 
When driven by conflicting values and their own loss of compassion over time, the 
education practices and attitudes of teachers and clinicians can be dissonant with the ethical 
and cultural expectations of a doctor to be compassionate and caring.  The negative values 
in the “hidden curriculum” modelled by those who are teaching in clinical settings often 
expose young students to behaviours which are inconsistent with the values expressly being 
taught (ignored values) or which actively work against values expected of medical trainees 
(inhibited values)174.  The espoused virtuous explicit values conflict with the enacted 
implicit values.   
 
Students can also be faced with situations where they must choose between what they have 
been told are “good doctor” values and behaviours, and their professional survival or 
academic success.  For example, in a study of exposure to and participation in unethical 
behaviour by students, 58% said that they had done something unethical during their 
clinical rotation.  Of these, 32.6% cited fear of poor evaluation”, 31.6% cited “to fit in with 
the team” and 36.8% gave both reasons for their unethical conduct175.   
 
A common example occurs when a patient suffers preventable harm from a medical 
mistake176.  The student may be faced with two competing values – honesty to the patient 
and the ethical duty to disclose the event to the patient and the collegiate loyalty owed to 
the team.  If the medical team leader chooses not to inform the patient (thus ignoring the 
patient-focussed value and supplanting it with self-interest), the student is left in a difficult 
ethical place.  This is even more difficult, when the person who has not behaved 
appropriately has power in relation to the assessment of the student or young doctor.  In this 
case, students have described feeling like they are an accomplice177.  Sometimes the 
                                                
174  Stern DT. The development of professional character in medical students. 2000 The Hastings Center 
Report, July-August, volume 30(4), pages S26-S29. 
175  Feudtner et al. 1994 at note 154: at page 673.  
176  Martinez et al. 2008 at note 155; Kroll et al 2008 at note 153. 
177  See eg, Feudtner et al. 1994 at note 154: at page 674.  
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inconsistency arises between stated commitments and values and organisational 
requirements, such as excessive working hours.  For example, a young doctor may 
recognise that his or her level of fatigue is a patient-safety risk, but may feel impotent to 
refuse to continue working if required by their clinical supervisor178. 
 
Other examples of these value conflicts include the clash between compassion and respect 
for patients, and various clinician behaviours such as  “blaming” a patient for their disease, 
for not responding as expected to a treatment or for having a chronic illness.179  Another 
area of value conflict occurs where derogatory language and humour is used by clinicians 
in relation to patients, their families or the medical students themselves.180  The research 
indicates that these forms of inappropriate behaviour towards patients are ubiquitous in 
healthcare.  In one 1994 study, 98% of the students had heard doctors refer derogatorily to 
patients181.  In a 2000 Canadian study covering both innovative (usually problem-based 
learning centres) and traditional medical schools, over 40% of senior students did “not 
perceive that their teachers manifest humanistic quality in their relationships with patients 
or students nor are they good role models in teaching the doctor-patient relationship”.182  
The senior students felt that only 30% of their teachers were concerned about how patients 
adapt psychologically to their illnesses, across both types of medical schools.  The data was 
so marked that the authors concluded “This study questions the adequacy of medical 
faculty as role models for the acquisition of caring competence by medical students”.183 
 
                                                
178  See eg, Lopez L. Creating an ethical workplace: reverberations of resident work hours reform. 2009 
Academic medicine, volume 84, pages 315-319. 
179  Gunderman R. Illness as failure: Blaming patients.  2000 The Hastings Center Report, July-August, 
volume 30(4), pages 7-11. 
180  See Wear et al 2006 at note 156; and Wear D. Aultman JM. Zarconi J. Varley JD. Derogatory and 
cynical humour directed towards patients: views of residents and attending doctors. 2009 Medical 
Education, volume 43, pages 34-41. 
181  Feudtner et al. 1994 at note 154. 
182  Maheux et al. 2001 at note 161: Table 1, page 632. 
183  Maheux et al. at note 161: at page 630. While many of these studies are American, the limited 
studies available about doctor attitudes to patients (often disease specific), show similar attitudes 
between Australian doctors and US doctors in equivalent studies.  It is also consistent with the 
observations of the thesis author in her interactions as a carer and consumer in healthcare, as a carer 
advocate for other healthcare consumers and as a collaborator and regulator in medical education. 
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Another scenario likely to show dissonance between what is said and what is done that can 
lead to cynicism relates to the management and organisation of the facility in which the 
students’ training occurs, the arrangements in the training and the attitudes shown to 
students.  For example, medical students and trainee doctors often find themselves within 
an organisational setting and work schedule which does not provide them with sufficient 
time to provide compassionate care to patients.184  They may also find themselves in 
situations where their desire to be compassionate to a patient is treated by their supervisor 
as not appropriate “doctor” behaviour.  When it comes to medical student welfare and 
teaching, the teachers and clinicians may also not “walk their talk”, giving rise to cynicism 
and mistrust. 
[Students] may express cynicism if told that encounters with death and serious 
illness of patients can be expected to be traumatic to them, but yet to say they need 
support with these will be viewed as an admission of their own weakness.  They are 
told they must learn to make many judgments in a climate of uncertainty, yet feel 
rewarded by a show of self-confidence that pre-empts such admissions.185 
 
Another area of dissonance is between the humanism expected of doctors in their teaching 
role and how they treat students.   
Teachers also influence students by caring about and respecting them.  All teaching 
involves the simultaneous transmission of two lessons: one is a lesson about theory 
or technique —why nature or artefact is what it is, or how to do something; the 
second is a lesson about ethics —the teacher’s response to the student’s efforts to 
learn and grow. The first lesson teaches students about intellectual constructs and 
technological reach and limits; the second instructs them about the exercise of 
power and authority and the meaning of human dignity.  Too often teachers focus 
on the first lesson, either unaware of or unsympathetic to the second. But 
diminishing the significance of concern and respect in human relationships maybe 
by far the most powerful lesson that teachers leave behind186. 
This often occurs in the process of assessment and feedback provision to students.  
Sometimes teachers are poor, reluctant, or even rude, communicators187.  Sometimes there 
may have been interpersonal differences between the senior doctor and the student or 
                                                
184  Kopelman 1983 at note 171. 
185  Kopelman 1983 at note 171: at page 2007. 
186  Reiser SJ. The moral order of the medical school. Chapter 1 in Wear D. Brickel J. (editors) 
Educating for professionalism: Creating a culture of humanism in medical education. 2000 
University of Iowa Press, Iowa City: at page 3-10. 
187  Dyrbye LN. Thomas MR. Shanafelt TD. Medical student distress: causes, consequences and 
proposed solutions. 2005 Mayo Clinic Proceedings, volume 80(12), pages 1613-1622: at page 1618. 
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young doctor, which may or may not have been discussed with the student or young 
doctor188.  Often adverse comments are unexpected or more extreme than expected, and 
there has been little if any constructive feedback along the way189.  Sometimes it involves 
students and young doctors failing to “understand” the unwritten rules they are being 
measured against and being judged harshly against standards they have never been 
informed about.190 Often students and young doctors feel angry and distressed that 
problems had not been brought to their attention at the time.  Such treatment can result in 
long term anguish and embitterment for the young doctor or student, who feels unfairly 
criticised and unsupported in their learning.191  
 
While many of the studies have been conducted in the United States, studies that have been 
conducted elsewhere show much the same experience and patterns with some cultural 
variations, including Canada192, the United Kingdom193, Australia194 and Italy195.  For 
example, an English study published in 2004, showed that (like their US counterparts) there 
were some good physician role models, but students also described “a hierarchical and 
competitive atmosphere in the medical school, in which haphazard instruction and teaching 
                                                
188  In fact, research shows that feedback is most commonly not provided: Burack JH. Irby DM. Carline 
JD. Root RK. Larson EB. Teaching compassion and respect – attending physicians’ responses to 
problematic behaviors. 1999 Journal of General Internal Medicine, volume 14, pages 49-55. 
189  Chowdhury R. Kahu G. Learning to give feedback in medical education. 2004 The Obstetrician and 
Gynaecologist, volume 6, pages 243-247. 
190  Hundert EM. Douglas-Stewart D. Bickel J. Context in medical education: the informal ethics 
curriculum. 1996 Medical Education, volume 30, pages 353-364. 
191  Hundert et al. 1996 - see note 172: the first article by Hundert provides two excellent case-studies, 
where tape-recorders were used to record conversations about “the hidden curricula”, which illustrate 
this point and look at some of the suffering caused by these processes. 
192  Maheux et al. 2001 at note 161. 
193  Lempp H. Seale C. The hidden curriculum in undergraduate medical education: qualitative study of 
medical students’ perceptions of teaching.  2004 British Medical Journal, 2 October, volume 329, 
pages 770-773. 
194  Gordon J. Markham P. Lipworth W. Kerridge I. Little M. The dual nature of medical enculturation in 
postgraduate medical training and practice. 2012 Medical Education, volume 46, pages 894-902.  
This was a small study of only 22 doctors who had graduated from one medical school, and focussed 
mostly on their experiences after graduation (median period since graduation was 26 years).  Some 
younger doctors in the study talk about continuing problems with absorption and assimilation of 
undesirable values and practices, as well as experiences rejecting assimilation of some undesirable 
values. – see Table 1, page 896. 
195  Lamiani G. Leone D. Meyer EC. Moja EA. How Italian students learn to become physicians – a 
qualitative study of the hidden curriculum. 2011 Medical Teacher, volume 33, pages 989-996. 
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by humiliation occurred, especially during the clinical training years”.196  The impact of 
these inconsistencies – the clash between words and deeds197 - can undermine the altruism 
and idealism and have a negative impact on the well-being of medical students as discussed 
further below.  One surgeon, Dr Chen, expressed the innate quandary for medical students 
and her own resolution of it thus: 
[Medical students] must reconcile incompatible ideals or “counter-attitudes” – 
values as diametrically opposed as detachment and concern, certainty and 
uncertainty, and humanism and technology.  Like adolescents searching for a sense 
of identity, medical students will vacillate between each extreme. ...  Ultimately 
they will settle at a comfortable equilibrium point, and this act of creating a new 
moral paradigm – detached concern, secure uncertainty, and humanistic technology 
– marks an important step in the transformation of the lay medical student into the 
full-fledged professional physician.198 
 
In a thought-provoking article that looks at these dichotomies, Coulehan and Williams199 
contend that medical education is currently based on a commitment to explicit “doctoring” 
values, such as empathy, compassion and altruism (what is said), and on an implicit 
commitment to detachment, self-interest and objectivity (what is done).  In this adverse 
socialisation environment, it is hard for medical students to become “good doctors”: 
We believe that our entering medical students are “good seeds”.  In this essay, we 
focus on the lack of nourishment and the exposure to defoliants they encounter in 
medical training.200 
 
Compared to the explicit values that form part of formal medical education, the educative 
force of implicit socialisation is that the implicit values are enacted all day, every day 
throughout medical training.201   The authors state that implicit values learned in medicine 
distort medical professionalism and favour the development of three traits that are 
                                                
196  Lempp et al 2004 - see note 193. 
197  Burks DJ. Kobus AM. The legacy of altruism in health care: the promotion of empathy, prosociality 
and humanism. 2012 Medical Education, volume 46, pages 317-325: at page 319. 
198  Chen 2008 – see note 115: at pages 44-45. 
199  Coulehan et al. 2001 at note 70. 
200  Coulehan et al. 2001 at note 70: at page 599. 
201  See also Cleland J. Johnston P. Enculturation to medicine: power for teachers or empowering 
lessons. 2012 Medical Education, volume 46, pages 835-837: at page 836, where they quote an 
aphorism attributed to Albert Einstein: “Setting an example is not the main means of influencing 
another; it is the only means.” 
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antithetical to being a caring physician.202  The first of these traits is detachment, which acts 
in opposition to empathy and leads to a “coldness of heart” towards the patient.  The second 
is a sense of entitlement – a form of unending recompense for the rigour, intensity and 
long-term exploitative nature of medical training.  The last trait is “non-reflective 
professionalism”, which is used as a dissonance-resolving device where students 
“consciously adhere to traditional medical values, while being relatively unaware that they 
base much of their behaviour on beliefs at variance with these values.”203   
 
These traits are closely linked to the techniques that different medical students use to cope 
with the dissonance perceived between: 
• the explicit values they are learning and probably associated in their pre-medical minds 
with the “good doctor”, and  
• the implicit values enacted in the behaviour of some clinicians, and apparently accepted 
and sometimes reinforced, in the organisational arrangements around them. 
Psychologically, human beings are driven to make sense of the world around them.  The 
deep dissonance experienced by these conflicting messages, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
automatically causes anxiety and is stressful for the person. 
 
When students see these behaviours and observe the dissonant values being enacted, at first 
they may simply recognise the dissonance and feel the anxiety or stress.  However, to 
reduce the anxiety and stress, they need to resolve the dissonance.  Students may seek to 
draw attention to the behaviour they see as inconsistent with medical virtues by speaking 
out, but in so doing, run the risk of alienating someone who can have a powerful influence 
on their future, including assessment or employment.204  Resistance can therefore be a high-
risk strategy and is often avoided by students.  The perception of risk and discomfort in 
raising ethical concerns appears to vary with the nature of the team, where the issue is 
observed and with the composition of the team205.  However, the risk appears generally 
                                                
202  Coulehan et al. 2001 at note 70: at page 600. 
203  Coulehan et al. 2001 at note 70: at page 600. 
204  See eg, Phillips et al. – see note 166: at page 891. 
205  Clever SL. Edwards KA. Feudtner C. Braddock III CH. Ethics and Communication: Does students’ 
comfort addressing ethical issues vary by specialty team? 2001 Journal of General Internal 
Medicine. August, volume 16, pages 560-566: at page 561-562. 
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high because the strongly hierarchical culture of most hospitals, and the power of medical 
staff over those lower down the hierarchy, like medical students.   
 
For example, in a study, where 51% of students had witnessed unethical acts during their 
clinical years and 96% had reported hearing derogatory comments about patients, when 
asked if they were comfortable raising their ethical concerns, 39% believed they were too 
low in the hierarchy to question these behaviours206.  In another study, 42% of students had 
been subject to pressure about practices, which exposed them to personal risk of physical 
harm, such as pressure not to use universal precautions put in place to stop transmission of 
blood-borne diseases.  Despite the significant and potentially fatal impact of such exposure, 
75% of the students “succumbed to that pressure against their better judgment suggesting 
the strength of the pressure students feel to oblige medical personnel”.207  
 
Students may dissociate from the dissonance, through keeping silent or separating 
themselves “either by indignation or by retreating to a deferential ‘know nothing’ student 
role”208 but still recognise the behaviour as alien and inappropriate.  This is likely to reduce 
their regard and respect for the person who enacted the dissonant values.  In either case, the 
student may well respond with cynicism, as they are told one value and observe another.209   
 
If students like the person who enacts the dissonant values, see them as a good person, or 
indeed see them as an otherwise good doctor, or they are struggling to establish their 
professional identity, the management of the dissonance can become more psychologically 
complex.  They are likely to look at ways of making these two perceptions consonant.  One 
method is to assume they have not actually correctly understood what has happened 
because they are junior – a situational misunderstanding.  The second is to assume that 
their understanding of the explicit value was incorrect, and what the more senior clinician is 
doing must be the right thing – a normative misunderstanding.  The impact of regular use of 
                                                
206  Clever et al. 2001 - see note 205: at page 561. 
207  Feudtner et al. 1994 - see note 154. 
208  Phillips et al 2012 - see note 166: at page 891.  
209  Billings MA. Lazarus ME. Wenrich M. Curtis JR. Engelberg RA. The effect of the hidden 
curriculum on resident burnout and cynicism. 2011 Journal of Graduate Medical Education 
December, volume 3(4), pages 503-510. 
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these methods to resolve dissonance is to subtly undermine their own sense of what is 
professionally appropriate and replace it with something more accommodating of the 
implicit values enacted.  Such methods avoid continuing dissonance by effectively moving 
the student’s values closer to the implicit values and further from the explicit values – a 
form of “ethical erosion”210.  
 
Applying these kinds of reasoning more generally, Coulehan and Williams211 argue that 
there are three solutions adopted by students to the overall ubiquity of the dissonance 
between explicit and implicit values.  The first “solution” is to abandon any attempt to 
comply with both sets of values and to aim for an ethic of competence, using the implicit 
values as the primary “doctor” values – what they call a “deflating” of values.  Under such 
a model someone can still be good doctor, even if he or she is rude, disrespectful or has 
poor communication skills.  This co-option of other values by implicit values in the 
professionalisation process is supported in other studies: 
The data seem to indicate that students try to bury any dissonance they feel and 
believe that the profession expects them to be resilient and not to have values, traits 
or needs that interfere or at odds with the ability practice medicine as modelled.212 
 
The second “solution” is to conflate the values, as suggested by Dr Chen’s quote above, 
where she talks about “detached concern” 213.  While in most cases it is not possible to fulfil 
both values at once, non-reflective professionalism allows a student to resolve the 
dissonance essentially by not thinking too hard about it.  Given the time constraints on 
those in training, there is often little time for serious reflection in any case.  The authors 
argue that “non-reflective professionalism” allows students and later doctors to delude 
themselves that there is consonance where there is not, and to define consonance is a 
manner which allows this to be so.  For example, the young medical professionals become 
convinced that the most effective way to show compassion for a patient is to take a 
clinically detached approach”.214 
                                                
210  Feudtner et al. 1994 at note 154. 
211  Coulehan et al. 2001 at note 70. 
212  Phillips et al. at note 166: at page 46. 
213  Chen 2008 – see note 115: at pages 44-45. 
214  Coulehan et al. 2001 at note 70: page 601. 
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In a poignant but everyday tale of such a deflation of values between self-interest and the 
patient’s interest, Dr David Hilfiker describes trying to decide whether a patient’s leg 
should be stitched in a country hospital.  He has been called from home to attend the 
country hospital, and if he simply applies a dressing, will receive minimal reimbursement 
from the patient’s insurer.  If, however, he can stitch the wound (which may or may not be 
required), he will be significantly better recompensed.  He describes the discussion with the 
patient, giving him the pros and cons.  When it looks like the patient will choose not to 
have stitches, he finds himself warning the patient again about the possible increased risk of 
infection and other benefits of having the wound stitched, as well as repeating the risks if 
the wound is not stitched.  The description concludes with George the patient saying: 
“Well, all right. I’ll leave it up to you. Why don’t ya put the stitches in? I guess I 
don’t want to monkey with it.” 
 
George gets his stitches.  I haven’t been guilty of any great trespass, but I know how 
I have slanted my words.215 
 
In some ways, this shows how easy it is to conflate values, without any particular malice.  
A common example is in the practice of so-called defensive medicine, where a doctor does 
a test or procedure which is not necessary for the patient or best practice, but which he or 
she thinks would be likely to be able to be used defensively, if the doctor is sued or a 
complaint is made.  This is even more confounded when the doctor gains financially from 
the defensive practice.  Another conflation occurs when a doctor “gives in” to a patient’s 
request for a treatment, such as an antibiotic for a viral infection or some other request (like 
surgery for low back pain or arthroscopy, where there is no evidence of patient benefit in 
these procedures), with a superficial nod to “patient autonomy”, a disregard of the ethical 
duty of non-malfeasance and scant attention to the financial conflict of providing an 
unnecessary service. 
 
The last way the dissonance can be resolved is through rejecting the implicit values and 
retaining the student’s commitment to the explicit values of medicine or to their idealistic 
beliefs about what doctors should be like.  In this case, continuing the seed imagery used at 
                                                
215  Hilfiker D. Healing the Wounds: A physician looks at his work. 1985 Pantheon Books, New York: 
page 177. 
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the beginning of their analysis, the seed “either falls on a patch of good soil (immunizing 
factors in the medical school) or is a hybrid seed that thrives on adversity (natural 
immunity)”.216  Natural immunity arises from having a pre-existing, more defined and 
mature value set, beyond the ideals of medicine, including religion or spiritual values, 
political or social values or, sometimes, other non-traditional backgrounds.  Other potential 
“immunizing” factors are being a woman, being in generalist training (like general practice 
or as a general physician) or being at a medical school that seeks to actively tackle the 
implicit values and model empathy, compassion, attentiveness, fidelity and courage in daily 
routines and organisational practices.217  
 
Some of the consequences of the perceived loss of idealism and increased cynicism 
discussed above is that the longer term emotional, psychological and physical well-being of 
doctors appears to be linked to maintenance of that idealism.  Retained altruism can provide 
protection from burn-out both at the student and post-graduate level.218  The impact of 
cynicism on medical students is also negative where it results in a lack of empathy for 
certain classes of patients219; derogatory and cynical humour directed at patients220; a 
greater pre-occupation with job security, debt and social status in career choices221; and a 
general reduction in compassion and humanism.  Reductions in or an absence of empathy 
are the antithesis of what is desirable for a healing relationship222.  
 
Honesty and deceit 
Historically, medical paternalism put a doctor’s duty to “protect the patient” from some 
awful truth above a duty of truth-telling.  However, it is widely accepted now that honesty 
is considered an important virtue for a doctor to have, particularly in his or her dealing with 
                                                
216  Coulehan et al. 2001 - see note 70: page 601. 
217  Coulehan et al. 2001 - see note 70: page 601-602. 
218  Billings et al. 2011 - see note 209. 
219  Some of the groups of patients, which have been identified as subject to a lack of empathy include 
obese patients, elderly patients and chronically ill patients. 
220  Wear D. Aultman JM. Varley JD. Zarconi J. Making fun of patients: medical students’ perceptions 
and use of derogatory and cynical humor in clinical settings. 2006 Academic Medicine, May, volume 
81(5), pages 454-462 
221  Mader et al. 2014 – see note 158. 
222  See eg, McMurray et al 2000 – see note 48: at page 2. 
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patients223.  It is a virtue mentioned in most documentation of medical values, but its 
practice is seldom taught in medical school224.  There is evidence that over the course of 
medical training, students are both encouraged and in some cases, required not to be honest 
with patients and sometimes, with hospital management.  Examples of this include: 
• Witnessing doctors not telling the truth to patients, especially when there has been 
an adverse event or error;225 
• Witnessing doctors falsifying records when an adverse event occurs226; 
• Being obliged to mislead patients227; 
• Being unsure of whether an adverse event has occurred and being discouraged from 
asking;228 
• Telling untruths about specialty interests, because of fear of poor treatment by 
supervisors;229 
• Keeping quiet about an issue to “protect” the team – a “norm of selective 
disclosure”230;  
• Lying or remaining silent about having failed done a test or examination of a 
patient, when it had been overlooked in a busy environment, for fear of negative 
assessment231; and 
• Being asked to change or changing results in experiments or research232. 
 
                                                
223  See eg, Chuang AW. Nuthalapaty FS. Casey PM. Lacmarczyk JM. Cullimore AJ. Dalrymple JL. 
Dugoff L. Espey EL. Hammoud MM. Hueppchen NA. Katz NT. Peskin EG. For the Undergraduate 
Medical Education Committee, Association of Professors of Gynecology and Obstetrics.  To the 
point: reviews in medical education – taking control of the hidden curriculum. 2010 American 
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, volume 203, 316.e1-6: at page 316.e1. 
224  Stern DT. Practicing what we preach? An analysis of the curriculum of values in medical education. 
1998 American Journal of Medicine, volume 104, pages 569-575: at Table 1, page 571 and page 
574. 
225  Feudtner et al. 1994 at note 154: page 673  
226  Martinez et al. 2008 at note 155: at page 737;  
227  Feudtner et al. 1994 at note 154: at page 673-674, where 53% of students had been expected to 
mislead their patients either by lying or withholding information, with 98% of these students 
subsequently doing so. 
228  Martinez et al. 2008 - see note 155: at page 737, where 9% of students were unsure whether an error 
had occurred. 
229  Woolley et al. 2006 - see note 281: see Table 2, where 46% of students felt they had to be less than 
completely honest about their specialty or career interest to get fair treatment. 
230  Kroll et al. 2008  - see note 153: at page 984-985. 
231  Feudtner et al. 1994 – see note 154: at page 673. 
232  Ariyan S. Of mice and men – honesty and integrity in medicine. 1994 Annals of Surgery, December, 
volume 220(6), pages 745-750: at pages 746-748. 
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Most of these types of mistruths lead to discomfort for the student and no doubt contribute 
to their own sense of ethical erosion over the training period.  There is evidence that to 
witness these forms of behaviour and be unable to speak out can contribute to anxiety, 
reduce mental well-being and contribute to burnout, as discussed below. 
 
6. Impact of medical training on mental health and well-being 
There are many studies that show that medical school can have a negative effect on the 
mental health of students, with a “high frequency of depression, anxiety and stress among 
medical students”233 and burn-out, which is described as “high emotional exhaustion and 
depersonalization”.234  A systematic review of these studies set out several different factors 
hypothesised to be contributing to the decline in student mental health during medical 
school, including: 
• Academic pressure and workload; 
• Financial concerns; 
• Sleep deprivation; 
• Exposure to patients’ suffering and death; 
• Student abuse, such as public humiliation and various forms of bullying; and  
• A “hidden curriculum” of cynicism, resulting in an unwillingness to care for 
chronically ill people and decreased empathy.235, which has been discussed above. 
 
Further, it has been postulated that the pressures of medical school can contribute to a 
perception of omnipotence and omniscience as defence mechanisms against the anxieties 
generated by medical education.236  German research found that the mental health of 
medical students, as reflected in a healthy behaviour pattern, appears to decline as their 
                                                
233  The following article reviewed 40 articles on medical student psychological distress:  Dyrbye LN. 
Thomas MR. Shanafelt TD.  Systematic review of depression, anxiety, and other indicators of 
psychological distress among US and Canadian medical students. 2006 Academic Medicine, April, 
volume 81(4), pages 354-373. 
234  Durning SJ. Constanzo M. Artino Jr AR. Dyrbye LN. Beckman TJ. Schuwirth L. Holmboe E. Roy 
MJ. Wittich CM. Lipner RS. Van der Vleuten C. Functional neuroimaging correlates of burnout 
among internal medical residents and faculty members. 2013 Frontiers in Psychiatry. 15 October, 
volume 4, article 131, page 1. 
235  Dyrbye et al 2006 - see note 233: page 354. 
236  Kane RL. Kane RA. Physicians’ attitudes of omnipotence in a university hospital. 1969 Journal of 
Medical Education, August, volume 44, pages 684-690. 
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years of study continue, and that this decline continues when they move to being 
physicians. 237  In this study, more than 27% of first year medical students demonstrated a 
risk behaviour pattern associated with excessive ambition, which was described as ‘an 
excessive commitment to work, difficulties with emotionally distancing from work, limited 
coping abilities in stressful situations and difficulties managing negative emotions.238   
 
Swedish research has noted as well that psychiatric morbidity is common in medical 
students but few seek help, and untreated morbidity can often result in burnout.  Those 
medical students who have the highest levels of performance-based self-esteem, those who 
disengage through exhaustion and workload and those with depressive symptoms appear to 
be at highest risk of burnout.239  Burnout has a high personal cost to medical students and 
residents, their families, patients and the health system, because of its pervasive impact: 
Burnout is a prolonged psychological response characterised by emotional 
exhaustion and depersonalisation within one’s career.  Its occurrence has been 
associated with decreases in the quality of care, empathy, altruistic attitudes and 
career satisfaction, and increases in patient objectification and patient 
dissatisfaction, and depression and substance use among medical professionals.240 
 
The impact of burnout on a medical student’s behaviour can be significant, 241 with research 
showing impaired academic performance, increased cynicism and reduced empathy, 
academic dishonesty, substance abuse, depression, suicidal ideation242 and, in some cases, 
suicide243.  A large 2010 study of more than 2,500 medical students in 7 US medical 
schools showed that about 52.8% suffered from burnout.  The study results suggested a 
                                                
237  Voltmer E. Kieschke U. Schwappach DL. Wirsching M. Spahn C. Psychosocial health risk factors 
and resources of medical students and physicians: a cross-sectional study. 2008 BMC Medical 
Education, 2 October 2008, pages 46-55: at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/8/46 . 
238  Voltmer et al. 2008 - see note 237: at page 49 and Figure 1. 
239  Dahlin ME. Runeson B. Burnout and psychiatric morbidity among medical students entering clinical 
training: a three-year prospective questionnaire and interview-based study.  2007 BMC Medical 
Education, volume 7, page 6: at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/7/6 . 
240  Burks et al. 2012- see note 197: page 320.  
241  Dyrbye et al. 2005 at note 187: at pages 1616-1617. 
242  Tyssen R. Vaglum P. Grønvold NT. Ekeberg Ø. Suicidal ideation among medical students and 
young physicians: a nationwide and prospective study of prevalence and predictors.  2001 Journal of 
Affective Disorders, volume 64, pages 69-79. 
243  Hays LR. Cheever T. Patel P. Medical student suicide 1989-1994. 1996 American Journal of 
Psychiatry, volume 153(4), pages 553-555.  
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relationship between burnout and a range of unprofessional actions, with burnout being 
strongly associated with engaging in one or more unprofessional behaviours (like lying 
about the completion of a patient’s test results).  It also showed those suffering from 
burnout had reduced attention to the physician’s responsibility to society.244 
 
The experience of burnout and other signs of mental ill-health appears to be particularly 
prevalent in the residency years.  For example, in a 2002 study of burnout in an Internal 
Medicine Residency Program, 76% of the residents met the criteria for burnout.  Among 
those who met the criteria, they were significantly more likely to provide sub-optimal care 
at least once a month.245  Other research shows that residents suffer high levels of 
depressive symptoms246 and, in some cases, anger.247  These problems have been known 
about for more than 30 years248 but remain an important unresolved issue for the mental 
health and well-being of residents.249  For example, in 2010 study across 13 US hospitals, 
depression scores for residents went from 3.9% prior to internship to 25.7% during 
internship.  While doctors, residents and medical students all show signs of burnout, a 2013 
functional neuroimaging study on residents and faculty members found that the effects of 
burnout are significantly greater for residents and the burnout adversely effects the clinical 
                                                
244  Dyrbye LN Massie Jr FS. Ecker A. Harper W. Power D. Durning SJ. Thomas MR. Moutier C. Satele 
D. Sloan J. Shanafelt TD. Relationship between burnout and professional conduct and attitudes 
among US medical students.  2010 Journal of the American Medical Association, 15 September, 
volume 304(11), pages 1173-1180: at pages 1178-1179 
245  Shanafeldt TD. Bradley KA. Wipf JE. Back AL. Burnout and self-reported patient care in an internal 
medicine residency program. 2002 Annals of Internal Medicine, 5 March, volume 136(5), pages 358-
367. 
246  Collier VU. McCue JD. Markus A. Smith L. Stress in medical residency: status quo after a decade of 
reform. 2002 Annals of Internal Medicine, 5 March, volume 136(5): pages 394-396.  This study 
stresses the significance of the financial burden on US residents, who have a combination of very 
high student loans and low wages to contend with, sometimes over several years.  This may be 
different in Australia, because of different loan and payment arrangements.  However, there are 
many other studies showing increased depression in residency from causes that are likely to be 
common across residency programs I other jurisdictions. 
247  Anger seems to be experienced only in some specialties.  For example, in family medicine, this does 
not appear to be a big concern. Michels PJ. Probst JC. Godenick MT. Palesch Y. Anxiety and anger 
among family practice residents: a South Carolina Family Practice Research Consortium Study. 2003 
Academic Medicine, January, volume 78(1), pages 69-79. 
248  Butterfield PS. The stress of residency: a review of the literature. 1988 Archives of Internal 
Medicine, June, volume 148(6), pages 1428-35. 
249  Sen S. Kranzler HR. Krsytal JH. Speller H. Chan G. Gelernter J. Guille C. A prospective cohort 
study investigating factors associated with depression during medical internship. 2010 Archives of 
General Psychiatry, volume 67(6), pages 557-565. 
252 
Chapter 5 –Formation of the Doctor Identity 
reasoning of more junior staff, possibly because of its effect on cognitive control, which is 
an experience-dependent skill.250  This means the cognitive effect and risk of harm to 
patients is likely to be greater when medical students and less experienced doctors suffer 
the effects of burn-out.  It is likely that there is variation across jurisdictions, due to the mix 
of systems that junior doctors are working in, but it remains a concern everywhere.251 
 
Modelled behaviour by clinical educators 
As noted earlier, students are most profoundly impacted by the examples of clinicians they 
see when they are working in the clinical setting.  Modelled behaviour can impact 
negatively on medical student well-being at a number of levels in their professionalisation.  
It often demonstrates physically, mentally and emotionally unhealthy behavioural norms 
for dealing with the impact of patient suffering and death on the clinician’s own sense of 
well-being.  Where the modelled behaviour enacts implicit norms and creates dissonance 
with explicit beliefs, it perpetuates anxiety in students.  It also often leads to a gradual loss 
of the student’s own original moral and behavioural compass, so that the student stops 
practising those good habits and virtues, with which they entered medical school, as they 
struggle to develop their professional identity. 
 
The apparently limited range of modelled behaviours to deal with emotional, physical and 
psychological stressors also conditions medical students to be silent about their physical, 
psychological and emotional needs.252  This can have longer term impact on their well-
being, both as students and later as doctors as discussed in Chapter 4.  Normal behaviours 
such as crying, whether from exhaustion or sadness253, can be perceived as unprofessional 
and infrequently observed in those whom the students are likely to see as role models254.  
                                                
250   Durning et al. 2013 – see note 234: pages 4-6. 
251  In Australia, for example, a website to assist junior doctors manage their mental and physical well-
being has been created http://www.jmohealth.org.au/  
252  See eg, Kansagra S. Everything I learned in medical school: besides all the book stuff. 2011 Kindle 
book. Chapter 1: The Sinking Feeling, which tells of working in the operating theatre as a student 
and falling asleep standing up, while being unable to tell supervisors about it.  Location 94 to 131. 
253  Sung AD. Collins ME. Smith AK. Saunders AM. Quinn MA. Block SD. Arnold RA. Crying: 
experiences and attitudes of third-year medical students and interns. 2009 Teaching and Learning in 
Medicine: An international journal, volume 21(3), pages 180-187.  
254  Shuval JT. Adler I. The role of models on professional socialization. 1980 Social Science and 
Medicine Part A: medical psychology and medical sociology, volume 14A, pages 5-14. 
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Tears are only considered an acceptable response by students, if shed in private and away 
from colleagues and patients255.   
 
Medical students often cope with the emotions associated with grief, loss, mortality and 
vulnerability through denial and detachment. These are frequently the modelled behaviours, 
as noted by surgeon Pauline Chen: 
Attracted to medicine in part because of our own particular anxieties [about dying], 
we may be a self-selected lot who eagerly suppress these fears as we adopt a 
professional ethos that embraces denial.256 
 
Denial is seen by students as a way of dealing with both emotions and physical impacts of 
practice, like fatigue – a method which is modelled by those already working as doctors.  
Surgeon Chen is a transplant surgeon, and on her 83rd organ procurement, she had to take 
organs from a woman of her own age and appearance.  After that event, she recognised how 
deep the defence of denial that she learned as a medical student had been, and how it had 
negatively affected her treatment of patients as human beings, particularly when they are 
dying. 
In the confines of our hospitals and our own particular practices, we imitate these 
fearless efforts to cure. During my training, I watched my attendings – seemingly 
immune to fatigue and hunger – stitching, removing stitches, then putting them back 
in and pushing onward in an attempt to save their patient in the operating room.  …  
Just as easily, however, we physicians slip from the dramatic heroics into a well-
work pattern of denial.  Denial, after all, is a way of coping that we learn early and 
well as first year medical students, suppressing our anxieties as we carve away at 
the cadaveric remains of fellow human beings.  Over time we come to believe so 
deeply that sublimating our fear of death makes us better doctors that some of us 
will skip around the very word during our conversations with terminal patients.  We 
will work almost maniacally to forestall the inevitable, but then stubbornly – when 
death becomes inescapable, refuse to face it for fear of losing our focus on the goal 
of cure.257 
 
Like ethical responses, the socialisation of emotional responses occurs within the hidden 
curriculum, where detachment is often modelled, tears are seen as weakness and students 
                                                
255  Sung et al. 2009 – see note 253 
256  Chen 2008 – see note 115: pages 60-61. 
257  Chen 2008 – see note 115: pages 204-205. 
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are expected to toughen up258.  The downside of this approach are that the student often 
loses empathy for the suffering of patients in an attempt to suppress their own legitimate 
feelings and internalise the emotional load associated with their work.   This is likely to 
contribute to burnout, depression and mental ill-health 
 
Where the hidden curriculum creates dissonance as discussed earlier, this leads not only to 
cynicism but often to burnout.   While some of these studies are small and of poor quality, a 
recent study using validated measuring tools demonstrated that there was a correlation 
between poor professional climate, as assessed by students, residents and faculty, and 
medical student burnout.259  Those who were high on the scale measuring burnout also 
tended to have decreased levels of empathy.  It appears from studies that the exposure to 
unprofessional conduct itself increases both cynicism and burnout.260 
 
The use of humiliation and belittlement in medical education 
The risk of mental health problems and of experiencing socially-prescribed perfectionism 
can be aggravated by practices within the university and hospital experiences of medical 
trainees.  For example, the actions of teachers or senior doctors can create an environment 
where perfect performance appears to be demanded, especially if belittlement or 
humiliation are used as teaching tools261.  This reinforces the students’ fear of failure and 
“imperfection”.  Such unrealistic demands and the fear of humiliation can also lead students 
to tell lies or mislead their supervisors, if they have failed to complete examinations or tests 
of patients, as discussed above.  Fear of humiliation and shaming are powerful drivers in 
human beings, as discussed in Chapter 4, especially where students strive for perfection. 
 
                                                
258  Angoff N. Crying in the Curriculum 2001 Journal of the American Medical Association, volume 
286(9), pages 1017-1018. 
259  Brazeau CM. Schroeder R. Rovi S. Boyd L. Relationships between medical student burnout, 
empathy and professionalism climate. 2010 Academic Medicine, volume 85 (10), supplement, at 
pages S33-S36. 
260  Billings et al. 2011 - see note 209: at page 507. 
261  See eg, Kassebaum DG. Cutler ER. On the culture of student abuse in medical school. 1998 
Academic Medicine, November, volume 73(11), pages 1149 -1158. 
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There is extensive and long-standing international literature on the incidence of the use of 
public belittlement and humiliation of medical students and junior doctors262.  In the United 
States, since 1991, data has been gathered regularly on this issue through the Medical 
School Graduation Questionnaire.  Despite efforts263 to eradicate the practices over the last 
decade or more, little progress appears to have been made, with 34% of students reporting 
in 2012264 that they have experienced humiliation or belittlement.  While this was the 
largest type of mistreatment, there were significant other areas, including sexual and racial 
mistreatment - overall 47% of students experienced one or more of the specified forms of 
mistreatment during their medical undergraduate training265.  The main sources of these 
negative experiences appear to be clinical faculty or consultants in the hospital (31%), 
residents or interns (28%) and nurses (11%)266. 
 
The incidence of mistreatment in medical studies appears also to be higher than in other 
academic faculties267, though it is said that “faculty incivility” has been on the rise more 
generally in higher education268.  While most of the research in this area has been driven by 
the data from the US national database, there is evidence that this occurs elsewhere, 
                                                
262  Fnais N. Soobiah C. Chen MH. Lillie E. Perrier L. Tashkhandi M. Straus SE. Mamdani M. Al-
Omran M. Tricco AC. Harassment and discrimination in medical training: a systematic review and 
meta-analysis. 2014 Academic Medicine, May, volume 89(5), pages 817-827. 
263  See eg, Fried JM, Vermillion M. Parker NH. Uijtdehaage S. Eradicating medical student 
mistreatment: a longitudinal study of one institution’s efforts. 2012 Academic Medicine, volume 
87(9), pages 1191-1198.  
264  Mavis B. Sousa A. Liscomb W. Rappley MD. Learning about medical student mistreatment from 
responses to the medical school graduation questionnaire. 2014 Academic Medicine, May, volume 
89(5), pages 705-711. 
265  The questions about mistreatment ask about being publicly belittled or humiliated, threat or actual 
physically punishment, being asked to perform personal or sexual services, and a range of 
discriminatory conduct, covering gender, race, sexual orientation.  See Mavis et al. 2014 – see note 
264: table 2, page 708.  
266  Mavis et al. 2014 at note 264: at page 707. 
267  See eg, Rautio A. Dunnari V. Nuutinen M. Laitala M. Mistreatment of university students most 
common during medical studies.  2005 BMC Medical Education, October, volume 5, pages 36-48, at 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/5/36: see pages 43-44.   
268  Berk 2009 – see note 156: at page 8. 
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including Canada269, Australia270 and Finland271.  In some areas such as sexual harassment, 
this is hypothesised to relate to the powerful hierarchies and gendered culture which still 
exist in medicine272.  In relation to humiliation and belittlement and other forms of general 
abuse, it is hypothesised that there is a “trans-generational legacy”, where those who were 
mistreated in training themselves mistreat those they train. 273  Others see it as a part of the 
professional socialisation process – “a rite of passage in the education of physicians” and as 
a motivator to do better.274  
 
A popular medical teaching technique involves a teacher or other person in power asking a 
student or junior doctor a series of questions to elucidate their knowledge of specific facts, 
usually in a clinical setting, often with a patient, family and colleagues present.  This can 
happen in ward rounds or at other times, and has been used in classroom settings as well.  
While the pedagogical reason for asking questions is that thinking is driven by questions 
not answers, the execution of the theory in medical training has been the cause of 
significant complaints by medical students, where it has been used in an abusive and 
humiliating manner.275  It is based loosely on the so-called Socratic method, where the 
                                                
269  Cook DJ. Liutkus JF. Risdon CL. Griffith LE. Guyatt GH. Walter SD. Residents’ experiences of 
abuse, discrimination and sexual harassment during residency training. 1996 Canadian Medical 
Association Journal, 1 June, volume 154(11), pages 1657-1665. 
270  White GE.  Sexual harassment during medical training: the perceptions of medical students at a 
university medical school in Australia.  2000 Medical Education, volume 34, pages 980-986; see 
also Askew DA. Schluter PJ. Dick ML. Régo PM. Turner C. Wilkinson D. Bullying in the Australian 
medical workforce: cross-sectional data from an Australian e-Cohort study. 2012. Australian Health 
Review, volume 36, pages 197-204.  A number of Australian medical colleges have also issued 
policies or publications, directed at addressing the issue with their members: see, eg Royal 
Australasian College of Surgeons. Bullying and harassment – recognition, avoidance and 
management. 2011 RACS, available at 
http://www.surgeons.org/media/301655/2011_bullying_harassment.pdf  
271  Rautio et al. 2005 - see note 267. 
272  See eg, White GE.  Sexual harassment during medical training: the perceptions of medical students 
at a university medical school in Australia.  2000 Medical Education, volume 34, pages 980-986. 
273  Rautio et al. – see note 267: see pages 43-44.  See also Rees CE. Monrouxe LV. “A morning since 
eight of just pure grill”: a multischool qualitative study of student abuse. 2011 Academic Medicine, 
volume 86(11), pages 1374-1382.  One of the students describes an interaction where the student 
questions the harassment being used, and the clinician’s response is “Well, it happened to me, and 
I’ve done all right”. (see Appendix at page 1382). 
274  See eg, Mavis et al. 2014 - seet note 264: at page 708.  
275  Wear D. Kokinova M. Keck-McNulty C. Aultman. Research Basic to Medical Education: Pimping: 
Perspectives of 4th year medical students.  2005 Teaching and Learning in Medicine: An 
international journal, volume 17(2), pages 184-191: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15328015tlm1702_14  
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teacher asks questions to lead the student towards knowledge and understanding, but the 
nature of Socratic dialogue had a different purpose and means.  This was to free the mind 
from the constraints of prior beliefs by deconstructing all prior thought on the subject (the 
de-constructive phase). Thereafter, the teacher helps bring forth new ideas in the 
constructive phase.  In theory, this process is supposed to occur in a safe environment, in 
the presence of a teacher guided by humility.276 
 
In the American literature and popular medical culture, it is often called “pimping”.  The 
impact of this process can vary enormously, depending upon how it is done and with what 
intention.  At the positive end, it can be a way of identifying what a student knows and does 
not know and reminding all present of some key points – a form of interactive learning, 
with the aim of helping students to remember the key points277.  Where it is done with an 
intent to humiliate or embarrass, it can easily cross the line to become a systematic form of 
abuse.  An article on “The Art of Pimping” appeared in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association, in 1989, where Brancati said: 
On the surface, the aim of pimping appears to be Socratic instruction.  The deeper 
motivation, however, is political.  Proper pimping inculcates the intern with a 
profound and abiding respect for his attending physician while ridding the intern of 
needless self-esteem.  Furthermore, after being pimped, he is drained of the desire to 
ask new questions – questions that his attending may be unable to answer.  In the 
heat of the pimp, the young intern is hammered and wrought into the framework of 
the ward team.  Pimping welds the hierarchy of academics in place, so the edifice of 
medicine may be erected securely, generation upon generation. 
 
The article illustrates another operation of the “hidden curriculum”, and the tension 
between the explicit values of learning and the implicit values of professional enculturation.  
Where the student’s failure to answer questions asked is followed by humiliation or verbal 
abuse, it clearly crosses the line, but as one author asks: “where does the Socratic method 
end and current concepts of harassment and abuse begin?”278  Given the frequent reports of 
                                                
276  Elder S. Application of the Socratic Method in health professionals’ education. 2 November 2010.  
Educational Theory and Practice at: http://edtheory.blogspot.com.au/2010/11/application-of-
socratic-method-in.html.  
277  Detsky AS. The art of pimping, 2009 Journal of the American Medical Association, 1 April, volume 
301(13), pages 1379-1381: at 1381. 
278  Gordon LA. Is the Socratic Method illegal? 2003 The American Surgeon. February, volume 69(2), 
pages 181-182: at page 181.  
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verbal abuse and humiliation experienced by medical students, and the consequent shame 
burden they bear, perhaps the perceived pedagogical benefits are outweighed by the 
crystallised risks.279  
 
There are also specific medical forms of mistreatment, such as discrimination and 
mistreatment related to specialty choice, which seems to stem from inter-group biases 
within medicine, such as between specialties.280  Student-reported actions have included 
observing and experiencing negative comments and treatment based on specialty or career 
interest, often accompanied by denial of teaching training or clinical opportunities.  These 
were sufficient for many medical students to be less than honest with their teachers about 
their career interests.281  
 
Bullying and humiliation, and the evidence of its current prevalence in medical training and 
practice as discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  For medical students and trainees, these 
practices can have important organisational impacts through increasing the reticence of 
students and other team members to speak up or ask questions, and through creating long 
term anxiety.  Combined with the hierarchical nature of healthcare, it can reinforce and 
accentuate the power distance and work against team based approaches to working282.  
Once medical students are conditioned by being humiliated, abused or shamed when they 
ask a question, make a mistake, delay to consider an answer or raise concerns with more 
senior staff, they may well remain inhibited in these areas for the long term.  At a biological 
level, these kinds of events prime their emotional brain to recognise and respond 
automatically, with significant long term effects, as were discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 
above. 
 
                                                
279  For a thoughtful analysis of these questions and further research questions, see Wear et al 2005 at 
note 275. 
280  Oser TK. Haidet P. Lewis PR Mauger DT. Gingrich DL. Leong SL. Frequency and negative impact 
of medical student mistreatment based on specialty choice: a longitudinal study. 2014 Academic 
Medicine, May, volume 89, pages 755-761. 
281  Woolley DC. Paolo AM. Bonaminio GA. Moser SE. Student treatment in clerkships based on their 
specialty interests. 2006 Teaching and Learning in Medicine: an International Journal, volume 
18(3), pages 237-243:  see especially Table 2, page 239.   
282  Helmreich RL. Merritt AC. Culture at Work in aviation and medicine: national organizational and 
professional influences. 1998 Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot (UK). 
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In many ways, element of the post-graduate intern and residency training process operate in 
a similar fashion to medical student abuse, so far as their intense psychological impact is 
concerned.  For example, some young doctors experiencing internship have likened it to 
“hazing”283, the process through which young recruits to military services, sporting clubs, 
apprenticeships, fraternities and colleges were traditionally initiated into their group 
identity.  The training processes of internship, residency and then specialty-fellowship 
training, continue many of the patterns established in the undergraduate phase of medical 
training.  Post-graduate hospital based training has been described as “difficult, intense and 
sometimes dehumanizing”284, with more stories of stress, humiliation, exhaustion285 and 
further shaming of trainees by doctors higher up the hospital training hierarchy, when they 
don’t comply with medical group norms, for example, by questioning certain medical 
practices286.   
E. Conclusion 
The selection, education and post-graduate training of doctors is an intense socialisation 
experience that works deeply on the identity of those who seek to become doctors.  While 
this chapter focusses on many of the aspects of medical education that appear to have a 
negative impact on patient safety and doctor well-being, there are also many positive 
aspects in the training process.  The proposals in Chapter 7 look to how the positive aspects 
can be increased and the negative aspects reduced. 
 
The professionalisation process moves a person from being a layperson, with sensibilities 
like a patient, to a doctor – an intense process which can make it difficult for young trainee 
doctor to hold onto at least part of the identities they started with.  The implicit values 
enacted by doctors and teachers in their everyday actions provide stronger lessons on what 
it is to be a doctor than the formal lessons, so it is important for senior doctors to model 
good and healthy behaviours.  Retaining some of their pre-medical identity and the values 
                                                
283  Konner 1987 – see note 9;  Jauhar 2008 – see note 9:page 5; see also Takakuwa et al. 2005- see note 
9: page 186. 
284  Takakuwa et al. 2005 - see note 9: page 183. 
285  See eg, Marion 2001 - see note 9; Klitzman 2010 - see note 9. 
286  See eg, Jauhar 2008 - see note 9: pages 190-194. 
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they brought into medical school can “immunise” students against the negative 
consequences of some of the implicit values to which they are exposed, and assist them to 
resist habituation into ethical erosion. Their identity as a doctor and “good person” are 
likely to be more resilient and multi-faceted, which can benefit the doctor, their patients and 
their work team. 
 
Many of the experiences of medical school and later training are inimical to individual 
doctor well-being, to good care for patients, to a safe and effective healthcare system.  The 
education and training of doctors create the blueprint for vulnerabilities in the Doctor 
Identity, so far as preventable patient harm is concerned.  These psychological Achilles 
heels will vary between individuals, as will their resilience.  The Doctor Identity including 
the “perfect performance” schema is influenced by their own experiences in medical 
training, and the parts of themselves that remain unchanged by medical professionalisation.  
All these can interact to establish the nature of the vulnerabilities from threats to that 
identity.  Chapter 6 shows how this process can continue over a doctor’s professional life.  
Chapter 7 shows that there is already positive change in medical training, Colleges and 
regulators, which may be starting to address some of these issues. 
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Chapter 6. The consolidation and maintenance of the 
Doctor Identity  
A. Introduction 
In Chapter 5, the education and training of people to become doctors was discussed in some 
detail.  The formation of the doctor identity involves not only learning the craft skills and 
the specialised knowledge of medicine as a science, but also the role of the doctor as a 
social actor – what is broadly called their medical socialisation or professionalisation.  This 
transformation is a powerful identity shifting process, involving a redefinition of the 
individual, both internally and externally.  The strength of the enculturation process and the 
almost universally recognised Doctor Identity, means that someone who becomes a doctor 
joins a profession of similarly changed individuals.  Some have described it as a process of 
homogenisation1 because it reduces the pre-existing variations between individuals as they 
are formed into the more consistent and differentially recognised identity of a doctor.  This 
thesis hypothesises that this common identity brings with it common vulnerabilities, in 
relation to medical error and preventable patient harm. 
 
The process of consolidation and maintenance of the doctor identity continues over the life 
of someone who chooses to become a doctor.  As discussed in Chapter 5, in the formative 
stages of professional socialisation, the doctor-trainee learns to “act like a doctor” by 
watching those doctors who teach them2.  They learn a role different from their “non-
doctor” identity.  Replicating the actions of those who are more senior and apparently 
successful is also a normal human coping mechanism for young people used to success in 
their previous learning experiences.  They seek to fit into what must seem to be an 
otherwise alien and overwhelming environment.  Replication is also adaptive in the 
particular learning environment, where the non-professional beginner needs to impress 
                                                
1  Beagan BL. Neutralizing differences: producing neutral doctors for (almost) neutral patients. 2000 
Social Science and Medicine, October, volume 51(8), pages 1253-1265; see also Shapiro M. Getting 
Doctored: Critical reflections on becoming a physician, 1987 New Society Publishers, Philadelphia: 
see especially chapter 2.  This same narrowing of variety of identity through professionalisation has 
also been acknowledged in training for the legal profession: see Guinier L. Fine M. Balin J. Becoming 
gentlemen: Women, law school and institutional change. 1997 Beacon Press, Boston. 
2  The enactment of roles is seen in some schools of sociology as the mechanism through which the 
concept of “self” is created.  See: Goffman E. The presentation of self in everyday life. 1969 (1990 
Reprint) Allen Lane the Penguin Press, London: especially Chapter 1 – Performance. 
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those who are evaluating them3.  This process continues from the University context, 
through the initial medical postgraduate years, normally based in a hospital setting, and into 
the specialty training environment.  In each of these stages, the professional progress of a 
doctor depends to a large extent on the establishment of good relations with the supervising 
doctor.  This in turn perpetuates the existing practices and culture, reinforcing the 
professionalisation process commenced at University.  The first part of this chapter looks at 
the impact of the Apprenticeship model of post medical graduation training on the 
consolidation of the Doctor Identity.  
 
Once a doctor is qualified, there are also a range of external validations that fortify the 
Doctor Identity, and provide personal reinforcement to the young doctor.  These include the 
socio-economic benefits associated with being a doctor and the privileged position 
accorded to doctors in our society and many others.  They also include the cultural and 
media stories associated with “being a doctor”, often deeply embedded in an heroic 
paradigm. The second part of this chapter looks at these external reinforcers that motivate, 
strengthen and maintain the Doctor Identity and substantially increase the perceived risk 
and potential loss from any threat to that identity. 
 
The third mechanism which consolidates and maintains the Doctor Identity comes from 
peer pressures to conform to and protect the group identity - sometimes called the “tribal” 
aspect of medicine.  This collective nature of the profession has both positive and negative 
consequences for the Doctor Identity, and it serves as a powerful behavioural “forcing 
function”.  It creates enormous pressure to conform to peer norms and to not question the 
behaviours of other doctors around them.  
 
The chapter includes a case study of the profound personal influence of the Doctor identity, 
even where this causes serious threats to the health and well-being of the doctor.  The case 
study, which looks at doctor’s experiences of being a patient or carer, also shows the 
perverse consequences the absorption of the “othering” norm of patients as “not-doctors”.  
                                                
3  Haas J. Shaffir W. Becoming Doctors – the adoption of a cloak of competence. Department of 
Sociology, McMaster University Ethnographic. 1987 JAI Press, Greenwich (Connecticut). 2nd edition 
2009 Jack Haas Publishing (Kindle format), Victoria (Canada): see especially Chapter IV and V. 
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The training of doctors to cope with suffering can involve an “othering” of patients4.  The 
perception of patients as “not-doctor” creates a multi-layer effect.  At one end this can 
result in doctors’ failing to seek medical attention when they need it for fear of becoming “a 
patient”.  At the other end, it can result in doctors treating patients in a manner that they 
would find unacceptable for themselves or their own family members.  
 
This chapter hypothesises, on the evidence presented, that the ability of doctors to identify 
and act on preventable patient harm is also influenced by processes of consolidation and 
maintenance of identity.  Medical error and patient harm brings an immediate threat to the 
individual and professional identity and tribal mores of doctors, which prompts the normal 
human psychological threat responses discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
B. Embedding the Doctor Identity through Apprenticeship 
Much of the clinical training of doctors, both before and after graduation, occurs through 
modelling the practices of established members of the profession, usually in a hospital 
setting in an apprenticeship based model.  “Acting like a doctor” in strongly hierarchical, 
apprenticeship-based clinical training involves learning most immediately from the next 
least experienced person in the chain, with all doctors learning from and often modelling 
those at the top of the hierarchy.   
 
A junior doctor in such a hierarchy is relatively powerless and dependent for acceptance 
and success upon the favour of all those who are more senior.  Their relative powerlessness, 
combined with limited experience at this early time in their careers, mean that junior 
doctors are not in a good position to question behaviours of more senior staff, when these 
appear to be unsafe or ethically questionable.  This is partly because their concern may 
simply arise out of ignorance and be a misunderstanding of correct action or behaviour, and 
questioning may expose them to ridicule or shaming.  At the beginning of their career, they 
                                                
4  Shapiro J. Walking a mile in their patients' shoes: empathy and othering in medical students’ 
education. 2008 Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities in Medicine, volume 3(10), pages 1-11: accessible 
at BioMed Central - doi:10.1186/1747-5341-3-10. 
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are also often compelled to curry grace and favour with those higher up the hierarchy to 
secure a training position, which can make questioning a senior very difficult5.   
 
Adopting an uncritical approach to those higher up the hierarchy means they are therefore 
extremely vulnerable to replication of senior clinical behaviours which may or may not be 
the most physically, mentally or emotionally healthful.  The reluctance to question 
superiors (and, in some cases, the observed negative impact of so doing) can also result in 
the absorption of the superiors’ behaviours associated with conflicting implicit norms.  The 
implicit norms expressed through the behaviours of doctors in practice are often at variance 
with the values and norms taught in the formal medical training curricula or regulatory 
standards, established by accreditation bodies and other explicit standards monitoring 
processes and organisations.   
 
For example, despite the imposition of a mandatory standard on compliance with hand 
washing by health professionals as part of the Australian Commission on Quality and 
Safety in Health Care’s National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards, audits still 
show a lower rate of compliance by doctors than other health professionals6.  This is despite 
more than 150 years of awareness that hand hygiene is critical for reducing infection in 
patients7 and the efforts of the World Health Organisation over the past decade to focus on 
                                                
5  The fear of asking questions can impinge upon learning in a very fundamental way – with junior 
doctors being reluctant to ask questions when they don’t know something or when they appropriately 
need assistance when something is outside their current competence. 
6  National compliance rate showed medical practitioners had the lowest rate of compliance across all 
classes of health professional, and while overall the medical profession reached the “target standard of 
70% at 70.9%, their compliance before touching a patient was 65.8% and after touching a patient’s 
surroundings was only 60.7%.  Hand Hygiene Australia. National Data Period Two 2015 (June): 
sighted on 2 November 2015, at: http://www.hha.org.au/LatestNationalData.aspx  
7  This work on the spread of so-called “childbed fever” through a lack of hand-washing was undertaken 
by Ignaz Semmelweis between 1841-1848 in Vienna: Semmelweis I. The etiology, concept and 
prophylaxis of childbed fever. (Edited and translated by Codell Carter K.) 1983 Madison University of 
Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin.  Oliver Wendell Holmes published a similar hypothesis in the USA in 
1843, based on a 1795 treatise published by Dr Alexander Gordon of Aberdeen: Holmes OW. The 
contagiousness of puerperal fever. Chapter in Medical Essays 1842-1882.  Essay printed in 1843, 
reprinted with additions 1855. Made available through Project Gutenberg as an E-Book: at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2700/2700-h/2700-h.htm#link2H_4_0005. Also available at 
http://www.bartleby.com/38/5/1.html.  Two distinguished professors of obstetrics, Hugh L Hodge and 
Charles D Meigs fervently denied Holmes’ theory of contagion.  In the case of both Semmelweis and 
Holmes, the findings were contested and generally ignored by the medical profession. 
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this issue8.  Because of the young doctors’ strong desire to be a doctor, modelling the actual 
behaviours of those higher in the hierarchy powerfully shape the identity and actions of the 
young doctor.  While it is hoped that this teaches good professional habits, in some cases, 
no doubt, it fosters bad habits.  So far as handwashing is concerned, data shows that it 
might be better for patients if junior doctors emulated nurse handwashing practice, rather 
than senior doctor behaviour. 
 
The apprenticeship model of medical training also embeds the power of the medical 
hierarchies that exist within both the hospital and the individual training groups.  Like the 
Masters and apprentices that existed in Guilds in the medieval period, this relational model 
with its high status differential and power distance characteristics remains at the core of 
medical training.  At its best, a highly skilled and gifted teacher helps the trainee to acquire 
competence through experience and guidance; at its worst poor and destructive practices 
are perpetuated and the culture remains unquestioned.  The intrinsic problem with such a 
relationship is that these characteristics cumulatively decrease the possibility that someone 
will question what is being done and make it much more unlikely that the junior party in 
the relationship will “challenge the errors of their superiors”.9 
 
Some of the negative modelled behaviours are known, at an intellectual level, to be 
counter-productive and perhaps likely to lead to unsafe practices, but they are argued to be 
part of the tradition of medicine10.  One example of this is the question of fatigue and 
working hours, discussed in Chapter 4.  Part of these “traditional” professional attitudes 
derive from the residual volunteerism that was historically part of a medical world vastly 
different from today, where doctors often provided their medical and training work in a 
                                                
8  The WHO first Global Patient Safety Challenge, Clean Care is Safer Care, began in October 2005.  
The campaign is now also using the tag Save Lives – Clean your Hands. Sighted 2 November 2015, 
athttp://www.who.int/gpsc/en/  
9  Helmreich RL. Merritt AC. Culture at Work in aviation and medicine: national organizational and 
professional influences. 1998 Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot (UK): for status differential, see pages 
39-41; for power distance, see pages 57-58. 
10  Other examples of this are provided in the RACS EAG Report. Expert Advisory Group on 
Discrimination, Bullying and Sexual Harassment advising the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons 
(RACS). Report to the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons. 28 September 2015 RACS, Melbourne 
(RACS EAG Report 2015). Available at http://www.surgeons.org/about/expert-advisory-
group/reporting/: see especially “Unhealthy work practices and training arrangements”, page 12; and 
page 2, where it is stated the “Long established traditions that have been inherited and have normalised 
unprofessional and, and sometimes illegal, behaviours must be relinquished.” 
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public hospital for free11.  Under that model, interns received only very low wages plus 
board and lodging, or were even unpaid12.  The expectation was that the doctor would work 
as many hours as asked of him or her.  Such traditions can be difficult to shift, even where 
research evidence shows the negative outcomes of doctor fatigue for patients, other care 
team members and doctors themselves.  The current on-going reliance in many public 
hospitals on voluntary training work by all doctors, especially senior doctors, is also a 
negative historical legacy of volunteerism.  This model may need to be reconsidered in the 
context of the increasing volume of trainees and assessment obligations, and the imposition 
of external pedagogical standards and educational training on the volunteer supervisors.  
There is a growing need for the allocation of dedicated “time to train” in work expectations 
of supervisors to address some of the deficiencies in training under the strictly “volunteer” 
model. 
 
The current theory is that all qualified doctors can and should be teachers, despite in many 
cases, never having received any formal training in adult pedagogy.  Teaching is an 
expected part of the role of most doctors, particularly those based in public hospitals.  For 
example, the Australian Curriculum Framework for Junior Doctors13 includes a number of 
                                                
11  In the United Kingdom, there was a long tradition of doctors working a few hours of their week on an 
“honorary” unpaid basis in exchange for rights of private practice in these hospitals. In the UK this 
occurred in “voluntary hospitals” which were charitable bodies often looking after poor acutely ill 
people, who were expected to recover and the arrangements ceased with the implementation of the 
National Health System:  http://www.nhshistory.net/voluntary_hospitals.htm#The%20doctors  In 
Australia this practice occurred to a lesser extent in public hospitals up to the introduction of Medibank 
in 1975.  Those who were not covered by private insurance because of costs relied on “charitable care 
made possible by contributions in money or services by members of religious and benevolent 
community organisations and the medical profession”. Browning B. Health funding and medical 
professionalism – a short historical survey of the relationship between government and the medical 
profession in Australia. 2000 Australian Academy of Medicine and Surgery: Available at 
http://www.aams.org.au/contents.php?subdir=library/history/funding_prof_med_au/&filename=index#
3.  
12  In the history of medicine, periods of internship were, in some countries, generally unpaid.  A 
description of a 1937 internship in the US Harvard medical service was that an intern received “a 
bedroom, board and the laundering of one’s white uniform” with working hours that “were all day 
every day, and on call for admissions and emergencies every other night, all night long”.  When interns 
needed money, they sold their blood for transfusions at $25 per pint as well as a pint of whiskey. 
Thomas L. The Youngest Science – Notes of a Medicine-watcher.1983 Penguin Books, New York: 
pages 36-37. 
13  The Australian Curriculum Framework for Junior Doctors “outlines the knowledge, skills and 
behaviours required of prevocational doctors (PGY1, PGY2 and above) in order to work safely in 
Australian Hospital and other healthcare settings” and was developed by the Postgraduate Medical 
Education Councils of Australia.  The Framework was revised in 2009 and 2012. Sighted on 2 
November 2015, at http://curriculum.cpmec.org.au/background.cfm .  Under “Professionalism”, there 
is a section called Teaching, which requires a Junior Doctor to have the following skills by the end of 
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requirements for junior doctors in their first two years post University medical qualification 
that expect these competencies to be established in that period.  With little formal teaching 
time allocated to the attainment of these skills, junior medical officers often replicate the 
same teaching methodologies that they see being practised around them.  Visiting Medical 
Officers have in most places a contractual requirement to teach junior doctors and others as 
part of their contract for services, sometimes with additional pay or time allocation, but not 
always.14  While there are sometimes courses offered to assist doctors with teaching skills, 
participation in these is seldom a requirement. Specialist Colleges are only now beginning 
to require Fellows who will teach their College’s trainees to have any training or education 
in adult pedagogy.  The result of this “skills acquisition by absorption” is that poor teaching 
methods are as likely to be replicated as good ones.  Poor training methodology can at the 
least be ineffective, and at the worst, enduringly harmful, involving shaming and public 
humiliation. 
 
The Australian Medical Council requires that Specialist Colleges select supervisors with 
“demonstrated appropriate capability for” the role and facilitate “the training, support and 
professional development of supervisors”.  The notes in the 2015 Standards are clearer than 
the earlier Standards about the Colleges obligations in relation to the selection and training 
of supervisors.  In addition to knowing the program requirements, they are to “have skills in 
adult learning, in providing constructive feedback to trainees, and in responding 
appropriately to concerns” in the education of trainee specialists and the need for training 
and resources to support these roles15.  They also focus on supervisor’s responsibilities for 
patient safety and detecting and helping the “trainee in difficulties”.  The Specialist College 
Standards do not have specific educational requirements for trainers and supervisors.  In 
most Australian jurisdictions, such requirements do not exist in the pre-vocational 
                                                
that period of their training: Plans, develops & conducts teaching sessions for peers & juniors; Uses 
varied approaches to teaching small & large groups; Incorporates teaching into clinical work; and 
Evaluates & responds to feedback on own teaching. 
14  See eg, the ACT’s Health (Visiting Medical Officers Core Conditions) Determination 2013, clause 14, 
relating to teaching.  The VMO is expected to teach and train postgraduate medical and dental officers 
as part of their normal sessions and ward-rounds.  Additional payments for formal teaching outside 
these circumstances can be paid if agreed in advance with the Director-General of Health. 
15  Australian Medical Council Specialist Education Accreditation Committee. Standards for Assessment 
and Accreditation of Specialist Medical Education Programs and Professional Development Programs 
by the Australian Medical Council. 2015 Standard 8.1.3, page 23: available at 
http://www.amc.org.au/accreditation/medical-education  
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accreditation sphere16, covering the intern training period and post-graduate year 2, in most 
Australian jurisdictions.  In both cases, the regulatory requirements for the training to 
support supervisors is “light touch”, and to a large extent, junior doctors report that the 
education methods and skills used by supervisors and trainers are highly variable across 
hospitals and within hospitals.  While the standards also require Colleges to collect 
supervisor feedback, there is reluctance among many junior doctors to provide negative 
feedback, even anonymously.  The small number of junior doctors in a specific area or 
under a specific supervisor allows their ready identification.  Providing negative feedback 
about a supervisor or complaining about inappropriate or sub-standard training is seen as a 
career limiting move17.  
 
While those responsible for training programs often recognise that the lack of consistent 
skills in training can lead to variable training experiences, there has been a reluctance to 
compel trainers and supervisors to undergo training.  Colleges and hospitals depend on the 
co-operation of supervisors and trainers for what is often an unpaid additional 
responsibility.  Should additional requirements be imposed upon supervisors and trainers, 
there is a general concern raised by hospital administrators that doctors may seek additional 
reimbursement.  While this may also be a concern for Colleges, another concern appears to 
be that College Fellows will not volunteer for these roles if they are seen as too burdensome 
and to take away from their capacity to generate income.  In a recent Royal Australasian 
College of Surgeons study, commercial gain was identified as an important motivator for a 
significant proportion of Fellows, and the desire to maintain market share was a driver of 
uncooperative behaviour between surgeons18.  An awareness of potential costs and of the 
                                                
16  The Australian Medical Council (AMC) accredits State and Territory-based 
Postgraduate/Prevocational Education Councils, who (in turn) accredit training positions for 
Postgraduate Year 1 (PGY1) and PGY2 Medical Practitioners.  Post Graduate Year 1 training positions 
are required to be accredited to a set of standards agreed between the AMC and the Medical Board of 
Australia (MBA).  These standards require hospitals which employ PGY1 and 2 medical graduates to 
place them in accredited positions for the trainees to become qualified to practice independently 
through satisfactory completion of PGY1.  Accredited position must meet the standards established by 
the various State and Territory based Councils, and approved by the AMC through their accreditation 
of the various Councils. 
17  KPMG. ACT Health Review of the Clinical Training Culture – the Canberra Hospital and Health 
Services. September 2015 (KPMG TCH Review 2015): see page 36 especially, but there are many 
other instances noted in the Report. 
18  RACS EAG Report 2015 – see note 10: page 12. 
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limited reservoir of willing volunteers has constrained efforts to require proper pedagogical 
training for Specialist supervisors and trainers and other Intern and Resident trainers. 
 
An apprenticeship model of training can entrench poor practices – both clinical and 
professional – over generations, with little chance of detection.  For example, in a recent 
Report of a Review of the Clinical Training Culture in the Canberra Hospital and Health 
Services19 76% of written submissions said they had observed behaviours that condoned or 
accepted bullying, discrimination and harassment.  It was hypothesised by those in focus 
groups and submissions that senior doctors who were behaving in a bullying fashion had 
experienced bullying themselves in the past and thus had an attitude of “We survived. You 
should be able to do the same”.20  While many trainees and others saw these behaviours 
were unsatisfactory, there was a low incidence of formal complaints because the 
vulnerability of young doctors in the training hierarchy, a culture of resignation and the 
“fierce competition” for training places.  These all increased the power differential between 
the trainees and supervisors who described their situation as a “master/servant mentality”.21 
 
The recent Royal Australasian College of Surgeons Report of the Expert Advisory Group 
on Discrimination, Bullying and Sexual Harassment22 gives many examples of the 
downsides of the apprenticeship model, where the power exercised by the Master is not 
subject to adequate, transparent scrutiny, appropriate ethical obligations and means of 
accountability.  This review was commissioned by the Royal Australasian College of 
Surgeons following the press coverage associated with the Tam/McMullin whistleblowing 
incident discussed later in this chapter23.  The Report, released in September 2015, 
demonstrated that discrimination, bullying and sexual harassment were “pervasive and 
serious problems in the practice of surgery in Australia and New Zealand”.  Like the 
Canberra Review, there was extensive evidence of a “culture of fear and reprisal”: 
                                                
19  KPMG TCH Review 2015 – see note 17. 
20  KPMG TCH Review 2015 – see note 17: at page 13. 
21  KPMG TCH Review 2015 – see note 17: at pages 44-46. 
22  RACS EAG Report 2015 – see note 10. 
23  See Thesis below at page 302 and following. 
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Making a complaint is ‘career suicide’.  People are afraid to raise an issue or make a 
complaint, fearing risk to their traineeship or their career and livelihood.24 
 
This was described as the single biggest reason allowing perpetrators to continue their bad 
behaviour.  The association with hierarchical power was clear: senior surgeons and surgical 
consultants were reported as the primary source of these problems, with “abuse of power 
and authority a significant cultural issue”.25  The Report also saw the “lack of teaching 
skills and ignorance of contemporary adult education models” as direct contributors to “bad 
behaviour in general and bullying in particular”.  It also noted that “many teachers teach the 
way they were taught, using humiliation and bullying”26.  The College has responded by 
accepting in full the report and recommendations of the Expert Advisory Group and 
apologising publicly for behaviours which “have been too long tolerated and have 
compromised the personal and professional lives of many in the health workforce”27.  
 
The consequences of the apprenticeship model of training, so far as the Doctor Identity is 
concerned, are to oblige compliance with the practices and mores associated with the 
dominant doctor identity.  The requirements to model observed behaviour and to learn from 
the experience of those who can exercise real power over a doctor’s capacity to work, earn 
and prosper encourages conformity with dominant behavioural norms.  Tribal loyalty 
requirements, discussed later in this chapter, lead people to be silent, even when they think 
something is wrong.   
 
The consolidation of the Doctor Identity through training provided under the apprenticeship 
model encourages the dominance of a single kind of Doctor Identity, which is vulnerable to 
the threats posed by medical error and patient harm.  This creates secrecy for individuals 
when errors and harm occur, and shared lies about what actually happens in healthcare.  It 
permits shaming and humiliation in training, so that doctors’ threat mechanisms are primed.  
High levels of consequent anxiety provide a stressful background to their working lives.  
                                                
24  RACS EAG Report 2015 – see note 10: at page 5. 
25  RACS EAG Report 2015 – see note 10: at pages 4, 7-8. 
26  RACS EAG Report 2015 – see note 10: at pages 8-9. 
27  Royal Australasian College of Surgeons.  RACS apologises for discrimination, bullying and sexual 
harassment. Media Release, dated 10 September 2015. Available at: 
http://www.surgeons.org/news/racs-apologises/  
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The inaccurate “perfect performance” schema is supported through many of the power 
dynamics and hierarchies that infuse all parts of the hospital system.  This has facilitated 
the continuation of practices and thought processes that deliver negative outcomes for 
patients and doctors alike. 
 
C. Reinforcing and maintaining the Doctor Identity 
During and after a doctor’s training, there are a range of external reinforcers that support 
and maintain the Doctor Identity.  These social supports for the consolidation and 
maintenance of the Doctor Identity often create or increase the positive feelings someone 
has about him or herself.  Some of these are tangible – like a higher than average income 
and some status privileges.  Some are important but intangible, such as power, trust and 
prestige.  At its most basic level, where there is a threat to the Doctor Identity, for many 
doctors there will be a compounding fear that the loss of identity could have a profound 
economic effect on them and their dependants. 
 
The second set of reinforcers comes from the representations of doctors in historic and 
present day cultural narratives, which generally show doctors in a positive, affirming and 
sometimes heroic, light.  At its most sacrificial level, there is the doctor whose life is 
encapsulated in World Medical Association’s Declaration of Geneva which has been 
recommitted to many times, since its creation in 1948.  This states:  
At the time of being admitted as a member of the medical profession, I solemnly 
pledge to consecrate my life to the service of humanity.28 
 
The stories of some doctors living such “consecrated” lives appear in medical culture and in 
the popular mind.  Modern examples include doctors working as volunteers, for example, 
with Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders).  The doctors engage in 
humanitarian work in areas of armed conflict, natural disasters, neglected people and 
refugees and displaced people.  They also campaign on issues like proper access to 
medicines for everybody who needs them, for help for various preventable and curable 
diseases of poorer countries, and for research on diseases common in economically 
                                                
28  See http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/g1/index.html : sighted on 12 February 2015. 
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disadvantaged countries that are often neglected in the research of more economically 
advantaged countries.29  Other examples in the popular imagination are doctors working in 
areas of poverty, with marginalised patients30.  However, there are many other images in 
the media and cultural narratives about doctors that influence how doctors see their own 
identity as a Doctor.  These can be powerful reinforcers of various behaviours or self-
beliefs, some of which may be conducive to patient safety and some of which may not. 
 
1. Power, Privilege and Money 
The selection and formation process for entering medical education reinforces the person’s 
own perceptions of their own capacities and abilities, as discussed in Chapter 5.  Once in 
practice, these beliefs are reinforced by the legal and psycho-social power, the privilege and 
prestige associated with being a doctor and the socio-economic power generally associated 
with being a doctor.  In the latter case, the earnings that are possible through becoming a 
doctor exceed most other careers, and the personal privilege flowing from being a doctor 
add to its attractiveness.  Deeply embedded in the Doctor Identity is also the concept of 
power – at its most basic, power over life and death. 
 
The doctor’s “power” in healthcare is both multi-faceted and pervasive.  Brody divides the 
physician’s power into three areas31.  There is the power which comes directly from a 
doctor’s “training in the discipline and the art and craft of medicine” – called by Brody 
“Aesculapian power”.  There is a sense of personal power and personality characteristics 
independent of this knowledge, which Brody calls “charismatic power”.  The third kind of 
power comes from the high social status and often high socio-economic status of doctors 
and Brody calls it “social power.”  The pervasive impact of these different kinds of power 
on an individual’s self-identity comes because the combination results in real power over 
others, over their life and death.  These create a strong psychological framework around 
                                                
29  See http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/our-work : sighted 13 February 2015. 
30  See eg, Hilfiker D. Not all of us are saints – a doctor’s journey with the poor. 1994 Hill and Wang, 
New York, which tells of his work in the Community of Hope Health Services in a poverty-stricken 
part of Washington DC and Joseph House, a residential facility for homeless men in the final stages of 
AIDS. 
31  Brody H. The Healer’s Power. 1992 Yale University Press, New Haven (USA): pages 16-17. 
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which the Doctor Identity and worldview is shaped.  These powers with other aspects of 
privilege compound each other: 
If physicians either are drawn from the higher socio-economic and educational 
classes or rise to them upon entering medical practice, then cultural power will be 
mixed with the power gained from high social status alone.  That power will appear 
more prominent when the patient is of relatively low socioeconomic status.  The 
physician will live in a certain neighbourhood, wear certain clothes, drive a certain 
car, and use language in a way that tends to cause others in society to defer to her 
wishes, even when the influences of cultural, charismatic and Aesculapian power 
are corrected for.32 
 
Brody also argues that where healing fails and the patient cannot be healed, or where the 
treatment may not be effective, as was historically the case, the charismatic and social 
power of a doctor could trigger the placebo effect in a patient to encourage the body’s own 
healing independently of the treatment.  Where this did not occur, the doctor could provide 
comfort and reassurance that “everything that could be done was done”.33  Brody concludes 
that “The skilful use of charismatic and social power kept medicine successful over the 
centuries when Aesculapian power was relatively empty of effective interventions.”34  The 
knowledge-based power of medicine and these broader powers are intertwined with the 
vulnerability of people when they are ill and dependent upon the knowledge and skills of 
the doctor.35 
 
Such power is reinforced or exemplified by exclusive (or near exclusive) legal powers, for 
example to prescribe many different drugs, to declare a person legally incompetent, to 
subject someone to confinement against their will in a mental hospital, to certify illness for 
leave purposes in employment.  In a study of doctors who became patients, the impact of 
these real powers on a doctor’s self-concept is well-illustrated by one study participant: 
We have the right to give drugs and do things that no other human being has. I can 
put a needle into your spine and thread a wire up it.  I have this tremendous power 
over people, and therefore maybe over myself.  Maybe I can keep anything bad 
from happening to me, because I know that if I am diligent, I can keep anything bad 
                                                
32  Brody 1992 - see note 31: at page 18. 
33  Brody 1992 - see note 31: pages 18-19. 
34  Brody 1992 - see note 31: page 19. 
35  Starr P. The social transformation of American Medicine – the rise of a sovereign profession and the 
making of a vast industry. 1982 Basic Books, New York: Introduction, page 4. 
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from happening to patients.  If something bad does happen to a patient, I think, 
“How could it have happened? I was perfect.”36 
 
Historically, this sense of personal power linked to the Doctor Identity has been reinforced 
by actions and recommended behaviours, designed to ensure that a doctor is seen by others 
as being of a higher status.  For example, in 1495, the learned Italian doctor and 
philosopher Gabriele de Zerbi published his De Cautelis Medicorum (Advice to medical 
men). He set out, among other things37, behaviours designed to reinforce the doctor’s social 
position.  Zerbi’s image of a doctor put him apart from many of the ordinary activities of 
life, with the aim of maintaining the confidence of patients of the power of the doctor.  This 
meant not taking part in public festivities or hunting or public affairs, and being of the right 
social class to ensure his authority, but there was also a need to publicly reinforce this: 
The doctor should therefore emphasize the signs of his class.  His house, said Zerbi, 
should be large and obvious, so that everyone knows where it is (and can reach it 
rapidly in emergency).  His clothes and behaviour should be distinctly non-plebian 
(decent, but avoiding the over-dressing of the doctor who sought success by merely 
pleasing his patient). He should not go shopping for food and household necessities, 
for he would be noticed by the vulgar, which would cheapen him38. 
 
The historical external indicia of power and status are different, but the current populist 
images of doctors continue to reflect analogous external indicia of economic power and 
social privilege in today’s society.  The modern stereotypical indicia, whether they are 
accurate or not, include frequent ownership of expensive cars, living in large houses in 
expensive locations, having children who attend exclusive private schools and having 
frequent overseas holidays (often tax deductible to attend conferences in exotic locations).  
The perceived power aspect of the Doctor Identity is often reinforced by such external 
indicia, where they exist.  The existence of privilege39, often over the lifespan of a Doctor, 
                                                
36  Klitzman R. When doctors become patients. 2008 Oxford University Press, New York: page 34. 
37  Zerbi also included recommendations for the study required to become a physician, describes the ideal 
physician, and the doctor’s proper attitude to the patient and their family. Linden DEJ. Gabriele 
Zerbi’s De cautelis medicorum and the Tradition of Medical Prudence. 1999 Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine, volume 73(1), pages 19-37: at page 22. 
38  French R. The Medical Ethics of Gabriele de Zerbi. Chapter 3 in Wear A. Geyer-Kordesch J. French 
RK. (editors) Doctors and Ethics: The Earlier Historical Setting of Professional Ethics. Clio Medica 
24 – The Wellcome Series in the History of Medicine. 1993 Rodopi, New York, pages 72-97: pages 
74-75. 
39  The meaning of this term in this context is the unearned benefits given to people who fit into a specific 
social group, of which they often remain consciously unaware.  One of the scholars who has written 
about this describes the way that people with a specific privilege may understand the corollary 
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can unconsciously increase feelings of superiority and hubris.  McIntosh also describes the 
consequence of privilege as being “an invisible package of unearned assets that I can count 
on cashing in each day, but about which I was “meant” to remain oblivious.  …privilege is 
like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, 
codebooks, passports, visas, cloths, compass, emergency gear and blank checks.”40  The 
privileges which flow from the Doctor Identity may therefore not always be consciously 
recognised by the doctor.  However, threats which might result in a loss of these privileges, 
through the loss of the status associated with being a doctor, will be felt as a significant 
psychological and possibly material threat. 
 
There is also often a strong link between self-perceptions of power and access to economic 
resources. 41  For example, depending upon the way health services are funded in different 
countries, doctors often also have an exclusive right to perform certain treatments and to 
have them partly or fully reimbursed from the public purse or from other institutional 
funders, such as private health insurers.  These are potent economic powers.  Doctors’ 
incomes are high relative to the rest of the community in many countries, which provides 
further social and economic reinforcement of their professional prestige and the social 
privilege associated with being a member of the medical profession.  It provides greater 
economic opportunities for themselves and their families and there is generally a culturally 
assumed linkage between power and income42  A significant difference also exists in both 
                                                
disadvantage eg of being black, without recognising the benefits they have every day eg from being 
white.  McIntosh M. White privilege and Male privilege - A personal account of coming to see 
correspondence through work in Women’s Studies. Working Paper 189. 1988 Wellesley Centers for 
Women, Massachusetts (USA). Paper available at: http://nationalseedproject.org/peggy-mcintosh-s-
white-privilege-papers.  She argues that the obliviousness to the advantages of specific privileges 
fosters the maintenance of the myth of meritocracy. 
40  McIntosh 1988 – see note 39: page 1. 
41  The American Sociologist Charles Horton Cooley described how someone’s self-image is shaped by 
society, through his concept of the Looking Glass Self, which includes the idea that our sense of self 
grows out of our social interactions with others, and our understanding of our identity is reflected on 
the values and attributes “seen” or judged by others.  Cooley CH. On Self and Social Organization. 
Schubert HJ (editor). 1998 University of Chicago Press, Chicago: see Part III – The Self, Social Order 
and Social Changes. 
42  Brody 1992- see note 31: page 208. 
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Australia43 and the US44 between the earnings of private specialists, primary care doctors 
and hospital employed specialists.  The medical power and status differentials between the 
various groups in hospital hierarchies often reflect or are reinforced by income 
differentials45. 
 
High income levels can also be seen as an “objective measure” that doctors are “better 
than” the average.  In Australia, the income of doctors is generally in the highest income 
quintile.  In the 2011 Census, using $1,500 per week as a generous estimate of male full-
time weekly earnings, only 14% of the population over 15 years had personal income above 
that level46, about 30% of full-time employees and 85% of full-time employed doctors.  For 
doctors working part-time, over 70% had earnings above that level.47  Table 6.1 shows the 
breakdown of various different sub-groups in the medical practitioner occupational 
category by income48.   
                                                
43  Cheng TC. Scott A. Jeon S-H. Kalb G. Humphreys J. Joyce C. What factors influence the earnings of 
GPs and Medical Specialists in Australia? Evidence from the MABEL survey. Melbourne Institute 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12/10. July 2010 Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic 
and Social Research, Melbourne: page 10.  This showed the average gross personal earnings from 
medical practice in 2008 as $177,883 for general practitioners and $316,570 for specialists. For GPs 
who were self-employed, the earnings level was 27.6% above those PS who were salaried or on 
contract (page 12).  For specialists who were self-employed (either hospital or non-hospital based), 
their earnings were 26.8% higher than hospital-based salaried specialists with no right of private 
practice (page 13). 
44  This differential has been long-standing in the US See Brody 1992 - see note 31: pages 214-220.  For 
recent figures see: Japsen B. Doctor pay rises to $221K for Primary Care, $396K for specialists. 2013 
Forbes – Pharma and Healthcare, 12 June. Available at: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2013/06/12/doctor-pay-rises-to-221k-for-primary-care-396k-
for-specialists/ sighted 28 April 2015. 
45  The work of Helmreich and Merritt discuss the status differentials between actors in an operating 
theatre – different kinds of doctors, nurses, orderlies – and note that “Status inequalities in the OR are 
pervasive and readily observable.  All physician groups have higher status than surgical and 
anaesthesia nurses and do not hesitate to invoke their authority. Helmreich et al. 1998 – see note 9: 
page 12. 
46  The 2011 census collected personal income data for all persons aged 15 years and over.  People were 
asked to report a total of all wages and salaries, government benefits, pensions, allowances and other 
incomes they usually receive before deductions for tax, superannuation contributions, salary sacrifice, 
or other deductions, like health insurance or other automatic deductions.  These were reported within 
12 weekly income ranges set by ABS. 
47  These data are calculated from the 2011 Census Data using the web-based data analysis tools Table 
Builder.  The analysis was done on the 2011 Census – Employment, income and unpaid work 
database.     
48  These are self-reported income levels and are normally considered by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) to be an under-estimate in most cases across the income spread and across all 
occupations.   See Australian Bureau of Statistics. Income data in the Census. Factsheet.  3rd paragraph 
under “Points to consider when using Census income data”: sighted 14 April 2015, 
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Table 6.1: 2011 Australian Census Data – Doctors and Employed People,  
by level of Personal Income 
 
Occupational group and Labour force category 
Income 
less than 
$600  
$600-
<$1,500 
$1,500-
$1,999 
$2,000 
or more  
Total - 
all 
incomes 
% Total in 
highest 
income 
bracket 
Employed 
worked 
full-time 
Generalist Medical Practitioners 206 6,300 5,522 19,614 31,642 62% 
Anaesthetists 14 58 255 2,547 2,874 89% 
Specialist Physicians 12 232 500 3,371 4,115 82% 
Psychiatrists 3 76 207 1,425 1,711 83% 
Surgeons 12 162 291 3,597 4,062 89% 
Medical Practitioners - other* 91 733 1,084 5,518 7,426 74% 
Total f/t doctors 338 7,561 7,859 36,072 51,830 70% 
All f/t employed 702,554 3,745,08
6 
924,278 891,533 6,263,45
1 
14% 
Employed 
worked 
part-time 
Generalist Medical Practitioners 420 2,528 1,718 4,482 9,148 49% 
Anaesthetists 0 43 55 562 660 85% 
Specialist Physicians 51 226 132 609 1,018 60% 
Psychiatrists 27 126 96 472 721 65% 
Surgeons 33 134 87 367 621 59% 
Medical Practitioners - other* 225 384 207 1114 1,930 58% 
Total p/t Doctors 756 3,441 2,295 7,606 14,098 54% 
All p/t employed 1,889,342 954,724 90,282 78,738 3,013,08
6 
3% 
Total 
employed 
Generalist Medical Practitioners 626 8828 7240 24,096 40,790 59% 
Anaesthetists 14 101 310 3,109 3,534 88% 
Specialist Physicians 63 458 632 3,980 5,133 78% 
Psychiatrists 30 202 303 1897 2,432 78% 
Surgeons 45 296 378 3964 4,683 85% 
Medical Practitioners - other* 316 1117 1291 6632 9,356 71% 
Total Doctors 1,094 11,002 10,154 43,678 65,928 66% 
All employed 2,591,896 4,699,81
0 
1,014,560 970,271 9,276,53
7 
10% 
% in 
different 
income 
brackets 
% of all f/t employed doctors 1% 15% 15% 70% 100%  
% of all employed doctors 2% 17% 15% 66% 100%  
% of all f/t employed 11% 60% 15% 14% 100%  
% of all employed 28% 51% 11% 10% 100%  
 
Source: Specific data drawn from Employment, income and unpaid 
work database of the 2011 Census, held by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics and accessed through Table Builder. 
 
                                                
http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/factsheetsuid?opendocument&navpos=450 .  
Only census income data has been used in this analysis, because the estimates of income used are 
different than the methods used in other ABS income/earnings series.  The income categorisation used 
was based on the ABS median income figure from that census of $577 (rounded to the nearest category 
above that ie, the one ending at $599).  The ABS income groupings above $1,500 are listed separately, 
because of the average male earning figure used in the ABS Doctors and Nurses publication referred to 
below.   
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The Doctors and Nurses Study49 based its estimate of doctor earnings on the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics Survey of Employee Earning and Hours.  In that Study, undertaken in 
2012, full-time doctors in non-managerial positions earned an average of $2,862.30 per 
week.  There was a significant gender difference, with the figure for male doctors being 
$3,015.60, and female doctors being $2,644.1050.  The equivalent figures for all 
occupations were $1,471.70 for men and $1,266.40 for women, with the median for that 
same full-time group at $1,250.00 and the overall median being $963.00 for all 
employees51.  Despite this inbuilt gender disparity, at more than twice the average of other 
full-time workers, both male and female doctors are among the highest paid people in our 
society. 
 
The self-reported data of the Census and the data in the Doctors and Nurses study are also 
supported by Australian Tax Office Data.  2012-13 Tax office data showed that of the 10 
best paid occupations, using average taxable income from 2012-13, 6 were varieties of 
medical practitioner. 
                                                
49  ABS. Australian Social Trend, April 2013: Doctors and Nurses. ABS Cat No. 4102.0. 10 April 2013: 
at page 5 - How much do doctors and Nurses earn? 
50  The earnings of female clinicians are significantly lower than those of male clinicians, even when 
controlled for hours worked – the 2010 Melbourne Institute Study of doctor income showed that the 
earnings of female general practitioners and specialists are between 17% and 25% respectively lower 
than male equivalent doctors. Cheng et al 2010 – see note 43: page 12 and page 16 – the higher figure 
of 25% is on page 12 and attributed to GPs.  However, there is a lower figure for the upper range of 
23% on page 16. No explanation is provided nor base data to check the calculations. 
The comparisons in this study controlled for different hours worked, where this was an issue The 
econometric model used in the study is set out in the report – see Cheng et al 2010 – see note 43: at 
pages 6-8.  One of the authors Professor Scott noted that the differential between the earnings of male 
and female General Practitioners, exceeded the national gender earnings disparity of 20.7% Melbourne 
Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research. Female GPs earn 25% less than male 
counterparts.  Media Statement, 21 July 2010. 
Using Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) employee earning data, also shows that female medical 
practitioners work less than one hour less than male medical practitioners for 87% of the income. ABS. 
Employee Earnings and Hours, Australia, May 2012. ABS Cat No. 6306.0, released 23 January 2013: 
at page 2 – Headline results.  
51  ABS 2010 – see note 50: at page 2 – Headline results. 
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Table 6.2: Australia’s 10 best paid occupations 2012-13 
 Occupation No. of individuals Average taxable 
income 
1 Surgeons 3,570 $361,202 
2 Anaesthetists 3,015 $319,033 
3 Internal Medicine Specialists 7,525 $263,601 
4 Financial dealers 5,090 $219,213 
5 Judicial and other legal professionals 2,645 $192,189 
6 Psychiatrists 2,610 $186,778 
7 Mining Engineers 9,595 $166,410 
8 Other medical practitioners 30,455 $166,025 
9 Chief executives and Managing Directors 146,355 $152,364 
10 Generalist medical practitioners 23,430 $144,498 
 
Source: Australian Tax Office. Media Release – Australia’s 
highest earners revealed. 29 April 2015.  These income figures 
are after costs of practice and other tax deductions are removed.  
 
While the income measures used in these various data are not measuring exactly the same 
thing, they consistently show that doctors in Australia are in the highest income earning 
groups in the community.  In a society where income level is correlated with social status, 
health and social “worth”, income can be a powerful reinforcer of the positive self-
perception and hierarchical power of doctors.  Combined with the high socio-economic 
backgrounds of many who enter medicine, discussed in Chapter 5, the high levels of 
income will directly reinforce the privilege associated with being a doctor and provide 
practical, material purpose to protecting the Doctor Identity. 
 
However, where the importance of maintenance of income, and its associated power and 
privileges, become a motivational priority, this can have a number of negative 
consequences so far as patient safety is concerned.  The linkage between high income and 
power, and the doctor’s altruistic obligations discussed above, creates ethical problems for 
the medical profession and individual doctors, especially in fee-for-service based medicine.  
In these situations, the doctor’s own income is contingent on the provision of a service, 
payable by the patient.  Because doctors advise on the existence of a condition and the most 
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appropriate treatment for that condition52, they are in a position of great power and 
influence over the choices made by a patient or family, and many of these can substantially 
financially benefit the doctor.  The issue of the impact of high income on doctors’ practices 
has been a concern historically.  The famous 15th Century physician Paracelsus, for 
example, describes the true physician as treating “the sick ‘out of love for his neighbour’, in 
contrast to the ‘wolf doctor’, who only thinks of financial gain”.53 
 
The ethical issue is not the financial benefit directly, but the conscious and even 
unconscious incentive there will be for a doctor to promote options which may benefit the 
doctor and not necessarily be the safest, best or preferred option of the patient.  Pellegrino 
describes the risk to physician virtue in these situations in this manner: 
 [T]here remains the inescapable human inclination to compromise integrity in the 
cause of self-interest.  As a result, scientific data, research protocols, the context of 
scientific or technical consultations, and the management of patients in clinical 
investigations may subtly be or overtly shaped to please the funding source54. 
 
There are also examples of where doctors enlist their patients or potential patients in 
debates with Government about medical fee levels, where it is mainly the doctor’s income 
level which is at risk55.  Similarly, when doctors provide governments with “policy advice”, 
                                                
52  Indeed, there is evidence that medicine as the “delineator of pathology” is now able to define problems 
once recognised as personal characteristics (eg easily feeling embarrassment or being a certain 
weight), or economic issues or social phenomena (eg the current socio-economic determinants of 
health) as either illnesses or as part of the domain of influence of medicine. See eg, Freidson E. 
Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge. 1970 (2nd edition -1988 
Impress) University of Chicago Press, Chicago: Chapter 12, pages 244-277.  See also Freidson E. 
Professional Dominance – the Social Structure of Medical Care. 1970 (reissued in 2007) Aldine 
Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (NJ. USA): at page 147. 
53  Bergdolt K. The discourses of practitioners in Medieval and Renaissance Europe. Chapter 26 in Baker 
RB and McCullough LB.(editors) The Cambridge World History of Ethics. Book DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521888790 online publication date May 2012. 2008 Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge (UK): page 377. 
54  Pellegrino ED. Thomasma DC. The Virtues in Medical Practice. 1993 Oxford University Press, New 
York: at page 171. 
55  In 2009 the Australian Government sought to reduce the Medicare rebate payable for cataract surgery, 
because new technology had reduced what was once a lengthy and complicated procedure to one 
which was now simple and inexpensive.  The reduction was designed to ensure that Medicare rebates 
were commensurate with the effort required to carry out the procedure.  Reports stated that the income 
of many ophthalmologists exceeded $1 million per year.  The ophthalmologists were reported to have 
warned their elderly patients that prices to them would therefore rise, and engaged them in an 
ultimately successful political campaign to reduce the savings sought by Government. Alexander H. 
Medew J. Harrison D. Doctors’ fees under microscope. 2015 The Canberra Times – Forum, 24 
January, page 4. 
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they will often promote their own economic interests, thinly disguised in a veneer of patient 
interest.56  To a large extent then, the socio-economic power, income and privilege 
associated with the Doctor Identity creates a rich environment of conflicting values.  As 
discussed in Chapter 557, these conflicts can generate significant psychological turmoil, as 
doctors are faced with two conflicting cognitively dissonant pictures of their actions and 
motivations.  Once again, these can reinforce and normalise a tendency not to think too 
much about the apparent conflict, but to engage in “non-reflective professionalism”58 
discussed in Chapter 5. In this case, the patient’s and doctor’s interests are conflated to the 
economic benefit of the doctor, as a way of resolving the potential cognitive dissonance in 
the individual doctor’s mind and in the professional group’s collective mind-set. 
 
The recent Report for the Royal Australian College of Surgeons also showed a range of 
negative impacts on medical culture from a focus on maximising commercial gain, 
including: 
• Bullying and lack of cooperation with colleagues driven by desire to maintain 
market share; 
• Actual or potential compromised assessments of international medical graduates 
who may become future competitors; 
• Separating real performance concerns from competitors or new entrants into the 
market, when the assessors have a personal stake in minimising competition.59 
 
                                                
56  For example, doctors will promote fee for service medicine (which can provide them with direct 
control over often a much greater income stream than other forms of payment) by saying it provides 
greater consumer choice, when for many patients, this form of funding may actively undermine their 
capacity to access medical services at all.  Another Australian example is where the medical profession 
has opposed the creation of publicly funded fee-for-service reimbursement of nurse practitioner roles, 
not because of direct fear of competition but on the basis of patient health and safety. See Keating T. 
Trasancos C. The development of Nurse Practitioner Policy. Chapter in Lin V. Gibson B. Evidence –
based Health Policy – problems and possibilities. 2003 Oxford University Press, Melbourne, pages 
144-155. 
57  Hilfiker D. Healing the Wounds: A physician looks at his work. 1985 Pantheon Books, New York: 
page 177. 
58  Another analogous explanation for this behaviour can be found in the work of the philosopher Alasdair 
MacIntyre, who talks about compartmentalisation between work roles and someone’s own moral code, 
and the challenge and courage required of a moral agent to work across these thought compartments. 
Macintyre A. Social structures and their threats to moral agency. 1999 Philosophy, volume 74, pages 
311-329 at 321. 
59  RACS EAG Report 2015 – see note 10: at page 12. 
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So far as consolidation and maintenance of the Doctor Identity is concerned, it is arguable 
that the economic and social rewards associated with “being a doctor” are extremely 
powerful drivers to encourage someone to remain as a doctor.  The competitive nature of at 
least some parts of the profession also cause conflicts with ethical standards requiring the 
“effacement of self-interest”.  Pellegrino and Thomasma argue that this altruistic 
beneficence has been deeply eroded with the general rise of self-interest in society and the 
tension this has created, leading to “the moral malaise of the profession”.   
 
The tension between the stated ethical goals of the profession and the personal imperatives 
to maintain income and associated privileges appear to sometimes be resolved through 
unconsciously placing priority on these external reinforcers of the Doctor Identity.  
Sometimes this can have a direct negative impact on patient safety for example, by 
exposing a patient to the risks of unnecessary treatment.  It can also decrease the incentive 
to recognise and act on preventable patient harm, particularly, where to do so, may give rise 
to addition costs or to a threat to professional kudos.  Perhaps the greatest potentially 
negative impact is the additional magnification of the “fear of loss” that can arise with a 
threat to Identity, when the potential loss of this identity would also put income, privilege, 
and power at risk. 
 
2. Medical Narrative and media stereotypes of the Doctor 
The Doctor identity is influenced intensely by doctors seeing themselves and being seen by 
the public as members of a profession.  Since the late medieval period, medicine has been 
considered one of the classic “learned” professions, behind theology and next to law.60  
Medicine’s role, influence, scope and means of operation as a profession have varied much 
over the centuries61.  In modern times, it is probably considered the quintessential 
profession, with even a greater significance than was historically the case, because of its 
                                                
60  O’Day R. The Professions in Early Modern England, 1450-1800: Servants of the Commonweal. 2000 
Pearson Education, Harlow (England). 
61  Pelling M. The Common Lot – Sickness, medical occupations and the urban poor in Early Modern 
England. 1998 Addison Wesley and Longman Ltd, London (UK): see Part III- Occupations, especially 
Chapter 9 on barber surgeons and Chapter 10 on medical practitioners. 
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connection to modern science and technology62.  Some of the key elements traditionally 
associated with being a profession are: 
• A body of complex knowledge and skills; 
• Altruism/ public service; 
• Ethical codes or standards; 
• The existence of a “contract” with society in exchange for monopoly powers; 
• Autonomy and self-regulation; and 
• Control of entry into the profession. 
While many aspects of being a profession or professional have changed over time63., there 
are some of these elements which remain in the popular imagination, sometimes supported 
by laws, including the ethical and service expectations of the medical profession64.   
 
Some of these have deep cultural roots in the medical narrative.  An example of this is the 
frequent references to Hippocrates and to his oath, as the basis for both the practice and 
ethics of modern medicine, more than 2000 years after its genesis.  Despite clear debate 
                                                
62  See discussion by Friedson 1970, 1988 Impress – see note 52: page xviii. 
63  Self-regulation is one of the areas of change, with Governments in many places increasing their 
regulatory control, particularly where patient safety is concerned. For example, since July 2010 in 
Australia, the Australian Health Professions Regulatory Authority has provided a national government 
regulatory framework based on registration, which now covers 14 health professions.  In the 
Intergovernmental agreement which was the basis for this scheme, the Commonwealth, State and 
Territory ministers listed the criteria they considered relevant for including any other groups claiming 
that their profession should also be covered by the national system in Attachment B to the 
Intergovernmental Agreement for a National Registration and Accreditation Scheme for the Health 
Professions dated 26 March 2008: at pages 22-24.  
64  See eg, Medical Board of Australia. Good medical practice: a Code of Conduct for Doctors in 
Australia. March 2014.  The purpose of this Code according to the Medical Board of Australia is to 
inform doctors of what is expected of all doctors registered in Australia and to inform the community 
what it can expect from doctors. Sighted 4 November 2015.  The original version was prepared by the 
Australian Medical Council: Australian Medical Council (AMC). Good Medical Practice: A Code of 
Conduct for Doctors in Australia- Developed by a working party of the Australian Medical Council on 
behalf of the medical boards of the Australian states and territories. July 2009 AMC, Canberra.  The 
most recent version is available at http://www.medicalboard.gov.au/Codes-Guidelines-Policies/Code-
of-conduct.aspx. 
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about the Oath’s authorship65, continuity of use66 and its relevance to modern medicine67, 
as well as its lack of use in Australian Medical Schools68, it is still drawn on as a source of 
historic and moral gravitas by Australian doctors in the public domain69.  For example, in 
2014, in the public debate about the medical use of marijuana in Australia, the then 
President of the Royal Australasian College of Physicians relied on this associated gravitas, 
when he wrote “The doctors’ Hippocratic oath “to first, do no harm” guides my conduct”.70  
Thus, even though the reference is to a phrase not even part of the Oath71, there is sufficient 
                                                
65  Compare: Nutton V. Medicine in the Greek World. Chapter 1 in Conrad LI. Neve M. Nutton V. Porter 
R. Wear A. (editors and Members of the Academic Unit, the Wellcome Institute for the History of 
Medicine, London). The Western Medical Tradition 800 BC to 1800 AD. 1995 Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge (UK); with Wootten D. Bad Medicine – Doctors doing harm since Hippocrates. 
2007 Oxford University Press, Oxford: page 5.  See also, Farnell LR. Greek Hero Cults and the ideas 
of immortality, 1920 The Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of St Andrews. 1921 Clarendon 
Press, Oxford: page 269: accessed through the Internet Archive on 20 March 2015: 
https://archive.org/stream/greekherocultsid00farnuoft#page/n5/mode/2up 
66  See Nutton 1995 - see note 65: page 29; see also Wootton D. – see note 65: page 5. 
67  See eg, Kerä L. The Hippocratic Oath as epideictic rhetoric: reanimating medicine’s past for its future. 
2001 Journal of Medical Humanities, volume 22 (1), pages 55- 68. 
68  In a 2002 study of the use of ethical declaration s associated with medical graduation in Australia and 
New Zealand, only one University used a modified Hippocratic Oath.  Five use the 1949 Geneva 
Declaration of the World Medical Association or a modification of that and one (University of New 
South Wales) allowed the final year medical students to collectively determine their own. McNeill PM. 
Dowton SB. Declarations made by graduating medical students in Australia and New Zealand. 2002 
Medical Journal of Australia, 4 February, volume 176, pages 123-125. 
69  For example, a search on the content of a newspaper for Australian general practitioners, called 
Australian Doctor, for the period between September 2005 and March 2010 has at least 30 references 
to Hippocrates. These relate to topics as diverse as: opposition to Medicare audits of doctors (Sahari S. 
Medicare’s new powers overstep the mark Australian Doctor 22 August 2008: page 24); service to the 
Northern Territory health system (McNamara S. NT starved of doctors despite initiative. Australian 
Doctor. 17 October 2008: page 13; teaching in general practice (Grist J. Road to excellence. Australian 
Doctor. 3 October 2008, page 46); making profits in medical practice (Parnell K. Hard evidence 
needed to tackle overservicing. Australian Doctor, 10 February 2006, page 18); and the ethics of 
medical reality television and television reporting of medical intrusions on Saddam Hussein after his 
capture (McCredie J. As seen on TV. Australian Doctor. 17 March 2006: page 17). 
70  Professor Nicholas Talley (President of the Royal Australian College of Physicians). RACP head says 
it’s time for clinical trials for marijuana. 2014 Canberra Times. 3 September. Sighted 20 March 2015 
at http://www.canberratimes.com.au/comment/racp-head-says-its-time-for-clinical-trials-for-
marijuana-20140903-10bt06.html. 
71  An Hippocratean reference exists in Epidemics, Book 1, Chapter 2, Part 11, in a section about using 
bowel movements to predict the progress of a disease, the Hippocratean author says “Declare the past, 
diagnose the present, foretell the future; practise these acts. As to diseases, make a habit of two things-
-to help, or at least to do no harm. The art has three factors, the disease, the patient, the physician. The 
physician is the servant of the art. The patient must co-operate with the physician in combating the 
disease.”  For a more detailed history of the phrase “Primum Non Nocere – First, do no harm”, which 
is of much more recent origin, see Smith CM. Origins and Uses of Primum Non Nocere – Above All - 
Do No Harm! 2005 Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, volume 45, pages 371-377. 
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cultural meaning for both the doctor and the audience to understand the serious medical 
nature of his statement. 
 
Our society’s understanding and picture of medicine are underpinned at many levels by 
powerful narratives about what it is to be a doctor and about the nature of modern 
healthcare.  These exist partly as a projection of the expectations of medicine as a 
profession.  At a more complicated level, the narratives of the “miracle of modern 
medicine” and “heroic doctors,” are driven by the human fear of illness and its 
consequences, and mortality. These protective narratives include: 
• medical omnipotence or invulnerability72,  
• the belief that all medical services that are delivered are best practice73; and  
• medical omniscience and the universal beneficence in healthcare74.   
 
While most doctors recognise that they are not omnipotent or omniscient and that medical 
understanding is limited and subject to revision75, the cultural narratives are powerful, 
pervasive and influential within medicine, healthcare and wider society.  Patients and the 
community often accept these stories, because when people require medical care when they 
                                                
72  See eg, Malterud K. Hollnagel H. The doctor who cried: a qualitative study about the doctor’s 
vulnerability. 1995 Annals of Family Medicine, volume 3(4), July/August, pages 348-352: at page 348.  
Hardwick PJ. Lunch times eaten? 2000 Psychiatric Bulletin, volume 24, pages 2-27: at page 26; Banja 
J. Medical errors and medical narcissism. 2005 Jones and Barlett Publishers, Boston: see especially 
pages 63-68.  
73  See eg, the recent Australian Care Track study, patients receiving care received appropriate care in 
57% of their encounters (ranging from 90% for coronary heart disease to 13% for alcohol 
dependence):  Runciman WB. Hunt TD. Hannaford NA. Hibbert PD. Westbrook JI. Colera EW. Day 
RO. Hindmarsh DM. McGlynn EA. Braithwaite J. CareTrack: assessing the appropriateness of health 
care delivery in Australia. 2012 Medical Journal of Australia, 16 July, volume 197(2), pages 100-105; 
and the 2003 US Appropriateness of Care study, which showed patients overall received 54.9% of 
recommended care, ranging from a high of 78.7% for senile cataracts to 10.5% for alcohol 
dependence: McGlynn EA. Asch SM. Adams J. Keesey J. Hicks J. DeCristofaro A. Kerr EA. The 
quality of health care delivered to adults in the United States. 2003 New England Journal of Medicine, 
26 June, volume 348, pages 2635-2645. 
74  Prasad V. Vandross A. Toomey C. Cheung M. Rho J. Quinn S. Chacko SJ. Borkar D. Gall V. Selvaraj 
S. Ho N. Cifu A. A decade of reversal: an analysis of 146 contradicted medical practices. 2013 Mayo 
Clinic Proceedings, August, volume 88(8), pages 790-798. 
75  See comments on Prasad et al at note 74 by Mandrola J. Changing the culture of American Medicine – 
start by removing hubris, 28 July 2013 at http://www.drjohnm.org/2013/07/changing-the-culture-of-
american-medicine-start-by-removing-hubris/ sighted on 21 August 2013. 
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are sick, they are very vulnerable76.  The medical ethicist Edmund Pellegrino describes the 
problematic aspect of the necessary trust that must be placed in a professional whose 
services are required to heal patients.  A sick or injured person is placed in what he calls a 
“state of special dependence” because “we are forced to trust professionals if we wish 
access to their knowledge and skill … to surmount or cope with our most pressing human 
needs”77. At these times, these narratives can be reassuring and can relieve the anxiety 
associated with the vulnerability of illness.  In his 1972 critique of medicine and its 
effectiveness, Cochrane describes the reliance of patients on ineffective treatments and the 
provision of these by doctors as “a marriage of two minds – between the desire to help and 
the desire to be helped”.78 
 
Perhaps equally importantly, it is difficult to find publicly available data to contradict these 
narratives79  Despite the original research of the Quality in Australian Health Care Study 
published two decades ago showing the high incidence of preventable harm in healthcare in 
Australia, there continues to be a lack of comprehensive publicly available performance 
and outcome reporting in most of healthcare80.  This means patients or others involved in 
the public discourse about preventable patient harm have difficulty either questioning or 
affirming these stories from a proper evidence base. 
 
                                                
76  McKinley S. Nagy S. Stein-Parbury J. Bramwell M. Hudson J. Vulnerability and security in seriously 
ill patients in intensive care. 2002 Intensive and Critical Care Nursing, volume 18(1), February, pages 
27-36. 
77  Pellegrino et al. 1993 – see note 54: Chapter 5 – Fidelity to trust, pages 65-78: at page 65. 
78  Cochrane AL. Effectiveness and efficiency –random reflections on health services. 1972 The Nuffield 
Provincial Hospitals Trust, Nuffield (England). Available at: 
http://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/publications/effectiveness-and-efficiency-random-reflections-health-
services accessed on 24 March 2014: page 9. 
79  Insight Economics Deloitte. Evaluating health outcomes in Australia’s healthcare system – a scoping 
study of potential methods and new approaches. 2007 Australian Centre for Health Research, 
Melbourne: section 3.4, page 33. 
80  The Australian Government is providing some comparative performance data though the My Healthy 
Communities website http://myhealthycommunities.gov.au/national and My Hospitals website 
http://www.myhospitals.gov.au/about-the-data/overview .  While both have some data on safety and 
quality related data, it is very rudimentary at present.  For example, My Hospitals quality and safety 
data covers hand-washing and hospital acquired infections only.  My Health Communities data is 
focussed more on derivative measures of primary and specialty care quality outside of hospital, eg 
potentially preventable hospitalisations, barriers to accessing care; and public health related data.  The 
absence of data on preventable patient harm remains a significant concern. 
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While there are often statements made about the quality of Australian healthcare, most of 
these are aspirational rather than factual for a number of reasons.  First, there is a 
longstanding lack of current data on quality of care both nationally81 and internationally82.  
Secondly, the limited available data on appropriateness of care in Australia shows less than 
60% of patients receiving appropriate care83 and that there is significant, unexplained 
variable in interventions across Australian healthcare84.  Thirdly, there are widely 
acknowledged high levels of preventable patient harm from those studies which have been 
conducted as was seen in Chapter 1.  Lastly, progress at achieving measurable 
improvements in patient safety has been acknowledged as halting and slow, partially 
because of this lack of data85.   
 
The cultural narrative most associated with modern medicine in the popular media also 
provide the community with comforting, inspiring tales of doctors and nurses doing their 
heroic best in struggles against all odds, usually with positive health outcomes for the 
patient.86  These are reinforced on television through medical dramas and medical “reality” 
television series87, through other media and, in some cases, by direct healthcare provider 
                                                
81  See Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC). Chapter 10 - Reporting 
for Safety: Use of Hospital Data to monitor and improve patient safety in  ACSQHC. Windows into 
Safety and Quality in Health Care. 2010 ACSQHC, Sydney. 
82  Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. World Health Organization (WHO) World Alliance for 
Patient Safety.  Knowledge is the enemy of unsafe care. 1st meeting on the Global Research Program 
for Patient Safety. 1 November 2005 Meeting Summary  
83  Runciman et al. 2012 – see note 73. 
84  Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare (ACSQHC) and the National Health 
Performance Authority. Australian Atlas of Healthcare Variation. 2015 ACSQHC, Sydney. 
85  See eg, Pham JC. Frick KD. Pronovost PJ. Why we don’t know whether care is safe? 2013 American 
Journal of Medical Quality, volume 28(6), pages 457-463; Berwick DM. My Right Knee. 2005 Annals 
of Internal Medicine. 18 January, volume 142(2), health module, page 121-125; Makary MA. Daniel 
M. Medical error – the third leading cause of death in the US. 2016 British Medical Journal, 3 May, 
volume 353, page i2139 : doi: http://dx.doi.org.virtual.anu.edu.au/10.1136/bmj.i2139 
86  See eg, a search of You tube shows many presentations on medical miracles, some of which are patient 
stories mediated by a journalist, some of which are promotional videos of an institution around a 
patient story eg: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nWtPQak2cYk , 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8NSH4272QY , 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJnuK3yAwl0  
87  In a Ranker listing of the best medical “reality tv shows”, they are described in the following manner:  
The best medical reality shows are those that present fascinating, challenging medical cases 
and then let viewers see how patients are treated. The subject matter in a great medical 
reality TV show is often bizarre (or at the very least, slightly unusual), and the doctors, 
nurses and other medical staff involved in treatment are charismatic.  
 Chapter 6 –The consolidation and maintenance of the Doctor Identity 288 
self-promotion through advertising and other means88.  The beliefs promoted in these 
stories is that healthcare delivers miracles89, and that doctors, as leaders in these miracles, 
are able to transcend the scourge of illness, infertility and death through extraordinary skill 
and almost super-human power.  In many ways, the narrative is that of a medieval chivalric 
tale, with the disease as dragon, the patient as the person requiring rescue and the doctor or 
medical team as the heroic knight or band of knights.  While at some level most doctors are 
aware of the mythical nature of the narrative, it nonetheless can provide significant 
psychological comfort and a potential alternative when cognitive dissonance arises and 
identity is threatened, because of preventable patient harm.  This can more easily be 
reframed as one of the necessary casualties in an heroic battle against illness and mortality. 
 
Where someone dies in medical care, the pervasive cultural story can provide comfort to 
provider and family alike.  The explanation is framed in terms of the inevitability of death 
because the odds against survival were just too high.  The person was too old or too sick or 
otherwise unable to “win the fight”.  They were in the final stages of life, and were 
suffering from horrendously complex conditions.  If this is not the case, then there are other 
exculpatory narratives that say almost all adverse events arise from system problems and 
are not the responsibility of individual doctors or health professionals.  In this larger 
cultural narrative, victories over mortality belong to the doctors, and failures belong to the 
patient, “the system” or the overwhelming power of the adversary disease.  These narrative 
protects doctors, patients and families alike from the much less comforting picture provided 
by the limited data that exists.  They provide a strong buttress to support and protect the 
Doctor Identity when preventable patient harm occurs, and provide a useful, often 
unquestioningly acceptable justification for the negative outcomes of care for patients and 
families. 
 
                                                
See: http://www.ranker.com/list/best-reality-medical-shows/tvs-frank : accessed 5 November 2013. 
Some Australian examples are Last Chance Surgery, presented by a past president of the Australian 
Medical Association, and RPA, which has been running since 1995 and is promoted as “capturing the 
compelling around-the-clock drama of the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital in Sydney”.  
88  See eg, the role of women’s magazines in the promotion of plastic surgery and individual plastic 
surgeons: Sullivan DA. Cosmetic surgery: the cutting edge of commercial medicine in America. 2001 
Rutgers University Press, New Jersey (USA): see especially chapter 7, pages 155-186. 
89  See eg, The Huffington Post, Medical Miracles at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tag/medical-
miracles ;  The Mirror, Medical miracles at http://www.mirror.co.uk/all-about/medical%20miracles. 
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Where a story of unsafe care or some other professionally inappropriate conduct becomes 
headline news in the media, the underlying power of the heroic cultural story come in to 
separate this individual or facility from the rest of the profession and the protective 
statutory edifices put up to protect the public from “rogues”.  This is made easier where the 
doctor is seen as an outsider, such as the overseas-trained surgeon Dr Patel in Bundaberg 
who was labelled in the media as Dr Death90, or someone who is mentally ill, such as the 
so-called “Butcher of Bega” Dr Graeme Reeve91. Such extreme categorisations serve to 
exclude these behaviours and the doctors concerned from tainting the cultural narrative of 
doctors as intrinsically heroic and caring.  These people become to be seen as aberrations 
and “non-doctors”.  They are often portrayed as the cultural opposite of “the Doctor 
Identity”, rather than examples upon the spectrum of doctor performance.   
 
The heroic and caring cultural stories remain untainted, despite there usually being 
significant evidence that there was wide knowledge of problems amongst colleagues and 
nothing was done by them to protect patients.  Further, even though in these cases, both 
practitioners had already had formal limitations placed on their practices in other places, the 
Statutory and professional “guardians of the practice gate” were ineffective to protect other 
patients from harm.  In some cases, while the hospitals or individuals subject to 
investigation are held up as the epitome of evil or examples of practice way outside the 
boundaries, often the differences between “normal practice” and what is uncovered are 
shades of grey rather than the black and white ends of the spectrum.  The quarantining of 
the moral or practice failures to those individuals and organisations that are able to be 
“othered” ensures they are excluded from the Doctor Identity92.   
 
                                                
90  Lessons from Dr Death. Editorial, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 April 2005, sighted at 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/Editorial/Lessons-from-Dr-Death/2005/04/25/1114281502583.html on 
15 June 2015. 
91  Carroll L. ‘Butcher of Bega’ Graeme Reeves released from jail, Sydney Morning Herald,  28 
December 2013: sighted at http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/butcher-of-bega-graeme-reeves-released-
from-jail-20131228-300fo.html. 
92  This is analogous to the analysis of Eichmann in Hannah Arendt’s classic analysis of his trial in 
Jerusalem.  In her analysis, evil was not committed by demons or monsters, but often by very ordinary 
people – what she describes as the “banality of evil”, which came from a failure to think, empathise 
and consider the moral and practical consequences of one’s actions. Arendt H. Eichmann in Jerusalem 
– A Report on the Banality of Evil. 2006 Penguin Books, New York: see particularly the introduction 
by Amos Elon and the Epilogue and Postscript, pages 253-298. 
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In practical terms, to acknowledge and act as if healthcare was as unsafe as the limited data 
shows would fundamentally challenge the beneficence narrative of healthcare.  This would 
increase a patient’s sense of vulnerability, when their lives are placed in the hands of 
doctors and healthcare services through illness and injury.  While it is the law in Australia93 
that all healthcare consumers should be given sufficient information to understand the risks 
and benefits associated with any proposed healthcare treatment, such information can 
increase the stress associated with healthcare, especially when the need for treatment is 
both urgent and life-saving.  The psychological effects of bringing the frequency and 
seriousness of preventable patient harm to the conscious awareness of both consumers and 
providers, therefore, can be quite unsettling for both groups.  In this situation, the powerful 
cultural narrative of healthcare acts as a defensive bulwark against an open 
acknowledgement of the need to act urgently to address patient safety.   
 
The lack of on-going data collection on patient outcomes and preventable patient harm 
across much of healthcare also serves a useful purpose.  It enables health professionals and 
the health system to maintain the cultural narrative about its quality and commitment to 
care and to minimise any urgency for action on recognised areas of concern.  The lack of 
truth and transparency also serves a silencing function across the system.  If the ubiquity of 
error is not openly acknowledged, then the medical narrative is perpetuated and 
strengthened, and the community and the doctor’s worldview around medicine remains 
unquestioned.  This was generally observed in relation to types of work where mistakes 
were common more than 60 years ago.  Everett Hughes in his 1951 essay on Mistakes at 
work noted that, in these circumstances: 
The colleague-group will consider that it alone fully understands the technical 
contingencies, and that it should therefore be given the sole right to say when a 
mistake has been made.  The layman, they may contend, cannot even at best 
understand the contingencies.  The attitude may be extended to complete silence 
concerning mistakes of a member of the colleague group because the very 
discussion before a larger audience may imply the right of a layman to make a 
judgment that is most jealously guarded. 94   
 
                                                
93  The duty to disclose risk to a patient was set out in detail in the 1992 High Court case of Rogers v 
Whitaker [1992] HCA 58; (1992) 175 CLR 479 (19 November 1992). 
94  Hughes EC. Mistakes at Work. 1951 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, August, 
volume 17(3), pages 320-327: at pages 323-324. 
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Hughes notes that this silence extends to not drawing attention to the mistakes of 
colleagues, not discussing mistakes among themselves and remaining tight-lipped even 
where matters come to public attention.  These actions are also illustrated in the section 
below on tribal behaviours.  Hughes also describes the high level of anxiety generated in 
these circumstances. 
 
One consequence of this is that, when consumers or family members draw attention to 
individual cases of patient harm, or health professionals openly admit the truth and discuss 
their errors and harm they have caused to patients, they can be “othered”.  Such doctors 
may be labelled as aberrant or “not part of the club”.  In the case of patients and families, 
they may be criticised for exhibiting a lack of gratitude for the doctor’s heroic efforts.  In 
both cases, they are distinguished from the dominant cultural narrative and quarantined 
from impacting on it.  The patient, family or the professional are characterised as unusual, 
so that the narrative remains intact and contrary evidence is ignored. The solidity of the 
medical narrative for doctors, patients and society makes it hard to overturn.  
 
Doctors who have become most vocal about the need for patient safety action have 
generally either had personal experiences of being a patient or loved one of a patient in the 
health system, or have become personally aware when their actions have significantly 
harmed or killed a patient. Others have been researching adverse events, where they saw 
first-hand the extent of the problem.  In each of these cases, the unconsciously absorbed 
medical narrative learned through professionalisation and reinforced in public discourse 
was challenged because they saw medicine and the system in which it operates through a 
very different lens.  The dissonance was too clear to ignore and explain away.  The Doctor 
Identity was profoundly challenged by other important aspects of who they were, so they 
began to see things very differently.  For example, Dr Don Berwick was founding head of 
the Institute for Healthcare Improvement in 1989.  While he was clearly aware of many of 
the issues already, in 1999 he spoke95 of the impact of the serious illness of his wife that 
year, which had involved more than 60 inpatient days in 3 institutions.  He stated that 
“before this, I was concerned; now I am radicalized.  If what happened to Ann could 
                                                
95  The Plenary Speech given at the 11th Annual National Forum on Quality Improvement in Health Care 
in New Orleans in 1999, was recorded in Berwick D. Escape Fire - lessons for the future of health 
care. 2002 Commonwealth Fund, New York. (Escape Fire) 
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happen in our best institutions, I wonder more than ever before what the average must be 
like.”96 
D. The Tribal Doctor 
As can be seen from the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6 above, doctors are socialised into an 
identity that is seen as quite separate from most other identities.  As a group, the creation of 
the Doctor identity is shared with their professional peers, that is, all other doctors.  This 
shared identity has a great many impacts on their thoughts and actions.  The bonds seen to 
exist between doctors separate them from others “outside the profession” in their own 
minds.  This separation occurs partly through the training and consolidation processes 
discussed above and the existence of the medical tribe remains both a powerful defining 
element of the Doctor Identity and a powerful maintainer of that identity.   
 
The powers used to circumscribe membership to the tribe have the potent capacity to 
exclude those who don’t comply with the norms and rules associated with the tribe.  Intra-
group loyalty is often valued above duty owed to patients and others.  Because the tribal 
nature of the profession remains strong, it also serves to compel conformity to the implicit 
rules of professional and peer loyalty.  Where doctors stand up for patients or against 
inappropriate norms operating within their specific tribe, whether that be at the specialty, 
ward or hospital level, the personal and professional costs borne by them can be enormous.  
Whistle-blowers in medicine suffer greatly.  This section of the chapter looks at these 
issues.   
 
The open exercise of professional exclusion and personal ostracism serves as a mighty 
warning to those who may feel uncomfortable about a specific incident or type of 
behaviour, but be unsure what they should do.  The message is that for someone to take on 
these concerns and take formal action will be an extremely costly personal and 
professionally action.  Even if the action is found to be justified, the colleague who took 
action may still be made to suffer for breaching tribal loyalties.  These bonds of loyalty, 
their deep historical roots and their collegial enforcement can play particular havoc with 
medical error and patient harm.  Disclosure of these can be seen as a collective threat to the 
                                                
96 Escape Fire – see note 95: page 23, and see also pages 20-29. 
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Doctor Identity, and the fear of reprisal can deepen the veil of secrecy that often arises 
when harm occurs. 
 
1. History of tribalism in Medicine 
The concept of the medical tribe is well–documented over many centuries.  The second 
paragraph of the Oath of Hippocrates is a useful ancient example of this, where a doctor 
pledges: 
To hold him who taught me this art equally dear to me as my parents, to be a partner 
in life with him, and to fulfil his needs when required; to look upon his offspring as 
equals to my own siblings, and to teach them this art, if they shall wish to learn it, 
without fee or contract; and that by the set rules, lectures, and every other mode of 
instruction, I will impart a knowledge of the art to my own sons, and those of my 
teachers, and to students bound by this contract and having sworn this Oath to the 
law of medicine, but to no others. 
 
The medical and surgical bodies, which have existed since the middle ages, were 
essentially guilds, which operated to separately define those who are medical practitioners 
from those who are not.  While the historical record shows that doctors sought to claim a 
monopoly through both royal and other government fiat, the theoretical monopoly was, in 
fact, both ineffective and ignored by most of the non-medical healers that proliferated 
outside of what was often a very small segment of the medical marketplace97.  However, 
even among the guilds and Colleges in the regulated field of medicine (covering physicians, 
surgeons and apothecaries) in England from the medieval period onwards, there were 
extensive disputes about boundaries.98   
 
Indeed, examples of exclusive tribal behaviours still continue, where there are, in fact, 
many tribes within medicine itself, and within the hierarchy of a hospital.  The loyalties and 
                                                
97  Pelling 1998 – see note 61: pages 30-33 especially; and Chapter 10, pages 230-233. 
98  For example, there have been centuries-long disputes between physicians, surgeons, apothecaries and 
others over who should provide what health related services to whom, and about the organisations that 
had statutory powers in relation to these groups and their precedence against each other.  For example, 
the turf wars and bitter disputes in London between the Worshipful Society of Apothecaries of London 
(formed in 1617 and precursors to modern pharmacists), the College of Physicians (formed by statute 
in 1522) and the Company of Barber Surgeons (formed by Statute in 1540) are well documented over 
many centuries, as are their sometimes united fights against the many other practitioners of various 
forms of care intended to promote health, who were their competitors. See for eg, Pelling 1998 – see 
note 61: see Part III- Occupations, especially Chapter 9 on barber surgeons and Chapter 10 on medical 
practitioners. 
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bonds created in these settings can have benefits but also a great many risks.  For example, 
the negative consequences of such tribal behaviours in modern times are detailed in Sir 
Donald Irvine’s 2003 book The Doctors’ Tale – Professionalism and Public Trust.  At the 
time, he was the Immediate Past President of the UK’s General Medical Council (GMC), 
the body responsible for the regulation of doctor behaviour and discipline.  In a list of 
concerns including the negative impacts of a culture of elitism and perfectionism, and the 
need to preserve reputation by ignoring fallibility and uncertainty, he summarises some of 
the downsides of tribal behaviours in the following manner. 
A strong general culture of self-protection, defending the group and individual 
transgressors against outside criticism or attack except where deviant behaviour has 
been explicitly acknowledged by the tribe as unacceptable.  Examples of such tribal 
behaviours by individuals against the majority have included unreasonable 
advertising, denigrating a colleague’s practice and poaching a colleague’s patients, 
that is to say any behaviours that impinge on a colleague’s livelihood.  …the 
misplaced collegiality which results in the tendency to defend the clinical practice 
of individual members except in the most flagrant circumstances “there but for the 
grace of God go I,”… may be coupled with the simpler “not my problem”. Both are 
recipes for inaction.99 
 
Irvine goes onto discuss the history of such tribal behaviours and the internal medical tribes 
and their functioning with the National Health Service, but the description he gives can be 
seen in most hospitals or health systems where doctors are trained in a similar manner.  
This powerful description shows the link with identity formation through the apprenticeship 
model of clinical training discussed above.   
 
He describes the system of College fellowships, appointments and promotion, which still 
form the bedrock of specialist training in Australia and elsewhere, as “a remarkable system 
of closed patronage”, which required deference to authority, not “rocking the boat” and 
never “whistle-blowing” on colleagues.  Irvine notes that: “On the contrary, speaking out 
against a colleague was considered “not done” and indeed was listed by the GMC until 
quite recently as an ethical offence known as disparagement”.  This offence was developed 
                                                
99  Irvine D. The Doctors’ Tale – Professionalism and Public Trust. 2003 Radcliffe Medical Press, 
Abingdon (UK): pages 24-26.  Even as recently as 1990, there were 23 complaints made to the General 
Medical Council (GMC) in relation to disparagement, though only 12 of these were continuing by the 
October 1990 meeting of the GMC.  See: Smith RG. Medical Discipline – the Professional Conduct 
Jurisdiction of the General Medical Council 1858-1990. 1994 Clarendon Press, Oxford: Table 1.1, at 
page 8. 
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to discourage public debates about the efficacy of treatments or the character of particular 
doctors100, because any reputational damage to individual members of the medical 
profession were seen as impacting upon the economic fortunes of all.  This public 
dissension was thought by the doctor institutions, such as the Royal College of Physicians, 
to bring disrepute upon the whole profession.101   
 
In early attempts to address such public displays, the Royal College of Physicians 
established the Statutes of Morality as part of its regulation of physician behaviour in its 
early years of incorporation in the 1500s.102  These statutes mostly sought to ensure the 
provided rules of etiquette and exclusive structured business behaviours between doctors103.   
At their very beginning, these statutes included conflicting messages which appeared to 
place the duty of doctors to each other (and self-interest) above their duty to patients.  For 
                                                
100  The history of these ethical obligations for doctors not to criticise other doctors appears first to have 
arisen in response to bitter, public fights which occurred historically within the medical profession as 
part of their entrepreneurial enthusiasm to capture and hold the limited market of those who could pay 
well for healthcare. This competitive promotion continued for several centuries despite these efforts.  
See, eg, Porter D and Porter R. Patient’s Progress: Doctors and Doctoring in Eighteenth Century 
England. Until the scientific basis of medicine was better established and the mechanisms of disease 
better understood, there were often significant public arguments between doctors, recorded in lectures 
and pamphlets, with different doctors scorning the practices of others and publicly critiquing different 
schools of medical thought.  There was also high levels of competition with unregistered healers, 
surgeons and apothecaries. Wear A. The Discourses of Practitioners in Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Century Europe. Chapter 27 in Baker RB. McCullough LB. (editors). The Cambridge World History of 
Medical Ethics. Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521888790 online publication date 
May 2012. 2008 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), pages 379-390: page 377. 
101  Baker R. The Discourses of Practitioners in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Britain and the United 
States. Chapter 36 in Baker RB and McCullough LB. (editors) The Cambridge World History of 
Medical Ethics. Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521888790 online publication date 
May 2012. 2008 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), pages 446-464: page 448.  See also 
Brody HA. Meghani Z. Greenwald K. Michael Ryan’s Writings on Medical Ethics. Philosophy and 
Medicine Series. 2009 Dordrecht Springer, London. 
102  The earliest College statutes dealing with ethics appear to have been passed in 1543, but these are 
listed with an addendum (formerly penal statutes).  These lists are fragmentary and so the first of these 
may be even earlier. Clarke G. A History of the Royal College of Physicians of London. Volume 1, 
1964 Clarendon Press, Oxford (UK): see chapter VI, especially at page 90.  The Statutes of 1647 
(which are complete), list these behavioural norms under Chapter 22 “De Conversatione Morali,et 
Statutis Poenalibus”  (appendix II in Clarke, op cit.) and in later works these are called “the Moral 
Statutes” eg Brody HA. Meghani Z. Greenwald K. Michael Ryan’s Writings on Medical Ethics. 
Philosophy and Medicine Series. 2009 Dordrecht Springer, London (UK): pages 153-154, where the 
Moral Statutes of 1835 are listed in English. 
103  McCullough LB. The Discourses of Practitioners in Eighteenth-Century Britain. Chapter 30 in Baker 
RB and McCullough LB. (editors) The Cambridge World History of Medical Ethics. Book DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521888790 online publication date May 2012. 2008 Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge (UK), pages 403-413: at pages 405-406, especially Part III. An ethos of 
Personal Regard and Proper Manners. 
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example, doctors were required to not teach their patients about medicine and medical 
treatments.  Undercutting of fees and criticism of colleagues was forbidden.  Further, where 
there was not agreement about a patient’s condition, there were processes designed to 
ensure this was not apparent to the patient or the family: 
Above all “discord” had to be avoided so the “Art” was not prejudiced. 
Consultations [between doctors] were to be in private, carried out in Latin, with no 
one breaking ranks in front of the sick.104 
 
Despite the College using fines or even imprisonment on those it had jurisdiction over105, 
the problem of internecine professional brawls continued through the centuries, partly 
because of the professional self-definition of doctors as gentlemen106.  An insoluble tension 
appeared to exist between the cultural requirements of a gentleman to defend his 
professional honour when attacked by another, and the collegial obligations to the 
Profession, which was sought to be enforced, ineffectively in large part, by the College.  
The profession’s focus on tribal loyalty (as against defence of individual honour) grew by 
the 19th Century with the establishment of hospitals, public hospitals and medical schools, 
all of which required professional collaboration to work.107  
 
Government regulation of the medical profession in the United Kingdom started with the 
Medical Act 1858, which required doctors to be registered and created the General Medical 
Council, to determine whether someone was guilty of “infamous conduct in any 
professional respect”108.  This phrase was not defined by statute, but through the practices 
                                                
104  Wear commenting on the 1693 version of the Moral Statutes of the Royal College of Physicians.  Wear 
2008 – see note 100: page 381. 
105  Clarke describes a Dr Christopher Langton who was expelled from the College in 1558 after three 
warnings, for “rashness, for levity and for foolishly contending with other fellows in the presence of 
witnesses when visiting patients, for his ridiculous vainglory, which dishonoured the College, and to 
make good measure for certain unspecified marks of incontinence.”  Clarke provides other examples 
where doctors were punished for critiquing Galen, and were threatened with imprisonment if they 
refused to respond to the College. See: Clarke 1964 at note 102: Chapter VII see especially pages 108-
109 and following. 
106  Baker 2008 - see note 101: at page 448. 
107  The important work of Thomas Percival on ethics arose from the need for rules of conduct for 
disputing doctors at Manchester Hospital, where such a dispute had led to an impasse where doctors 
refused to work with each other.  Percival T. Medical Ethics or a Code of Institutes and Precepts 
adapted to the Professional Conduct of Physicians and Surgeons. 1803 Printed by S Russell, 
Manchester (UK). Also available free on Google Books 
108  Medical Act 1858, section 29. 
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and decision of the Council.  Deprecation of the professional skill, knowledge, services or 
qualifications of another doctor or doctors (sometimes also called disparagement) was 
listed as a professional offence in the first so-called “Blue Book” of the General Medical 
Council.109.  Few cases of disparagement or deprecation of other medical colleagues led to 
doctors being erased for the medical register (without other accompanying offences)110, but 
its very existence as an ethical offence indicates the continuing importance of tribal loyalty.  
The concurrent powers of the Royal College of Physicians and other bodies such as local 
medical associations and the British Medical Association, with their official and unofficial 
capacity to ostracise111 those who didn’t play by the often unwritten rules of professional 
loyalty probably operated in the space below the statutory radar of the General Medical 
Council in these lower level professional etiquette matters.  
 
Ostracism also occurred informally in jurisdictions with written Codes of conduct, such as 
the United States.112  The first code of doctor-to-doctor conduct in the United States was 
entitled the Boston Medical Police in 1808.  This document spelt out even more plainly the 
nature of these tribal obligations:  
The esprit de corps is a principle of action, founded on human nature, and, when 
duly regulated, is both rational and laudable.  Every man, who enters into a 
fraternity, engages by a tacit compact, not only to submit to the laws, but also to 
promote the honour and interest of the association, so far as they are consistent with 
morality and the general good of mankind. A Physician, therefore, should 
cautiously guard against whatever may injure the general respectability of the 
                                                
109  General Medical Council. Functions, Procedure and Disciplinary Jurisdiction. 1963: page 13 
Paragraph (IX)(5). 
110  Smith 1994 at note 99 lists all of the matters subject to disciplinary hearing over the period 1858-1990.  
Many of the records of the early years of the jurisdiction did not contain any information about the 
substance of the allegation so the record is not complete, but there were isolated instances of 
deprecation.  For example, Case 334 28 November 1907 in Smith’s Appendix (page 252) was for 
canvassing and depreciating another practitioner, with the practitioner being erased for 150 months 
111  The Association’s original tool of compulsory ostracism where a member behaved in a manner 
considered to offend their peers (often relating to income levels, working with non-doctors etc) were 
significantly affected by a judicial finding in 1919 that it constituted an unlawful restraint of trade: 
Pratt v The British Medical Association [1919] 1 KB at 274. 
112  Hyde DR. The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and Politics in organized medicine. 
1954 Yale Law Journal, May, volume 63 (7), pages 937-1022: page 949, which stated: 
 Because the AMA had the consent and support of a great majority of doctors, its standards can 
often be enforced against an offender without formal action.  The physician who is suspected of 
‘unethical’ practice may be subjected to professional ostracism.  This may involve denial by 
member physicians of patient referrals and consultations and the loss of advancement in 
hospital and other professional appointments.  The mere availability of such sanctions is usually 
enough to deter possible violators of AMA’s code of conduct 
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profession, and should avoid all contumelious representations of the faculty at large, 
all general charges against their selfishness or improbity, or the indulgence of an 
affected or jocular scepticism, concerning the efficacy and utility of the healing 
art.113 
 
Given this long history of concern, loyalty to other doctors later formed a key part of most 
of the first tranche of modern codes of ethics.  These principally derived partly from the 
writings of three doctors, each of whom worked or studied at Edinburgh University during 
the period known as the Scottish Enlightenment114.  These were Dr John Gregory of 
Scotland115, Dr Thomas Percival of England116 and Dr Benjamin Rush of the United States 
of America117.  These authors mark an important shift in ethical codes, as they focussed on 
the ethical obligations of doctors to patients and other public obligations of doctors, as well 
as doctor-to-doctor conduct.  This last component continued as an important part of ethical 
codes for a long time.  For example, the 1847 American Medical Association Code of 
Ethics is seen as one of the first widely promulgated, formal modern encapsulations of the 
duties owed by doctors to patients and each other.118 In it, there were frequent references to 
the need for doctors to share any disagreements about treatment options only with each 
                                                
113  Boston Medical Association. Boston Medical Police. 1808 Snelling and Simon, Boston: at page 8 - 
Conduct for the support of the medical character.   There is also a detailed section on why it is 
important for the profession not to air its differences in public, because it not only hurts “the 
contending parties, but what is of more consequence, they discredit the profession and expose the 
faculty itself to contempt and ridicule.” (pages 6-7) along with a range of doctor to doctor behavioural 
expectations.  This document was prepared by the Standing Committee of the Association of Boston 
Physicians in 1807, “having been instructed to propose a code of Medical Police” for the Association’s 
next Annual General Meeting.  While they assert they drew on the work of Gregory, Rush and Percival 
in developing the Police, they omitted all of the ethical duties to patients.  
114  In fact, Aberdeen University was the birth place of what became known as the philosophy of common 
sense – based on the concept that reality was able to be understood and discerned through our senses 
and our own experiences.  This philosophy also found a strong home in Edinburgh University.  For 
further discussion of this philosophy and its connection to developments in the US, see: Herman A. 
How the Scots invented the Modern World: the true story of how Western Europe’s poorest nation 
created our world and everything in it. 2001 Crown Publishers, New York: pages 222-225. 
115  Gregory J. Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician. 2nd edition (revised by his son Dr 
James Gregory) 1803 W. Creech & T. Cadell & W. Davies, Edinburgh. [Access to this historic book 
was provided through the Royal Australasian College of Physicians History of Medicine Library] 
116  Percival 1803 – see note107. 
117  Rush B. Sixteen Introductory Lecturers, to courses of Lectures upon the Institute and Practice of 
Medicine with a Syllabus of the latter. 1811 University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania. 
118  American Medical Association. Code of Ethics of the American Medical Association, adopted May 
1847, 1848 TK and PG Collins, Printers, Philadelphia. 
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other, and to avoid implied or explicit criticism of colleagues, especially in front of a 
patient or family member119. 
 
These behavioural norms were even more strongly set out in the first Australian medical 
association of the same era.  In the 1846 Rules of Association of the Port Phillip Medical 
Association in the colony of Victoria, in Australia, the rules120 stated, among other things: 
35. That, as the dignity and influence of this Association essentially depend 
upon the friendly co-operation and harmony of its members, this Association 
strongly reprobates all hostile collisions and personal animosities. 
36. That, as differences of opinion of necessity arise in the treatment of diseases, 
this Association enjoins upon its members the exercise of honourable feelings and 
mutual forbearance in their professional intercourse. 
37. That no member of this Association shall give any countenance whatever to 
disparaging reflections or false reports affecting the professional character of other 
members. 
38. That in all cases where one member is called in to attend for another and in 
all consultations of members, the member called in shall neither say, look nor 
insinuate such things as he knows will operate to the injury of the member in 
previous attendance nor otherwise endeavour to supplant him in the estimation of 
his patient. 
39. That any member who shall in any manner attempt to undermine or 
otherwise injure the professional reputation of any other member shall, on proof of 
such an offence, incur the highest censure of the Association. 
 
These legacies of collegial loyalty above all things remain in the “implicit values” 
expressed by the profession’s responses to criticism from inside the profession, when this 
becomes public – so called whistle-blowing.   
 
2. Conspiracies of silence and the treatment of medical 
whistle-blowers  
Many examples of the continuing power and impact of loyalty to the tribe in medicine 
remain today, despite the greater explicit focus on duties to patients.  One is the practical 
“conspiracy of silence” where doctors and medical administrators avoid criticising even 
                                                
119  American Medical Association 1848, see note 118: chapter II, in particular. 
120  Graham HB. Happenings of the now long past: the Centenary of the Medical Society of Victoria. 1952 
Medical Journal of Australia, 16 August, volume II-39th year, number 7, pages 213-247. 
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badly performing doctors121.  For example, in the 2002 Health Complaints Commission 
inquiry into Canberra neurosurgical services, the first review was unable to make a 
definitive finding on the standard of care of services because of a lack of co-operation by 
other surgeons122.  This review was presented to the then Health Minister but not made 
public123. In the end, the Commissioner made some of the information public, through 
summarising his major findings in his Annual Report124 and a separate report was tabled in 
the ACT Legislative Assembly on 9 December 2003125.  Among other things, this report 
noted that a significant number of doctors had simply refused to comply with statutory 
notices requiring them to provide information to the Commissioner in relation to the 
inquiry, despite the unexercised legislative power to fine or imprison for such failure.126 
 
There is also substantial continuing evidence of negative professional impacts on doctors 
(and other health professionals) who make public their criticisms of others in the 
profession, even where the behaviour complained of is not acceptable in the broader 
community and the complaint is upheld.127  In the case of the Canberra Neurosurgical 
inquiry, the medical informant, Dr Gerard McLaren was shunned and intimidated for his 
                                                
121  For a patient focussed study of this issue, Gibson R. Singh JP. Wall of Silence – the untold story of the 
medical mistakes that kill and injure millions of Americans. 2003, Lifeline Press, Washington DC. See 
also Faunce T. Mure K. Cox C. Maher B. When silence threatens safety: Lessons from the first 
Canberra Hospital Neurosurgical Inquiry. 2004 Journal of Law and Medicine, volume 12, pages 112-
118. 
122  ACT Community and Health Services Complaints Commissioner. Annual Report 2002-2003. 2003: at 
page 57. 
123  Faunce TA. Bolsin SNC. Three Australian Whistleblowing sagas: lessons for internal and external 
regulation. 2004 Medical Journal of Australia. 5 July, volume 181(1), pages 44-47.  
124  ACT Community and Health Services Complaints Commissioner 2003 – see note 122. 
125  Community and Health Services Complaints Commissioner ACT. A Final Report of the Investigation 
into Adverse Patient Outcomes of Neurosurgical Services Provided by the Canberra Hospital. Dated 
February 2003. 
126  Community and Health Services Complaints Commissioner ACT. A Final Report of the Investigation 
into Adverse Patient Outcomes of Neurosurgical Services Provided by the Canberra Hospital. 
February 2003: page 15. 
127  Faunce et al. 2004 at note 123: this document covers three Australian Inquiries –into Camden and 
Campbelltown Hospitals in 2003, the Canberra Hospital in 2003 and King Edward Memorial Hospital 
in Western Australia 2002.  It arguable that this punitive reaction is one shared by other social 
structures. The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre notes that where someone threatens a social order or 
structure by acting as a moral agent that order will seek to contain or suppress such action, including 
punishing the person seen as a threat.   MacIntyre A. Social structure and their threats to moral agency, 
1999 Philosophy, volume 74, pages 311-329: see especially page 321 and following.  His summary of 
the reason for the perceived threat is set out in the moral maxim he states at page 319: “always ask 
about your own social and cultural order what it needs you and others not to know” 
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efforts.  Medical colleagues present at his Grand Rounds presentation about the cases of 
concern, reported that: 
The staff-specialist whistle-blower was chastised by colleagues and threatened with 
defamation proceedings when he attempted to present anonymised cases from the 
suppressed report in hospital grand rounds.128 
 
An example of the treatment of a whistle-blower in the United Kingdom relates to 
anaesthetist Dr Stephen Bolsin, who drew medical management attention to the poor 
outcomes for babies operated on in the Bristol Royal Infirmary Paediatric Cardiac Surgery 
Department.129  He testified to the Kennedy Inquiry about what happened to him when he 
drew the attention of medical management to the significant number of preventable deaths 
in cardiac surgery on babies.  He described being shunned by the medical establishment 
and having to seek a job abroad, having applied unsuccessfully for jobs in Britain.  He also 
describes having his concerns and data ignored or dismissed, and being warned that that 
this was not the way to progress his career in Bristol.130   Both Dr Bolsin and Dr McLaren 
gave harrowing accounts of their mistreatment by other members of the medical tribe in a 
2007 Four Corners television program131. 
 
In relation to the Bristol Infirmary, the Kennedy Report also referred to various negative 
cultural elements at the Infirmary.  In particular, it drew conclusions about the negative 
impact of inter-specialty and inter-professional tribalism as barriers to ensuring quality care 
was delivered to patients: 
…  The positive aspects of tribalism are clear.  Tribalism engenders a sense of 
belonging, a set of common goals, a sense of mutual support.  Moreover, 
competition between various tribes may be beneficial if it creates an environment of 
creative tension within the organisation.  The danger of tribalism, of course, is that 
where here are numerous tribes it can threaten to undermine the capacity of a large 
organisation to adhere internally to a set of agreed core values and to represent these 
values to the outside world.  Moreover, when tribal groups fall out, or disagree over 
                                                
128  Faunce 2004 at note 123: at page 46. 
129  The Public Inquiry held published a significant report, which included criticism of the inaction of those 
doctors notified of the problems. Kennedy I. Learning from Bristol – the Report of the Public Inquiry 
into children’s heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Presented to the Secretary of 
State for Health July 2001, CM 5207(1): (the Kennedy Inquiry and Report) 
130  Dyer C. Whistleblower in Bristol case says funding was put before patients. 1999 British Medical 
Journal, volume 319, pages 1387. 
131  Masters C. “First Do No Harm”, ABC Four Corners, 27 August 2007. 
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territory in an organisation such as the NHS, the safety and quality of the care given 
to the patient is put at risk.132 
 
Combined with the hierarchy within the hospital and between specialties, the Report 
commented on the “negative side of group loyalty”, which “makes it difficult for an 
individual to summon up the courage not to conform”.  It influenced “who gets listened to 
within the organisation when questions are raised”.133  They noted that “professional self-
images …affect behaviour: they are a powerful force militating against teamwork, 
particularly among younger staff, anxious not to fall foul of those with power or 
authority.”134 
 
A more recent example of the treatment of medical “whistle-blowers” brought to public 
attention in 2015 related to a female surgical trainee Caroline Tan, who alleged sexual 
assault and sexual harassment by her supervising male neurosurgeon in 2005.  After a long 
process where she was belittled and degraded in myriad ways, she took action before the 
Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal.  After an extensive and strongly defended 
hearing, the offence was found to have occurred and the complainant was awarded 
$100,000 damages135.  The male surgeon, Chris Xenos remained in his job at Monash 
Medical Centre, as did his supervisor, Dr Danks, who was found to have been a partial 
witness and to have “not understood his responsibility [as Unit Head] to deal with a claim 
such as this is an impartial and fair manner”136. Despite qualifying as a neurosurgeon, 10 
years after complaining and qualifying, Caroline Tan has been unable to gain a position in 
the Australasian public hospital system137.   
 
A senior female vascular surgeon, Dr Gabrielle McMullin, brought this to public notice by 
stating that, in the current cultural environment, for women who wanted to protect their 
                                                
132  Kennedy Report - see note 129: page 266, paragraphs 9-10. 
133  Kennedy Report - see note 129: page 269, paragraph 19. 
134  Kennedy Report - see note 129: page 269, paragraph 18. 
135  Tan v Xenos (No 3) (Anti-Discrimination) [2008] VCAT 584 (11 April 2008) 
136  Tan v Xenos – at note 135: paragraphs 344-350, especially 347-8. 
137  McDermott Q. Michelmore K. At their Mercy: the bullying and bastardisation of young doctors in our 
hospitals. 2015 Four Corners ABC Television Program, broadcast 25 May 2015 see also Price J. 
Loyalty in the medical field cuts both ways. 2015 Canberra Times, 5 May, page 5.  
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surgical career, it was a safer option to comply with requests for sex from male colleagues, 
rather than to report harassment.  Describing Dr Tan’s situation on radio138, she said: 
“At the hospital Caroline ended up training at, one surgeon took her under his wing. 
But things got uncomfortable. 
 
“He kept asking her back to his rooms after hours. But after this one particularly 
long [work] session, she felt it was rude to refuse and they ended up back in his 
rooms, where, of course, it was dark and there was nobody else around, and he 
sexually assaulted her. 
 
“She was horrified. She ran out of the office. She didn't tell anyone. 
 
“Dr McMullin said the surgeon began to give Caroline bad reports and faced with 
the prospect of failing after years of hard work, Caroline finally complained. 
 
“After a long and gruelling legal process, Caroline won her case. 
 
“However, despite that victory, she has never been appointed to a public position in 
a hospital in Australasia," Dr McMullin said. 
 
“Her career was ruined by this one guy asking for sex on this night. And 
realistically, she would have been much better to have given him a blow job on that 
night. 
 
“The worst thing you could possibly do is to complain to the supervising body, 
because then, as in Caroline's position, you can be sure that you will never be 
appointed to a major public hospital.” 
 
Not surprisingly, there was significant public coverage of the matter in press139, radio140 
and television141. In response to this the Royal Australian College of Surgeons established 
an Expert Advisory Group, including a majority of external non-surgeon appointees, in 
March 2015 to, among other things, survey the prevalence of bullying, discrimination and 
                                                
138  See eg, Matthews A. Sexual harassment rife in medical profession, senior surgeon Dr Gabrielle 
McMullin says. ABC News AM Program, 23 April 2015: sighted at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-
03-07/sexual-harassment-rife-in-medical-profession-surgeon-says/6287994   
139  See eg, Lillebuen S. Senior surgeon Gabrielle McMullin stands by advice for female doctors to stay 
silent on sex abuse. 2015 Sydney Morning Herald, 7 March: sighted at 
http://www.smh.com.au/national/senior-surgeon-gabrielle-mcmullin-stands-by-advice-for-female-
doctors-to-stay-silent-on-sex-abuse-20150307-13xzog.html ; Johncock W. Gabrielle McMullin shows 
it pays to be outrageous when fighting sexism, 2015 Sydney Morning Herald, 9 March sighted at 
http://www.smh.com.au/comment/gabrielle-mcmullin-shows-it-pays-to-be-outrageous-when-fighting-
sexism-20150309-13yrn0.html ;   
140  See eg, Jackson E. Sexual harassment rife in medical profession warns surgeon. AM with Michael 
Brissenden, 9 March 2015.  
141  McDermott et al. 2015 – see note 137. 
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sexual harassment in surgery in Australia and New Zealand, and to report on how to 
positively impact on surgical workforce culture in these areas. 142  A joint statement from 
the College and Expert Advisory Group stated: 
Recent media reports profiling discrimination, bullying and sexual harassment by 
surgeons have been distressing.  These reports have highlighted the serious adverse 
impact it can have on the lives of good people.  They have criticised the College for 
not doing enough to prevent it.  The reports helped galvanise the College to act 
decisively now.143 
 
The Report of the Expert Advisory group was provided to the Royal Australasian College 
of Surgeons in September 2015, and the College has accepted all of the recommendations, 
many of which are designed to overcome these tribal practices.  These include:  
• The need for the College and Specialty Societies to lead the way in changing the 
culture of surgery, so that discrimination, bullying and sexual harassment are no 
longer acceptable or tolerated; 
• The improvement of surgical education so that bullying, intimidation and 
harassment are no longer seen as acceptable methods of adult education; and  
• The introduction of complaints management processes that are transparent, robust 
and fair, where people can raise concerns without fear of victimisation.144 
 
While the College has acknowledged and apologised for the problems of the past and 
undertaken to create better institutional and on-the-ground responses, it will be important to 
observe how the existing Fellows, who have been steeped in the deep history of tribalism, 
react and change over the period of implementation. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The long and entrenched history of medical tribalism and its negative impact on those in 
the profession who speak out and are critical of other doctors, even for very good reasons, 
show how deeply tribal loyalty influences and shapes the Doctor Identity.  Even with 
                                                
142  Royal Australasian College of Surgeons. Expert Advisory Group on Discrimination, Bullying and 
Sexual Harassment, Terms of Reference.  Sighted at http://www.surgeons.org/media/21627902/EAG-
2015-TOR.pdf  
143  Knowles R. Griggs M. Joint Statement from the Expert Advisory Group and Royal Australasian 
College of Surgeons.  Media release 28 April 2015 by Expert Advisory Group on discrimination, 
bullying and sexual harassment. Sighted at: http://www.surgeons.org/media/21628819/eag-
mediarelease-28-april-final-.pdf  
144  RACS EAG Report 2015 – see note 10: pages 13-17. 
 Chapter 6 –The consolidation and maintenance of the Doctor Identity 305 
efforts towards reform and legislative codes which seek to make clear the doctor’s primary 
loyalty to patients and their safety, there is a deep cultural history that exposes doctors who 
do speak out to an often vicious collective response from their peers and colleagues. 
 
These cultural sanctions are extremely powerful and the impact of seeing just one person 
subject to these humiliating processes can influence others for a long time.  It is not 
surprising that even in the recent Royal Australasian College of Surgeons process discussed 
above, the Expert Advisory Group reported that some Fellows, Trainees and International 
Medical Graduates did not participate in the research and consultation processes for fear of 
reprisal145.  Where personal identity is defined, to a large extent, by membership of a 
professional group, the psychological and practical impact of potential group rejection 
creates an often impossible barrier to speaking up.  This remains a significant barrier to 
more open processes around medical error and patient harm, as well as effective, collective 
action by the profession. 
 
E. The Doctor as “Not patient” 
Part of the Doctor Identity defines a doctor as fundamentally different from the person he 
or she has to care for – the patient.  This carries risk for both the doctor and the patient.  
Firstly, as a human being, a doctor is just as likely as anyone else to develop ill-health, and 
seeing themselves as “not patient” can lead them to fail to seek early assistance for their 
own medical conditions, leading sometimes to unnecessary illness or early death.  
Paradoxically, once a doctor has the experience of being a patient, their practice of 
medicine often changes to reflect their new understanding of what it is like to be a patient.  
Secondly, when doctors define patients as “other”, their capacity for empathy often declines 
because they do not see the patient’s shared humanity.  As discussed in Chapter 5, part of 
the training of professionalism is to ensure the Doctor Identity supplants others that the 
trainee may have arrived with and to achieve a new professional identity.  In no area is this 
separation more significant than the one between doctor and patient.  Part of the decline in 
empathy observed over the period of medical training arises directly from the shift away 
                                                
145  RACS EAG Report 2015 – see note 10: page 5. 
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from identification with patients.  Sometimes this is claimed to be related to the 
establishment of so called “professional distance” or “clinical objectivity”.   
 
Other times it arises from the modelled behaviour of more senior doctors in situations 
where they feel uncomfortable or frustrated.  For example, with the focus of the medical 
narrative on curing patients, those who are chronically ill or dying are often problematic for 
doctors.  Failing to recover is seen as the patient’s failure at multiple levels146 – the patient 
fails to respond to a cure, the patient fails to comply with medical expectations (or even 
worse, instructions), the patient has failed to properly look after himself or herself and so is 
treated as an object of derision.  These modelled behaviours of doctors, while maladaptive 
in the maintenance and promotion of empathy, can be a form of self-protection from the 
anguish which may otherwise be experienced through observation of the suffering and 
death of others. 
 
At the beginning of training, medical students often closely identify not only with patients 
but with diseases they are studying.  They often see themselves as suffering from the 
conditions they are learning about.  So common is this is that it is described as 
hypochondriasis of medical students.147  What has been less noted is the consequence for 
doctors in looking at their own health once they have become doctors.  In an Australian 
website to provide health advice to doctors, the introduction summarises the transformation 
which occurs between student and doctor: 
As medical students, we initially think that we suffer from every symptom we read 
about.  By the time we have graduated, we believe that we are immune from every 
disease we have read about.  By now “we’re doctors, not patients.” 148 
 
Similarly, in a 2007 Australian Medical Association Study on the health and well-being of 
junior doctors, it was noted that: 
                                                
146  Gunderman R. Illness as failure: Blaming patients. 2000 The Hastings Center Report, July-August, 
volume 30(4), pages 7-11. 
147  See eg, Hodges B. Medical student bodies and the pedagogy of self-reflection, self-assessment and 
self-regulation. 2004 Journal of Curriculum Theorizing (JCT), Summer, volume 20(2), pages 41-51: at 
pages 44-45, especially section on “Medical Students’ Disease”.  Whether there is a higher rate of 
health anxiety among medical students has been the subject of some debate – see Howes O. Salkovskis 
P. Health anxiety in medical students. 1998 Lancet, 2 May, volume 351, page 1332. 
148  Doctors; Health Advisory Service website; at http://www.dhas.org.au/content/view/5/5/ ; viewed 28 
June 2011. 
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…. Many doctors do not behave like good patients.  They may not follow the advice 
they would give to their own patients and often do not seek appropriate medical 
care.  This paradox is often attributed to the culture of the medical profession, which 
is very competitive and has high expectations of dedication to work and unlimited 
resilience under stress.  The stigma of ill-health that prevails among doctors 
discourages the open admission to colleagues of medical problems or personal 
difficulties.149 
 
There are a number of autobiographical accounts of the transition of doctor to patient, 
which describe in vivid detail the impact of this transition on individual doctors and often 
how it affects their practice in the future150.  One thing that stands out in these accounts is 
the pain caused to the ill doctors from the status and power changes that occur for the 
doctor who becomes ill, and the profound impact it has on their sense of self.  While it is 
arguable that this experience is a common one for most patients admitted to hospital, the 
various doctor descriptions of the process seem to emphasise how far it feels they have 
fallen.  For example, Dr Rosenbaum’s story of his diagnosis and treatment for cancer of the 
larynx starts with this motif of moving from king to commoner, from commander to baby: 
On my seventieth birthday, I reported to the hospital to have a biopsy.  I had 
practiced medicine at this hospital in Portland, Oregon, for more than forty years.  I 
had been the chief of medicine and president of the staff; this year my eldest son, 
Richard, was president of the staff.  On fifteen thousand previous visits I had 
entered through a private door like a king. … But today it was different.  I was one 
of the common herd. … Lying in bed in a hospital room was a new experience too.  
I had been in similar rooms thousands of times, but in a different position.  Then I 
was in command, neatly dressed, standing, looking down at a helpless patient in 
bed.  Now I was that patient, literally stripped of my dignity.  I was no longer in 
charge.  I was being treated like a baby.151 
 
Where a doctor has also been a carer for a loved one, this has also provided a window to 
observe the medical role and system from a different perspective.  Dr Donald Berwick, one 
of the Founding directors of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, tells of such an 
experience during the illness of his wife Ann in a monograph entitled Escape Fire. In 
detailing the experience, he said: 
                                                
149  Australian Medical Association (AMA). AMA Survey Report on Junior Doctor Health and Wellbeing. 
2008 AMA, Canberra. 
150  See eg, Pinner M. Miller B. (editors) When doctor are patients. 1952 WW Norton & Co, New York;  
Rosenbaum E. A taste of my own medicine – when the doctor is the patient. 1988 Random House, New 
York;  Kurland G. My own medicine – a doctor’s life as a patient. 2002 Times Books, New York;  
Weisman J. As I live and breathe – notes of a patient-doctor. 2002 North Point Press, New York.  
151  Rosenbaum 1988 – see note 150: pages 3-5. 
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Above all, we needed safety, and yet Ann was unsafe.  I have read the works of the 
physician Lucian Leape documenting medication errors, but now I have seen them 
first hand at the sharp end, sitting by Ann’s bedside for week after week of acute 
care.  The errors were not rare; they were the norm.152 … The experience of 
patienthood or patient-spousehood, as the case maybe, was often one of trying to get 
the attention of decision-makers to correct their impressions or their assumptions.  
Sociologically, this proved very tough, as we felt time and again our migration to 
the edge of the label “difficult patient”.153 
 
In both cases, the experience can be a radicalising one, as the doctor has a very different 
worldview and identity thrust upon him or her.  While Dr Rosenbaum retired after his 
treatment for laryngeal cancer, he states that he actually wrote his story for other doctors to 
learn from because “The view is entirely different when you are standing at the side of the 
bed from when you are lying in it.  If I could go back, I would do things in my own practice 
very differently than I did.”154   
 
Dr Donald Berwick had greater professional insight than most doctors into the quality and 
safety of healthcare from an organisational perspective.  However, his experience of his 
wife’s serious illness 10 years after he founded the Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
had a profound effect on what the everyday failures in healthcare meant to him.  He 
compared the care that was needed by his wife, and what she actually received, with the 
Mann Gulch Fire of 1949 where 13 young fire-fighters died as follows: 
We are causing harm, and we need to stop it.  I think the fire has jumped the gulch.  
The blaze is on our side.  As I waited helplessly for Ann to get a medicine when 
“time was of the essence”, I even felt the fire licking at my heels.  The people know 
this.  Not just the people in the beds, but the people doing the work too. The doctors 
and nurses and technicians and managers and pharmacists and all the rest know –
they must know – the truth.  They see it every day, and even if their defensive 
routine no longer permits them to say what they see, they do see it: errors, delays, 
nonsensical variation, lack of communication, misinformation, the care environment 
not at all a place of healing.155 
 
The comments of both these doctors also reveal how the lens of understanding and 
observation of a doctor often excludes these perceptions, which can seem so obvious when 
                                                
152  Berwick 2002 – see note 95: page 23.  
153  Berwick 2002 – see note 95: page 25. 
154  Rosenbaum 1988 – see note 150: page viii. 
155  Berwick 2002 – see note 95: pages 28-29. 
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one is looking from a different place.  The shock and astonishment felt by the doctors in all 
these “patient stories” shows how strong the psychological blinkers were which precluded 
them from seeing what was no doubt evident in their own practices, but which was not 
necessarily “in their awareness” until they looked from another psychological place, outside 
the Doctor Identity. 
 
Beyond these powerful anecdotal stories, some of the most comprehensive work looking at 
the impact of life threatening illnesses on the self-identity of doctors was undertaken by Dr 
Robert Klitzman, a psychiatrist and researcher.  The complete study was published in 2008 
in a book entitled When doctors become patients156, and was based upon 2 two-hour in-
depth interviews with 70 doctors with life-threatening illnesses, including HIV-AIDS, 
cancer, heart disease and many other serious conditions.  Klitzman first notes the depth of 
denial that characterised what he calls “post residency disease” – it was the obverse of what 
occurs with medical students.  Doctors would fail to respond to symptoms and refuse to 
have tests, and then be diagnosed late, with often serious consequences for their disease 
recovery.   
Through their professional training and socialization, these doctors frequently had 
come to see physicianhood as protective against illness – as immunity and defense.  
They believed that doctors were magically invulnerable to disease.  Their 
professional roles shaped their thinking.  …  This belief in invulnerability can easily 
border on magical thinking.  Indeed, many doctors felt they donned a ‘magic white 
cloak” giving them authority and protecting them against strangers’ bodies and 
disease.157 
 
Klitzman describes the transition from student to doctor to patient as a series of 
psychological transitions, where in the end, the “doctor” identity is so strong, and the 
“othering” of patients so deep, that it has traumatic impact on the doctor’s own sense of self 
when they become ill. 
Medical students identify first with patients, and only later with fellow physicians.  
Medical training radically challenges these trainees, taking them apart 
psychologically, wounding them. They must then put themselves back together and 
end up identifying with fellow doctors.  Yet given these defenses, carefully built up 
over years, the eventual loss of this sense of invincibility can prove devastating, 
undermining prior rationalizations.  Now sick, they strongly resist giving up their 
role as doctor. 
                                                
156  Klitzman 2008 – see note 36. 
157  Klitzman 2008 – see note 36: pages 33-34. 
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… These physicians’ surprise [about the possibility of disease or death in their 
lives] was itself surprising, indicating the extent to which they had previously been 
socialized to feel otherwise.  These beliefs persisted to such a degree that physicians 
may not only distance themselves from patients, but also look down at, and 
stigmatize, them.  Some doctors thought that being a patient was “the worst possible 
thing” that could happen to them.  … These doctors revealed the degree of 
stigmatization of patients that can exist within the medical profession. … “To be a 
patient is suddenly a step down”.158 
 
The strength of the doctor’s perception of his or her identity included “magical thinking” 
that as a doctor he or she will escape illness and even mortality, or that doctors are obliged, 
by being doctors, not to get sick.  Klitzman notes “the thickness of the psychic armor that 
doctors don [through years of training] – the belief that, for various reasons, physicians 
simply do not get ill.”159  This parallels the mistaken views about doctor invulnerability to 
fatigue in Chapter 4. 
 
Klitzman’s research also reveals the shame that some of the doctor’s feel about getting sick.  
Deeply seated feelings about oneself can enlarge the wound that others perceptions 
cause.  These self-views can exacerbate fears of discrimination.  At times, sick 
doctors may feel shame, and their concerns about possible discrimination can reflect 
their own worries and psychological projections – their own views of themselves as 
flawed. … Physicians’ beliefs in their own invulnerability can increase the shame 
they feel if they do in fact become sick.160 
 
This aspect of Klitzman’s research shows that the psychological identity of Doctor 
transcends their scientific knowledge and training as doctors about the cause of disease and 
the human condition.  The illusory schema that doctors are better than human overshadows 
the special skills and knowledge, which define a doctor in the ordinary world.  If the doctor 
becomes sufficiently ill to no longer be able to work, the crisis of identity is profound, 
because being a doctor is an identity, not just an activity.161  While this is true to some 
extent with other professionals and careers, the medical narrative and power associated 
with “being a doctor” become irrevocably tied to their own sense of self.  
                                                
158  Klitzman 2008 – see note 36. 
159  Klitzman 2008 – see note 36: page 34 
160  Klitzman 2008 – see note 36: page 140. 
161  Klitzman R. “Post-residency disease” and the medical self: identity, work and health care among 
doctors who become patients. 2006 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, volume 49(4) Autumn: 542-
52. 
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The threat of losing their job can challenge their deepest senses of meaning and self-
definition.  Their profession permeated their very beings.  Generally, they had 
integrated their professional selves and identities, and now, when forced to abandon 
their career, faced crises. … But doctoring emerged  … not merely as a matter of 
education and academic degrees.  Physicianhood did not constitute merely a socially 
constructed role.  Rather, these doctors internalized the white coats they wore.  
Even when they were no longer practicing medicine, this career permanently 
stamped them.  This identity became profoundly embedded, functioning at multiple 
levels and springing from deep-seated fears and desires that at times operated 
despite these individuals, shaping their views, experiences and responses to the 
world.162 
 
This study provides rich information, about the power of the Doctor Identity and the 
sometimes mistaken beliefs flowing from it.   It also illustrates how hard it is – even in the 
shadow of their own mortality – for doctors to recognise the existence of the powerful and 
distorting lens on the world, gained through their education and training and maintained by 
various forces in throughout their lives.  It is therefore difficult for a doctor to see the effect 
of this lens on his or her own perceptions and understanding of people, events and the work 
and social environment.  In turn, this creates a view of reality in which they are unlikely to 
take any compensatory actions for their human vulnerabilities to avoid negative patient 
safety consequences.   
 
Indirect reinforcement of the perception that a doctor is somehow less subject to human 
frailty also comes through examples of apparently ruthless sieving of students who 
themselves become ill during their training or have a disability163.  Those who are seeking 
to assume the Doctor Identity are selected to confirm and reinforce the cultural stories and 
stereotypes favoured in the Doctor Identity.   
 
Where practices and norms define the “Patient Identity” as separated from the Doctor 
Identity, this is said to allow a doctor to stay aloof from uncomfortable emotions which 
could otherwise “cloud” their judgement.  A more powerful consequence is that necessary 
empathy for a truly effective therapeutic relationship is likely to be impaired.  So powerful 
                                                
162  Klitzman R. When doctors become patients. 2008 Oxford University Press New York: page 297-298. 
163  Takakuwa KM, Rubashkin N and Herzog KE. What I learned in medical school – personal stories of 
young doctors 2005 University of California Press, Berkley (California): Part 3 “Confronted” includes 
a number of stories of discrimination in medical training experienced by people who become ill, have a 
disability, are fat, are women or are from a “minority” race background in the US: pages 137-188. 
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is this separation that it results in doctors often ignoring their own health needs, not merely 
from busyness, but from a perception that, whatever they are, they are by definition, not a 
patient. 
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Chapter 7. Some new ways forward – a research 
agenda and actions  
A. Introduction 
This thesis contributes new knowledge through the development of a series of well-
evidenced hypotheses which may explain why it has been so hard to get improvements in 
patient safety, despite an awareness and strong evidence that this is a significant and 
continuing issue for patients in health care.  The thesis achieves this by drawing on 
evidence from a wide range of different disciplines to develop a new possible explanation 
for observations of actions which seem inconsistent with the medical maxim to “First do no 
harm”.  The hypotheses provide alternative explanations for why action to address known 
patient safety risks has been very slow, why doctors appear unaware of much of the harm 
occurring around them and why many doctors may not appear to be particularly engaged or 
interested in achieving safer care for patients.   
 
The first hypothesis is that the occurrence of patient harm and medical error can be 
perceived psychologically by a doctor as a fundamental threat to her or his identity. The 
psychological significance is fundamental, because of the intensity and duration of the 
medical training process and the cultural, socio-economic and peer reinforcement of the 
Doctor identity, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  Not only is the Doctor Identity important at 
a professional level, but at a personal level.  The intensity and consistency of the formation 
and maintenance of the Doctor Identity means that it often becomes a doctor’s main self-
identity.  A threat to the Doctor Identity is therefore likely to be perceived as a threat to 
psychological existence.  At the very least, it is a threat to a highly desired, generally well-
remunerated and rewarded life, the achievement of which is likely to have involved decades 
of work and delayed gratification. 
 
The second hypothesis is that such a serious threat to identity causes a range of 
psychological defences, often rooted in the biological responses of the brain to threats to 
existence, and that these defences can make it hard for a doctor to recognise, identify or 
accept the risk of patient harm.  Many of the psychological defences are triggered and act 
unconsciously and so rapidly that it can be difficult or impossible for a doctor to stop them 
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occurring.  The brain may even stop potential threat information coming to conscious 
awareness and alter memory to protect self-identity.  Where doctors are unaware that they 
are subject to the same perceptual risks, biases and defences as other human beings, this 
may result in behaviour or inaction that increases risks of harm to patients.  Unless the 
potential for harm is recognised, there can be no planning or commitment to pre-emptive 
action to prevent occurrence. 
 
The third hypothesis is that elements of the Doctor Identity deny ordinary human 
psychological responses and physical limitations, and thus promote unrealistic self or group 
perceptions.  This creates risks to both doctors and patients.  Many of these risks may be 
avoidable through modifying these perceptions and developing more realistic self-and 
professional schemas. 
 
If these hypotheses are correct, the explanation is not only consistent with the evidence 
across a range of disciplines, but offers the possibility for new and perhaps more effective 
action to reduce the harm to patients and to improve the lives of doctors.  It may also 
provide support for better team-based care and more compassionate and humane health 
care.   
 
B. A research agenda 
1. A testable start 
Primary research is likely to be possible in relation to the first of these hypotheses.  With 
the greater availability of neuro-imaging, it is possible to undertake primary research about 
whether doctors perceive medical error and preventable harm as serious threats to their 
identity.  For example, by exposing doctors to scenarios involving medical errors, patient 
harm and personal responsibility for unexpected patient outcomes or poor care while their 
brains are scanned, researchers could tell if these scenarios activated the threat areas of the 
brains of doctors.   
 
The fear of making mistakes may also affect others whose career identity involves their 
ability to “know”, such as lawyers and academics.  It may even be that our society’s mixed 
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messages about “learning from your mistakes”1 makes the commission of an error create a 
sense of significant threat for others as well.  Testing current mental models of what it is to 
be wrong and then focussing on how to encourage real learning from mistakes without 
producing shame or humiliation may have broad application in our society.2 
 
The thesis also describes the process of professionalisation and consolidation of the doctor 
identity, as well as the biological threat mechanisms that appear to be triggered in all 
human beings, when there is a threat to their identity or existence.  Many behaviours 
associated with doctors’ responses to the occurrence of patient harm, particularly where it 
may involve them personally, appear to share characteristics with human responses to 
threat.  There may be a need to trial more complex interventions or processes to test out and 
address these aspects of this thesis.  For example, research needs to explore ways of 
increasing doctor awareness of their own psychological functioning, to explore means of 
influencing the formation and maintenance of the Doctor Identity towards more realistic 
and healthful self-perceptions; and to explore means of decreasing the use of shame and 
humiliation as tools in medical training and management3. 
 
2. The Precautionary Principle 
The other two hypotheses have significant evidence bases in ordinary human psychology.  
If the first hypothesis is correct (and there is also inferential evidence to support it), then it 
is plausible that the body of knowledge about human psychology in relation to threat could 																																																								
1  This mixed message is well captured in the title of the important book by Tavris and Aronson 
“Mistakes were made, but not by me”.  Tavris C. Aronson E. Mistakes were made (but not by me) – 
Why we justify foolish beliefs, bad decisions and hurtful acts. 2007 Harcourt Books, Orlando (USA). 
The combination of high expectations of performance and public accountability if an error is made 
can be a strong impediment to anyone to openly learning from their mistakes. 
2  For example, two different perceptual models of wrongness – “doing wrong” and “being wrong” and 
the implications of these are discussed in some depth in Kathryn Schulz ‘s book Being wrong – 
adventures in the margin of error. 2010 Portobello Books, London (UK).  It provides some useful 
techniques to reduce the emotional load of error, while increasing a sense of personal agency and 
accountability. 
3  For example, the work of Brené Brown on shame and shame resilience, set out firstly in I thought it 
was just me – Women claiming power and courage in a Culture of shame 2007 Gotham Books, New 
York, and later in The gifts of imperfection: Let go of who you think you’re supposed to be and 
embrace who you are. 2010 Hazelden, Center City (Missouri), discusses techniques for preventing 
and managing shame and humiliation.  She has also produced an evidence based multi-media 
training course for psychologists and their clients, published as Connections Curriculum – a 12 
session psycho-educational shame resilience curriculum. 2009 Hazelden, Center City (Missouri). 
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be drawn upon directly in the case of doctors, while pending further specific research in 
these areas.   
 
The reason that such an approach may be ethically justified is that the known risk of a 
failure to act is that the demonstrated high level of patient harm will continue.  Where harm 
is known to occur from either action or inaction in areas of scientific knowledge, but 
research about the causation is limited and certainty not yet possible, the correct ethical 
approach is to use the precautionary principle.  Applying this principle to my thesis means 
that action research may be undertaken, pending scientific proof of the theory proposed in 
this thesis.  This requires that the proposals for action provide a scientifically plausible 
solution to the known harm that will otherwise result from human conduct (in this case 
health care).  I have used the term “action” research”, because the precautionary principle 
allows the conduct of research actions which are consistent with that theory to be tested and 
reviewed, pending scientific proof of the theory.  The aim is to reduce the risk of known 
harm where the link between harm avoidance and action is scientifically plausible.  The 
principle is especially useful in complex areas (like health care), where there are “multiple 
dimensions of uncertainty”4.   
 
Under the precautionary principle, the adoption of solutions must be undertaken through an 
appropriate risk assessment process, weighing what is known about risk of harm from 
action and inaction, and the place of uncertainty.  The management of risk involves a 
requirement to monitor and, where possible, measure the effects of action or inaction.  In 
2005, the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge set out details of a 
working definition of the Precautionary Principle, which is defined as an anticipatory 
measure designed to prevent harm, when there is a risk of harm to people or the 
environment. 
When human activities may lead to morally unacceptable harm that is scientifically 
plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm. 
Morally unacceptable harm refers to harm to humans or the environment that is  
• threatening to human life or health, or  
• serious and effectively irreversible, or  																																																								
4  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World 
Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST). The Precautionary 
Principle. March 2005: page 27 
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• inequitable to present or future generations, or  
• imposed without adequate consideration of the human rights of those affected.  
The judgement of plausibility should be grounded in scientific analysis. Analysis 
should be ongoing so that chosen actions are subject to review. Uncertainty may 
apply to, but need not be limited to, causality or the bounds of the possible harm. 
Actions are interventions that are undertaken before harm occurs that seek to avoid 
or diminish the harm. Actions should be chosen that are proportional to the 
seriousness of the potential harm, with consideration of their positive and negative 
consequences, and with an assessment of the moral implications of both action and 
inaction. The choice of action should be the result of a participatory process.5 
 
The precautionary principle is not automatically triggered when scientific evidence to prove 
harm or benefit is not available or not strong.  It requires that people look at whether the 
management of risk is possible, feasible or reasonable, and that the risk or benefit must be 
plausible and scientifically tenable.  It provides support for action in those areas where 
there is known evidence of risk of harm, even where the exact extent is unclear.  In these 
cases, it is up to a proponent of a known harmful strategy to prove that the risk of harm is 
minimal or non-existent or outweighed by potential benefit. 
 
In some areas of risk described in the thesis, such as the likelihood of negative impacts 
from fatigue on doctors, patients, and others, the precautionary principle could justify early 
action to stop fatigue-inducing shifts and shift rotations.  Indeed, in some countries, like 
those in the European Union, action has already been taken6.  While there is scientific 
acceptance that human beings get tired, and this inhibits both performance and cognitive 
function, there remains a reluctance to change practices in medicine for many of the 
reasons discussed in the chapter 4 case-study.  There continues to be denial of fatigue and a 
systematic failure in health care organisations to recognise that fatigue is a serious safety 																																																								
5  UNESCO and COMEST 2005 – see note 4: page 14. 
6  The Council of Europe’s European Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC) has set working hours for 
all workers in the European Union. The directive provided transitional derogation power under 
clause 39(c)(i) for services relating to hospitals (including doctors in training) but these were limited, 
with compliance to occur at the latest by 2012.  These include a maximum work week of 48 hours 
and a minimum rest period of 11 consecutive hours per 24 hours. These limits applied to junior 
doctors in the UK from August 2009.  In 2016, the British Medical Association noted that: “We are 
satisfied with EWTD as it stands and believe it protects doctors from the dangers of overwork whilst 
protecting patients from overtired doctors.” BMA. Holding the line on working time. 18 May 2016. 
https://www.bma.org.uk/collective-voice/policy-and-research/international-policy/ewtd  For full 
discussion of the various positions, see Temple J. Resident duty hours around the globe: where are 
we now? 2014 BMC Medical Education, Supplement, pages S1-S8. Available at 
http://bmcmededuc.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-6920-14-S1-S8  
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issue for both patients, doctors and others, such as other road users when a fatigued 
clinician is driving home7.   
 
The argument made by some doctors and administrators is that doctors must work long 
hours because then there is more continuity of care, and patients “like” it.  However, this 
belies the known risk to quality of care from clinician fatigue and the strong evidence of 
empathy decline with fatigue.  In a busy hospital, just being present on a shift for long 
periods (or for long shifts over a week) does not actually deal with continuity of care, but it 
certainly guarantees the negative effects of fatigue.   
 
What is needed is a trial of options8 which do not accept fatigue being built into a hospital 
operating arrangement., and separately addresses continuity of care and clinical handover 
so that patients are not put at risk by either a fatigued worker or poor handover of 
information.  If hospitals continue to function by systematically overworking their staff, 
and patients are harmed, then it seems appropriate that the financial and moral risk of this 
rest upon the hospital administration.  Equally, doctors and other staff should be protected 
and empowered to reject unsafe working hours and barriers to acting this way should be 
removed.  Therefore, using the precautionary principle, it seems highly sensible to look 
more closely at solutions that either reduce risk or remove the cause of harm in both areas.   
 
																																																								
7  The Australian Medical Association has just announced that it is undertaking another survey of 
working hours of young doctors.  The last of these surveys was undertaken in 2011, so this is likely 
to be a useful addition to current knowledge.  The Canberra Times article announcing this drew 
specific attention to the risk of harm from fatigue on the road.  See Baker E. Doctors to audit hours 
in battle against fatigue. 2016 The Canberra Times, 30 October 2016, accessed at 
http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/doctors-to-audit-hours-in-battle-against-fatigue-
20161030-gsdxrk.html on 31 October 2016. 
8  Appendix C of the 2009 IOM Report on resident working hours includes a summary of international 
experiences with limiting resident duty hours.  Ulmer C. Wolman DM. Johns MME.(editors). 
Resident Duty Hours: Enhancing sleep, supervision and safety. Committee on optimizing Graduate 
Medical Trainee (Resident) Hours and Work Schedule to Improve Patient Safety, National Research 
Council. 2009 National Academies Press, Washington DC: 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK214948/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK214948.pdf.  There are also 
other occupations where 24-hour cover is required as well as a high degree of reliability of service, 
and these could provide other useful models – some of which already exist in hospitals. 
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3. Quality improvement activities as research 
In many areas of patient safety, there have been few “gold standard” clinical trials of the 
randomised double-blind prospective, controlled-trial kind.  In many cases, this 
methodology may not be appropriate, because of the multivariate nature of the problem, the 
known risks of being in a non-intervention group and the impracticality of trialling 
practices on a double-blind manner in many real-life clinical situations.  The research 
methodology of continuous quality improvement is probably more appropriate and useful 
to try different ways of improving quality care.  In this form of research, an intervention is 
trialled after measuring a baseline, then the intervention is implemented and the outcomes 
measured again and evaluated to make any necessary refinements.  The so-called Plan-Do-
Study-Act cycle initially promoted by W Edwards Deming provides a widely recognised 
model for this kind of activity.  There is evidence from a systematic review that often the 
research undertaken using these activities fails to “accord with primary features of the 
method”, particularly the use of short-term iterative cycles over time.9  Like poorly 
executive “gold standard” research, this concern means that it is just as important in quality 
improvement research that the research is properly carried out. 
 
In a 2005 article looking at Evidence based Medicine and quality improvement10, Don 
Berwick says that quality improvement activities, which do not reach the “gold standard” 
for evidence, can nonetheless do much to avoid the problems and biases that otherwise 
arise as “unguided human observers are frail meters of truth.”  He suggests that these 
activities, which he describes as “pragmatic science”, need to have evidential rigour, but 
within their own terms, including: 
• tracking effects over time, especially with graphs (rather than summarizing with 
statistics that do not retain the information involved in sequences);  
• using local knowledge—the knowledge of local workers—in measurement (rather 
than relegating measurement to people least familiar with the subject matter and 
work);  
																																																								
9  Taylor MJ. McNicholas C. Nicolay C. Darzi A. Bell D. Reed JE. Systematic review of the 
application of the plan-do-study-act method to improve quality in healthcare. 2014 BMJ Quality and 
Safety, April, volume 23(4), pages 290-298. 
10  Berwick DM. Broadening the view of evidence-based medicine. 2005 Quality and Safety in Health 
Care, October, volume 14(5), pages 315-316. 
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• integrating detailed process knowledge into the work of interpretation (inviting 
observers to comment on what they notice rather than ‘‘blinding’’ them to protect 
them against what they know);  
• using small samples and short experimental cycles to learn quickly (rather than 
overpowering studies and delaying new theories with samples larger than needed at 
the time); and  
• employing powerful multifactorial designs (rather than univariate ones when the 
better questions for the time are formative, not summative). 
 
This methodology is likely to also be useful for other possible interventions in areas 
identified in this thesis, particularly where there may be local variations of practice.  For 
example, the trialling of different shift arrangements or work practices during longer 
periods of work may provide a variety of different ways of avoiding and managing fatigue.  
Similarly, these methods may be useful for trialling different, healthier ways of managing 
the emotional responses of doctors and other health professionals to patient harm or 
unexpected outcomes.  The effective use of this kind of research and the recording and 
publication of results could accelerate the speed, with which improvements can be 
achieved. 
C. How the hypothesised conceptualisation and understanding 
of the Doctor Identity may provide different possible 
solutions 
There are many possible solutions suggested by the hypothesised connection between the 
threat to identity and attitudes and actions of doctors relating to patient harm.  The 
relationship between the doctor identity and patient harm, as hypothesised through the lens 
of this thesis, includes the vexed relationship between patient harm and the perception of 
being a “good” doctor.  In that case, there are two main directions for research:  
• how to modify the Doctor Identity to a more realistic and safer basis; and  
• how to reduce the threat to identity arising from patient harm. 
 
Both these are complex questions and need to be tackled from multiple places.  For 
example, the steps necessary to modify the doctor identity to one which is more realistic 
will involve working at multiple levels – with doctors, with patients, with the health 
system, with colleagues, probably over a long period.  It is not enough simply to educate 
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new doctors in a different way.  It will also be important to ensure that the modelled 
behaviours seen by them in their training will be different.  This necessitates education of 
all doctors on their own potential vulnerabilities.  It involves helping both trainee doctors 
and experienced doctors develop skills to work out effective ways of protecting patients 
and themselves.  It also requires the development of ways of training young doctors in an 
environment which does not produce shame and humiliation.   
 
Equally, the community needs to look at how it responds to errors and harm in health care, 
both in a legal and social manner, such as through the media.  With the development and 
maintenance of empathy a high priority in achieving better outcomes for both doctors and 
patients, solutions are needed which place value in the relationships established in health 
care11.  At the same time, doctors and patients need safe spaces to discuss problems and 
have honest exchanges about unexpected outcomes from whatever the cause. 
 
It is unlikely that solutions to such complexity will be able to be produced in a timely 
manner using a normal scientific model of research and problem-solving that works one 
aspect at a time.  However, it is still important to look as systematic ways of working in 
these complex areas to evaluate what works.  The problem of patient safety inaction, 
examined through the lens of the thesis, can be envisaged in a richer and more complex 
way, possibly by conceptualising it as an example of a “wicked problem”12.  These kind of 
problems are fundamentally different from those that the narrower, scientific method 
usually tackles, which the original authors of the term define as “tame problems”13.  There 
is incomplete knowledge of all the influencing factors.  There are a large number of people 																																																								
11  For example, early work is being done in Whanganui in New Zealand, which has committed itself to 
moving towards being a Restorative City to shape the hospital, staff and patient complaints processes 
and management generally to maintain and preserve both patient safety and the relationships within 
health care by using more restorative practices. Personal communications with hospital management 
on a visit by the thesis author to Whanganui in October 2016. 
12  There are multiple names for the kinds of complexities faced in this area - sometimes called a 
“wicked problem” from the work of.  Another name is a “Mess” (from the work of Ackoff – see note 
15) or “Social Mess” (from the work of Horn – see note 16, which is defined as a system of problems 
which interrelate with each other and other problems.  This definition has some attraction, because it 
includes ideological and cultural complexities. See, Horn R. Knowledge Mapping for complex social 
messes. Presentation to Foundations in the Knowledge Economy, 16 July 2001. 
http://web.stanford.edu/~rhorn/a/recent/spchKnwldgPACKARD.pdf. 
13 Rittel HWJ. Webber MM. Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. 1973 Policy Sciences, volume 
4, pages 155-169. 
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and organisations involved.  The different factors and aspects of the problem are 
interconnected with each other and multiple other issues, and sometimes solutions for one 
conflict with solutions of the other.   
 
This different conceptualisation of the nature of the problem can show different systematic 
methods of arriving at more appropriate solutions.  For example, when failure to report 
adverse events was simply conceptualised as a compliance failure, attempts were made to 
fix the problem by making reporting obligatory.  This was done using employment 
contracts, accreditation conditions or other regulatory instruments to “make” people report.  
Research has shown that such an approach has been singularly unsuccessful14.  
Conceptualising the problem differently opens up other possible ways of both analysing the 
problem and shaping the solution.  For example, the idea of a wicked problem spawned the 
concept of a “mess 15” or “social mess”.  Robert Horn of Stanford University developed a 
technique of Mess mapping and Resolution Mapping.16 to develop way to deal with these 
complex problems.  Other techniques such as dialogue mapping, which attempt to harness 
collective intelligence and reduce the forces of fragmentation might also offer some new 
and collaborative ways of working on these problems from multiple angles17.Perceiving the 
linked problems of Doctor Identity, identity threat and inaction on patient harm as a system 
of interrelated problems can open up other tools for working out potentially different ways 
to tackle its complexity. 																																																								
14  Levinson DR. Hospital incident reporting systems do not capture most patient harm. Department of 
Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, Report No. OEI-06-09-00091. January 
2012. 
15  The theorisation of “messes” was created and developed by Russell Ackoff from his first use of the 
term in 1974 in Ackoff R. Redesigning the Future. 1974 Wiley, New York: see mostly chapters 1 
and 2.  See also: Ackoff R. Systems Messes and Interactive planning. Chapter in Trist E. Murray H. 
Emery FE. The Social engagement of Social Science: A Tavistock Anthology Volume 3: The Socio-
Ecological Perspective. 1997 University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia (USA): pages 417-438. 
http://www.moderntimesworkplace.com/archives/ericsess/sessvol3/Ackoffp417.opd.pdf   
16  Horn’s concept of social mess extended Ackoff’s idea to systems of interrelated problems and other 
messes. He describes a methodology for resolving complex problems of this nature in the following: 
Horn RE. Weber RP. New tools for resolving wicked problems – Mess mapping and resolution 
mapping processes. 2007: accessed at 
http://www.strategykinetics.com//New_Tools_For_Resolving_Wicked_Problems.pdf on 29 October 
2016. 
17  Conklin J. Dialogue mapping: Building shared understanding of Wicked Problems. 2006 John Wiley 
& Sons, Chichester (UK).  For an introduction to the theory behind this method see Conkin J. 
Wicked Problems and Social Complexity, which is an extract from the book – available at 
http://cognexus.org/wpf/wickedproblems.pdf . 
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The next sections look at some of the problem and solution areas that are likely to need to 
be woven into an integrated systemic analysis of the kind discussed here.  Equally, some of 
these may provide ideas for some of the quality improvement short cycle Plan-Do-Study-
Act kinds of research.  Determining which methods would be best may also vary in 
different settings, different groups and different individuals.  Documenting and sharing the 
lessons is also important. 
 
1. Reflection, truth and empathy – are these virtues good for 
patients and good for doctors? 
The doctor-patient relationship has a deep ethical history in medicine18.  The Doctor 
Identity has traditionally been understood to have a strong relational element because of 
this heritage.  However, such relationships can be fractured administratively and otherwise 
in modern health care, through delivery of care in disconnected siloes and through the 
pressures placed on doctors to maximise throughput of patients.  Evidence of the 
breakdown of the relational part of doctoring is often shown through the “othering” of 
patients or expressed though the so-called hidden curriculum within health care, discussed 
in Chapter 5 and 6 above.  This is often exhibited through disrespectful comments about 
patients, ignoring the presence of the patient or family, not listening to what is said by the 
patient or family, and not talking to patients directly, but about them in their own presence.   
 
While some doctors naturally have greater relational capacity and emotional intelligence, 
these are also skills that can be learned.  If a doctor is able to communicate and empathise 
better and sees these skills as valuable and intrinsic to “being a good doctor”, then these 
skills form a foundation upon which to engage differently with patients both when things 
are going well and when they are not.  Relational trust develops and flourishes in the 
presence of mutual respect, truthfulness and empathy.  The principles espoused in 
restorative justice and relational theory may be useful in this context, and this form of 
																																																								
18  See eg, Pellegrino ED. Thomasma DC.  The virtues in medical practice. 1993 Oxford University 
Press, New York. See also Jonsen AR. A Short History of Medical Ethics, 2000 Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
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training could be used to assist doctors-in-training and in practice to develop these virtues, 
as part of their Continuing Professional Development. 
 
Processes which encourage empathy and relationship between doctors and patients are 
arguably at the core of the transformation of the Doctor Identity from one of impossible 
perfection of performance, to one where the patient and the doctor work together in 
humility and compassion towards the health goals that the patient is seeking.   
 
The introduction of reflective spaces and practices for doctors to reflect on their 
experiences, their feelings and their work, and to debrief about difficulties they are facing 
with specific patients in a way where new skills of compassion and empathy are taught is 
another idea.  Doctors may need to allow time in their day for reflection on both their own 
needs and on their patient’s outcomes.  They may also need to develop skills to work out 
how to collect appropriate information on unexpected patient outcomes.  Managers and 
trainers may need to ensure that doctors have available time in their day and the necessary 
skills to assist them to actually listen and understand their patients’ needs in an empathic 
manner.   
 
Part of changing the Doctor Identity should also involve refreshing the nature of what care 
means to patients, doctors and the health care system.  Such an approach might increase 
and recognise the value associated with spending time with a patient, listening to their 
concerns and considering their issues empathically.  A health care team could develop and 
share a common understanding of the priorities of care and act consistently and 
collaboratively to achieve this vision across the team at all levels.  The complexity of 
transforming individuals, teams and institutions in a way to build empathy and trust is 
significant, and likely to require a multi-pronged approach, akin to the discussion above on 
managing wicked problems or social messes. 
 
2. Doctors as whole, emotional beings – promoting resilience and 
well-being 
Another complex problem is poor mental health and professional burnout among doctors 
and medical students.  While the link is drawn in the thesis between these negative doctor 
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outcomes, patient harm and threat to identity, there are likely to be many other contributing 
causes to mental ill-health and professional burnout, which will need to form part of a 
package of solutions.  
 
Doctors often ignore their own health and emotional needs, and need to be taught skills of 
self-care.  They need to understand that self-care and patient safety are intertwined issues.  
Doctors, patients, health administrators, policy makers, the media, and others who transmit 
cultural stories about doctors are all actors in health care.  All need to have a realistic view 
of the human nature of doctors, their limitations and what is safe practice for all.  While 
there will always be occasions when any worker may be asked to act beyond the ordinary 
bounds of human performance in an emergency, a health system should not rely on such 
exceptional performance to meet basic health care needs.  Such a plan will ensure the 
continuation of unsafe practices, high risks to patients and a sense of failure in doctors, 
which adds to the risk of mental ill-health and burn-out. The concept of the heroic doctor 
who never sleeps, is always calm and kind, and performs miracles over endless shifts that 
permeates much of our community’s medical cultural mythology needs to be understood as 
a fiction.  The community must understand that doctors are human beings whose 
performance is affected in the same way as everyone else’s.  This may free doctors from 
such impossible standards and ensure patients and potential patients understand the 
limitations and risks associated with health care.  How this can be achieved requires a 
different way of looking at the problem, given its multi-faceted nature. 
 
As noted in the thesis many times, medical error and preventable patient harm can cause 
harm to both doctors and patients.  Where incidents of harm are badly managed, they can 
result in trauma to both doctors and patients from that process, and in a significant 
breakdown of trust and relationship.  This can have a long term effect on the patient, who 
may no longer feel safe using the services of a specific doctor or institution, or indeed, any 
doctor or health service.  This can result in someone who has been harmed once delaying 
presentation for health care or losing trust in the advice provided, which can have a 
negative long term impact on health.  It can also have a long-term effect on the doctor – 
Chapters 4 and 5 discuss in some detail the psychological trauma for doctors and the health 
care team associated with patient harm, when there are no processes to help the individuals 
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to acknowledge, discuss and recover from their part in the harm.  Too often the processes 
currently in place are insensitive to the threat caused to the doctor, and can be both blaming 
and shaming, and even humiliating.  Each of these emotional responses bring further 
trauma.   
 
With the cycle of trauma that arises from unhealed trauma, this can lead to poor team 
relations, anger and irritability; personal health issues such as trouble sleeping, 
hypervigilance; and a loss of professional confidence and peer isolation.  Processes for 
dealing with adverse events, errors, and incidents of preventable harm need to be managed 
in a way which is respectful of patients and doctors, which acknowledges harm done and 
the anguish suffered and which is constructively focussed towards repairing relationships. 
Such restorative processes need to be focussed squarely on ethical duties of doctor to 
patient, rather than on saving money for the institution by “hiding” or obfuscating an 
unexpected outcome. 
 
Active strategies to avoid trauma and training that addresses trauma healing and resilience, 
like the Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience19 training, that was developed by 
the Eastern Mennonite University, could be shaped to focus on the shared traumas of doctor 
and patient arising from patient harm and disrespectful care. It is known that the impact of 
trauma seldom “goes away” of its own accord, and that active strategies to address the 
legacy are needed to allow healing. 
 
This is another example where it is likely that effective resolution of the problems relating 
to the well-being of doctors, especially in relation to preventable patient harm, and the harm 
done to patients may be best seen as inter-related problems, with a wicked problem lens.  
This may provide a way of minimising future harm to both doctors and patients as well as 
healing past trauma. 
 
																																																								
19  Yoder CE. Barge EZ. STAR Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience -The Unfolding Story 
2001-2011.  This is available as an E-book at http://emu.edu/cjp/star/sept-11th-commemorative-
book/download/star-the-unfolding-story.pdf , accessed 31 October 2016. 
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D. Bringing medical error and preventable patient harm to 
attention 
1. Counting and reflection– engaging the scientist within 
It is often stated as a maxim that ‘unless something is counted it doesn’t count’, and health 
care is particularly poor at collecting and using data on patient harm.  The lack of success 
of this may well be linked to the perception of threat to identity caused by the attribution of 
harm to their care, with the potential tumultuous cascade of patient and family distress, 
professional shaming and even disciplinary action.  Discussions with doctors will often see 
them distinguishing between “unexpected outcomes” and “adverse events”.  In most cases, 
from a patient and family’s perspective, an unexpected outcome is an adverse event., the 
more so, if the patient and family were not informed beforehand of the possibility of this 
outcome.   
 
Nevertheless, there is a possibility that a shift of language may assist a change in practice if 
it does not give rise to the same threat.  Doctors could be asked to collect information on 
unexpected patient outcomes, rather than harm or adverse events, and this could allow the 
collection of this information in a less identity threatening manner.  In addition, patients 
could be asked to identify and record their own unexpected patient outcomes as a way of 
cross-checking and avoiding the effects of inattentional blindness, discussed in Chapter 3.  
Clearly, a less threatening context will also depend upon the use made of the data.  If 
doctors and patients saw this as their shared information collected to improve their care and 
that of others, this may help engage the scientists within both parties.  If they were then 
able to have a respectful open discussion when an unexpected outcome occurred, this could 
assist in a culture transition.  Systematic collection of information on patient outcomes 
(whether expected or unexpected) allows a more informed and evidence-based discussion 
to occur. 
 
It is widely recognised in systems engineering, that until it is known what is going wrong, it 
is very difficult to fix a problem.  However, there are often few systems to record where an 
unexpected outcome occurs or to easily match up what was the expected outcome to see if 
there was a difference.  For more than a century, doctors have stated that the measurement 
of patient outcomes is the only way to determine if health care is really delivering on its 
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social purpose to alleviate suffering.  The recording of patient outcomes should be an 
ordinary part of the fulfilment of a doctor’s ethical and professional duties to patients.  
Hospitals should have readily accessible data on this through their medical records.  To 
determine if each incident of care was effective, specific information that is often not 
recorded should be recorded.  Such information should set out: 
• what was the patient’s concern;  
• what was the doctor’s tentative diagnosis before testing; 
• what the tests (if any) showed; 
• what treatment was recommended; 
• what was the outcome of the treatment; 
• whether there were any unexpected outcomes; and  
• how the patient progressed over various periods (depending upon the nature of the 
diagnosis and treatment). 
 
These were the basic measures set out by Codman20 in his work on patient outcomes a 
century ago, and there is still little systematic collection of this data throughout health care.  
Where outcome data is rigorously collected, for example, in some specialty collections like 
the Australian Orthopaedic Association’s National Joint Replacement Registry21 and 
various sub-specialty collections such as the Australian and New Zealand Neonatal 
Network22, this data allows the rapid expansion of knowledge and speedy detection of 
causes and contributing factors to unexpected patient outcomes. 
																																																								
20  Codman developed an “End Result” system, looking systematically at patient outcomes, mishaps and 
mistakes, He resigned from his full-time medical position at Massachusetts General Hospital in 
1911, he implemented the system in his own hospital, then published his data. Codman EA. A Study 
in Hospital Efficiency. Reprinted by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO). 1996 JCAHO Press, Oakbrook Terrace (USA). For a short history of 
Codman’s pioneering efforts, see Neuhauser D. Ernest Armory Codman MD  2002 Quality and 
Safety in Health Care, volume 11, pages 104-105. 
21  The Registry has a high participation rate among orthopaedic surgeons, and produces publicly 
available report on an annual basis.  There are also specific reports for consumers.  It is funded 
entirely by the Commonwealth Department of Health.  All these are available on the Registry 
website: https://aoanjrr.sahmri.com/  
22  The Network collects data from all level III neonatal intensive care units and a number of Level II 
special care units.  It has done so since 1995 and issues public reports on the data on an annual basis.  
The most recent published report is: Chow SSW. Le Marsney R. Haslam R. Lui K. Report of the 
Australian and New Zealand Neonatal Network (ANZNN) 2014. 2016 ANZNN, Sydney: accessed at 
http://www.anznn.net/Portals/0/AnnualReports/Report%20of%20the%20Australian%20and%20New
%20Zealand%20Neonatal%20Network%202014.pdf . on 31 October 2016. 
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Similarly, the IHI Trigger Tool23 and the Advanced Incident Monitoring System24 
developed by the Australian Patient Safety Foundation (APSF), while apparently well 
documented for detecting and analysing adverse events, have had limited infiltration in 
Australia.  The IHI Trigger tool methodology is claimed to detect many more adverse 
events than are picked up by conventional incident reporting systems.  The original APSF 
AIMS incident monitoring system also allowed the inclusion of many other variables in the 
reporting of adverse events, so that a much richer analysis for prevention could be 
undertaken.  Many Australian jurisdictions opted for a financial risk management focussed 
system, which did not collect sufficient information on incidents to facilitate their 
prevention.  The APSF and other systems also suffered from significant delays in reporting 
of data and analysis.  If real progress is to be made in understanding why unexpected 
patient outcomes occur, then resources must be available to allow data analysis and 
dissemination, not just collection. 
 
Some elements of the Doctor Identity, such as doctor focus on high achievement, the 
scientist within and the ethical doctor, provide positive counterbalances to the possible 
identity threat seen in the collection of such data.  For example, if doctors can see that there 
is a “competitive edge” to be gained by measuring unexpected patient outcomes or a 
professional requirement to do so, they may well be happier to be engaged25.  Rather than 
data being seen as part of a “policing strategy”, data collection could then be seen as a way 																																																								
23  Griffin FA. Resar RK. IHI Global Trigger Tool for Measuring Adverse Events. IHI Innovation Series 
white paper. 2nd Edition 2009 Institute for Healthcare Improvement, Cambridge (Massachusetts).  
The Trigger Tool is also explained on the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s website: 
http://www.ihi.org/resources/pages/tools/ihiglobaltriggertoolformeasuringaes.aspx . 
24  https://www.apsf.net.au/About_Us.html.The incident monitoring work of the APSF was first funded 
under the work of the Professional Indemnity Review and was piloted in a number of specialties.  
One of the Colleges – the Australasian College of Emergency Medicine continues to use this as do a 
number of other organisations, including the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of 
Radiologists.  The work across specialties was documented in the Professional Indemnity Review’s 
Final Report: Review of Professional Indemnity Arrangements for Health Care Professional. 
Compensation and Professional Indemnity in Health Care – Final Report. November 1995 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra: paragraphs 5.86-5.174.  The APSF has also 
used its expertise internationally through the World Health Organisation’s Patient Safety Project to 
develop an International Classification for Patient Safety: see 
http://www.who.int/patientsafety/implementation/taxonomy/en/. 
25  Atul Gawande’s 2004 article from the New Yorker showed how reporting of the best outcomes led to 
competitive improvements.  Gawande A. The Bell Curve. 2004 The New Yorker 6 December: 
accessed at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/12/06/the-bell-curve on 31 October 2016. 
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of exhibiting a positive competitive edge, as part of their scientific endeavour and/or as part 
of their ethical obligations to their patients.  Subspecialties or disease groups have 
historically picked up data collection as part of their mission or as a challenge, and this data 
has been very important in the improvement of outcomes for patients, as discussed above.  
They have often used patient outcome monitoring to look at individuals or teams that had 
excellent outcomes to see why they were better than others26.   
 
Methods of general patient outcome measurement could be developed and taught by 
Medical Colleges, Universities or clinical excellence or standards bodies, to help doctors 
learn effective ways to monitor and reflect on their own performance.  The idea of data 
collection on patient outcomes as an ethical or professional obligation could be introduced 
through the regulatory power of the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency.  At 
the institutional level, this could also be a professional requirement of individual doctors to 
gain visiting rights.  Over time, this professional data collection would also provide a 
potential resource for more evidence-based credentialing processes in hospitals.  The data 
could also be used to determine the appropriate clinical privileges that specific doctors 
should exercise.  There is also the possibility of hospital fostering of such data collection 
through a compulsory requirement of facility accreditation under the Australian 
Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care. 
 
2. A modified systems approach – a key to understanding, not 
avoidance 
Part of the current discourse on patient safety was to talk about “systems, not people”, 
whereas in most of health care, the systems are to a large extent made up of and by people.  
Health care is made up of the attitudes, beliefs, values and practices of individuals working 
together in administrative and physical systems, which are also designed and overseen by 
other people.  Therefore, an explanation which sees patient safety as a “system” issue, not a 
“people” issue, does not give the best message.  To achieve change in a health system, 
people have to believe that they have individual and group agency and efficacy.  
 
																																																								
26  See Neonatal Network example at note 22. 
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They also have to properly understand a problem.  An example, is where a patient is not 
changing a wound dressing as required.  The doctor may see the person as wilfully 
disobeying an instruction and be angry or dismissive of them.  In reality, the patient is 
having trouble dressing the wound because he can’t bend over and lives alone and has no-
one to assist, or he cannot afford to buy dressings as often as needed.  If the patient feels 
safe enough to tell the doctor why they are not dressing the wound, the doctor then can look 
at other ways to assist the patient.  A similar open and empathic investigation is needed to 
understand why patient harm has occurred or why someone made an error or did an action 
which resulted in harm.  Root-cause analysis was designed as just such a tool, but often 
poor implementation and inadequate training about the mechanism has resulted in a 
continuation of the blame culture or a failure to follow-up on actions to address underlying 
“system pathogens”. 
 
It is important to consider the identity implications for doctors and others to avoid “systems 
approaches” being used as an excuse for inaction.  Such inaction misunderstands the 
reasons to look at systems.  One way of stopping this, at the same time as promoting a 
restorative culture around preventable harm, is to use the mechanism sometimes discussed 
in the corporate responsibility arena of “reactive fault”27.  Where a person does harm which 
is not caused by prohibited conduct (like coming to work alcohol or drug affected), then if 
they are honest about it and engage in development of a response to avoid a recurrence, 
then no disciplinary action would be taken.  If, however, they do not act on 
recommendations to ameliorate or make reparation for the harm done, then this second 
failure may be seen as a disciplinary offence.  This supports positive action and an open 
culture, but it makes failure to act on a known problem the grounds for action.  This may be 
argued to be closer to Reason’s “just culture” or to a restorative justice approach to health 
care harm identification and reduction. 
 
																																																								
27  This concept was spelled out in the work of Brent Fisse.  See Fisse B. Reconstructing corporate 
criminal law: Deterrence, retribution, fault and sanctions 1983 Southern California Law Review, 
volume 56, pages 1141- 1246: at pages 1183-1213.  Fisse places “reactive fault” in the location of 
“corporate fault”.  However, as a concept, it could be used to apply to both individuals and 
corporations to foster desired actions to prevent repeated harm in the future. 
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3. Consumer engagement – the view through another lens 
The better engagement of patients and consumers in health care governance, design and 
management provides a range of solutions to patient safety, which otherwise can be limited 
through the application of only a medical “lens”.  Patients often see the events around either 
an instance of harm or an unexpected patient outcome quite differently from the doctor or 
other health care team members.  Equally, when doctors are considering patient safety 
issues that relate to unrealistic self-perception, for example, decisions about long shifts, 
sometimes the presence of a patient or a consumer representative can remind doctors that 
they are subject to normal human limitations.  Where doctors and administrators are 
making financial decisions that impact on patient care, patients can often also ask questions 
about the effect on patient care and draw attention to the experience or priorities of service 
users.  While doctors sometimes argue that they too have been patients or their family 
members have been patients, this may or may not have helped them to see themselves, their 
colleagues of their services with a different lens.   
 
Often where a doctor has had such an experience and moved their “gaze” from the medical 
professional to the patient, carer or consumer “gaze”, it can profoundly change their 
approach to medicine and their understanding from the consumer’s end of the transaction.  
In addition to the examples provided in Chapter 6, another more recent example of a doctor 
who has been through such a process is Dr Robin Youngson, a New Zealand anaesthetist.  
His daughter was seriously injured in a car accident and while he believed she had great 
technical care which led to her full recovery, he and his wife saw that the lack of empathy, 
compassion and humanity in her care as deeply disturbing.  This led the couple to start an 
organisation called Hearts In Healthcare whose worldwide mission is to re-humanise health 
care28. 
 
Consumers not only provide a different perspective and lens in health care, but equally 
importantly, they are able to bring a degree of external scrutiny.  Where consumers are 
properly trained for the role, they can oversee and ensure greater accountability for 
decisions made across health systems.  Their different lens also allows them to reflect the 
public or community interest, rather than the sectional interests of the various professions 																																																								
28  The website for the movement is at http://heartsinhealthcare.com/ . 
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or the bureaucracy.  This is a different task from the consumer lens function in individual 
service design and delivery, but nonetheless, it is an important part of producing a more 
patient-centred culture and focus to health care.  This is very important in a transition to a 
just culture in relation to patient harm.  Consumers can provide some level of assurance that 
decisions are not simply being made to protect the hospital’s financial interests, rather than 
to ensure appropriate outcomes for patients. 
 
E. Training for compassion, empathy and humility – the test for 
effective medical education 
As discussed in chapter 5, there has, for a long time, been a focus in medical training on the 
technical aspects of medicine, often to the exclusion of other important skills.  There is a 
growing focus on compassion in health care, and an expanding evidence base to show that 
an empathic doctor creates a positive space for the patient to recover and heal.  However, 
many doctors and medical educators still think of these skills as “soft skills”, despite the 
evidence set out in Chapter 3 that empathy has a proved therapeutic effect29.  This reference 
is often used to contrast with the real “hard skills” of medicine.  Yet from the perspective of 
this thesis and from most patients, it is crucial to ensure that these so-called soft skills are 
embedded in the understanding of what it is to be a good doctor.  Some skills, like humility, 
and the capacity to value the skills of others – whether patients, family or other health 
professionals – also help to shape the whole experience of patients in health care.  They 
may also reduce the likelihood of errors and harm which flow from not listening to others.  
They may also reduce the power gradient, which means all team members (including the 
patient and their family) are heard respectfully. 
 
At the deepest level, the practice of many of these skills should become small parts of every 
action and interaction day-by-day in the doctor-patient relationship.  However, the 
psychological literature discussed earlier in the thesis shows that when someone is tired or 
stressed by pressure of work or other emotional stressors (like the death of a patient), they 
																																																								
29  For hypotheses on why patients get better faster and more often with empathic care, see Decety J. 
Fotopoulou A. Why empathy has a beneficial impact on others in medicine: unifying theories. 2015 
Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience, January, volume 8, article 457, pages 1-11. 
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may not be in a good position to exercise these skills.  If the goal of being a good doctor 
was no longer achieving perfect emotional regulation, doctors would need to be able to 
recognise the existence of these physiological effects on their own psychological 
equilibrium to act appropriately.  Once they are self-aware, doctors can then consider the 
likely human impact of their own fatigue and stress on their team members and on their 
patients and family.  At another level of empathy, doctors may begin to understand the 
effects of stress and fatigue on the behaviours of other team members and patients.  This 
empathic understanding helps to foster and sustain positive team and doctor-patient 
relationships. 
 
It is not sufficient to embed these values in the training of young doctors and medical 
students, where they are entering a professional world that has its own sense of the Doctor 
Identity, based on an outdated and unrealistic model of a “good doctor”.  As noted earlier in 
the thesis, both individual and collective identities can be difficult to change, especially 
when many of the attributes are unspoken.  As such they exist as part of a collective 
misguided but powerful dream.   
 
Because of the power of modelled behaviour on young doctors, there is strong evidence 
that it is necessary to change the behaviour of doctors who are already practicing.  They 
will need to be educated about the dangers embedded in mistaken views about the 
achievement of consistent perfect performance.  Many may also need an understanding of 
normal human emotions and physical conditions (like fatigue) that effect performance and 
can give rise to vulnerability.  Work has already been done on part of this, through the 
University of Sydney’s work for the Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health 
Care30 and the WHO as part of their 2009 and 2011 Patient Safety Curriculum Guides31.  																																																								
30  The forerunner of the WHO work was the National Patient Safety Education Framework, produced 
for the Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) by the Centre for 
Innovation in Professional Health Education at the University of Sydney, under the leadership of 
Associate Professor Merrilyn Walton and Dr Tim Shaw: ACSQHC. National Patient Safety 
Education Framework. July 2005: available at https://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/National-Patient-Safety-Education-Framework-2005.pdf on 31 October 
2016. 
31  The World Health Organisation (WHO) first released a Medical School Curriculum Guide in 2009 
and then a Multi-professional version in 2011: World Health Organisation (WHO). WHO Patient 
Safety Curriculum Guide for Medical Schools. 2009 WHO, Geneva; World Health Organisation 
(WHO). Patient Safety Curriculum Guide. Multi-professional Edition. 2011 WHO, Geneva. 
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However, these are unlikely to be sufficient, on their own, to bring about a paradigm shift 
because of the barriers arising from the Doctor Identity, and because of the complex 
interactions with the mores and behaviours of established doctors. 
 
The skills associated with “humanising healthcare” are diverse, and the knowledge of the 
neuroscientific basis of many doctor responses to the threat to identity posed by patient 
harm not widely known.  All of these need to be built into Continuing Professional 
Development, through bodies like Medical Colleges.  There may also be a role for 
regulators, such as the Australian Medical Council, the Australian Health Practitioner 
Regulation Agency and the Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care.  
They could develop requirements that people were able to demonstrate this knowledge and 
provide practical examples of how this was enacted in their practices.  Some of this might 
be as simple as doctors seeking feedback from patients about their experience as a patient, 
where these kinds of characteristics and skills are identified in the survey as desirable 
attributes and explained in lay language.  These could also help patients and doctors have 
conversations that can create stronger relationships.   
 
Health care now is sometimes not being provided in the context of a long term relationship 
between a single doctor and patient, but rather through a practice or practices where 
multiple doctors may be seen by the one patient over time.  In these more complicated 
group relationships, it would also be important that training and skills be provided to all 
people working in the treating teams and environments.  The culture of the practice, the 
service or the facility will then carry these same messages and exhibit the same concerns.  
This then supports a different and more appropriate practice group identity for both patients 
and doctors.  Where this is a positive one for patients, it may encourage greater loyalty to a 
particular practice, though with long waiting times for appointments, clinical need can 
sometimes override a sense of loyalty.  New safe models of quality care need to be 
developed in this changing environment. 
 
The skill and practice of compassion, empathy, humility and reflection can become 
embedded in every day practice, but it can take time in the day.  In modern health care, 
being a good doctor can also be associated with getting through vast quantities of work, to 
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service the financial needs of the hospital or even the doctor’s own financial commitments. 
This can result in a measure of worth that ignores both the humanity of the doctor and the 
needs of the patient and family.  A true redirection of the moral compass of health to 
support compassion, empathy, humility and reflection requires the provision of time and 
places as part of everyday work to imagine and enact these values.  This requires health 
systems to reallocate priorities so that care, respect, compassion and humility can flourish.  
It also requires a true commitment to the health and welfare of its own staff, as well as 
patients.   
 
F. Engaging doctors as change leaders – engaging motivation 
and ability 
Many of the desirable aspects of the refined Doctor Identity which are likely to produce a 
sense of identity which has fewer of the negative impacts on patients and doctors in the 
patient safety area are present in the new and emerging curricula of Medical Colleges and 
the requirements of regulatory authorities32.  While these vary, most include requirements 
about communication, collaboration and leadership, and are framed in similar terms to the 
CanMEDS Physician Competency Framework33. This defines leadership in the following 
manner: 
As Leaders, physicians engage with others to contribute to a vision of a high-quality 
health care system and take responsibility for the delivery of excellent patient care 
through their activities as clinicians, administrators, scholars, or teachers. 
 
Many of these competencies set out in these frameworks have the potential to reduce some 
of the problems associated with “perfect performance” models, so that doctor in specialist 																																																								
32  See eg, the Postgraduate Medical Education Councils of Australia. Australian Curriculum 
Framework for Junior Doctors, which includes 3 learning areas: Clinical Management, 
Professionalism and Communication.  Professionalism includes the competency of self care and 
Doctors as leaders under Professional behaviour, and respect, breaking bad news and open disclosure 
in the patient interactions competency, and working in teams under Communication. 
http://www.cpmec.org.au/ACF-2010/structure.cfm  The curriculum of the Royal Australasian 
College of Physicians is currently being revised and it has 10 competencies for Basic Adult training, 
including Leadership, management and Teamwork, Communication and Quality and Safety. 
https://www.racp.edu.au/trainees/curricula/AIMBasicTrainingCurriculum/basic-training-
competencies  
33  This was revised in 2015 http://www.royalcollege.ca/rcsite/canmeds-e .  It has fewer roles than the 
Royal Australasian College of Physicians one above (7), but includes Communicator, Collaborator 
and Leader. 
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training and their trainers each learn about their own vulnerabilities.  Equally, they provide 
opportunities to embed some parts of the compassionate healer model in both College 
training specialists and their trainees.  However, these are still new, and their ability to 
enhance change requires their adoption by more senior staff as well as the shaping of new 
doctors.  While the clear statement of such competencies can foster change, they are likely 
to take some time to filter into everyday practice.   
 
However, if experienced doctors begin to see the benefits to themselves that arise from this 
shift, the speed of change may well be accelerated.  It is recognised in the research set out 
in Chapter 2 that the support of doctors is not sufficient to achieve transformation of 
practice or culture, but that their opposition can easily stymie such change.  Therefore, it 
will be important to inform and engage senior as well as junior doctors in leading efforts to 
change.  Ackoff34 suggests a collaborative process called idealised design for complex 
transformation, on the basis that  
Improvement of an existing condition or state requires a clear vision of what is 
wanted, not a clear vision of what is not wanted. 
 
Albert Bandura’s theories of self-efficacy35 and moral agency36. are both relevant to the 
production of change in the areas raised in this thesis and provide an alternative 
methodology for change.  Doctors, as leaders, need to feel they are capable of achieving 
change, and they need to feel that they are acting consistently with their sense of moral 
agency37.  Bandura’s theories have been used to develop mechanisms for broad scale social 
change38.  The book, Influencer examined examples of broad scale change, and saw that to 
achieve these changes, it was necessary to affect the majority of 6 different areas of 																																																								
34  Ackoff R. Rovin S. Redesigning society. 2003 Stanford University Press, Stanford (California, 
USA): see page 2 and Chapter 1 for the method description. 
35  Bandura A. Self efficacy mechanism in human agency. 1982 American  Psychologist, February, 
volume 37(2), pages 122-147. 
36  Bandura A. Social cognitive theory of moral thought and action. Chapter in Kurtines WM, Gerwits 
JL. (editors) Handbook of moral behaviour and development., volume 1, 1991 Erlbaum, Hillsdale 
(New Jersey, USA), pages 45-103.   
37  As noted in chapter 6, social structures (like hospitals or professions) can seek to impeded the 
exercise of moral agency, and these barriers to action must also be addressed. Macintyre A. Social 
structures and their threats to moral agency.  1999 Philosophy, volume 74, pages 311-329. 
38   Patterson K. Grenny J. Maxfield D. McMillan R. Switzler A. Influencer – the power to change 
anything. 2008 McGraw-Hill, New York. 
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influence.  The two domains of influence the authors describe are motivation and ability, 
while the three sources of influence are personal. social and structural39.   
• Personal motivation – creating new experiences and new motivations; 
• Personal ability – helping people gain and practice skills including emotional skills; 
• Social motivation – harnessing peer pressure; 
• Social ability – building social capital 
• Structural motivation – designing the right rewards, ensuring accountability 
• Structural ability –  modifying the environment to make doing the right thing easy. 
They argue that the three sources of influence are supported respectively by psychology, 
social psychology and organisational theory, as academic bodies of work, and that all these 
six sources of influence are needed to tackle most complex problems. 
 
The first step in their change program is to identify behaviours, and then distinguish those 
which they describe as “vital behaviors”40.  These are the behaviours that distinguish high 
performers from low performers, and generally give rise to “a cascade of change”.  They 
also suggest searching for “recovery” behaviours which are those that help change get back 
on track rather than give up the change effort.  Behaviours describe an action not an 
outcome.  Once these have been identified, then they suggest trialling a range of possible 
behaviours and measuring which ones appear to work best in the specific environment – 
called testing for positive deviance - and then test again41. In essence, this is a Plan-Do-
Study-Act research cycle. 
 
They assert that behind each vital behaviour are the 6 areas of influence noted above.  
Stories and moral engagement are powerful influencing strategies for motivations 
(especially in health care where doctors and other normally have an intrinsic motivation to 
help people).  Another strategy to influence motivation and overcome reluctance to try 
something new is to create new experiences that are fun. 
 
																																																								
39  Patterson et al. 2008 – see note 38 - Part 2 at Chapters 4-9.  Chapter 10 describes how to the 
influencers together to achieve change.  
40  Patterson et al. 2008 – see note 38: chapter 2. 
41  Patterson et al. 2008 – see note 38: pages 35-41. 
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Setting out the whole methodology and applying it to the issue of doctor behaviour in 
relation to error and safety identified in this thesis, is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Nonetheless, it seems a research strategy worth exploring.  Two of the initiatives analysed 
in Influencer are in the health care arena: the 100,000 lives campaign and the subsequent 5 
million lives campaigns initiated by Dr Don Berwick and the team at the Institute of 
Healthcare Improvement.  This methodology may provide options for engaging doctors 
actively to address a problem, which when conceptualised, is one where the solutions are 
likely to benefit them as well as patients.  This could harness the leadership in the medical 
profession and individual doctors to enact parts of the changes necessary.  One of the 
elements discussed in the literature on Wicked Problems and social messes is that it is only 
through engagement of all stakeholders that change will be possible.  Without a 
participatory model to actually describe fully the complexity, Ackoff noted in 1974 that a 
less inclusive process, which tries to break down complex problems into discrete analytical 
spaces “not only usually fails to solve the individual problems that are involved, but often 
intensifies the mess.  The solution to a mess can seldom be obtained by independently 
solving each of the problems of which it is composed.”42  This is a view shared in 
Influencer as well.  
 
G. Conclusions 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the findings of this thesis are set out in three hypotheses 
centred around the relationship between patient harm, the Doctor identity and the threat to 
identity caused by the possibility or actuality of patient harm.  If these hypotheses are 
correct, the explanation is not only consistent with the evidence across a range of 
disciplines, but offers the possibility for new and perhaps more effective action to reduce 
the harm to patients and well as to improve the lives of doctors.  It may also provide 
support for better team based care and more compassionate and humane health care.  In 
some cases, there is a sense of intuitive accuracy with the issues described, for example, the 
impact of fatigue of both doctors and patients and the need for better data on unexpected 
patient outcomes to design effective safety strategies.  In other cases, the thesis posits 
																																																								
42  Ackoff R. 1997 – see note 15, at page 428. 
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relationships which appear to be worth exploring in further research, for example, to 
explore ways of increasing doctor awareness of their own psychological functioning, to 
explore means of influencing the formation and maintenance of the Doctor Identity towards 
more realistic and healthful self-perceptions; to explore means of decreasing shaming and 
humiliation as tools in medical training and management; and to develop more restorative 
and constructive processes to manage unexpected patient outcomes and medical errors. 
 
Determining whether these hypotheses are a reasonable alternative or supplementary 
explanation to understand why action to address patient safety issues overall has been very 
slow, is an important public policy issue.  This is because, even at the most modest 
estimates, the human and financial costs of preventable patient harm is very significant, not 
just in Australia but throughout the world.  If the modest WHO average figure of 10% of 
admissions involving an adverse event is taken as a likely minimum, there are currently 
more than 600,000 people in Australia annually who suffer preventable harm in public 
hospitals alone43.  While most of the incidents of harm to patients result only in temporary 
disabilities or the need for extra treatment, in some cases people die or suffer significant 
permanent disabilities.  Using the Quality in Australian Health Care study data and 2014-15 
hospital separation data, this would involve around 29,000 lives shortened by their health 
care and more than 81,000 people with some degree of permanent disability.44  This is not 
satisfactory or acceptable – it describes a harm tolerant system, with significant risks, rather 
than the purported high-quality health system propounded by Governments and expected 
by the community. 
 
Action was needed two decades ago when the data from the 1995 Quality in Australian 
Health Care Study was first known and treated by the then Federal Health Minister as a 
																																																								
43  This estimate applies the 10% harm rate of the WHO to the Australian hospital statistics for 2014-15.  
This is a modest estimate using the number of hospitalisations of public acute hospitals only -just 
under 6 million hospitalisations.  The total number of hospitalisations across all kinds of hospitals 
was over 10 million, giving an upper range of 1 million adverse events using the WHO estimate. 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) Australia’s hospitals 2014-15 at a glance. Health 
services series no. 70. July 2016 AIHW, Canberra. 
44  These estimates use the modest public acute adverse event estimate from note 43, and apply the 
proportions of different consequences of adverse events identified in the Quality in Australian Health 
Care study referenced in Table 1.2 in Chapter 1 of 13.6% of adverse events resulting in permanent 
disability and 4.9% resulting in death. 
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matter of public importance.  While efforts have progressed in modest ways, there has not 
been the kind of quantum leap that many expected once the issue of preventable patient 
harm was documented in detail.  It is hoped that this thesis may provide a new 
understanding about why the issue has been so intractable, and to provide some new 
insights to support different action that could lead to greater progress over the next two 
decades.   
 
In addition, this thesis provides insights to reduce the harm also being done to providers of 
health care, in particular, doctors.  Doctors suffer from their own impossible desire for 
consistently perfect performance and from their own unrealistic expectations of their 
cognitive and physical performance under stress, fatigue and trauma.  A more humble 
understanding by doctors of their own human limitations and vulnerabilities, is not 
however, enough.  The health system and the community must recognise and act upon 
doctors’ unmet need for support.  Administrative arrangements and practices in hospitals 
and other places where health care is delivered must recognise the human physical and 
emotional needs of doctors and seek to meet them to reduce the high rates of mental ill-
health and burnout, suffered by doctors and discussed in this thesis.   
 
In my experience, doctors would like a health system which allowed them to be the most 
compassionate and empathic carers that they can be.  Patients would like to have empathic 
care from doctors, who listen to them and who they trust and believe are working to keep 
them as safe as possible when they are vulnerable.  The hypotheses put forward in this 
thesis require attention to the threat to the Doctor Identity which is currently intrinsic to the 
occurrence of medical error and patient harm.  Changes which honour both doctors and 
patients, must acknowledge and address this impediment to patient safety progress, to 
achieve the shared dream of safe, humane and empathic health care within a reasonable 
time. 
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